State v. Rowe

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

DAMIAN ORLANDO ROWE, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 24-0547
FILED 10-16-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Navajo County
No. S0900CR201900750
The Honorable Jon H. Saline, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Rigg Law Firm P.L.L.C., Pinetop
By Brett R. Rigg
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Joseph E. Begun
Counsel for Appellee
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which
Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Damian Orlando Rowe appeals from his
conviction for transportation of narcotic drugs for sale, arguing that the
superior court erred by denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 One day in August 2019, a State Trooper, authorized to stop
and inspect commercial vehicles, aided another officer in the stop of a
commercial vehicle, leading to the seizure of hundreds of pounds of cocaine
and methamphetamine. The two men arrested had the last name Rowe.
Later that day, the State Trooper saw windshield-tint and reflector
violations on Damian Rowe’s commercial truck and stopped him near
Holbrook for an administrative inspection.

¶3 As the trooper inspected the vehicle and requested Rowe’s
license and registration, he learned that Rowe shared the same last name as
the two men arrested earlier, and that all three men were based in
California. He also noticed air fresheners on every air vent on the truck’s
dashboard, two cans of spray air freshener in the cab, and multiple air
fresheners in the sleeper berth. When the trooper asked Rowe to produce
his logbook, Rowe presented a paper book, which is only permissible under
49 C.F.R. §§ 395.22 and 395.34 for a limited time when an electronic logbook
fails to function. According to the trooper, an electronic logbook, unlike a
paper one, is connected to the vehicle’s computer and automatically keeps
track of mileage and engine hours, marks vehicle location, and is therefore
harder to falsify. Rowe explained that his electronic logbook had broken, he
had just received the vehicle in Arkansas and had completed a single trip
from Arkansas to California, and was then hauling his first load from
California.

¶4 The trooper returned to his vehicle to check for any
connection between Rowe and the earlier arrestees, as well as to input
Rowe’s paper information and to verify the logbook. During this time, he

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checked with the arresting officer in the earlier case for any connection to
the previous stop, as well as with a drug task-force officer for Rowe’s
criminal history or connections to drug trafficking.

¶5 About half an hour later, the trooper found no connection
between the earlier arrestees and Rowe but learned that Rowe had been in
contact with an individual the DEA was investigating. Rowe had also
hauled a load from Arkansas to California, despite not saying so during
their earlier conversation. The trooper asked Rowe questions about his
logbook and, based on the administrative inspection, placed Rowe out of
service for ten hours because of his failure to maintain an electronic
logbook.

¶6 While questioning Rowe about his logbook, the trooper
requested permission to search the truck, but Rowe declined. The trooper
called for a drug-sniffing dog, which arrived an hour later. Within two
minutes of arrival, the dog alerted to the driver’s area of the truck, leading
to the seizure of eleven pounds of cocaine.

¶7 Rowe moved to suppress the evidence from his truck, arguing
that the stop exceeded the lawful scope of a traffic stop and the trooper had
no reasonable suspicion to detain him beyond the initial stop. After hearing
testimony from the arresting trooper, the court denied the motion. Rowe
moved to reconsider. The court reviewed the trooper’s dash camera footage
and heard closing arguments but again denied the suppression motion.

¶8 Rowe appealed his conviction and sentencing for the
transportation of narcotic drugs for sale.1 We have jurisdiction under
Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised
Statutes (“A.R.S.”) §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).

1 The jury originally convicted Rowe for transportation for sale and
possession with intent to sell, but the court vacated the possession charge
as a lesser-included charge. See State v. McNulty, ___ Ariz. ___, ___, ¶ 23,
573 P.3d 581, 588 (App. 2025) (The appropriate remedy when a defendant
is convicted for both the greater and lesser-included offense is to vacate the
conviction for the lesser.); State v. Cheramie, 218 Ariz. 447, 449, 451, ¶¶ 10,
22 (2008) (Possession of a dangerous drug is a lesser-included offense of
transportation for sale of a dangerous drug.).

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DISCUSSION

¶9 The parties agree that the trooper could stop Rowe for the first
nine minutes while inspecting the windshield and reflector violations.
Rowe argues that the remaining hour-and-a-half detention exceeded the
scope of the traffic stop and thus violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

¶10 In reviewing the validity of the trooper’s stop in this case, we
consider two timeframes. The first is the time from the initial stop to calling
for a drug-sniffing dog. The second is the time between when the trooper
requested the dog and when it alerted on the vehicle. We review the
superior court’s factual findings on a motion to suppress for an abuse of
discretion, considering only the evidence presented during the suppression
hearing (including the dash camera video) and viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to affirming. State v. Mitcham, 258 Ariz. 432, 437, ¶ 13 (2024).
But we review the superior court’s conclusion on whether the search or
seizure complied with the Fourth Amendment de novo. Id.

