State v. Alonso

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

EMILIANO TRUJILLO ALONSO, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 24-0323
FILED 07-31-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2022-139169-001
The Honorable Suzanne E. Cohen, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Damon A. Rossi
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Madeline Shupe
Counsel for Appellee
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s decision, in
which Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Emiliano Trujillo Alonso appeals his convictions
and sentences for two counts of child molestation, three counts of sexual
abuse, and two counts of sexual conduct with a minor. For the following
reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2011, a family friend reported to police Alonso had sexually
abused her. No charges were brought against Alonso at the time. In 2022,
two of Alonso’s daughters reported to police they too were sexually abused
years earlier. Police investigated, and the State ultimately charged Alonso
with seven felonies involving the three victims.

¶3 Before trial, the State moved in limine to preclude opinion
testimony regarding the victims’ credibility, including “the percentage or
frequency of false allegations” in sexual abuse cases. Alonso did not object
but also asked the trial court for “reciprocal consideration” by precluding
opinion testimony as to his credibility. After oral argument, the court’s
resulting minute entry granted the State’s motion but was silent as to
Alonso’s request. A review of the oral argument transcript, however, makes
clear the court only expressly ordered the preclusion of testimony
regarding false allegations.

¶4 At trial, the jury heard testimony from the three victims, the
lead detective, two police officers, one daughter’s high school teacher, an
expert on the process of victimization, and the forensic nurse practitioner
who completed a physical evaluation of the family friend. As part of the
detective’s testimony, he read aloud to the jury 103 pages of his
interrogation of Alonso. Prior to the detective’s testimony, Alonso asked
the trial court to strike the following few lines from the transcript as
improper opinion evidence:

[Detective]: I-I kn—I kn—I know when someone isn’t telling
me the truth.

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[Alonso]: Uh-huh.

[Detective]: You’re not tell-telling me the truth right now. But-
but I know that you remembered what’s happened.

[Alonso]: Mm.

...

[Detective]: Yeah. Tell me one time. What happened. One
time. I don’t think they’re ly-lying. I don’t.

[Alonso]: No, and like I said, I-I—honestly, I—I us-used to use
[marijuana] and I don’t remember.

¶5 The trial court denied Alonso’s request reasoning that the
lines were not testimony, but rather “an interview in which the police
officers [were] legally allowed to lie.” The court told Alonso, however, it
would consider providing a jury instruction “to talk about what the
detective sa[id] in the interview” if Alonso wished to draft one. He drafted
two. The court combined the two into a single instruction as follows:

Detective []’s questions and/or statements to [Alonso] in his
interview (Exhibit 22) are not testimony and should not be
considered by you for any purpose other than to give
meaning to [Alonso’s] answers. You should not consider any
opinion he gave during this interview about [Alonso’s]
believability.

¶6 The jury convicted Alonso as charged. The trial court
sentenced Alonso to varying terms of imprisonment on each count, with
the longest term being life imprisonment with the possibility of release after
35 years. Alonso timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article 6,
Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1),
13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Alonso argues the trial court erred in allowing the detective
to read his interrogation statements that (1) he knew when someone wasn’t
telling him the truth, (2) Alonso wasn’t telling him the truth, and (3) his
belief the victims weren’t lying. Those statements, Alonso contends,

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constituted opinion evidence that Alonso “lacked honesty” and “vouched
for [the victims’] honesty,” entitling Alonso to a new trial.

¶8 We review a trial court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Gentry, 247 Ariz. 381, 385, ¶ 14 (App. 2019). Because
Alonso raised his objection in the trial court, we review for harmless error,
“which places the burden on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict or sentence.” State
v. Strong, 258 Ariz. 184, 200, ¶ 45 (2024) (internal quotations and citation
omitted).

