State v. Luckett

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

DEONTE MAURICE LUCKETT, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 24-0649
FILED 11-13-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2024-117474-001
The Honorable Joshua Yost, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Joshua C. Smith, Rebecca Jones
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Kristen Reller
Counsel for Appellant
 STATE v. LUCKETT
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s decision, in
which Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Deonte Maurice Luckett appeals his convictions and
sentences for aggravated assault and disorderly conduct. For the following
reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Late one night, Luckett and his girlfriend argued. The two
physically tangled and Luckett wielded a kitchen knife. Several children
were present, some sleeping and some awake. The oldest of the girlfriend’s
children intervened to protect his mother before running and locking
himself in a bedroom. Luckett took chase, breaking down the bedroom door
before things finally de-escalated.

¶3 After a six-day trial, a jury convicted Luckett of one count of
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a class 3 felony, and two counts
of disorderly conduct—one a class 6 felony and the other a class 1
misdemeanor. The jury also found three aggravating circumstances proven
for the class 3 felony and one aggravating circumstance proven for the class
6 felony. The trial court found Luckett had five prior felony convictions and
sentenced him to a presumptive term of 3.75 years’ imprisonment on the
class 6 felony, a concurrent, aggravated term of 13 years’ imprisonment on
the class 3 felony, and time served (180 days) on the misdemeanor.

¶4 Luckett timely appealed, arguing the trial court erred when it
refused to grant his motions for a change in counsel. We have jurisdiction
under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S.
§§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶5 Luckett challenges the trial court’s denial of his motions to
change counsel. Asserting the relationship between he and his appointed
attorney was irretrievably broken, Luckett contends the court failed to
conduct the requisite inquiry to meaningfully consider the basis for his

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motions. He also argues the court “improperly conditioned his right to
counsel on a waiver of his speedy trial rights,” “creating an unconstitutional
dilemma.”

¶6 We review a trial court’s denial of a request for new counsel
for abuse of discretion. State v. Riley, 248 Ariz. 154, 167, ¶ 7 (2020). “We will
affirm the trial court’s ruling if the result was legally correct for any reason.”
State v. Carlson, 237 Ariz. 381, 387, ¶ 7 (2015) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).

¶7 In a pre-prepared form filed July 5, 2024, Luckett moved to
change counsel without providing any factual basis for his request. In a
handwritten letter filed July 9, 2024, Luckett again moved to change
counsel, stating:

I, Deonte Maurice Luckett, hereby request that [defense
counsel] be withdrawn as my counsel of record, and that
[blank space] be substituted as my attorney in all future
proceedings in the trial court.

I Deonte M. Luckett [am] writing this memorandum in order
to seek change of counsel for ineffective counsel of [defense
counsel]. He has not been keeping me inform[ed] of any
Motions or Evidence pertaining to my case. Has not barter[ed]
for a better plea or giv[en] me any legal advice that would aid
me in said case. Your Honor if you need any further
Information I would be more than happy to say it formally in
an oral argument[.] Thank you for your time and
understanding[.]

¶8 At his next court appearance, a final trial management
conference held on August 15, 2024, the trial court directly questioned
Luckett about his motions to change counsel, asking him to further explain
the reasons for his request. Luckett answered that his attorney failed to: (1)
follow his instructions (“everything I ask my lawyer to do, he—he find[s] a
reason to not do it”); (2) solicit his advice (“he didn’t ask me [any] questions
about how—how should it be litigated”); (3) timely communicate case
developments to him (“he do[es]n’t tell me [any]thing unless I ask him
about it”); (4) speak with the witnesses he had identified; (5) withdraw from
the case or provide a bar number, as he requested; and (6) mount a defense
(“I asked him about my defense; would this work, this work. Up to until
about a week ago, he told me that nothing that I brought to his attention
would work.”). Although the court noted that new counsel, upon

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evaluating the facts of the case, also might not find a “reasonable basis” for
a defense, Luckett maintained that new counsel would “probably do a
better job.”

¶9 When the trial court asked Luckett whether he understood
that a change in counsel would necessarily cause a delay requiring him to
waive objections to the timing of his trial, Luckett objected, stating he had
filed his motions in a “timely” manner and would not forgo his right to a
speedy trial because the court had delayed ruling on his requests. The court
responded that the motions were not “filed in [the court] system” until mid-
July and explained that if Luckett refused to waive his right to a speedy trial
(last day September 23, 2024), the court would not appoint new counsel:

Well if you don’t waive your rights to a speedy trial, then I
can’t provide you with new counsel, because we have to make
sure that your counsel is competent and available and ready
to take your case to move forward.

¶10 Standing on his right to a speedy trial, Luckett asked the court
to dismiss the case with prejudice, which the court refused: “[Y]ou either
get new counsel and give that counsel the time to properly prepare, or you
want to move to trial and you go with the counsel that you currently have.”
Presented with that choice, Luckett stated: “I’m afraid I’m going to have to
go with the counsel that I have, but . . . I don’t like it.”