A. The Trooper Could Hold Rowe While Reviewing the Logbook as
Part of the Initial Stop.

¶11 The federal and state constitutions protect individuals against
unreasonable searches and seizures, U.S. Const. amend. IV; Ariz. Const. art.
2, § 8, and “any evidence collected in violation” of these provisions “is
generally inadmissible in a subsequent criminal trial,” State v. Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. 299, 302, ¶ 10 (2016). The State contends, and the superior court
found, that the trooper’s detention and review of the logbook was still part
of the trooper’s initial inquiry because it fell within the warrant exception
for pervasively regulated industries.

¶12 The State “carries the burden of proving that a warrantless
search is constitutionally valid under an exception to the warrant
requirement.” State v. Ontiveros-Loya, 237 Ariz. 472, 476, ¶ 10 (App. 2015).
Administrative searches of closely regulated industries are exempted from
the warrant requirement if the regulatory scheme allows for the search and
it satisfies the three-part test established in New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,
700, 702-03 (1987); United States v. Delgado, 545 F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir.
2008). Our supreme court has confirmed that commercial trucking is a
pervasively regulated industry. See State v. Jean, 243 Ariz. 331, 337, ¶ 24
(2018). But we find the Burger exception inapplicable here. The trooper did
not search the truck based on a closely regulated business. Instead, he
searched the truck after the drug-sniffing dog alerted, giving him probable

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cause for the search. Thus, we consider the trooper’s initial seizure under
the framework for a traffic stop.

¶13 “A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation
of that violation.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015); see also
United States v. Steinman, 130 F.4th 693, 703-04 (9th Cir. 2025). To be lawful,
a traffic stop must be limited in its scope, and an officer may “address the
traffic violation that warranted the stop,” make “ordinary inquiries incident
to the traffic stop,” and “attend to related safety concerns.” Rodriguez, 575
U.S. at 354–55 (quotation omitted). “The stop may last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate these purposes and complete the traffic mission
safely.” United States v. Taylor, 60 F.4th 1233, 1239 (9th Cir. 2023) (quotation
omitted); see also Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354 (“Authority for the seizure thus
ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should
have been—completed.”).

¶14 “Lawful inquiries incident to a traffic stop can include
checking a driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding
warrants, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of
insurance.” Steinman, 130 F.4th at 703. Such actions are justified because
“the Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] certain unrelated investigations that
[do] not lengthen the roadside detention.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354. But an
officer may not make unrelated investigation inquiries “in a way that
prolongs the stop.” United States v. Landeros, 913 F.3d 862, 866 (9th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355).

¶15 That is not to say that law enforcement officers can never
extend a stop to investigate matters other than the original traffic violation
without violating the Fourth Amendment. To the contrary, an officer may
extend a stop to investigate matters other than the original traffic violation,
so long as “the officers have reasonable suspicion of an independent
offense.” Taylor, 60 F.4th at 1239 (quoting Landeros, 913 F.3d at 867). In sum,
“if a traffic stop is constitutionally justified at its inception[,] . . . the analysis
is twofold. Was the stop prolonged, and, if so, was the prolongation
justified by reasonable suspicion based on the information available at that
juncture?” Steinman, 130 F.4th at 704; accord Landeros, 913 F.3d at 867–68.

¶16 Here, the trooper reviewed Rowe’s logbook. Law
enforcement officers may request routine driving documents while
conducting a legitimate stop. Because commercial truck drivers must
maintain logbooks, 49 C.F.R. § 395.8(k)(2), logbooks are also included in this
category, United States v. Maldonado, 356 F.3d 130, 134 (1st Cir. 2004). It
follows that an officer authorized to inspect commercial vehicles may ask

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for, review, and take the time required to ensure a logbook’s accuracy. See
United States v. Nguyen, 59 F.4th 958, 963–64 (8th Cir. 2023) (Asking a driver
for logbooks, bills of lading, and safety equipment and asking about
ownership, registration, and insurance are all proper inquiries for a
commercial vehicle.); Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355 (Officers may inquire into
matters ensuring vehicles are operated “safely and responsibly.”); 49 C.F.R.
§§ 395.3 and 395.8 (The number of hours a driver may be driving is strictly
limited and recorded in the logbooks.).

