State v. Riehle

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL LEE RIEHLE, Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CR 24-0648
FILED 02-12-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. CR-2024-00094
The Honorable Douglas Camacho, Judge

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED, SENTENCES VACATED AND
REMANDED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Alice Jones, Joseph Newberg
Counsel for Appellee/Cross-Appellant

John Trebon, PC, Flagstaff
By John J. Trebon
Counsel for Appellant/Cross-Appellee
 STATE v. RIEHLE
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey
joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Vice Chief Judge:

¶1 When a defendant is convicted of an offense that qualifies as
“dangerous,” he faces heightened penalties, including longer sentencing
guidelines and a mandatory lifetime injunction against contact with the
victim. Because of those heightened penalties, the Sixth Amendment
generally requires that a jury—not the court—determine whether the
offense qualifies as dangerous. But there’s one exception to this
constitutional directive: the court may designate an offense as dangerous as
a matter of law if the elements of the charged offense are necessarily and
always dangerous. No jury is required.

¶2 We must determine who decides when disorderly conduct
with a weapon is a dangerous offense—a jury or the judge. The State
contends that disorderly conduct with a weapon is always dangerous and
thus falls within the Sixth Amendment exception. We agree. The elements
of disorderly conduct with a weapon are inherently dangerous. As a result,
the Sixth Amendment does not require a jury to make that factual
determination in each case.

¶3 Michael Lee Riehle appeals his convictions and sentences for
two counts of disorderly conduct with a weapon, possession of dangerous
drugs and possession of drug paraphernalia. On cross-appeal, the State
argues the superior court erred by requiring a jury to determine whether
Riehle’s disorderly conduct convictions were dangerous offenses. We
affirm the convictions, but vacate and remand for the court to resentence
Riehle.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶4 We view and recount the facts in the light most favorable to
sustaining the jury’s verdicts.1 On a Friday morning in October 2023, Riehle

1 State v. Nelson, 214 Ariz. 196, 196, ¶ 2 (App. 2007).

2
 STATE v. RIEHLE
Opinion of the Court

threatened two victims with a rifle in separate incidents outside his home.
The first incident occurred when a woman was parked outside Riehle’s
home, waiting for a friend. Riehle yelled at her and fired three shots in her
direction. She fled unharmed and immediately called the police. Soon
after, Riehle pointed his rifle at a second victim as he drove past Riehle’s
property. This victim also called the police.

¶5 Police arrested Riehle at the scene. Officers described him as
“freaking out” and unintelligible. He said he fired at an intruder in self-
defense, but a protective sweep of the home revealed no one inside. A later
search of Riehle’s home uncovered weapons and drug evidence. Officers
recovered a rifle, a pistol, spent shell casings, ammunition and a zip lock
bag containing a white crystal substance resembling methamphetamine.
Next to the bag was a pen cap and burned aluminum foil covered in melted
methamphetamine.

¶6 A three-day jury trial was held. The jury heard testimony
from the police officer who collected the drug evidence and the crime scene
analyst who tested it. Both identified the white crystal substance as
methamphetamine based on their training and experience. The analyst also
administered a Marquis test, which tested positive as amphetamine. The
jury found Riehle guilty of two counts of disorderly conduct with a weapon,
possession of dangerous drugs and possession of drug paraphernalia. See
A.R.S. §§ 13-2904(A)(6), -3407 and -3415. The jury also found both victims
suffered physical, emotional or financial harm. See A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(9).

¶7 Before sentencing, the superior court asked the parties
whether Riehle’s disorderly conduct convictions should be designated as
dangerous offenses, subjecting him to a higher sentence and entitling the
victims to lifetime injunctions. See A.R.S. §§ 13-105(13), -704 and -719(A)(1).
Because the designation as dangerous would aggravate the legally
prescribed range of allowable sentences, the court told the parties a jury
would have to make that finding.