¶11 Later in the hearing, the prosecutor provided a Donald
advisement, outlining on the record the parameters of the State’s plea offer
to Luckett, noting he had declined the offer, and it had since expired. After
the prosecutor’s recitation, Luckett complained that defense counsel had
not explained the plea offer to him, prompting the court to ask whether
Luckett would like to accept the plea as outlined by the State. Luckett
expressed an interest in the plea and the court asked whether the prosecutor
was willing to reopen the offer. At that point, defense counsel interjected,
referring to his notes to recount multiple discussions with Luckett
concerning the plea offer and Luckett’s refusal to accept any plea requiring
prison time: “[U]nless he receive[d] probation, he had no interest in taking
a plea.” Without denying or contradicting defense counsel’s account,
Luckett stated that defense counsel was “supposed to get a better plea
deal.” To that end, Luckett asked whether he could receive a better plea
offer if he presented evidence of his employability. When the prosecutor
responded that the State would not provide a more favorable offer, Luckett
expressly rejected the plea, stating he did so “under duress” from his
attorney. The court then asked Luckett whether he had any questions about

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the plea offer and the possible sentences he faced. Luckett answered that he
understood the potential sentences but remarked that if a jury found him
guilty, “it’d be all because of my counsel.” The court found Luckett
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily rejected the State’s plea offer and
concluded the hearing.

¶12 The federal and Arizona constitutions guarantee a criminal
defendant both the right to counsel and the right to a speedy trial. U.S.
Const. amend. VI.; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24. To protect each of these
fundamental rights, a court may not condition a defendant’s exercise of one
upon his relinquishment of the other. See State v. Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, 509,
¶¶ 22-23 (1998) (holding a court may not present a defendant with a choice
that requires the relinquishment of a constitutional right and any “waiver”
elicited from a defendant confronted with such a “constitutionally
impermissible” choice is necessarily involuntary); see also State v. Schaaf, 169
Ariz. 323, 328 (1991) (explaining the “strong interest in the prompt and
expeditious handling of criminal trials . . . cannot outweigh [the]
constitutional right to be represented by counsel”).

¶13 Neither the United States Constitution nor the Arizona
Constitution provides “any time limit within which a trial must be held.”
Schaaf, 169 Ariz. at 327. Instead, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 8 sets
forth the time limits, requiring, as relevant here, the court to try every
in-custody defendant “[n]o later than 150 days after arraignment.” Ariz. R.
Crim. P. 8.2(a)(1).

¶14 When a defendant requests a change of counsel shortly
before trial, the right to counsel and the right to a speedy trial may come
into tension, but rather than presenting the defendant with the
“constitutionally offensive” choice of waiving one right to invoke the other,
Moody, 192 Ariz. at 509, ¶¶ 22-23, the court must preserve both by excluding
any necessary “[d]elays occasioned by or on behalf of the defendant” from
“the computation of time limits,” while affirming the defendant’s right to a
speedy trial. State v. Aragon, 221 Ariz. 88, 91, ¶ 7 (App. 2009) (explaining a
court need not deny a defendant’s request for a continuance “so he could
be represented by his counsel of choice” out of “concern that any such
continuance would violate” the right to a speedy trial, because any delay
incurred on a defendant’s behalf is excluded from the speedy trial calculus)
(quoting Ariz. R. Crim. P. 8.4(a)(1)).

¶15 Here, the trial court seemingly presented Luckett with a
“constitutionally offensive” choice—requiring him to either proceed to trial
with his appointed counsel or forego his right to a speedy trial. Because we

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may affirm a court’s denial of a motion for change of counsel “on any basis
in the record,” State v. Riley, 248 Ariz. 154, 169, ¶ 21 (2020), we must
determine whether Luckett’s decision to exercise his right to a speedy trial,
and thereby retain his appointed attorney, actually deprived him of his
constitutional right to counsel.

¶16 An indigent criminal defendant has a right to competent
counsel, but “is not entitled to counsel of choice, or to a meaningful
relationship with his or her attorney.” State v. Torres, 208 Ariz. 340, 342, ¶ 6
(2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A complete
breakdown in attorney-client communication or an irreconcilable conflict
between a defendant and appointed counsel, however, violates a
defendant’s constitutional right to counsel. Id.