¶17 Rowe does not contest the validity of the initial stop or that he
needed to have certain information on hand, including the logbook, data on
his company, truck, and the goods transported, as well as the time and
mileage traveled. And given the paper logbook and records, the trooper
had to verify that Rowe was entering all necessary information into his
logbook. Thus, the trooper had a sufficient reason to extend the duration of
the traffic stop. Cf. United States v. Barragan, 379 F.3d 524, 527, 528-29 (8th
Cir. 2004) (A forty-minute license-and-registration verification was
reasonable because of the extenuating circumstance that the vehicle was
registered in a different state than where it was bought.). And the trooper
testified that he was entering and verifying this information as he made
phone calls about his suspicions of drug activity. The evidence supports the
superior court’s finding that the trooper did not extend the stop beyond
what was necessary to gather the physical information, and there is no issue
with the trooper simultaneously inquiring into drug-related matters. State
v. Sweeney, 224 Ariz. 107, 112, ¶ 19 (App. 2010) (An officer may inquire into
matters unrelated to the grounds for the stop if the inquiries do not
measurably extend the stop’s duration. (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S.
323, 333 (2009))). Based on this evidentiary record, the superior court did
not err in finding no Fourth Amendment violation during this timeframe.

B. The Trooper Had Reasonable Suspicion and Acted Diligently to
Confirm the Suspicion in Continuing the Encounter.

¶18 After reviewing Rowe’s logbook and questioning him about
it, the trooper had completed the purpose of the initial stop. Any
subsequent delay or detention could be a second Fourth Amendment
seizure, permissible only with consent or reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 23-24, ¶¶ 22, 25 (App. 2007); see also

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Steinman, 130 F.4th at 704.2 Rowe did not consent to a search, so the trooper
had to have reasonable suspicion to continue the encounter.

¶19 We review investigatory detentions as a two-step inquiry,
first considering whether there was reasonable suspicion at the start of the
detention, and then whether the action taken was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances justifying the stop. Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 24, ¶ 27.
We review de novo the superior court’s legal conclusions addressing
(1) whether the totality of the circumstances amounted to reasonable
suspicion and (2) whether the duration of the investigation was reasonable.
State v. Woods, 236 Ariz. 527, 530, ¶ 10 (App. 2015); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).

¶20 Reasonable suspicion must be based on a particularized and
objective basis that the defendant is engaged in criminal activity,
considering the totality of the circumstances. State v. Boteo-Flores, 230 Ariz.
105, 107-08, ¶ 12 (2012) (“The totality of the circumstances, not each factor
in isolation, determines whether reasonable suspicion exists.”). Courts
“accord deference to a trained law enforcement officer’s ability to
distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions.” Teagle, 217 Ariz. at
24, ¶ 26.

¶21 Here, the trooper testified about three facts giving rise to his
suspicion: (1) Rowe was using a paper logbook when he had to use an
electronic one, (2) Rowe had more air fresheners in the driver’s
compartment and sleeper berth than was necessary for ordinary use, and
(3) Rowe gave inconsistent answers to questions related to his trips from
Arkansas to California. The trooper testified that, based on his training and
experience, the abundance of air fresheners could be used to cover the smell
of marijuana (which is impermissible in commercial trucks), and paper
logbooks are easy to falsify and are frequently used to hide criminal
activity. These facts, in combination, gave rise to reasonable suspicion.

¶22 Having determined the trooper had reasonable suspicion to
detain Rowe, the question remains whether the length of detention was
reasonable. There is no “hard-and-fast” time limit for a permissible
investigatory detention. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). The

2 We do not consider the time in which the trooper requested consent
to search the vehicle because it occurred while the trooper was questioning
Rowe about his logbook, and the trooper requested a drug-sniffing dog
within a minute after confirming Rowe declined.

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issue is “whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that
was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time
it was necessary to detain the defendant.” Boteo-Flores, 230 Ariz. at 108, ¶ 15
(quoting Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686). An extended duration is generally
permissible when waiting for a drug-sniffing dog. Id. at 109, ¶ 17; Teagle,
217 Ariz. at 266-67, ¶ 35 (An hour-and-forty-minute delay in receiving a dog
sniff was not “necessarily unreasonable.”); see also United States v. Bloomfield,
40 F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[L]ocal government police forces and the
state highway patrol cannot be expected to have drug dogs immediately
available to all officers in the field at all times.”).

¶23 As in Teagle, the trooper did not unreasonably detain Rowe.
The trooper requested a local drug-sniffing dog right after Rowe declined
consent, and, when that was unavailable, he requested the nearest drug
dog, which was about 30 miles away in Winslow. It is unclear why it took
roughly an hour to drive the dog the 30 miles, but that is unrelated to the
trooper’s actions. He acted diligently to confirm his suspicions and did so
promptly. The trooper’s detention of Rowe for an hour, pending a
drug-sniffing dog search, was reasonable and supported by reasonable
suspicion.

CONCLUSION

¶24 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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