State v. Scott

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

PAUL EDWARD SCOTT, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 24-0569
FILED 8-12-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2022-112690-001
The Honorable Kevin B. Wein, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Alice Jones
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Cynthia D. Beck
Counsel for Appellant

Paul Edward Scott, Eloy
Appellant

STATE v. SCOTT
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Paul Edward Scott appeals his conviction and sentence for
first-degree murder. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 13-1105(A)(1). Scott’s
counsel has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), stating counsel has searched
the record on appeal and found no arguable question of law that is not
frivolous. Counsel asks us to search the record for fundamental error. See
State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537 ¶ 30 (App. 1999) (stating we review the
entire record for reversible error). We allowed Scott to file a supplemental
brief in propria persona, which he did, raising issues that we address. Finding
no reversible error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts in a light most favorable to sustaining the
verdict and resolve all reasonable inferences against Scott. State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230 ¶ 2 (App. 1998).

¶3 On the evening of April 8, 2022, Scott, a transient, fell asleep
after drinking beer in his car in a parking lot behind a convenience store gas
station. A young woman (“Dana”)1 woke Scott to make sure he was okay
after noticing Scott’s feet hanging out of the car. The two began drinking
beer and chatting in Scott’s car when Peter—with whom Dana lived and
had children—appeared and began yelling at and punching Dana to force
her out of the vehicle. Peter threatened to shoot Scott, though Scott never
saw a gun. Scott grabbed a utility knife from his dashboard, causing Peter
to back away. Scott then returned to his car and attempted to run down
Peter, who ran off.

¶4 Scott dropped Dana off at the convenience store and went
back to the parking lot. Peter returned and attacked Scott and his car with

1 We use pseudonyms to protect the victims’ privacy. See Ariz. R. Sup.
Ct. 111(i).

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STATE v. SCOTT
Decision of the Court

rocks and a long pole before leaving. Several minutes later, officers arrived
in response to two witnesses’ 911 calls. While talking with Scott, the officers
received a dispatch call regarding another incident in which a man was seen
choking a woman (“the separate choking incident”). The officers responded
to that call, believing it was related to Scott’s incident, but found only Dana
hiding in a bush.

¶5 Meanwhile, Scott moved his car back behind the convenience
store, drank more beer, and fell asleep. Shortly thereafter, Peter again
approached Scott’s car and spoke with him. A few minutes later, Peter
stepped back from the car and Scott began driving away. But after noticing
Peter make some “motion with his hands,” Scott circled back twice. On the
second time, Scott rapidly accelerated and hit Peter, sending him airborne.
The impact killed Peter and caused Scott to crash, rendering his car
inoperable.

¶6 After about fifteen minutes, Scott went into the convenience
store and asked the manager to call the police because he had “killed
somebody.” He then returned to his car, drank more beer, covered Peter
with a blanket, and waited for the police. He later told the police he had not
wanted to kill Peter, but Peter had “talked too much s--t,” “beat up a
woman,” and was “an evil man” who “probably needed to die.” Scott
claimed Peter’s actions triggered his post-traumatic stress disorder but also
admitted he was not afraid for his life when he hit Peter and that he could
have just driven away.

¶7 Ten days later, a grand jury indicted Scott on one count of
first-degree murder, a Class 1 dangerous felony. Scott noticed several
defenses, including crime prevention, self-defense, defense of others,
defense of property, and justification.

¶8 In December 2023, the State filed a motion in limine to
preclude the 911 calls and witnesses’ testimonies that suggested Peter and
Dana were involved in the separate choking incident. The State argued such
evidence was inadmissible because Scott did not witness the choking
incident and was unaware of it before killing Peter. Scott countered the
evidence was admissible “other act” evidence under Arizona Rule of
Evidence (“Rule”) 404(b) and supported his self-defense argument. After a
three-day evidentiary hearing, the court precluded evidence related to the
choking incident but allowed Scott to re-urge the motion if the record
developed at trial made the evidence admissible.

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STATE v. SCOTT
Decision of the Court

¶9 Scott’s ten-day trial began in July 2024. During trial, Scott
requested various jury instructions on self-defense, crime prevention, and
defense of an occupied vehicle, citing multiple Arizona statutes and a
California jury instruction. The court denied Scott’s request for the
occupied vehicle and California instructions but gave the requested self-
defense and crime prevention instructions, as well as an instruction that
Scott had no duty to retreat. The court also instructed the jury on the
charged crime of first-degree premeditated murder and, at Scott’s request,
on the lesser-included offenses of second-degree murder and
manslaughter.

¶10 The jury found Scott guilty of first-degree murder. In
September, the court conducted a sentencing hearing in compliance with
Scott’s constitutional rights and Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.
The court sentenced Scott to natural life in the Arizona Department of
Corrections, see A.R.S. § 13-752(A), credited him with 903 days of
presentence incarceration, and imposed a total of $44 in fines.

