State v. Ramsey

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

DAMIEN RAMSEY, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 24-0661
FILED 12-19-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2023-132555-001
The Honorable Suzanne Marie Nicholls, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By Michael T. O'Toole
Counsel for Appellee

Vingelli & Company, Law Offices, PLLC, Scottsdale
By John N. Vingelli
Counsel for Appellant
 STATE v. RAMSEY
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Anni Hill Foster and Judge Veronika Fabian joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Damien Ramsey appeals his convictions for two counts of
aggravated assault and one count of disorderly conduct. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In July of 2023, Ramsey fired his gun in a confrontation at a
Tempe laundromat. Ramsey hit one victim 15 times, requiring doctors to
amputate the victim's leg. The State charged Ramsey with two counts of
aggravated assault, one count of disorderly conduct, and one count of
endangerment.

¶3 Before trial, Ramsey's counsel moved for an Arizona Rule of
Criminal Procedure ("Rule") 11 competency determination, alleging
Ramsey had schizophrenia and bi-polar disorder. The superior court
ordered a Rule 11 evaluation and appointed Dr. Spector and Dr. Hernandez
to evaluate Ramsey. Ramsey participated in Rule 11 evaluations with both
experts who each issued a report opining that Ramsey was competent.
Neither report acknowledged the history of mental illness cited by
Ramsey's counsel. After reviewing the reports, Ramsey's counsel and the
State stipulated that the superior court could decide the issue of Ramsey's
competency based on the expert reports without a competency hearing.
The superior court found Ramsey competent.

¶4 In March of 2024, almost two months after the competency
ruling, Ramsey sent a letter to the superior court expressing general
dissatisfaction with his counsel. In April of 2024, Ramsey filed a request to
change counsel. During a hearing on the request, Ramsey equivocated
about whether he wanted to change counsel. He eventually indicated he
did not. The superior court decided Ramsey needed more time to consider
his options and held the request in abeyance so Ramsey could decide what
he wanted to do. Six days later, at another hearing, Ramsey elected to keep
his current counsel.

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¶5 In November of 2024, the superior court held a jury trial.
Ramsey testified that two men confronted him in the laundromat, and that
he only fired his gun in self-defense after one of the men shot first. But he
also admitted that he pursued the victim after the victim fled, and
continued to shoot after the victim fell to the ground. The jury found
Ramsey guilty of two counts of aggravated assault and one count of
disorderly conduct, but not guilty of one count of endangerment. Ramsey
appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1),
13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶6 Ramsey argues the superior court erred in finding him
competent to stand trial. First, he asserts that the competency evaluations
were flawed because the expert reports did not mention the mental health
history cited by his counsel. Second, he claims that his counsel should not
have been allowed to stipulate to the court deciding competency based on
the evaluations without holding a full competency hearing. Ramsey raises
these issues for the first time on appeal. Ramsey and the State dispute the
standard of review for these claims. Ramsey argues that his challenge to
the competency evaluations should be reviewed for structural error, and
his challenge to the lack of a competency hearing should be reviewed de
novo. The State argues both claims are subject to fundamental-error
review. "If no objection is made at trial, and the error alleged does not rise
to the level of structural error, we review only for fundamental error." State
v. Valverde, 220 Ariz. 582, 585, ¶ 12 (2009), abrogated on other grounds by State
v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135 (2018). But we do not need to decide whether
structural or fundamental error applies to either claim, because the superior
court did not err. State v. Diaz, 223 Ariz. 358, 361, ¶ 12 (2010) (explaining
that when a defendant fails to establish error, "we need not determine the
applicable standard of review.").

¶7 Ramsey argues that because the experts in his case were not
aware his counsel had claimed Ramsey had a history of schizophrenia and
bi-polar disorder, they based their reports on incomplete information. He
further asserts no one informed him of his right against self-incrimination
in a Rule 11 hearing. See A.R.S. § 13-4508(A). But both expert reports noted
Ramsey denied any history of mental illness and no other available health
records suggested otherwise. The reports also stated Ramsey behaved
appropriately during his evaluations and demonstrated he understood the
legal process. Further, the reports noted that both experts reviewed the
limits of confidentiality with Ramsey, and he agreed to participate in both
evaluations. Ramsey does not point to anything in the record to suggest he

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withheld information during the Rule 11 evaluations. And on appeal,
Ramsey does not argue that the alleged prior diagnoses require a finding
that he was incompetent to stand trial. Indeed, the mere presence of a
mental illness is not enough on its own to render a defendant incompetent.
A.R.S. § 13-4501(3); see also State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 444, ¶ 56 (2004). A
defendant is competent to stand trial if "he has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding—and . . . he has a rational as well as factual understanding
of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402
(1960). The expert reports contained sufficient information to allow the
superior court to determine that Ramsey met these criteria. Accordingly,
there is no error.

¶8 Ramsey also argues his defense counsel should not have been
allowed to stipulate to let the court determine competency based on the
expert reports. We disagree. A defendant, through counsel, may waive the
right to a competency hearing. State v. Contreras, 112 Ariz. 358, 359 (1975).
Counsel may waive a competency hearing for his client, because "[c]ounsel
stands in the stead of his client when representing the accused." Id. "If the
defendant and the State stipulate in writing or on the record, the court may
determine competence based solely on the experts' reports" without a
competency hearing. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.5(a). A stipulation to determine
competency based on expert reports satisfies due process, even when there
are doubts about a defendant's competency. State v. Escalante-Orozco, 241
Ariz. 254, 268, ¶¶ 19–20 (2017), abrogated in part on other grounds by Escalante,
245 Ariz. 135 (2018).

¶9 Ramsey points to a statement in Contreras noting there was
"nothing in the record before us to indicate Contreras' dissatisfaction with
his attorney, and therefore the attorney has his general authority to make
such a waiver." 112 Ariz. at 359. Relying on that language, Ramsey argues
his counsel could not enter such a stipulation because Ramsey had
expressed concerns about his representation.

¶10 Even if we accepted Ramsey's characterization of Contreras,
we disagree that this record supports his argument. Ramsey points to
statements he made during one of his competency evaluations that he had
met with his counsel four times, and that he did not know about the
competency hearing until two days before. He also stated his counsel "had
liability concerns" about allowing him to testify in his own defense. Ramsey
further asserts that he "clearly refused to answer [Dr. Spector's] question as
to whether he trusted his lawyer." But none of those statements indicate
Ramsey disapproved of his counsel's decisions regarding competency.

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Throughout the competency process, Ramsey indicated he felt competent
and suggested his counsel initiated the evaluations as a "formality." And
when Dr. Spector asked if Ramsey trusted his lawyer, Ramsey expressed
confidence his counsel would "successfully represent" him.

¶11 Ramsey also points to a letter that expresses dissatisfaction
with his counsel, but he wrote that letter almost two months after his
counsel's stipulation. And to the extent Ramsey's later communications
addressed his counsel's actions regarding competency, Ramsey indicated
he felt competent and did not want the superior court to find him
incompetent. Ramsey's counsel's stipulation advanced this position. There
is nothing in the record indicating Ramsey opposed his counsel's
stipulation to determine his competency based on the expert reports. We
find no error in the superior court accepting Ramsey's counsel's stipulation
to determine Ramsey's competency based on the expert reports.

CONCLUSION

¶12 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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