State v. Castleberry

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

WHITNEY LEE CASTLEBERRY, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 24-0594
FILED 06-12-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2021-120110-001
The Honorable Sam J. Myers, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Joseph E. Begun
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Defender, Phoenix
By Michelle DeWaelsche
Counsel for Appellant
 STATE v. CASTLEBERRY
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Veronika Fabian
joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Vice Chief Judge:

¶1 Arizona law permits a person to use deadly force in defense
of premises when that person reasonably believes someone else is
committing a criminal trespass and deadly force is immediately necessary
to prevent or terminate that trespass. In this case, the superior court
instructed the jury that a person with “an absolute and unlimited right” to
be in a dwelling cannot commit criminal trespass, and gave the jury civil
landlord-tenant law definitions to determine whether the victim had such
a right. Those instructions converted the jury’s factual inquiry—whether
the defendant reasonably believed the victim was trespassing—into a legal
conclusion based on misplaced civil property rights. We vacate and
remand for a new trial.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the
jury’s verdict. State v. Nelson, 214 Ariz. 196, 196, ¶ 2 (App. 2007).

¶3 Defendant Whitney Lee Castleberry and Joe (a pseudonym)
had an on-and-off relationship that began in 2009. They shared a son.

¶4 In 2020, Castleberry signed a lease on an apartment.
Although Joe’s name was not on the lease, he lived there, kept his
belongings there and paid rent to Castleberry. A few months after they
moved in, Joe was locked out and he kicked in the front door. Castleberry
called the police. Joe was arrested. Castleberry paid for the repairs.

¶5 A second altercation turned deadly in May 2021. Joe returned
to the apartment after drinking all night. Castleberry found evidence on
Joe’s phone that he had been unfaithful. She told him to leave. He refused
and got physical, elbowing Castleberry in the head and slapping her face.
He then stormed out and she locked the door behind him.

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Opinion of the Court

¶6 Castleberry called her sister, who arrived to find Joe outside.
As the sisters tried to sleep, Joe began pounding on the door. They told him
to leave and tried to arrange a ride for him. The pounding grew louder.

¶7 Castleberry felt “nervous,” “scared” and “unsafe.” Joe had
kicked in the front door before. She grabbed her gun, went to the door and
cracked it open, but Joe pushed the door into her. She stumbled backwards
and fired. The bullet struck Joe. Castleberry performed CPR, but Joe died
from his injuries. The State charged Castleberry with second-degree
murder.

¶8 At trial, Castleberry argued her use of force was justified and
requested jury instructions on five justification theories: self-defense (A.R.S.
§ 13-405), defense of others (A.R.S. § 13-406), defense of premises (A.R.S.
§ 13-407), defense of a residential structure (A.R.S. § 13-418) and domestic
violence justification (A.R.S. § 13-415). The superior court instructed the
jury on all five, but modified the defense-of-premises instruction by adding
a sentence drawn loosely from State v. Reaves: “A person who has an
absolute and unlimited right to be in a dwelling cannot commit a criminal
trespass thereof.” See 252 Ariz. 553, 565, ¶ 31 (App. 2022) (holding that the
superior court properly instructed the jury that a “person who has an
absolute and unlimited right to be in a dwelling cannot commit a burglary
thereof”).

¶9 Castleberry asked the superior court to instruct the jury that
her use of force was presumed reasonable, and Joe was presumed to pose
an imminent threat under A.R.S. § 13-419 because he had forced his way
into her residence. The court denied that instruction because Castleberry’s
counsel appeared to concede during oral argument that Joe was at least an
invitee, which triggered the exception under A.R.S. § 13-419(C)(1).

¶10 The State requested jury instructions drawn from Arizona’s
Residential Landlord-Tenant Act (“Landlord-Tenant Act”). The superior
court agreed and instructed the jury on the Landlord-Tenant Act’s
definitions for landlord, owner, rent, rental agreement and tenant under
A.R.S. § 33-1310, along with termination of tenancy and recovery of
possession. Castleberry objected to both the modified defense-of-premises
instruction and the Landlord-Tenant Act instructions.

