State v. Barnes

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Petitioner,

v.

RANDALL MALCOME BARNES, Respondent.

No. 1 CA-CR 24-0554 PRPC
FILED 08-07-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2018-006078-001
The Honorable Kevin B. Wein, Judge

REVERSED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Faith C. Klepper
Counsel for Petitioner

Apfel Law Group, Phoenix
By Seth Apfel
Counsel for Respondent
 STATE v. BARNES
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 The State of Arizona petitions for review of the superior
court’s grant of Randall Barnes’ petition for post-conviction relief under
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.1. We grant review and, for the
following reasons, reverse the superior court’s grant of post-conviction
relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In October 2018, Barnes and his brother had an argument with
their neighbors that escalated into an exchange of gunfire. One of the
neighbors was shot and killed. Two witnesses identified Barnes as the
shooter; two other witnesses identified Barnes’ brother as the shooter.
Police were unable to match the fatal bullets to any of the guns recovered
from the scene.

¶3 The State charged Barnes with first degree murder, but
shortly before trial offered to let Barnes plead down to manslaughter.
Barnes entered the plea agreement in November 2021 and was sentenced to
10.5 years’ incarceration.

¶4 Three years later, Barnes petitioned for post-conviction relief
under Rule 33.1(e). He alleged he discovered evidence of prosecutorial
misconduct in concealing the problematic disciplinary history of the
detective who served as lead case agent in his homicide investigation.
Barnes and his counsel submitted affidavits in support of the petition
stating that they would have rejected the plea agreement and gone to trial
if they had known of the detective’s disciplinary history. The parties
waived an evidentiary hearing. After oral argument, the superior court
found the detective’s disciplinary history was material and granted relief.

¶5 The State timely petitioned for review and we have
jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 13-4031 and -4239(C); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.16.

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Decision of the Court

DISCUSSION

¶6 We will not disturb a superior court’s ruling on a petition for
post-conviction relief absent an abuse of discretion or error of law. State v.
Reed, 252 Ariz. 236, 238, ¶ 6 (App. 2021). We review the court’s legal
conclusions de novo. Id. We will affirm the superior court’s decision if it is
legally correct for any reason. State v. Roseberry, 237 Ariz. 507, 508, ¶ 7
(2015).

¶7 The State argues (1) the superior court erred in finding that
Barnes’ guilty plea did not preclude post-conviction relief, and (2) the
evidence of the detective’s disciplinary history was insufficient to merit
relief under Rule 33.1(e).

1. Preclusion

¶8 The superior court found that Barnes’ guilty plea did not
preclude post-conviction relief because the State’s failure to disclose the
detective’s disciplinary history rendered Barnes’ plea involuntary. The
State asserts this was error because criminal defendants need not have
complete knowledge of the relevant circumstances before pleading guilty,
and thus its failure to disclose the detective’s disciplinary history did not
affect the voluntariness of Barnes’ plea.

¶9 The voluntariness of a defendant’s plea is a question for a
constitutional claim under Rule 33.1(a). See State v. Leyva, 241 Ariz. 521, 525,
¶ 9 (App. 2017). Barnes did not raise a constitutional claim—he brought a
newly-discovered evidence claim under Rule 33.1(e). A guilty plea does not
preclude a Rule 33.1(e) claim. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.2(b); Ariz. R. Crim. P.
33.2(a)(1) cmt. (a guilty plea waives “all non-jurisdictional [claims] . . .
except those that relate to the acceptance or validity of the plea or
sentence”). The superior court reached the correct conclusion in finding that
Barnes’ guilty plea did not preclude post-conviction relief.

2. Relief under Rule 33.1(e)

¶10 Rule 33.1(e) permits a superior court to grant post-conviction
relief when “newly discovered material facts probably exist, and those facts
probably would have changed the judgment or sentence.” Ariz. R. Crim. P.
33.1(e). Newly discovered material facts exist if:

(1) the facts were discovered after sentencing;
(2) the defendant exercised due diligence in
discovering these facts; and

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(3) the newly discovered facts are material and not
merely cumulative or used solely for
impeachment, unless the impeachment
evidence substantially undermines testimony
that was of such critical significance that the
impeachment evidence probably would have
changed the judgment or sentence.

