State v. Ricci

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

TRAVIS RICCI, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 24-0686 PRPC

FILED 10-21-2025

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2011-005961-001
The Honorable Dean M. Fink, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Philip D. Garrow
Counsel for Respondent

Brown & Little PLC, Chandler
By Matthew O. Brown
Counsel for Petitioner
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court,
in which Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey
joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Vice Chief Judge:

¶1 Travis Ricci petitions this court for review from the dismissal
of his petition for post-conviction relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal
Procedure 32. We grant review but deny relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Ricci was a member of the Vinlanders Social Club, a white
supremacist group, in October 2009 when he approached a mixed-race
couple, John and Karen1, in the Palma Park. Ricci hurled racial slurs at John,
yelled “this is white power,” and the couple walked away. A passerby saw
Ricci harassing the couple from behind and described him as a shirtless
man with tattoos.

¶3 Around 45 minutes later, Ricci gunned down the couple as a
passenger in a car. Karen was hit and died. John described the shooter as
the same man who confronted them earlier. He described the man’s face
and stomach tattoo, leading to a composite sketch that closely resembled
Ricci. John later failed to identify Ricci in a photo lineup. The State charged
Ricci with first degree murder and other crimes, and sought the death
penalty.

¶4 A jury trial was held. Ricci’s fellow gang members testified
for the prosecution, including several who entered testimonial plea
agreements or received money for their cooperation. They described the
night of the murder. Ricci was at a party near the murder. He left the party
for a period, was seen “yelling at someone” outside, and then returned all
“worked up” about how a black man was treating a white woman. A few
minutes later, Ricci left the party for a second time, but this time in a car
with two Vinlanders, Aaron Schmidt and Ryan Maltba.

1 We use pseudonyms to protect the victims’ identities. Ariz. R. Sup.
Ct. 111(i).

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¶5 Schmidt was charged as a co-defendant here and pled guilty
to second degree murder, attempted first degree murder and assisting a
criminal street gang. He testified he owned the shotgun used in the
shooting and drove the car when Ricci fired at the victims. His wife testified
she buried the weapon.

¶6 Maltba pled guilty to a weapons charge resulting from the
investigation of this case, and he received substantial funds from law
enforcement. He testified he buried the shotgun shells.

¶7 In his closing argument, defense counsel conceded Ricci was
the person who initially confronted the victims but disputed he was the
shooter:

Now, we know Travis Ricci did start an argument at Palma
Park. We know he did. And he, that night ten years ago, had
a big mouth. And he should not have opened his mouth. He
was insulting. It was degrading. And it was none of his
business. But that doesn’t mean we have any idea what
happened when they got home, when he got home. And
everybody is so secretive about it. Nobody has the same story.

¶8 Jurors did not buy that argument. They convicted Ricci of
first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, conspiracy to commit
first degree murder, aggravated assault, two counts of drive by shooting,
assisting in a criminal street gang and misconduct involving weapons. The
jury recommended Ricci spend the rest of his life in prison. This court
affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. State v. Ricci, 1 CA-
CR 19-0194, 2021 WL 1149681, at *7, ¶ 40 (Ariz. App. Mar. 25, 2021) (mem.
decision).

¶9 Ricci petitioned the superior court for post-conviction relief.
He argued his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance by conceding in
the closing argument that Ricci was the person who confronted the victims
before the shooting. The superior court summarily denied Ricci’s petition.
We grant review. See A.R.S. § 13-4239; Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.16.

DISCUSSION

¶10 We review the superior court’s denial of post-conviction relief
for abuse of discretion. State v. Bigger, 251 Ariz. 402, 407, ¶ 6 (2021).

¶11 Ricci argues his attorney’s concession qualified as ineffective
assistance because that concession gutted his identity defense. In support,

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Ricci provided an affidavit from a juror who claimed to be “the final
holdout on a guilty verdict.” According to the affidavit, the juror was
“shocked” when defense counsel conceded Ricci started the fight with John
and Karen at the park. The juror said he would have viewed the case
differently without that concession, and that even the jury foreperson said,
“we would be having a very different conversation” without the
concession.

¶12 To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
defendant must show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 407, ¶ 8
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984)). A strategic
decision by counsel generally will not support an ineffective assistance
claim unless the decision has no “reasoned basis.” State v. Gerlaugh, 144
Ariz. 449, 455 (1985).

¶13 The superior court appropriately denied Ricci’s petition.
Defense counsel reasonably focused the jury on the weakest element of the
prosecution—who fired the weapon? See United States v. Thomas, 417 F.3d
1053, 1058–59 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining it can be advantageous for counsel
to concede elements of charges with strong evidence of defendant’s guilt in
order to focus on charges for which defendant has a better shot). The jury
heard stronger evidence that Ricci was the person who confronted the
victims in the park than the evidence he was the shooter. He was alone at
the park and disinterested witnesses fingered him as the culprit. The two
gang members in the car had extensive criminal records and were
motivated to finger Ricci as the culprit (lesser charges and money). Defense
counsel was not unreasonable to focus the jury on the weakest element of
the prosecution—whether Ricci held the gun that killed Karen.

¶14 What is more, concession is an effective rhetorical device
because it gains credibility and the jury’s trust, important considerations for
defense counsel of a defendant facing the death penalty. See Florida v.
Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190–91 (2004) (observing, in a case where defense
counsel conceded defendant committed murder in a calculated strategy to
avoid a death sentence, that “the gravity of the potential sentence in a
capital trial and the proceeding’s two-phase structure vitally affect
counsel’s strategic calculus” and “[a]ttorneys representing capital
defendants face daunting challenges in developing trial strategies”).

¶15 Ricci does not argue or offer evidence his attorney failed to
discuss the concession strategy with him. Cf. Thomas, 417 F.3d at 1056
(assuming, based on Nixon, 543 U.S. at 187, that counsel performed

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deficiently by conceding defendant’s guilt on one charge without
consulting him).

¶16 Because counsel acted reasonably under the circumstances,
we do not address prejudice. See State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, 567, ¶ 21
(2006).

CONCLUSION

¶17 We grant review and deny relief.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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