State v. Madril

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ZACHARY MADRIL, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 24-0415
FILED 05-06-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2022-123280-001
The Honorable Joseph Shayne Kiefer, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Joseph Newberg
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Jesse Finn Turner
Counsel for Appellant
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs
joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Zachary Madril appeals his convictions and sentences for
armed robbery, assault, and unlawful use of means of transportation. He
argues the superior court erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress his
post-arrest police interview and (2) declining to instruct the jury on
necessity. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Late one evening in June 2022, the victim was working at a
business in Mesa, when he stepped outside and went to his company van
to do some paperwork. Madril approached and asked for directions, but
the victim stated he was not familiar with the area.

¶3 As the victim turned to finish his paperwork, Madril struck
him on the head with a hard object1 and demanded the keys to the van. The
victim refused and, to protect himself, retrieved a handgun from the van.
Madril grabbed at the weapon, and the two men struggled to control the
gun. The victim fell to the ground with Madril on top of him, and the gun,
which was under the victim, discharged twice. A bullet grazed the victim‘s
left arm, and Madril suffered a minor skin tear between his right thumb and
forefinger.

¶4 Madril beat and choked the victim before wrestling the gun
away, then stood up and threatened to kill him if he did not turn over the
van’s keys. With the weapon pointed at him, the victim surrendered the
keys, and Madril took them and drove away.

¶5 Witnesses called 911. Police located and followed Madril for
more than sixty miles as he drove eastbound on the I-10 freeway toward
Tucson. He eventually drove the van into a field and then into an irrigation
ditch, where it became disabled. He fled, but was caught and arrested.

1 Police later found a large rock at the scene.

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Police recovered the victim’s handgun—containing two spent shell
casings—on the ground near the van’s driver’s-side door.

¶6 Police transported Madril back to Mesa, where a police
detective interviewed him early that morning. The State later charged
Madril with armed robbery, a class 2 dangerous felony; aggravated assault,
a class 3 dangerous felony; and theft of means of transportation, a class 3
felony.

¶7 The jury found Madril guilty of armed robbery; assault, a
class 2 misdemeanor and lesser-included offense of aggravated assault; and
unlawful use of means of transportation, a class 5 felony and lesser-
included offense of theft of means of transportation. The jury also found
three aggravators for the armed robbery, including that it was a dangerous
offense, and two for the unlawful use of means of transportation. The
superior court sentenced Madril to a minimum term of seven years’
imprisonment for the armed robbery, time served for the assault, and two
years’ supervised probation for the unlawful use of means of
transportation.

¶8 We have jurisdiction over Madril’s timely appeal. See Ariz.
Const. art. 6, § 9; Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, 13-
4033(A).

DISCUSSION

I. Madril’s Motion to Suppress His Police Interview

¶9 Before trial, Madril moved to suppress his interview with the
detective, claiming his statements were involuntary. The superior court
held an evidentiary hearing, at which the detective testified, photos of
Madril’s injuries were received in evidence, and the court considered the
recorded interview. The court later denied the motion, and a redacted
version of the interview was admitted and played for the jury at trial.

¶10 On appeal, Madril argues the superior court erred in denying
his motion to suppress because a totality of the circumstances showed his
statements were involuntary. We review for an abuse of discretion the
denial of a motion to suppress, “considering only evidence admitted at the
suppression hearing and viewing it in the light most favorable to sustaining
the ruling.” State v. Rushing, 243 Ariz. 212, 225, ¶ 56 (2017) (citation
omitted).

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¶11 Confessions are presumed to be involuntary, and the State
bears the burden of refuting the presumption and establishing
voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Hall, 120 Ariz.
454, 456 (1978). A confession is involuntary if, under the totality of the
circumstances, the will of the defendant was overborne. Id. In general, a
prima facie case for admission of a confession is made when the State shows
a confession “was obtained without threat, coercion or promises of
immunity or a lesser penalty.” State v. Jerousek, 121 Ariz. 420, 424 (1979)
(citation omitted).

¶12 A court may consider several factors in evaluating the
voluntariness of a defendant’s statement, including the time and length of
the interrogation, the setting in which it occurs, and the conduct of the
police. See State v. Doody, 187 Ariz. 363, 368-69 (App. 1996) (concluding a
thirteen-hour interview of a minor without significant breaks, although
“troublesome,” did not alone establish that officers overcame the suspect’s
will).

