State v. Owens
Opinion text
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
v.
BLAKE OWENS, Appellant.
No. 1 CA-CR 24-0530
FILED 07-17-2025
Appeal from the Superior Court in Navajo County
No. S0900CR201900130
The Honorable Melinda K. Hardy, Judge
APPEAL DISMISSED
COUNSEL
Navajo County Attorney’s Office, Holbrook, AZ
By Myles A. Braccio
Counsel for Appellee
Blake Owens, Ada, OH
Appellant
STATE v. OWENS
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig
joined.
P A T O N, Judge:
¶1 Blake Owens appeals the superior court’s denial of his
petition to seal criminal case records. Because we lack jurisdiction to
consider his appeal, we dismiss it.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 In 2019, Owens entered a global plea agreement involving six
criminal cases. In 2020, the court imposed three years’ probation and
ordered him to pay restitution. The court terminated Owens’ probation
halfway through his three-year term in July 2021. Owens moved to set
aside his convictions, which the court granted in October 2021.
¶3 In February 2024, Owens petitioned to seal certain criminal
case records under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Section 13-911 in
case number CR 2018-00921. The State, along with the Arizona Game and
Fish Department and a hunting club, objected to Owens’ petition to seal.
¶4 The superior court held a hearing on Owens’ petition in July
2024. A law enforcement officer testified that Owens was one of the most
prolific poachers in Arizona’s history. Owens testified that he was
attending law school and would like his records sealed when he applies for
admission to practice to “show the bar” he has been “rehabilitated.”
¶5 The superior court denied Owens’ petition to seal, finding
that the nature of Owens’ offenses involved extensive fraud and deceptive
behavior, and upholding hunting regulations promotes the public’s safety
and interests. The court also noted that Owens’ offenses in case number CR
2019-00130 were statutorily ineligible for sealing because they involved the
discharge, use or threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous
instrument. A.R.S. § 13-911(O)(4)(a).
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STATE v. OWENS
Decision of the Court
DISCUSSION
¶6 At the outset, we note the difference between being eligible to
petition to seal, meaning a party has completed the Section 13-911(A), (E),
(F), and (G) requirements making his petition eligible for the court’s
consideration (“eligibility to petition”), and the underlying substantive
merits decision by the court regarding whether a petitioner is statutorily
permitted to have his petition to seal granted under Section 13-911(O)
(“offense eligibility”). This distinction matters because under Section 13-
4033, “[a]n appeal may be taken by the defendant only from . . . [a]n order
that denied the defendant’s eligibility to petition the court to seal the
defendant’s case records pursuant to § 13-911 if the sole basis for the appeal is
the defendant’s eligibility to petition the court.” A.R.S. § 13-4033(A)(5)
(emphasis added); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 36.1(h).
¶7 Here, Owens is appealing from the court’s denial of his
petition to seal on the merits, i.e., offense eligibility to seal—specifically, its
holding that his offenses were not statutorily eligible to be sealed because,
among other things, they involved the discharge, use, or threatening
exhibition of a deadly weapon. A.R.S. § 13-911(O)(4)(a). The superior court
determined Owens was eligible to petition to seal when it found he met the
Section 13-911 requirements—including that the required timeframes had
passed, he had not been subsequently convicted of a felony or misdemeanor
offense, and he had successfully completed all terms and conditions of
sentencing, including payment of all monetary obligations and restitution.
See A.R.S. § 13-911(E) (required timeframes); (F) (restrictions on subsequent
offenses); (G) (monetary obligations and restitution); Ariz. R. Crim. P.
36.1(b).
¶8 We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider Owens’ appeal
because he is not appealing from the court’s denial of his eligibility to
petition to seal but from the court’s substantive ruling that his offenses were
ineligible to seal. Compare Ayala v. Minder, 1 CA-SA 24-0083, 2024 WL
2831566, at *1, ¶ 9 (Ariz. App. June 4, 2024) (mem. decision) (exercising
special action jurisdiction to review the court’s substantive merits ruling
denying petitioner’s petition to seal), with State v. Salerno, 2 CA-CR 2024-
0129, 2025 WL 300800, at *1-*2, ¶¶ 6, 8 (Ariz. App. Jan. 24, 2025) (mem.
decision) (affirming the superior court’s denial of appellant’s petition to
seal based on its finding he was ineligible to petition to seal because he had
not paid all fines pursuant to Section 13-911(A)(1)). We decline to sua
sponte exercise special action jurisdiction.
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STATE v. OWENS
Decision of the Court
CONCLUSION
¶9 Because the superior court’s denial of Owens’ petition to seal
was not made on the basis of his eligibility to petition the court, but rather
because it determined the criminal offenses he sought to seal were
statutorily ineligible under Section 13-911(O)(4)(a), we lack jurisdiction to
consider his appeal under Section 13-4033(A)(5). We therefore dismiss it.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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