¶11 In closing, the prosecutor argued that because of Joe’s “status
as a tenant,” Castleberry’s only recourse in an “active danger—dangerous
situation is to call police, or on a proper business day, seek eviction of the
tenant. She does not get to use physical force, lethal or otherwise, to get rid

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Opinion of the Court

of someone.” The prosecutor stressed that Castleberry “became [Joe’s]
landlord” by accepting his rent payments, and she “had no right to resort
to physical force to get him to leave.” That argument, according to the
prosecutor, defeated all five of Castleberry’s justification theories: “No
matter how many different justification statutes [the] defense tries to throw
at you, they all come down to the same thing.”

¶12 After a thirteen-day trial, the jury rejected all five of
Castleberry’s justification theories and found her guilty of second-degree
murder. The superior court sentenced her to fifteen years in prison. She
timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. §§
12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶13 Castleberry challenges the jury instructions on three grounds.
We review de novo whether an instruction correctly states the law, but
review for an abuse of discretion whether the superior court should have
given a particular instruction. State v. Solis, 236 Ariz. 285, 286, ¶ 6 (App.
2014). Jury instructions should translate the law into language real people
can understand. State v. Noriega, 187 Ariz. 282, 284 (App. 1996). Trial courts
should not give instructions that might mislead or confuse the jury. State v.
Trinidad, 257 Ariz. 485, 488–89, ¶ 18 (App. 2024). If a jury instruction is
given in error, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error did not contribute to the verdict. See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561,
567, ¶ 18 (2005).

¶14 When presented with a defense-of-premises justification, the
jury must determine whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes
would believe another person was committing a criminal trespass, and
whether deadly force was immediately necessary to prevent or terminate
that trespass. A.R.S. § 13-407. Jury instructions must direct the jury to
evaluate the defendant’s reasonable belief—not the victim’s legal status.
State v. Ewer, 254 Ariz. 326, 330, ¶ 19 (2023).

I. The Modified Defense-of-Premises Jury Instruction.

¶15 Castleberry asked the superior court to give the standard
defense-of-premises jury instruction. The court did so, but added one
sentence at the State’s behest, which read: “[A] person who has an absolute
and unlimited right to be in a dwelling cannot commit a criminal trespass
thereof.” Castleberry argues that addition (1) redirected the jury from what
matters (whether she reasonably believed Joe was trespassing) to what does

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Opinion of the Court

not (Joe’s legal status), (2) shifted the burden and (3) created a mandatory
presumption against her defense.

¶16 We agree. The phrase “absolute and unlimited right” appears
nowhere in the defense-of-premises statute, A.R.S. § 13-407, or the standard
Revised Arizona Jury Instruction, Rev. Ariz. Jury Instr. Stat. Crim. 4.07
(justification in defense of premises) (6th ed. 2022).

¶17 The State borrowed it from Reaves, where this court held that
a person with an absolute and unlimited right to be in a dwelling cannot
burgle that dwelling. 252 Ariz. at 564–65, ¶¶ 30–31. But that defense
belonged to the defendant, not the victim. The defendant in Reaves invoked
the defense to defeat a burglary charge, id., and the opinion relied on State
v. Altamirano, 166 Ariz. 432, 433–34 (App. 1990), to establish that a
defendant cannot burglarize his own home. Together, Reaves and
Altamirano recognize an individual defendant’s right to be in his own
home—a shield against prosecution.

¶18 The State flipped that shield into a sword. It requested the
“absolute and unlimited right” instruction not to protect Castleberry’s right
to be in her apartment, but to establish that Joe had the absolute right to be
there—and therefore could not have trespassed. That inverted instruction
has no support in the statute or the case law. Justification defenses belong
to defendants. The term “person” as used in the justification statutes refers
to the putative criminal defendant. Ewer, 254 Ariz. at 330, ¶ 15.

¶19 The State correctly argues that Ewer permits trial courts to
instruct on applicable law when helpful to the jury. But the modified
instruction was wrong; it was harmful, not helpful. It usurped the jury’s
fact-finding role, replacing the proper inquiry (whether Castleberry
reasonably believed Joe was trespassing) with an improper one (whether
Joe had property rights). A.R.S. § 13-407. On this record, the jury could
have found that Castleberry held a reasonable belief that Joe was criminally
trespassing, which required that she have “lawful control” of the apartment
and make a “reasonable request” that he leave. See A.R.S. § 13-1502(a)(1)
(defining “criminal trespass in the third degree”). Her name was on the
lease—he stayed there at her pleasure. He hit her and she asked him to
leave. He left but returned uninvited and tried to break down the door. To
be sure, the State may introduce evidence that Joe had lived in the
apartment, but that is just a data point for the jury to find Castleberry did
not reasonably believe that a criminal trespass was afoot.

