State v. Becker

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

NINA MAE BECKER, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 24-0555 PRPC
FILED 08-05-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2023-006919-001
CR2020-002008-001
The Honorable Jeffrey A. Rueter, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Nina Mae Becker, Phoenix
Petitioner

Arizona Attorney General’s Office
By Todd C. Lawson
Counsel for Respondent
 STATE v. BECKER
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Chief Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Petitioner Nina Mae Becker (“Becker”) seeks review of the
superior court’s summary dismissal of her first Arizona Rule of Criminal
Procedure (“Rule”) 33 petition for post-conviction relief. For the following
reasons, we grant review but deny relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 On June 20, 2023, pursuant to plea agreements resolving two
criminal cases, Becker pled guilty to two counts of presentment of a false
instrument for filing, both Class 6 felonies, and one count of a signing of
petitions violation, a Class 1 misdemeanor. The charges stemmed from
Becker’s 2020 and 2022 efforts to qualify for the Republican primary ballot,
including alleged misconduct in the submission of nominating petitions.
The agreements contemplated supervised probation, with the possibility of
up to one year in jail as a condition. The court accepted her pleas and later
sentenced her to two years of supervised probation. She spent 77 days in
custody between her arrest and sentencing.

¶3 Becker filed the petition for post-conviction relief at issue here
under Rule 33, asserting her pleas were not voluntary because she entered
them under duress caused by “the medical emergency she felt she was
under.” Medical records from Maricopa County Correctional Health
Services showed that Becker had been diagnosed with seborrheic
dermatitis—a common skin condition—while in custody. She claimed the
jail’s inadequate medical care led her to fear for her life and plead guilty
solely to secure release and obtain outside treatment. The superior court
summarily dismissed the petition, concluding Becker had not established a
colorable claim for relief.

¶4 Becker timely petitioned for review. The State did not file a
response. We have jurisdiction under Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 9, A.R.S. § 13-
4239(C), and Rule 33.16.

2
 STATE v. BECKER
Decision of the Court

DISCUSSION

¶5 “We will not disturb the superior court’s ruling on a PCR
petition absent an abuse of discretion or error of law.” State v. Evans, 252
Ariz. 590, 594 ¶ 7 (App. 2022). As the petitioner, Becker bears the burden of
establishing such error. State v. Poblete, 227 Ariz. 537, 538 ¶ 1 (App. 2011).

¶6 Before accepting a guilty plea, the court must engage the
defendant in a colloquy and ensure the plea is voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.2(a); State v. Rose, 231 Ariz. 500, 505 ¶ 13
(2013). The record shows—and Becker does not dispute—that the court
fulfilled those obligations. Becker affirmed under oath that she had
reviewed both plea agreements with her attorney, understood their terms,
and was entering her pleas voluntarily. She confirmed her plea was not
induced by force, threats, or promises outside the agreement. See Ariz. R.
Crim. P. 17.3(a). And the court was entitled to rely on those assurances in
concluding her plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. State v.
Chairez, 235 Ariz. 99, 100 ¶ 8 (App. 2013).

¶7 Statements made during a plea colloquy are accorded a strong
presumption of verity and are not easily overcome by post-conviction
claims. State v. Leyva, 241 Ariz. 521, 525 ¶ 12 (App. 2017); see State v.
Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984) (recognizing statements to court at a change
of plea hearing about voluntariness normally bind the defendant). Despite
this heavy burden, Becker asserts her pleas were “not a product of free will
but rather a desperate attempt to escape her deteriorating condition,” and
that she “believed her life was in danger due to the inadequate medical care
she was receiving.” However, she did not mention her skin condition until
the end of the plea hearing, when she requested release under pretrial
services pending sentencing. Even then, she did not suggest it had
influenced her decision to plead guilty. At sentencing, she again addressed
the court but raised no concerns regarding her health.

¶8 In reviewing Becker’s post-conviction petition, the superior
court examined her medical records, which confirmed a diagnosis of
seborrheic dermatitis and showed she was receiving treatment while in
custody. It found, “The medical records do not support the contention that
[Becker’s] medical condition was so severe that she signed a plea agreement
to get out of custody to save her life.” We defer to the court’s evaluation of
these records and other evidence. See State v. Sasak, 178 Ariz. 182, 186 (App.
1993) (appellate court defers to trial court in resolving conflicts in evidence
in post-conviction proceedings). It also noted the plea agreements

3
 STATE v. BECKER
Decision of the Court

contained no promise of release, further undermining Becker’s claim that
she pled guilty solely to obtain outside medical care.

¶9 Moreover, to find error with the court’s evaluation of the
facts, we must—after examining the entirety of the evidence—be “left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” State
v. King, 250 Ariz. 433, 438–39 ¶ 21 (App. 2021) (quoting State v. Burr, 126
Ariz. 338, 339 (1980)). But here, Becker has not presented any evidence
showing the jail did not or was unable to provide adequate care. And she
further failed to show that her medical condition compelled her to plead
against her will. Even assuming her concerns were sincere, they do not
reach the high bar needed to find error. Id. Nor would they rise to the level
of duress necessary to overcome the presumption of verity afforded to her
statements at the plea hearing—particularly where the record reflects that
she understood the agreement and made “a voluntary and intelligent
choice among the alternative courses of action.” Leyva, 241 Ariz. at 525 ¶ 14.

¶10 Because Becker did not present a colorable claim that her plea
resulted from duress, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in
summarily dismissing her petition. Rule 33.11(a); see State v. Verdugo, 183
Ariz. 135, 137 (App. 1995).

CONCLUSION

¶11 For the foregoing reasons, we grant review but deny relief.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

4