¶11 We have jurisdiction over Scott’s timely appeal under Article
6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. Sections 12-120.21(A)(1),
13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Alleged Error in Precluding Evidence

¶12 Scott argues the court erred by precluding evidence of the
choking incident. Citing Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 4042—
apparently for the first time—he contends the precluded evidence is “other
act” evidence that supports his self-defense argument. We disagree.

¶13 Prior acts of violence committed by a victim and known to a
defendant at the time of an alleged crime are admissible if offered to prove
the defendant had a reasonable belief he was in danger. State v. Fish, 222
Ariz. 109, 116 ¶ 18 (App. 2009); see also State v. Taylor, 169 Ariz. 121, 124
(1991) (“Arizona courts have long held that a murder defendant who
defends on the basis of justification should be permitted to introduce
evidence of specific acts of violence by the deceased if the defendant either
observed the acts himself or was informed of the acts before the

2 Although Scott cites the analogous Federal Rules of Evidence in his
supplemental brief, he makes no argument as to why we should apply
those rules in favor of the Arizona Rules of Evidence or how such
application would result in a different outcome, and we discern none.

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STATE v. SCOTT
Decision of the Court

homicide.”). And evidence of a victim’s unknown prior act of violence may
be admissible to prove the victim was the aggressor, though such evidence
is limited to general reputation evidence under Rules 404(a)(2) and 405,
which permit specific act evidence only when the victim’s character is an
essential element of the defense or on cross-examination. Fish, 222 Ariz. at
118 ¶ 28.

¶14 “In Arizona, a victim’s character is not an essential element of
self-defense[,]” consistent with interpretations of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Id. at 119 ¶ 29. Thus, under Rule 405, “a defendant may not
introduce evidence of specific acts unknown to the defendant at the time of
the alleged crime to show that the victim was the initial aggressor.” Id. at
121 ¶ 35. Further, “evidence of specific violent acts by the [v]ictim is not
admissible to prove a defendant’s state of mind and reasonableness unless
the defendant claiming self-defense knew of the specific acts” before the
alleged crime. Id. at 121 ¶ 37.

¶15 In Fish, we held that “because of the nature of the record,” a
defendant might nonetheless introduce specific act evidence previously
unknown to the defendant if that evidence would be used to corroborate
the defendant’s account of the crime. Id. at 124–25 ¶¶ 48–49. As explained
in Fish and recognized by the superior court in this case, a defendant
seeking to admit evidence of prior violent acts must still comply with Rule
404(b):

To determine whether specific prior act evidence is
admissible under Rule 404(b), a court must first determine
whether the evidence is clear and convincing as to the
conduct and that the person alleged to have committed it did
so, although ultimately those facts are left to the jury to decide
if the evidence is admitted. In addition, a trial court must also
determine whether the evidence: (1) Is offered for a proper
purpose under Rule 404(b); (2) Is relevant to prove that stated
purpose; and (3) Has sufficient probative value as not to be
substantially outweighed by undue prejudice under Rule 403.

Id. at 123 ¶ 43 (citation modified).

¶16 Here, the superior court found evidence of the alleged
separate choking incident was “presently inadmissible” because Scott had
shown no proper purpose for such evidence. But the court allowed Scott to
“re-urge this motion during trial relying on the record developed during
the presentation of evidence,” provided that he also “address the other

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STATE v. SCOTT
Decision of the Court

admissibility factors including that there is clear and convincing evidence
of the assault.” But because Scott conceded at trial that Dana denied the
separate choking incident occurred between her and Peter, Scott could not
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Peter choked Dana.
Further, he did not re-urge the motion, much less attempt to address the
additional admissibility factors recognized in Fish. Accordingly, the
superior court did not err by precluding evidence of the separate choking
incident.

II. Scott’s Requested Instructions Regarding Use of Force in Defense
of an Occupied Vehicle

¶17 Scott contends the court erred by denying his requests to
instruct the jury pursuant to A.R.S. Sections 13-418 and -419 on the use of
force in defense of an occupied vehicle and the presumption that the threat
or use of physical force was immediately necessary under specified
circumstances. We again find no error.

¶18 “A party is entitled to an instruction on any theory reasonably
supported by the evidence.” State v. Almeida, 238 Ariz. 77, 79 ¶ 9 (App. 2015)
(quoting State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58, 61 ¶ 16 (1998)). In making this
assessment, courts ask “whether the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the proponent, supports giving the instruction.” Id. (citing State
v. King, 225 Ariz. 87, 90 ¶ 13 (2010)). Thus, the superior court does not weigh
or resolve conflicting evidence but merely determines if the slightest
evidence tends to show justification. Id. at 79–80 ¶ 9 (citation modified).
“[W]e independently assess whether the evidence supported a justification
instruction, because that is a question of law and involves no discretionary
factual determination.” Id. at 80 ¶ 9.

