State v. Stoner

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

DANIEL JAMES STONER, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 24-0404 PRPC
FILED 03-25-2025

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2017-157518-001
The Honorable Jay R. Adleman, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Daniel James Stoner, Kingman
Petitioner

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Phillip D. Garrow
Counsel for Respondent

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.
 STATE v. STONER
Decision of the Court

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Daniel James Stoner petitions for review from the superior
court’s summary dismissal of his post-conviction relief (PCR) petition filed
under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. For the reasons that follow,
this court grants review but denies relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In December 2017, Stoner was charged with two counts of
sexual conduct with a minor, Class 2 felony offenses; one count of child
molestation, a Class 2 felony offense; three counts of sexual abuse, Class 3
felony offenses; and two counts of attempted sexual abuse, Class 4 felony
offenses. The indictment alleged the victim was under 15 years of age and
that the offenses were Dangerous Crimes Against Children (DCAC). The
State later amended the indictment to allege aggravating circumstances,
including betrayal of trust by a parental figure. In a pre-indictment
interview with police, Stoner admitted in detail to conduct aligning with
the charges on eight occasions between May and June 2017, when the victim
was about 12 years old.

¶3 In January 2019, Stoner pled guilty to three counts of
attempted sexual conduct with a minor, Class 3 felonies, DCAC offenses
and non-dangerous, non-repetitive offenses. The State agreed to dismiss the
remaining charges. The plea agreement provided that Stoner would be
sentenced to a prison term of between 11.75 and 15 years for Count 3 and
to lifetime probation with sex offender and computer usage terms for
Counts 1 and 2. The plea agreement also stated that, if accepted by the court,
Stoner “hereby waives and gives up any and all motions, defenses,
objections or requests which [Stoner] has made or raised, or could assert
hereafter, to the court’s entry of judgment against him and imposition of a
sentence upon him consistent with this agreement.” After a full colloquy,
including Stoner providing a factual basis for his guilty pleas, the court
found Stoner knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered into the
guilty plea and accepted it.

¶4 At a February 2019 sentencing, after receiving information
provided, including Stoner’s apology and statement that he would accept
“whatever punishment I receive and more,” the court sentenced Stoner to
12.5 years in prison for Count 3 and placed him on lifetime probation upon
his release from prison for Counts 1 and 2, including sex offender
registration and computer usage terms.

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Decision of the Court

¶5 Beginning in May 2019, as a self-represented litigant, Stoner
filed several seemingly identical PCR petitions. Then, at Stoner’s request,
counsel was appointed to represent him. Stoner’s attorney filed a notice of
completion of review, stating “there is a colorable claim regarding
ineffective assistance of counsel,” indicating there was no “physical,
scientific or testimonial” evidence supporting his confession on Count 3,
implicating a possible corpus delicti defense which prejudiced him because
Stoner would not have accepted the plea agreement if he were aware of the
defense.

¶6 The superior court construed this filing as “asserting no
colorable claim for relief,” changing Stoner’s court-appointed attorney to
advisory counsel and allowing Stoner to file a self-represented PCR
petition. After several extensions, in March 2022, Stoner filed a timely “Rule
33 Brief,” seeking to raise claims under Rule 33.1(a) (ineffective assistance
of counsel or IAC), (b) (subject matter jurisdiction), (c) (illegal sentence) and
(h) (insufficient evidence).

¶7 After considering Stoner’s Rule 33 Brief (which it construed
as a PCR petition), the State’s response, Stoner’s reply and the plea
agreement and other filings, the court summarily dismissed the petition
without an evidentiary hearing. The court found Stoner’s: (1) IAC claims
were precluded by the plea agreement and not supported by any colorable
claim of prejudice “especially in view of [Stoner’s] statements to the Court
at the time of sentencing;” (2) subject matter jurisdiction argument failed,
given the indictment invoked the court’s jurisdiction and (3) illegal sentence
arguments, based on constitutional challenges to Arizona Revised Statutes
(A.R.S) sections 13-1404, -1405 and -1410, failed because he did not comply
with the notice requirements to assert such an argument under A.R.S. § 12-
1841 and he waived those defenses in his plea. Stoner’s timely petition for
review by this court followed.