¶9 Arizona prohibits opinion testimony from one witness
concerning the truthfulness of a statement by another witness. State v.
Boggs, 218 Ariz. 325, 335, ¶ 39 (2008). Instead, “[d]etermining veracity and
credibility lies within the province of the jury, and opinions about witness
credibility are ‘nothing more than advice to jurors on how to decide the
case.’” Id. (quoting State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 383 (1986)). But our
supreme court has instructed that, on a limited basis, a detective’s
accusations about a defendant’s untruthfulness may be admitted where the
accusations “were part of an interrogation technique and were not made
for the purpose of giving opinion testimony at trial.” Id. at ¶ 40. Such limited
admissibility generally hinges upon a detective’s comments providing “a
necessary context for the defendant’s responses . . . especially when a
suspect’s story shifts and changes.’” Id. at ¶ 41 (quoting Lanham v.
Commonwealth, 171 S.W.3d 14, 27 (Ky. 2005)); see also State v. Cordova, 51 P.3d
449, 455 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002) (allowing such statements by an interrogator
“to the extent that they provide context to a relevant answer by the
suspect”); Dubria v. Smith, 224 F.3d 995, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding
an officer’s statements simply gave context to the defendant’s statements).

¶10 The State maintains the detective’s statements were made “as
part of an interrogation technique to elicit statements from Alonso.” Be that
as it may, nothing about the detective’s statements provided any
meaningful context to Alonso’s answers. Alonso’s responses of “Uh-huh”
and “Mm” are merely verbal cues he was listening to and understanding
what the detective was saying. And to the detective’s statement that he
didn’t think the victims were lying, Alonso’s response was that his past
marijuana use impacted his ability to remember what happened. But
throughout the interrogation, Alonso’s story never really “shift[ed] and
change[d].” See Boggs, 218 Ariz at 335, ¶ 41 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Alonso admitted to touching the victims’ breasts and
vagina but maintained he never did so with sexual motivation or for a
sexual purpose. Because the detective’s statements provided no helpful

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context for Alonso’s “Uh-huh”, “Mm,” and “I don’t remember” answers,
the detective’s interrogation statements should not have been admitted.

¶11 Having found error, the question becomes whether proof
beyond a reasonable doubt exists from a review of the record to conclude
“the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict or sentence.” Strong, 258
Ariz. at 200, ¶ 45.

¶12 Molestation of a child (genitals and anus) and sexual abuse
(female breast) require proof the defendant “intentionally or knowingly
engag[ed] in . . . sexual contact” with any person “who is under fifteen years
of age.” A.R.S. § 13-1410(A), -1404(A), (B). Sexual conduct with a minor
requires proof the defendant “intentionally or knowingly engag[ed] in
sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with any person who is under
eighteen years of age.” A.R.S. § 13-1405(A). Contact for “caretaking
responsibilities” or “interactions with a minor . . . that an objective,
reasonable person would recognize as normal and reasonable under the
circumstances” is permissible. A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(3)(b).

¶13 As noted, supra ¶ 10, Alonso admitted to touching the victims.
But he claimed to have done so while checking his daughters’ breasts for
cancerous lumps and vaginas while providing uterus massages—all for
non-sexual purposes. As for the family friend, Alonso said he accidentally
touched her “parts” when he caught her in the air. No “objective,
reasonable person” would recognize these touches as “caretaking
responsibilities” or “normal and reasonable under the circumstances.”
A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(3)(b). Alonso’s claims are rendered all the more
preposterous given his admissions he showed his daughters videos of sex
scenes while lying in bed.

¶14 Further, the trial court provided a limiting instruction to the
jury, prohibiting them from considering the detective’s statements as
testimony or for “any purpose, other than to give meaning to [Alonso’s]
answers.” It also instructed the jury “not [to] consider any opinion [the
detective] gave during th[e] interview about [Alonso’s] believability.”
Alonso did not object to the instruction, and in fact crafted two separate
instructions that were combined to make the final instruction the court
provided to the jury. We presume juries follow the court’s instructions.
State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557, 570, ¶ 46 (2003).

¶15 In combination with the evidence against Alonso, the victims’
testimonies and his own admission to “touching, fondling or

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manipulating” the victims, A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(3)(a), the instruction further
rendered the error harmless.

¶16 For the same reasons, any Arizona Rule of Evidence 403 error
Alonso raises for the first time on appeal, which we review for fundamental
error only, is necessarily not prejudicial. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561,
567, ¶ 19 (2005).

CONCLUSION

¶17 We affirm Alonso’s convictions and sentences.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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