¶13 We have independently reviewed the stipulated audio- and
video-recorded interview and other evidence presented at the suppression
hearing. See State v. Sweeney, 224 Ariz. 107, 111, ¶ 12 (App. 2010). Except
for the lateness of the hour and the fact that Madril complained he had been
unable to get much sleep while staying at his brother’s house in the days
before the incident, the interview circumstances lack any indica of
coerciveness, and we find no abuse of the superior court’s discretion.

¶14 Before the interview, Madril was placed in a non-descript
room, where he sat on a chair behind a table with water and sports drinks.
He became restless, rocked to the side, and slid onto the floor. The detective
came in to confirm he was okay, and Madril stated he was cold and
cramping and preferred to sit on the floor, where he stayed throughout
much of the interview. The detective suggested he drink one of the sports
drinks and left to get a notepad.

¶15 When he returned, the detective sat at the table and advised
Madril of his Miranda rights.2 Madril affirmed he understood his rights and
allowed the detective to interview him.

¶16 The detective interviewed Madril for about thirty minutes—
between about 3:30 and 4:00 a.m.—and less than four hours after his arrest.
No other officers were present during the interview, no physical or verbal

2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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threats or promises of any kind were made, and the detective’s tone was
conversational and non-confrontational throughout.

¶17 During the interview, Madril explained his actions as a
product of his lack of sleep over several days due to “detoxing” from crystal
methamphetamine and living with his brother’s noisy family, his desire to
go home to his family in Rio Rico, and his stress over financial obligations.
But he never indicated he wanted to end or take a break from the interview,
and he never asked for more to drink, food, a restroom, medical care, or to
sleep. See State v. Scott, 177 Ariz. 131, 136-37 (1993) (concluding that a failure
to ask for food, medication, or sleep, coupled with a lack of evidence that
any request would not be granted, satisfied the State’s burden to establish
the voluntariness of a confession). He also never appeared to be falling
asleep or needed to be prompted to answer questions, and much like the
defendant in State v. Anderson, nothing indicates the police would have
denied him the opportunity to rest or sleep had he requested it. See 197
Ariz. 314, 326-27, ¶ 35 (2000). Viewed in context, his answers were
appropriate, as was his engagement with the detective, and he offered
details about the incident, stressed he did not plan to steal the van or hurt
the victim, and stated he had “never done anything like this before.”

¶18 After the interview, Madril agreed to allow a police
photographer to take photos of his injuries, and he appeared eager to help.
He was then asked to provide a buccal swab of his saliva, but after a brief
discussion, he refused the request, demonstrating his will was not
overborne from lack of sleep or any “physical or psychological pressure
exerted by the police.” State v. Tucker, 157 Ariz. 433, 445 (1988). All told,
Madril interacted with law enforcement officials for just less than one hour.

¶19 Although Madril expressed several times that he had recently
had trouble sleeping, he never said he was too tired to engage in or continue
the interview. Moreover, law enforcement officials played no role in his
lack of sleep before the interview, which was consistent with Madril’s
explanation as to his use of crystal methamphetamine, and Madril has
failed to show the police engaged in any coercive activity. See generally
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). Instead, the State has
demonstrated Madril’s statements to the detective were voluntary under
the totality of the circumstances. Accordingly, the superior court did not
abuse its discretion when it denied Madril’s motion to suppress his police
interview.

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II. Madril’s Request for a Necessity Instruction

¶20 At trial, Madril testified and admitted pointing the gun at the
victim and demanding the keys to the van. However, he claimed he did so
because his fight with the victim and the gunshots made him panic, he was
not sure if the victim had another weapon, and the victim, by yelling for
help, was wrongly portraying himself as the victim. Based on this
testimony, Madril requested instructions on self-defense, duress, and
necessity, but the State objected to the duress and necessity instructions,
arguing any danger ended when Madril gained control of the gun and
Madril had reasonable alternatives to stealing the van at gunpoint. The
superior court denied the duress and necessity instructions after
concluding, as to necessity, that once he had the gun, Madril had reasonable
alternatives to stealing the van, but it instructed the jury on self-defense and
the use of force in crime prevention. The court also later denied Madril’s
motion for a new trial based on denial of the necessity instruction.

¶21 On appeal, Madril argues the superior court erred in denying
his requested necessity instruction. He maintains his testimony
demonstrated he had no reasonable alternative but to escape the situation
immediately.