Id.

¶11 Barnes and his counsel submitted affidavits asserting they
would have rejected the plea agreement if they had known of the detective’s
disciplinary history. The superior court concluded the evidence that Barnes
would have made a different decision regarding the plea agreement was
sufficient to warrant relief. This was error.

¶12 Barnes characterizes his claim as a newly discovered evidence
claim under Rule 33.1(e). But by framing his claim as a matter of his own
decision to plead guilty, he essentially challenges the voluntariness of his
plea. See Leyva, 241 Ariz. at 525, ¶ 9. Such claims must be filed within 90
days of sentencing. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.4(b)(3)(A). Barnes’ claim was not.

¶13 Under Rule 33.1(e), the court must determine whether the
newly discovered evidence “probably would have changed the judgment or
sentence.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.1(e)(3) (emphasis added). A defendant’s
subjective decision to accept or reject a plea agreement is not a judgment or
sentence. A judgment is a “court’s adjudication that the defendant is guilty
or not guilty based on the jury’s or the court’s verdict, or the defendant’s
plea.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.1(b) (emphasis added). A sentence is a “court’s
pronouncement of the penalty imposed on the defendant after a judgment
of guilty.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.1(c) (emphasis added). Thus, Rule 33.1(e)(3)
asks whether the newly discovered evidence would have changed (1) the
court’s adjudication of guilt based on the defendant’s plea, or (2) the court’s
pronouncement of the penalty for that adjudication. The evidence’s effect
on the defendant’s subjective decision to plea is irrelevant.

¶14 This means a superior court considering a Rule 33.1(e) claim
must determine whether it would have rejected the plea agreement or
sentenced the defendant differently if the newly discovered evidence were
in the record at the time of the plea. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Martin, 182 Ariz.
145, 147 (1995) (superior court must determine voluntariness and
intelligence of plea before accepting or rejecting it); State v. Durham, 108
Ariz. 327, 329 (1972) (“[T]he trial court must satisfy itself that there is a

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factual basis for the plea of guilty.”). Absent a finding that the disciplinary
evidence probably would have changed the judgment or sentence in this
case, the superior court erred in granting relief under Rule 33.1(e). And the
record here would not support such a finding.

¶15 Newly discovered evidence must be “not merely cumulative
or used solely for impeachment, unless the impeachment evidence
substantially undermines testimony that was of such critical significance
that the impeachment evidence probably would have changed the
judgment or sentence.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.1(e)(3). We review Rule 33.1(e)
claims based on the state of the evidence as it existed at the time of a
defendant’s plea. See State v. Amaral, 239 Ariz. 217, 219, ¶ 9 (2016) (newly
discovered evidence “must appear on its face to have existed at the time of
trial but be discovered after trial”).

¶16 When Barnes entered the plea agreement in November 2021,
everyone understood that the detective was unavailable to testify at trial
because she was on medical leave. And the State affirmed that it did not
intend to call the detective to testify at trial. Because the detective was never
going to testify, there was nothing for the disciplinary evidence to
undermine.

¶17 Barnes argues that he “could have and would have called [the
detective] to question the integrity of her investigation and her credibility
as the lead detective who took key statements and handled evidence.” But
there is no evidence that, at the time of his plea, Barnes could have forced
the detective to testify despite her being on medical leave. Barnes claims the
detective was never actually unavailable but offers only (1) a 2023 minute
entry from a separate case in which a separate judge found the detective
was “no longer unavailable,” and (2) a 2024 minute entry from the same
judge noting that news reports had “challenged [the] truthfulness of [the
detective’s] health-related claims.” Neither establishes that the detective
would have been available to testify at Barnes’ trial.

¶18 The record is clear that, at least as far as the court and the
parties knew in November 2021, the detective was medically unavailable to
testify at trial. The evidence of her disciplinary history could not have
substantially undermined her testimony because she would not have been
available to give any testimony at trial. Thus, the disciplinary evidence
could have had no effect on the judgment or sentence.

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CONCLUSION

¶19 We reverse.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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