¶8 The State elected not to call a jury for this purpose and asked
to proceed with sentencing. The superior court sentenced Riehle as a
category one non-dangerous, non-repetitive offender. For the two
disorderly conduct with weapons convictions—both class 6 felonies—the
court imposed presumptive one-year prison terms, to run consecutively.
For the possession of dangerous drugs conviction—a class 4 felony—the
court imposed a mitigated one-year prison term, to run consecutively to the
disorderly conduct sentences. For possession of drug paraphernalia—a

3
 STATE v. RIEHLE
Opinion of the Court

class 6 felony—the court imposed a four-month prison term, to run
concurrently with the drug possession sentence.

¶9 Riehle timely appealed and the State timely cross-appealed.
We have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, -4032(3) and
-4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶10 Four issues are raised on appeal. Riehle argues (1) the State
did not adequately disclose the crime scene analyst or police officer as
witnesses or describe their anticipated testimony, (2) the analyst’s
testimony was inadmissible, and (3) the jury heard insufficient evidence to
support his convictions. On cross-appeal, the State argues the superior
court should have designated the disorderly conduct with a weapon
convictions as dangerous offenses without a jury finding. We address each
issue in turn.

I. Expert Witness Disclosure.

¶11 Riehle first argues the State did not adequately disclose the
law enforcement witnesses who identified the methamphetamine or their
anticipated testimony. Riehle did not object below, so we review for
fundamental, prejudicial error. See State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 140,
¶ 12 (2018).

¶12 Court rules govern discovery and disclosure. State v. Fish, 259
Ariz. 27, 31, ¶ 9 (App. 2024). “There is no general constitutional right to
discovery in a criminal case.” Id. (quoting Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S.
545, 559 (1977)). Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.1(b) requires the
State to disclose witness names and their anticipated testimony:

the name and address of each person the State intends to call
as a witness in the State’s case-in-chief and any relevant
written or recorded statement of the witness; [] any statement
of the defendant and any co-defendant; [and] all existing
original and supplemental reports prepared by a law
enforcement agency in connection with the charged offense.

The purpose of Rule 15.1 is “to give full notification of each side’s case-in-
chief so as to avoid unnecessary delay and surprise at trial.” State v.
Armstrong, 208 Ariz. 345, 353, ¶ 38 (2004) (quoting State v. Dodds, 112 Ariz.
100, 102 (1975)).

4
 STATE v. RIEHLE
Opinion of the Court

¶13 We find no fundamental error. Although the State did not
strictly comply with Rule 15.1(b), Riehle cannot claim surprise or prejudice.
After all, the State named both witnesses in its initial disclosure statement
and disclosed the crime scene analyst’s report. Under these circumstances,
Riehle should not have been surprised when these witnesses were called to
testify about their findings. State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 186 (1996)
(“[B]ecause Defendant had been given timely notice of the identity of the
State’s latent print and blood experts, he should not have been surprised
when they were called to testify about their findings.”).

II. Analyst’s Expert Testimony.

¶14 Having resolved the disclosure issue, we turn to Riehle’s
challenge to the admissibility of the analyst’s testimony. Riehle argues the
superior court should have excluded the crime scene analyst’s testimony
because the Marquis test was unreliable and the analyst was unqualified.
See Ariz. R. Evid. 702(a), (c). Because Riehle objected below, we review the
trial court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Blakley, 204 Ariz. 429, 437, ¶ 34 (2003). If we find error, we then determine whether
it was harmless. See State v. Strong, 258 Ariz. 184, 212, ¶ 129 (2024).

A. The Marquis Test.

¶15 Expert testimony must be based on reliable principles and
methods. Ariz. R. Evid. 702(c). Arizona law evaluates reliability based on
non-exclusive factors: (1) whether the expert’s theory or technique can be
or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has faced peer
review and publication; (3) whether the technique or theory is generally
accepted within the relevant scientific community; (4) the known or
potential rate of error of the technique or theory when applied; and (5) the
existence and maintenance of standards controlling application of the
technique. State ex rel. Montgomery v. Miller, 234 Ariz. 289, 299, ¶ 24 (App.
2014) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–
94 (1993)). Although the methodology of an expert witness must be based
on more than speculation, it need not be reliable to a degree of scientific
certainty. Id. at 298, ¶ 23.

¶16 The superior court found the Marquis test to be sufficiently
reliable. Riehle points to research that Marquis tests are less reliable than
confirmatory lab tests. But cross-examination is the appropriate tool to
attack “shaky but admissible [expert] evidence.” Id. at 298, ¶ 20 (quoting
Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 152 (3rd Cir. 1999)).