DISCUSSION

¶8 This court reviews the summary dismissal of a PCR petition
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, 566 ¶ 17 (2006)
(citing cases). Summary dismissal is appropriate if the petition presents no
“material issue of fact or law that would entitle the defendant to relief.”
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.11(a). A petition seeking review by this court must
contain “reasons why the appellate court should grant the petition,”
including a statement of issues, material facts and citations to supporting
legal authority. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.16(c)(2)(B)-(D). Petitioner must strictly

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Decision of the Court

comply with these requirements. See Canion v. Cole, 210 Ariz. 598, 600 ¶ 11
(2005).

¶9 A petition for review by this court cannot expand the alleged
basis for relief by seeking to assert arguments not first raised with the
superior court. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 13-4239(C); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.16(c)(2)(B);
State v. Ramirez, 126 Ariz. 464, 468 (App. 1980). Similarly, any argument
raised with the superior court but not raised in a petition seeking review by
this court is waived. See, e.g., State v. McFord, 125 Ariz. 377, 380 (App. 1980);
State v. Thompson, 139 Ariz. 552, 554 (App. 1984); accord A.R.S. § 13-4239.
Applying these standards, Stoner has shown no error.

I. Rule 33.1(a) IAC Claim.

¶10 Stoner argues counsel failed to file pre-trial motions to
dismiss based on actual innocence and equal protection along with defenses
of no criminal intent and insufficiency of evidence. “By entering a guilty
plea, a defendant waives . . . claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
except those that relate to the validity of a plea.” State v. Banda, 232 Ariz.
582, 585 ¶ 12 (App. 2013) (citing cases); see also State v. Villegas-Rojas, 231
Ariz. 445, 446 ¶ 6 (App. 2012) (“We do not consider claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel for a pleading defendant except to the extent they
relate to the validity of his plea.”) (citing cases). Therefore, other than claims
relating to the acceptance or validity of the plea or sentence, Stoner has
waived any IAC claims.

¶11 Stoner argues his “actions are neither illegal and/or unlawful
pursuant A.R.S. § 13-1407 and/or A.R.S. § 13-1412” and (2) counsel failed
to inform Stoner of a possible corpus delicti defense to Count 3. To prevail
on an IAC claim, Stoner “must show both that counsel’s performance fell
below objectively reasonable standards and that this deficiency prejudiced
the defendant.” State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, 567 ¶ 21 (2006) (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). “To establish deficient
performance during plea negotiations, a petitioner must prove that the
lawyer either (1) gave erroneous advice or (2) failed to give information
necessary to allow the petitioner to make an informed decision whether to
accept the plea.” State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, 413 ¶ 16 (App. 2000) (citing
cases). To establish prejudice, Stoner “must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59
(1985).

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Decision of the Court

¶12 Stoner alleges IAC based on counsel’s failure to advise him of
potential affirmative defenses under A.R.S. § 13-1407 and 13-1412. Stoner
has not shown how he could have relied on the defenses in A.R.S. § 13-1407
that provide defenses for the acts of lawful or licensed medical personnel,
lack of knowledge of the victim’s age, treatment administered in an
emergency, marriage to the victim or young age of the defendant. Nor
could A.R.S. § 13-1412 apply, given there was no suggestion that Stoner was
“[a] peace officer.” Similarly, these defenses do not negate the acts Stoner
admitted in his guilty plea. Nor was counsel obligated to use any specific
defenses. See State v. Medina, 232 Ariz. 391, 403 ¶ 34 (2013) (citation omitted).

¶13 Stoner’s corpus delicti argument would only apply to
Count 3. In Arizona, “a defendant may not be convicted of a crime based
on an uncorroborated confession without independent proof of the corpus
delicti.” State v. Morgan, 204 Ariz. 166, 170 ¶ 15 (App. 2002) (citing cases).
That required corroboration, however, is modest. “[O]nly a reasonable
inference of the corpus delicti need exist before a confession may be
considered; it need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Gerlaugh, 134 Ariz. 164, 170 (1982) (citing cases). “[W]hen a defendant
confesses to several related crimes, independent evidence that establishes
the commission of the closely related crimes may suffice to corroborate the
confession as a whole, rendering it admissible.” State v. Carlson, 237 Ariz.
381, 388 ¶ 11 (2015) (citing cases). The corpus delicti rule also does not
defeat the factual basis of a plea provided by the defendant. State v. Rubiano, 214 Ariz. 184, 186 ¶ 10 (App. 2007) (citing cases). Here, Stoner admitted to
committing the three related crimes and those crimes were corroborated by
independent evidence. For these reasons, he has shown no error in the
superior court’s dismissing his Rule 33.1(a) IAC claims.