¶19 Section 13-418(A) outlines the justification defense of an
occupied vehicle:

[A] person is justified in . . . using . . . deadly physical force
against another person if the person reasonably believes
himself or another person to be in imminent peril of death or
serious physical injury and the person against whom the . . .
deadly physical force is . . . used was in the process of
unlawfully or forcefully entering, or had unlawfully or
forcefully entered, a[n] . . . occupied vehicle, or had removed
or was attempting to remove another person against the other
person’s will from the . . . occupied vehicle.

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STATE v. SCOTT
Decision of the Court

¶20 Section 13-419 provides presumptions that may apply to a
justification defense under several statutes, including A.R.S. Section 13-418:

A. A person is presumed to reasonably believe that the . . . use
of . . . deadly force is immediately necessary . . . if the person
knows or has reason to believe that the person against
whom . . . deadly force is . . . used is unlawfully or forcefully
entering or has unlawfully or forcefully entered and is present
in the person’s . . . occupied vehicle.

B. [A] person who is unlawfully or forcefully entering or who
has unlawfully or forcefully entered and is present in a[n] . . .
occupied vehicle is presumed to pose an imminent threat of
unlawful deadly harm to any person who is in the . . .
occupied vehicle.

A.R.S. § 13-419(A)–(B). Thus, Section 13-419’s presumptions—that Scott
was presumed to reasonably believe the use of deadly force was
immediately necessary and that Peter posed an imminent threat of
unlawful deadly harm to any person in Scott’s vehicle—would apply if, at
the time Scott chose to run down Peter, Scott knew or had reason to believe
Peter was “unlawfully or forcefully entering” Scott’s vehicle or had already
done so and was present in the vehicle.

¶21 Here, the clear video evidence showed Peter walking a
substantial distance behind Scott’s moving car and the gap between them
was widening before Scott chose to stop. Scott acknowledged he could have
simply driven away but chose instead to make a U-turn, point his car at
Peter, and “floor[] it.” And even if Peter unlawfully or forcefully entered
Scott’s car during their initial encounter—when he attacked Dana and tried
to pull her out of the car—he was not present in Scott’s car when Scott
decided to run him down. See A.R.S. § 13-419(A) (requiring aggressor to be
“present in the person’s . . . occupied vehicle”). Because no facts support a
conclusion or belief that Peter unlawfully or forcefully entered Scott’s
vehicle and was present in the vehicle when Scott decided to run him down,
Section 13-419’s presumptions do not apply.

¶22 Moreover, no evidence supports the factual predicate for
requiring an instruction under A.R.S. Section 13-418—that Scott could have
“reasonably believe[d] himself or another person to be in imminent peril of

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STATE v. SCOTT
Decision of the Court

death or serious physical injury” at the time he decided to kill Peter.3 At the
time of the final incident, Dana was not in Scott’s car, and no facts indicate
she was anywhere near the parking lot. Thus, Scott could not have
reasonably believed she was in imminent peril of death or serious physical
injury from Peter. And as for Scott, he admitted never seeing a gun or other
weapon, knew Peter no longer had the pole, and affirmed he was not afraid
for his life when he decided to run over Peter. He also acknowledged he
could have simply driven away rather than stop, circle back, and renew the
dispute by running down Peter. Because no facts support that Scott could
have reasonably believed he was in imminent peril of death or serious
physical injury, the superior court did not err in declining to instruct the
jury under A.R.S. Section 13-418.

¶23 Scott also contends the court erred by denying his proposed
instructions based on an evaluation of his credibility. But Scott does not
develop this argument or cite to supporting evidence in the record, and thus
he has waived it. See State v. Vargas, 249 Ariz. 186, 191 ¶ 22 (2020) (“[I]f the
appellant fails to properly develop an argument, the court may consider it
abandoned and waived.”). Further, we find no evidence in the record
supporting this argument, and as previously discussed, there was no
substantial evidence to support the requested instructions. See King, 225
Ariz. at 91 ¶ 17 (citing State v. Lujan, 136 Ariz. 102, 104 (1983) (“The privilege
of self-defense is not available to one who is at fault in provoking an
encounter or difficulty that results in a homicide.” (citation modified))).