5
 STATE v. RIEHLE
Opinion of the Court

¶17 The crime scene analyst acknowledged that false positives
were possible, but rare. He also shared his own extensive experience: he
had performed the Marquis test and similar tests hundreds of times and
never seen a positive Marquis test followed by a negative confirmatory lab
test. We find no abuse of discretion.

B. Expert Qualifications.

¶18 Riehle next argues the crime scene analyst was unqualified to
identify the white crystal substance as methamphetamine. We disagree. A
witness may qualify as an expert based on “knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education,” and when his “specialized knowledge will help the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Ariz.
R. Evid. 702.

¶19 The State laid enough foundation here to show the crime
scene analyst was qualified. The analyst testified he had worked in law
enforcement for over 30 years and spent the last two years as a crime scene
analyst. He had taken several narcotic identification classes and
participated in hundreds of investigations of methamphetamine-related
offenses. See State v. Parkinson, 258 Ariz. 601, 612–13, ¶ 42 (App. 2024)
(holding that police officers may provide expert testimony based on their
training and experience when foundation is provided). He applied that
training and experience to conclude the white, crystal substance was
methamphetamine, stressing its visual similarity, the paraphernalia and the
positive Marquis test. See id. The court did not abuse its discretion when it
permitted the crime scene analyst to testify about his opinion.

III. Sufficient Evidence.

¶20 Riehle argues his convictions for disorderly conduct with a
weapon, possession of drug paraphernalia and possession of dangerous
drugs were unsupported by substantial evidence. We review de novo
whether the record had sufficient evidence for the jury to render its verdict,
State v. Pena, 235 Ariz. 277, 279, ¶ 5 (2014), and will affirm if substantial
evidence supports the jury’s verdict, State v. Hausner, 230 Ariz. 60, 75, ¶ 50
(2012). See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a)(1). “Substantial evidence is proof that
reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to support a conclusion of
[the] defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Spears, 184 Ariz.
277, 290 (1996).

¶21 Riehle raises four distinct challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence, which we address in turn.

6
 STATE v. RIEHLE
Opinion of the Court

¶22 First, Riehle argues his disorderly conduct conviction against
the second victim was unsupported by reasonable evidence because that
victim testified he was not disturbed “too much in reality.” But the second
victim also testified he was “scared” and clarified that his peace was
disturbed. The jury heard substantial evidence to render its verdict.

¶23 Second, Riehle argues the State did not prove he had the
required mental state to disturb the first victim’s peace. Not so. The jury
could reasonably infer Riehle knew he was disturbing the first victim’s
peace by yelling, waving around a rifle and firing towards her car. See State
v. Noriega, 187 Ariz. 282, 286 (App. 1996) (a defendant’s mental state is
rarely provable by direct evidence and a jury will usually have to infer it
from his behaviors and the surrounding circumstances).

¶24 Third, Riehle argues the aluminum foil cannot be considered
drug paraphernalia because it was never tested. We disagree. The jury
heard substantial evidence to find Riehle possessed the aluminum foil to
consume a dangerous drug. Police found the aluminum foil next to the
methamphetamine and a pen cap. The foil had burn marks and a melted
white substance that resembled methamphetamine.

¶25 Last, assuming we found the crime scene analyst’s testimony
inadmissible, Riehle claims the State did not present substantial evidence
to prove the substance was methamphetamine. Because the testimony was
admissible, there was substantial evidence to support the conviction. Supra
¶¶ 17, 19.

IV. Dangerous Offense.

¶26 On cross-appeal, the State argues a jury need never be asked
to find that disorderly conduct with a weapon is a dangerous offense
because it’s always dangerous.

¶27 The Sixth Amendment demands that a jury determine all facts
that “increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal
defendant is exposed.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)
(adopting the concurrence in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252 (1999)
(Stevens, J., concurring)). This fundamental rule preserves the “historic link
between crime and punishment,” and “historic role of the jury as an
intermediary between the State and criminal defendants.” Alleyne v. United
States, 570 U.S. 99, 106, 114 (2013). But if a particular offense is always
dangerous, a jury need not be called and the superior court can designate
the offense as dangerous. State v. Gatliff, 209 Ariz. 362, 365–66, ¶¶ 17–18
(App. 2004).