II. Rule 33.1(b) Subject Matter Jurisdiction Claims.

¶14 Stoner argues the superior court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction because he was actually innocent, the superior court
improperly addressed jurisdiction over the indictment (not sentencing) and
the defenses discussed above available to peace officers and behavioral
health professionals violate his equal protection rights.

¶15 The superior court has original jurisdiction over felony
offenses like those Stoner was charged with here. State v. Maldonado, 223
Ariz. 309, 312 ¶ 20 (2010). The indictment, alleging Stoner committed the
offenses in Maricopa County, invoked the subject matter jurisdiction of the
Arizona Superior Court in Maricopa County. State v. Fimbres, 222 Ariz. 293,
302 ¶ 32 (App. 2009); A.R.S. § 13-109.

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¶16 “[J]urisdiction is established at the time of filing of the lawsuit
and cannot be ousted by subsequent actions or events.” Fry v. Garcia, 213
Ariz. 70, 73 ¶ 10 (App. 2006) (citation omitted). Accordingly, Stoner’s
attempt to distinguish between jurisdiction over the indictment and
jurisdiction over sentencing fails. Stoner’s subject matter jurisdiction
challenges (including the constitutionality of a criminal statute, defects in
the indictment and claimed actual innocence) do not deprive a court of its
power to adjudicate a case. See United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 66
(1951) (“[T]he unconstitutionality of the statute under which the proceeding
is brought does not oust a court of jurisdiction.”) (citing cases); Lamar v.
United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65 (1916) (“[The court] acts equally within its
jurisdiction whether it decides a man to be guilty or innocent under the
criminal law, and whether its decision is right or wrong.”); State v. Crocker, 163 Ariz. 516, 517 (App. 1990) (“[C]hallenge to the constitutionality of a
statute is a nonjurisdictional defense.”) (citing cases); State v. Reed, 121 Ariz.
547, 548 (App. 1979) (“[T]he denial of a procedural right during a grand
jury’s ‘probable cause’ proceeding is a non-jurisdictional defect inasmuch
as it can be waived by an indicted defendant.”). For these reasons, Stoner’s
arguments that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction fail.

III. Rule 33.1(c) Illegal Sentence Claim.

¶17 Stoner’s illegal sentence claim was based on constitutional
challenges to A.R.S. §§ 13-1404, -1405 and -1410. The superior court rejected
those claims in part because Stoner failed to comply with the notice
requirement in A.R.S. § 12-1841. In seeking review, Stoner argues that “by
attempting to add [A.R.S] § 12-1841 to Rule 33 proceedings, the court
plainly complicated the proceeding in an unfair manner that delayed the
proceeding while denying Mr. Stoner’s fundamental Due Process rights.”
But Stoner cites no exception for PCR proceedings to the statutory notice
for constitutionality claims required by A.R.S. § 12-1841. The superior court
properly noted Stoner failed to comply with A.R.S. § 12-1841 in making his
claim of unconstitutionality.

¶18 Under terms of his plea agreement, Stoner also “waive[d] and
[gave] up any and all motions, defenses, objections, or requests which he
has made or raised, or could assert hereafter.” “A defendant who pleads
guilty waives the right to assert on review all non-jurisdictional defenses,
including deprivations of constitutional rights.” State v. Chavez, 243 Ariz.
313, 318 ¶ 14 (App. 2017) (citing cases). Stoner thus waived the right to
assert all non-jurisdictional defenses.

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 STATE v. STONER
Decision of the Court

¶19 The superior court found there was no basis to support his
claim of an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 33.1(c) because Stoner’s
sentence is within the lawful ranges set forth under A.R.S. § 13-705 and the
terms of the plea agreement. Stoner offers no legal authority to suggest the
sentence violated the sentencing scheme or that the court imposed an
unconstitutional sentence.

CONCLUSION

¶20 This court grants review but denies relief.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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