¶24 Finally, Scott cites Newell v. State, 49 So. 3d 66, 74–78 ¶¶ 22–34
(Miss. 2010), and its application of the “Castle Doctrine,” ostensibly to argue
he had no duty to retreat from Peter. See also A.R.S. § 13-418(B) (“A person
has no duty to retreat before threatening or using physical force or deadly
physical force pursuant to this section.”). But the superior court instructed
the jury as to the “no duty to retreat” rule regarding justification for self-
defense and the use of force in crime prevention, and counsel for both the
State and Scott argued its possible applicability to Scott’s case. In his brief,
Scott does not develop a cogent argument of error on this issue, let alone
show fundamental error occurred. Accordingly, he has waived review of
this issue. See Vargas, 249 Ariz. at 191 ¶ 22.

3 Scott questions at what distance an assailant presents an imminent
threat, and he purports to cite statistics and military rules of engagement,
which he did not introduce at trial. He cites no authority for inclusion of
this purported “evidence” on appeal, and we find none.

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STATE v. SCOTT
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III. Adequacy of the Superior Court’s Final Jury Instructions

¶25 Scott argues the superior court’s final instructions to the jury
were inadequate and the court committed fundamental error by not
instructing the jury “on numerous statutory definitions and expanded
language of terms in regard to (self-defense/crime-prevention).” He
maintains the court should have provided “any instructions defining
crimes which would have been helpful to the jury to determine an element
of his defense.”

¶26 The superior court has discretion over whether to give or
refuse jury instructions. State v. Brown, 260 Ariz. 476, 480–81 ¶ 17 (2025).
Because Scott did not raise this issue at trial, we review for fundamental
error only. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 568 ¶ 22 (2005).

¶27 Scott fails to show he requested the additional instructions for
which he now generally argues and provides little clarity on appeal as to
what those instructions should have been. Rather, he quotes extensively
from State v. Fish, where the defendant requested an instruction that listed
the elements for the crimes of endangerment, threatening or intimidating,
and aggravated assault and also defined “unlawful physical force” as
including these crimes. 222 Ariz. at 126 ¶ 55. We concluded the court erred
in denying the defendant’s request because “we cannot assume that the jury
was aware of laws on which it was not instructed.” Id. at 129 ¶ 66.

¶28 But our decision in Fish was also based on the conclusion that
there was evidence in the record supporting a claim of self-defense. Id. at
129–30 ¶¶ 65, 68. We cannot reach the same conclusion here. Justification
defenses demand an immediate need to act. See, e.g., A.R.S. §§ 13-404 (self-
defense requires “a reasonable person would believe that physical force is
immediately necessary to protect himself”); -405 (requiring “a reasonable
person would believe that deadly physical force is immediately necessary
to protect himself”); -406 (defense of a third person requires immediacy
under §§ 13-404 or -405); -411 (crime prevention authorizes force only if
“immediately necessary” to prevent the commission of a specifically
identified offense). Here, no evidence was presented that Scott had an
immediate need to act to protect himself, Dana, or any other third person,
or to prevent a crime from being committed, when he chose to run down
Peter. On the contrary, the evidence unequivocally showed that even if
Peter could have been presumed to have initially posed an immediate
threat when he approached a sleeping Scott in the parking lot, he no longer
posed such a threat after he backed away from the car and Scott drove
away. The video evidence and Scott’s own statements make clear that, at

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STATE v. SCOTT
Decision of the Court

the time he was killed, Peter posed no immediate threat to Scott or anyone
else. Thus, because there is no evidence in the record supporting an element
of Scott’s self-defense claim, we see no error in the court’s decision to deny
Scott’s request.

IV. Additional Considerations

¶29 After reviewing the entire record for reversible error, we find
none. See Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300; Clark, 196 Ariz. at 537 ¶ 30. The evidence
presented at trial was substantial and supports Scott’s conviction and
sentence. So far as the record reveals, Scott was represented by counsel at
all stages of the proceedings and had a chance to speak at sentencing. The
sentence imposed was within statutory guidelines, and the proceedings
complied with Scott’s constitutional and statutory rights and the Arizona
Rules of Criminal Procedure. We also note that Scott filed over seventy
supplemental citations of legal authority, but none were availing or at all
persuasive, and thus do not affect our decision.

¶30 Upon filing of this decision, defense counsel shall inform Scott
of the status of the appeal and of his future options. Counsel has no further
obligations unless, upon review, counsel finds an issue appropriate for
submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for review. See State
v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85 (1984). This court, on its own motion,
grants Scott thirty days from the date of this decision to proceed, if he
desires, with a pro per motion for reconsideration. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.
31.3(a) (stating the appellate court may for good cause suspend any
provision of Rule 31 and order proceedings as it directs); 31.20(c) (allowing
fifteen days to move for reconsideration). Scott may petition the Arizona
Supreme Court for review no later than thirty days after the date of this
decision or, if he files a timely motion for reconsideration, no later than
fifteen days after the motion is decided. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.21(b)(2)(A).

CONCLUSION

¶31 We affirm Scott’s conviction and sentence.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JT

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