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¶20 The modified jury instruction also contradicts the
legislature’s directive. Our supreme court recently emphasized that
justification defenses in domestic violence cases apply “whether or not the
victim and the perpetrator of domestic violence are residents of the same
home.” State v. Brown, 260 Ariz. 476, 487, ¶ 50 (2025) (quoting with approval
2006 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 199, § 4 (2d Reg. Sess.)). The modified instruction
invited the jury to decide Castleberry’s justification claim based on whether
Joe lived there, precisely what did not matter in Brown. See id.

¶21 The instruction thus failed in three ways: (1) it weaponized
case law designed to protect defendants (Reaves, Altamirano), (2) it
contradicted legislative policy in domestic violence cases that justification
defenses do not depend on whether the parties shared a home (Brown) and
(3) it misdirected the jury from reasonableness to legal status (contrary to
Ewer). That misdirection was not academic—the record contained evidence
that Joe assaulted Castleberry, she told him to leave, he left, but returned
uninvited and pounded on the locked door. Because the instruction misled
the jury, it should not have been given. Noriega, 187 Ariz. at 284.

II. The Landlord-Tenant Act Jury Instructions.

¶22 Beyond the modified defense-of-premises instruction, the
superior court instructed the jury on the Landlord-Tenant Act definitions
for landlord, owner, rent, rental agreement and tenant, along with
instructions for terminating tenancies and recovering possession.
According to the “Recovery of Possession Limited” instruction: “A
landlord may not recover or take possession of the dwelling unit by action
or otherwise, including forcible removal of the tenant or his possessions.”

¶23 The landlord-tenant instructions had no place in this criminal
trial. First, the Landlord-Tenant Act governs civil tenancy disputes. It
applies to “the rental of dwelling units” and cross-references only other
civil chapters of Title 33, A.R.S. § 33-1304, not the criminal code. Cf. State v.
Fell, 203 Ariz. 186, 188–89, ¶¶ 9–14 (App. 2002) (justification defenses
defined in Title 13 cannot be cross applied across statutory schemes). When
a statute limits its own application by cross-reference to specific subjects,
we infer the legislature did not intend a broader reach. Id. at 189, ¶ 11.

¶24 Second, the defined terms did not help the jury understand
the applicable law—they led the jury astray. The “Recovery of Possession
Limited” instruction told the jury that a landlord cannot forcibly remove a
tenant. That is uncontroversial in a civil eviction proceeding, but it was
error in a criminal trial in which the defendant raised five justification

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defenses. The instruction converted a factual question into a legal
disqualification. The jurors should have determined whether Castleberry
reasonably believed Joe was trespassing, but the instruction redirected their
attention to how landlords must evict tenants.

¶25 And then in closing, the State emphasized that Castleberry
was Joe’s landlord, so she “had no right to resort to physical force to get
[Joe] to leave.” We may consider the challenged jury instructions in context,
which includes closing arguments. State v. Johnson, 205 Ariz. 413, 417, ¶ 11
(App. 2003).

¶26 Because the landlord-tenant definitions misled the jury, the
superior court erred. Given those errors and Castleberry’s trial objection,
the State must “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not
contribute to or affect the verdict or sentence.” Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567,
¶ 18.

III. Harmlessness.

¶27 The State argues that because A.R.S. § 13-407(B) permits
deadly force in defense-of-premises only as self-defense permits, any flaw
in the defense-of-premises instruction was inconsequential because the jury
rejected self-defense. But this assumes the jury rejected self-defense on the
merits—finding that Castleberry had no reasonable belief that Joe was
trespassing or that deadly force was not immediately necessary. Given the
State’s argument, the jury might have rejected self-defense because
landlords have no right to use force. After all, the State did not cabin the
landlord-tenant argument to defense of premises, but extended it to every
justification theory: “[N]o matter how many different justification statutes
[the] defense tries to throw at you, they all come down to the same thing.”