7
 STATE v. RIEHLE
Opinion of the Court

¶28 Here, the dangerous-offense designation would have
increased Riehle’s sentencing exposure and altered his eligibility for
probation. He was charged with and convicted of two counts of disorderly
conduct with a weapon, A.R.S. § 13-2904(A)(6), which are class 6 felonies
that carry a range of four months to two years, A.R.S. § 13-702(D), and are
probation eligible. If these convictions were designated “dangerous
offenses,” A.R.S. § 13-105(13), the sentencing range would increase to
between 18 months and three years in prison, A.R.S. § 13-704(A), and the
offenses would not be probation eligible, A.R.S. § 13-704(G).

¶29 And so, to prevail here, the State must show the elements of
disorderly conduct with a weapon are inherently dangerous. To determine
whether an offense is inherently dangerous, Arizona courts compare the
statutory elements of the offense to the statutory definition of
dangerousness. State v. Larin, 233 Ariz. 202, 212–13, ¶ 38 (App. 2013);
Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 107 (“The touchstone for determining whether a fact
must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is whether the fact
constitutes an ‘element’ or ‘ingredient’ of the charged offense.”).

¶30 Disorderly conduct with a weapon requires proof that the
defendant with intent to disturb the peace of a neighborhood, family or
person, or with knowledge of doing so:

Recklessly handles, displays or discharges a deadly weapon
or dangerous instrument.

A.R.S. § 13-2904(A)(6).

¶31 A dangerous offense is defined as:

[A]n offense involving the discharge, use or threatening
exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.

A.R.S. § 13-105(13).

¶32 The State argues that disorderly conduct with a deadly
weapon is always a dangerous offense because one who “recklessly
handles, displays or discharges a deadly weapon” to disturb the peace has
either “discharge[d], use[d] or threatening[ly] exhibit[ed]” that weapon to
accomplish their unlawful purpose. Riehle counters that disorderly
conduct with a deadly weapon might not be dangerous because one who
“recklessly handles” a deadly weapon to disturb the peace does not “use”
that weapon.

8
 STATE v. RIEHLE
Opinion of the Court

¶33 Both parties agree the word “use” means to employ
something to accomplish a purpose. And we agree. See also Voisine v.
United States, 579 U.S. 686, 692 (2016) (“Dictionaries consistently define the
noun ‘use’ to mean the ‘act of employing’ something.”) (citing three
dictionaries).

¶34 Applied here, a defendant who recklessly handles a weapon
to disturb the peace “employs” that weapon “to accomplish his unlawful
purpose.” The U.S. Supreme Court defined the word “use” as being
“indifferent as to whether the actor has the mental state of intention,
knowledge, or recklessness with respect to the harmful consequences of his
volitional conduct.” Id. at 693. A defendant who recklessly handles a
weapon to disturb the peace acts volitionally. He deliberately employs the
weapon—even if he handles it carelessly—to achieve his purpose.

¶35 To be clear, this definition of “use” does not encompass mere
possession of a weapon. To be dangerous, the defendant must employ the
weapon to accomplish the criminal offense. See A.R.S. § 13-105(13)
(“‘Dangerous offense’ means an offense involving the discharge, use or
threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon.”) (emphasis added). A
defendant who possesses a weapon while committing an unrelated crime
has not “used” the weapon within the statute’s meaning. For example, a
defendant who possesses a weapon at home while filing false tax returns
has not “used” the weapon to commit tax fraud—the weapon played no
role in accomplishing the crime. But a defendant who recklessly handles,
displays or discharges a weapon to disturb the peace has employed that
weapon as his instrument to achieve his unlawful purpose.

¶36 Thus, the superior court erred by not designating disorderly
conduct with a weapon a dangerous offense. We vacate Riehle’s sentences
and remand so that the court may sentence Riehle under the appropriate
scheme.

CONCLUSION

¶37 We affirm Riehle’s convictions but vacate his sentences and
remand for resentencing.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

9