¶22 We review for abuse of discretion the superior court’s
decision whether to provide a jury instruction, State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290,
309 (1995), and whether to grant a new trial, State v. Fischer, 242 Ariz. 44, 48
¶ 10 (2017). But we independently assess whether the evidence supports a
necessity instruction, because that is a question of law. State v. Pina-Barajas,
244 Ariz. 106, 108, ¶ 4 (App. 2018) (citation omitted). In our review, “[w]e
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting a jury
instruction.” Id. at ¶ 2 (citation omitted).

¶23 “A defendant is entitled to an instruction on any theory of the
case reasonably supported by the evidence.” State v. Richter, 245 Ariz. 1, 6,
¶ 24 (2018) (quoting State v. Lujan, 136 Ariz. 102, 104 (1983)). Generally, a
defendant is entitled to a justification instruction if the record contains the
“slightest evidence” of justification. State v. King, 225 Ariz. 87, 90, ¶ 14
(2010). “The slightest evidence—not merely an inference making an
argument possible—is required because speculation cannot substitute for
evidence.” State v. Vassell, 238 Ariz. 281, 284, ¶ 9 (App. 2015) (citations
omitted).

¶24 Justification defenses use “objective standards that depend on
the beliefs of a ‘reasonable person’ in the defendant’s circumstances rather

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than the defendant’s subjective beliefs.” State v. Carson, 243 Ariz. 463, 465,
¶ 9 (2018) (citing King, 225 Ariz. at 90, ¶¶ 11–12). “A person is justified in
using physical force against another, and does not commit a crime, ‘when
and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is
immediately necessary to protect himself against the other’s use or
attempted use of unlawful physical force.’” Id. (quoting A.R.S. § 13–
404(A)). “[D]eadly force is justifiably used if § 13–404 is satisfied and ‘a
reasonable person would believe that deadly physical force is immediately
necessary to protect himself against the other’s use or attempted use of
unlawful deadly physical force.’” Id. (quoting A.R.S. § 13–405(A)(2)).

¶25 The necessity defense statute provides: “Conduct that would
otherwise constitute an offense is justified if a reasonable person was
compelled to engage in the proscribed conduct and the person had no
reasonable alternative to avoid imminent public or private injury greater
than the injury that might reasonably result from the person’s own
conduct.” A.R.S. § 13–417(A).3 Thus, for a necessity defense to apply, a
defendant must show the risk of injury is imminent—i.e., immediate or
about to occur—and the person at risk has no reasonable alternative to
avoid an injury short of violating the law. Pina-Barajas, 244 Ariz. at 108–09,
¶¶ 5–7. Further, “justification based on imminent or immediate threats
dissipates rapidly,” such that, “as time elapses, other reasonable, legal
courses of action become increasingly available” to a reasonable person. Id.
at ¶¶ 6–7.

¶26 Here, overwhelming evidence indicates Madril placed
himself in the circumstances that led to his conduct, thus forfeiting any
necessity defense. See A.R.S. § 13-417(B)-(C). But even assuming he did not
and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Madril, once Madril
seized the weapon with the much older victim subdued and lying on the
ground with substantial injuries, there was no longer any threat to him.
And although Madril speculated the victim might have had another
weapon, speculation about a threat is not evidence of one. See Vassell, 238
Ariz. at 281, ¶ 9. Neither was Madril’s concern that the victim might
portray himself as the victim and that witnesses and police might believe
the victim over him. Madril’s own testimony shows he took the van at
gunpoint not because he faced what a reasonable person would consider an

3 A defendant may not assert a necessity defense if he intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly placed himself in the situation in which it was
probable he would have to engage in the proscribed conduct. A.R.S. § 13-
417(B).

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objective imminent threat, but because of his own subjective beliefs. See
Carson, 243 Ariz. at 465, ¶ 9.

¶27 Moreover, the record does not support Madril’s subjective
belief that he had no reasonable alternatives to avoid an injury short of
violating the law. Madril produced no evidence that he could not have
called 911, commanded the victim to remain on the ground until the police
or other help arrived, or retreated to a place of safety. Instead, he chose to
steal the van at gunpoint, and his own testimony supports that he made his
bad decisions out of panic, not out of necessity. His subjective belief that
breaking the law was his only alternative was neither reasonable nor
enough to entitle him to an instruction on necessity. The superior court did
not abuse its discretion because the evidence did not support Madril’s
necessity instruction.

CONCLUSION

¶28 Madril’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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