¶17 When a defendant requests a change of counsel, the trial court
must inquire regarding the basis for the request. Id. at 343, ¶ 7. “The nature
of the inquiry will depend upon the nature of the defendant’s request.” Id.
at ¶ 8. A formal hearing or evidentiary proceeding may not be necessary to
address “generalized complaints about differences in strategy,” but a court
“must conduct a hearing” when a defendant sets forth “sufficiently specific,
factually based allegations in support of his request for new counsel.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

¶18 “At such a hearing, the defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating that he has a genuine irreconcilable conflict with his counsel
or that there has been a total breakdown in communications.” Id. “[T]o
prove a total breakdown in communication, a defendant must put forth
evidence of a severe and pervasive conflict with his attorney or evidence
that he had such minimal contact with the attorney that meaningful
communication was not possible.” State v. Paris-Sheldon, 214 Ariz. 500, 505,
¶ 12 (App. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A
defendant must show more than personality conflicts or disagreements
with counsel over trial strategy,” and claims of “ineffective trial preparation
and failure to communicate, when unsupported by the record, are generally
characterized as disagreements over trial strategy.” Riley, 248 Ariz. at 168,
¶ 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In evaluating a request
for change of counsel, the trial court should consider whether an
irreconcilable conflict exists, whether new counsel would face the same
conflict, the timing of the motion, the inconvenience to witnesses, the time
period already elapsed between the alleged offense and trial, the proclivity
of the defendant to change counsel, and the quality of counsel. Torres, 208
Ariz. at 344, ¶ 15.

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¶19 Luckett argues “[t]he trial court’s handling of [his] motion for
new counsel was legally insufficient,” contending the court abdicated its
“duty to conduct a meaningful inquiry.” Contrary to this contention, the
record reflects that the court conducted a Torres inquiry, inviting Luckett to
fully explain, uninterrupted, the basis for his change of counsel request.

¶20 Prompted by the trial court, Luckett complained that his
appointed attorney failed to follow his instructions, solicit his advice, and
interview the witnesses he identified. These differences in strategy do not
constitute an irreconcilable conflict compelling a change of counsel. See
Riley, 248 Ariz. at 168, ¶ 15 (explaining complaints that an attorney has
“failed to conduct any interviews” are “disagreements over trial strategy,
which do not amount to irreconcilable differences”); see also State v.
Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421, 448, ¶ 84 (2016) (explaining that when a defendant’s
complaints relate to “strategic decisions,” the trial court need not “elicit on-
the-record responses from defense counsel”). Luckett also asserted that
defense counsel failed to adequately communicate with him and share
developments in the case, but Luckett’s other statements to the court belied
these claims. In listing his complaints, Luckett described repeatedly giving
defense counsel instructions and proposing various defense theories,
detailing continuing communications up to the week before the hearing. See
Riley, 248 Ariz. at 169, ¶ 17 (explaining that a defendant’s “knowledge of
the status of his case” demonstrated his ongoing communications with
counsel). In fact, when defense counsel refuted Luckett’s assertion that
counsel had failed to explain the State’s plea offer to him, Luckett admitted
that he had discussed the plea offer with counsel, reframing his claim from
a communication breakdown to ineffective assistance of counsel—
contending counsel should have negotiated a more favorable plea offer.
Moreover, defense counsel told the court he had shared pertinent
information and evidence with Luckett, such as the police incident report,
and stated a retained investigator was also willing to review the case with
Luckett. Luckett offered no rejoinder.

¶21 On this record, neither the scope of the hearing nor the nature
of the trial court’s inquiry was constitutionally insufficient. Luckett never
suggested that either an evidentiary hearing or an ex parte hearing “was
necessary to determine the source of the alleged conflict” or communication
breakdown. Riley, 248 Ariz. at 169, ¶ 18; see also State v. Gomez, 231 Ariz. 219,
225-26, ¶ 29 (2012) (“A trial judge is not required to hold an evidentiary
hearing on a motion for change of counsel if the motion fails to allege
specific facts suggesting an irreconcilable conflict or a complete breakdown
in communication, or if there is no indication that a hearing would elicit
additional facts beyond those already before the court.”). Having failed to

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demonstrate an irreconcilable conflict or a complete breakdown in
communications, Luckett did not present evidence sufficient to compel a
change of counsel. See Riley, 248 Ariz. at 169, ¶ 17 (“[B]ecause [the
defendant] failed to demonstrate an irreconcilable conflict or a completely
fractured relationship with [counsel], the trial court was not required to
appoint new counsel.”); see also Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at 448, ¶ 80 (“If the trial
court probes a defendant’s request for substitute counsel, the defendant
bears the burden of demonstrating either a total breakdown in
communication or an irreconcilable conflict with his attorney.”(internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). On this record, the trial court did
not effectively deprive Luckett of his right to counsel by denying his
motions.1

CONCLUSION

¶22 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Luckett’s convictions
and sentences.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

1 To the extent Luckett contests the effectiveness of counsel, we do not
consider such a claim on direct appeal. Torres, 208 Ariz. at 344-45, ¶¶ 15, 17
(“Ineffective assistance of counsel is a separate issue that can be raised only
in a proceeding for post-conviction relief.”); see also State v. Henry, 189 Ariz.
542, 547 (1997) (holding disagreements over “tactical decisions” that “raise
concerns about attorney competence . . . are more properly analyzed in
post-conviction relief proceedings”).

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