¶28 A juror who accepted that framing might have rejected self-
defense not because Castleberry was unreasonable, but because a landlord
has no right to use force at all—the erroneous premise seeded by the
modified instruction and cultivated by the landlord-tenant instructions.
The State has not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury rejected
self-defense on the merits rather than on the same tainted foundation.

¶29 The State’s harmlessness argument also fails under Brown.
When jury instructions leave room for jurors to conclude the State need not
defeat the justification defense, reversal is required. Brown, 260 Ariz. at 488,
¶ 55. That is what happened here. The instructions, read together with the
State’s closing, told the jury that Castleberry was legally barred from using
force as a landlord—no matter what a reasonable person in her

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circumstances would have believed. The State has not shown the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567, ¶ 18.

IV. Section 13-419 Presumption Instruction.

¶30 Arizona law presumes that a defendant reasonably believes
that deadly force is immediately necessary when she knows or has reason
to believe someone is unlawfully or forcefully entering her residential
structure, A.R.S. § 13-419(A), and the intruder poses an imminent threat,
A.R.S. § 13-419(B). Neither presumption applies, however, when the
person against whom force was used “has the right to be in or is a lawful
resident,” which includes “an owner, lessee, invitee or titleholder, and an
order of protection or injunction against harassment has not been filed
against that person.” A.R.S. § 13-419(C)(1).

¶31 A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction when the record
contains the “slightest evidence” to support it. Brown, 260 Ariz. at 481, ¶
18. We review the denial of a requested instruction for an abuse of
discretion, but whether the evidence supports the instruction is a legal
question we review de novo. State v. Wilson, 253 Ariz. 191, 194–95, ¶ 9 (App.
2022).

¶32 The superior court erroneously denied the presumption
instruction. Brown holds that an invitee who exceeds the scope of an
invitation becomes a trespasser. 260 Ariz. at 483, ¶ 33 (citing Nicoletti v.
Westcor, Inc., 131 Ariz. 140, 143 (1982)). The record contains more than
“slight” evidence that Joe exceeded his invitation. Castleberry testified she
felt “nervous,” “scared” and “unsafe.” She told him to leave. He left but
returned uninvited. A detective corroborated a fresh bruise on
Castleberry’s forehead. Joe had broken the door down before and
Castleberry feared he would do it again. The banging at the locked door
intensified. A jury could have found that Castleberry had reason to believe
Joe was entering unlawfully or forcefully—enough to trigger both
presumptions.

¶33 The superior court compounded this error by treating
counsel’s evidentiary assessment as a legal stipulation. When asked
whether there was “any evidence” that Joe was not at least an invitee,
Castleberry’s lawyer answered “No.” But that answer only reflected
counsel’s view of the record at that moment—not a concession or invited
error that the exception in A.R.S. § 13-419(C)(1) applies as a matter of law.
Whether Joe exceeded his invitation was a question for the jury.

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¶34 And the superior court—not Castleberry—introduced the
error. State v. Robertson, 249 Ariz. 256, 260, ¶ 18 (2020) (holding a party may
invoke invited error only when the party asserting the error is responsible
for it). Invited error does not apply here because the court raised the invitee
question and drew its own legal conclusion from counsel’s factual
assessment.

¶35 The error was not harmless. The A.R.S. § 13-419 presumption
is uniquely powerful—no other justification instruction tells the jury that a
defendant reasonably believed deadly force was necessary or that the
victim was presumed to pose an imminent threat. Without those
presumptions, Castleberry bore the full weight of persuasion against a
prosecutor who told the jury her entire justification defense was a “guise
and excuse.” Had the jury been properly instructed, the State would have
faced a powerful presumption it never had to overcome. Brown holds that
refusing the A.R.S. § 13-419 instruction is not harmless even when the
defendant testified he did not feel threatened. Brown, 260 Ariz. at 487–88,
¶ 53. That principle applies with greater force here because Castleberry
testified to fear, a detective corroborated a bruise on her forehead and the
record shows Joe had broken the same door once before.

CONCLUSION

¶36 We vacate Castleberry’s conviction and remand for a new
trial.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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