State v. Collison

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

EDWIN JOSEPH COLLISON, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 24-0527 PRPC
FILED 07-15-2025

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2014-152047-001
The Honorable Michael D. Gordon, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Edwin Joseph Collison, Florence
Petitioner

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.
 STATE v. COLLISON
Decision of the Court

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Edwin Joseph Collison petitions this Court to review the
superior court's order dismissing his first petition for post-conviction relief
("PCR"). We have considered the petition for review and, for the reasons
stated, grant review but deny relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In June 2016, Collison pled guilty to two counts of sexual
exploitation of a minor (class 2 felonies) and two counts of attempted
molestation of a child (class 3 felonies). The superior court sentenced
Collison to two consecutive 17.5-year terms of imprisonment.

¶3 More than eight years after sentencing, Collison filed his first
petition for PCR under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure ("Rule") 33. The
superior court summarily dismissed the petition, finding Collison failed to
state a colorable claim that could be raised in an untimely Rule 33
proceeding.

¶4 Collison now seeks review. After filing his petition for
review, Collison filed a supplement, which we have also considered. We
have jurisdiction under Rule 33.16 and A.R.S. § 13-4239(C).

DISCUSSION

¶5 This Court reviews the dismissal of a petition for PCR for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19 (2012).

¶6 On review, Collison asserts that the State violated his due
process rights, thus divesting the superior court of subject matter
jurisdiction over his case. But a constitutional claim under Rule 33.1(a) and
a subject matter jurisdiction claim under Rule 33.1(b) are distinct issues. A
constitutional violation, even if established, does not divest the superior
court of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we address Collison's
jurisdiction and constitutional claims separately.

¶7 A claim under Rule 33.1(a) must be filed "within 90 days after
the oral pronouncement of sentence." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.4(3)(A). A claim
alleging lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 33.1(b) must be raised
"within a reasonable time after discovering the basis for the claim." Ariz. R.
Crim. P. 33.4(3)(B). Untimely Rule 33.1(a) and (b) claims are excused only
"if the defendant adequately explains why the failure to timely file a notice
was not the defendant's fault." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.4(3)(D).

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 STATE v. COLLISON
Decision of the Court

¶8 The superior court entered judgment and sentenced Collison
in July 2016, but he did not file his PCR notice until August 2024. Collison
broadly concludes the superior court erred by claiming he provided
insufficient justification for his late filing, but his petition to this Court does
not explain the eight-year delay. Because Collison does not provide any
justification for his untimely PCR request, his arguments are precluded and
the superior court did not err by summarily denying his petition. See Ariz.
R. Crim. P. 33.2(b)(1) (stating the superior court "may summarily dismiss"
PCR notices lacking "sufficient reasons why the defendant did not raise the
claim . . . in a timely manner"). Further, Collison waived any constitutional
claim under Rule 33.1(a) by pleading guilty. See State v. Flores, 218 Ariz.
407, 409–10, ¶ 6 (App. 2008) (entering a guilty plea waives a defendant's
challenge to all non-jurisdictional defects, including the deprivation of
constitutional rights); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.2(a)(1) ("A defendant is
precluded from relief under Rule 33.1(a) based on any ground waived by
pleading guilty or no contest to the offense.").

¶9 Even if we were to analyze Collison's claims on their merits,
he is not entitled to relief.

¶10 Subject matter jurisdiction "refers to a court's statutory or
constitutional power to hear and determine a particular kind of case." State
v. Maldonado, 223 Ariz. 309, 311, ¶ 14 (2010). Article 6, section 14 of the
Arizona Constitution confers the superior courts original jurisdiction over
"[c]riminal cases amounting to felony." Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 14(4); see also
A.R.S. § 12-123(A) (noting the superior court "shall have original and
concurrent jurisdiction as conferred by the constitution"). The superior
court thus had jurisdiction to adjudicate Collison's felonies. See A.R.S. § 13-
3553(C); -1410(B); -1001(C)(2).

¶11 Collison's constitutional argument is similarly unavailing. He
asserts he was denied due process because he was sentenced under an
unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous statute. The superior court
sentenced Collison under A.R.S. § 13-705 ("Section 13-705") for committing
four "dangerous crimes against children" ("DCAC"). Collison argues that
to trigger the DCAC sentencing enhancements, the State was required to
prove his crimes were "dangerous" as defined under Section 13-105. See
A.R.S. § 13-105(13) (defining a "dangerous offense" as "an offense involving
the discharge, use or threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon or
dangerous instrument or the intentional or knowing infliction of serious
physical injury on another person"). Because his crime did not involve "the
discharge, use, or threatened exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous

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 STATE v. COLLISON
Decision of the Court

instrument against another person," Collison asserts that the superior court
could not sentence him for a DCAC offense.

¶12 Collison is wrong. The statutory scheme unambiguously
delineates between the sentencing ranges applicable to "dangerous
offenses," see A.R.S. § 13-704; -105(13), and DCAC offenses, see A.R.S. § 13-
705. The "dangerous offense" definition under Section 13-105(13) does not
extend to sentences imposed under Section 13-705. Indeed, Section 13-704
explicitly excludes DCAC offenses under Section 13-705 from dangerous-
offense sentences. A.R.S. § 13-704 (detailing sentencing ranges for persons
convicted of a dangerous offense, "[e]xcept as provided in § 13-705")
(emphasis added). The respective statutes punish distinct and separate
categories of crimes.

¶13 Collison pled guilty to two counts of both sexual exploitation
of a minor and attempted molestation of a child, each of which are
enumerated DCAC offenses. See A.R.S. § 13-705(T)(1)(d), (g); see also A.R.S.
§ 13-1001(C)(2). He was sentenced accordingly pursuant to Section 13-705.
See A.R.S. § 13-705 (sentencing range for dangerous crimes against
children). The superior court did not err.

¶14 In his supplemental filing, Collison cites to this Court's
decision in State v. Marner, 258 Ariz. 512 (App. 2024) to argue that a DCAC
offense must satisfy the "dangerous offense" definition under Section 13-
105(13). But the Marner Court held that luring a minor for sexual
exploitation, see A.R.S. § 13-3554, is not eligible for sentencing enhancement
under Section 13-705 unless the act was committed against an actual, non-
fictitious minor victim under the age of fifteen. Id. at 518–19, ¶ 22. Because
the Marner defendant targeted a police officer who posed as a child online,
the Court concluded that "DCAC sentencing enhancements d[id] not apply"
to his conviction. 1 Id. at 519, ¶ 23.

¶15 Unlike the Marner defendant, Collison targeted an actual
minor victim under the age of fifteen and was sentenced accordingly.
Marner's facts and holding do not apply to Collison's crime.

1 Another panel of this Court disagreed with the Marner majority and
expressly adopted the Marner dissent's conclusion that the Section 13-705
sentencing enhancement applies even if the offense involves a fictitious
victim. State v. McNulty, ___ Ariz. ___, ___, ¶ 42 (App. 2025). A petition for
review of Marner is currently pending before our supreme court.

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 STATE v. COLLISON
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶16 Because the superior court did not err in denying Collison's
requested relief, we grant review but deny relief.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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