State v. Elizondo

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

STEVE ALBERT ELIZONDO, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0082
FILED 11-04-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. CR-2024-00937
The Honorable Lee Frank Jantzen, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Christine A. Davis
Counsel for Appellee

Law Office of Nicole Countryman, Phoenix
By Nicole Countryman
Counsel for Appellant
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Veronika Fabian delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge Anni Hill Foster joined.

F A B I A N, Judge:

¶1 Steve Albert Elizondo appeals his convictions and sentences,
after a jury trial, for two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child. The
superior court sentenced Elizondo to two consecutive 60 year sentences of
imprisonment. On appeal, Elizondo claims: (1) the superior court denied
his right to due process by refusing to grant his motion to compel
production of text messages and (2) there was insufficient evidence to
support his convictions. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This Court “view[s] the facts in the light most favorable to
sustaining the jury’s verdicts and resolve[s] all reasonable inferences
against” Elizondo. See State v. Felix, 237 Ariz. 280, 283 ¶ 2 (App. 2015).

¶3 In August 2024, Elizondo was indicted for two counts of
continuous sexual abuse of a child against two victims, R.M. and K.C.
Before trial, Elizondo moved for in camera review of text messages he
alleged were sent by R.M. during R.M.’s police interview, arguing the
messages could contain exculpatory evidence. The superior court denied
his motion, finding there was no reasonable probability that R.M.’s cell
phone records would contain exculpatory evidence.

¶4 At trial, both R.M. and K.C. testified that Elizondo committed
multiple acts of intercourse with them and touched and penetrated their
genitals multiple times while the victims were under the age of fourteen. A
jury convicted Elizondo of both counts and the court sentenced him to 120
years of imprisonment followed by community supervision. Elizondo
appealed. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Article VI, Section 9, of
the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-
4033(A)(1).

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DISCUSSION

I. The Superior Court Did Not Err by Denying Elizondo’s Motion to
Compel Production of Text Messages.

¶5 Elizondo first argues the superior court denied him due
process by refusing to grant his pre-trial discovery motion for R.M.’s cell
phone records. He maintains he needed R.M.’s text messages, sent during
R.M.’s police interview, to present a complete defense. Specifically, he
claimed those texts may show collusion between R.M. and K.C. regarding
their testimony. “‘Whether a defendant’s due process right to present a
complete defense’ overcomes a victim’s right to avoid submitting to
discovery requests ‘is a matter of constitutional and statutory interpretation
that we review de novo.’” Draper v. Gentry, 255 Ariz. 417, 422 ¶14 (2023)
(clarifying and quoting R.S. v. Thompson (Vanders II), 251 Ariz. 111, 116 ¶10
(2021)).

¶6 When a defendant asserts discovery of a victim’s privileged
information is necessary to present a complete defense, and that discovery
is subject to in camera review rather than direct disclosure, the defendant
must show: “(1) the defendant seeks evidence whose materiality is of
constitutional dimension, as distinguished by evidence merely relevant to
the defense; and (2) there is a reasonable possibility that the requested
information actually includes such evidence.” Id. at 424-25 ¶¶ 24-30. “The
defendant’s request must be based on more than mere speculation and
must include a sufficiently specific basis to deter fishing expeditions,
prevent a wholesale production of the victim’s . . . records, and adequately
protect the parties’ competing interests.” Vanders II, 251 Ariz. at 120 ¶30.

¶7 Here, Elizondo’s request for text messages was based on the
type of “mere speculation” cautioned against in Vanders II. Elizondo argued
to the superior court that he believed the texts would show R.M. was
coaching K.C., the other victim, from the interview room. At trial, R.M.
testified that during the interview in question R.M. was texting a friend and
R.M. had not talked to K.C. about their testimony. On appeal, Elizondo
argues that his entire defense strategy was to discredit R.M.’s and K.C.’s
testimony by showing they and their mothers conspired and fabricated
their testimony and that R.M.’s cell phone records could have contained
corroborating evidence to that effect.

¶8 Elizondo asks this Court to make too many speculative and
conclusory leaps: (1) that R.M. was in fact communicating with K.C. during
the police interview; (2) that this communication was regarding the case or

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the interview; and (3) that such communications would contain evidence
necessary for Elizondo to present a complete defense. Elizondo has not
shown a “reasonable possibility” that discovery of R.M.’s phone records
during the interview would contain any messages or communication with
K.C., let alone potentially exculpatory evidence necessary to present a
complete defense. This Court cannot, therefore, conclude that the superior
court erred by denying Elizondo’s discovery motion. See Gentry, 255 Ariz.
at 425 ¶ 30.

II. Sufficient Evidence Supports Elizondo’s Conviction.

¶9 Elizondo argues there was insufficient evidence to convict
him because there was no physical evidence presented at trial, the victims’
testimony at trial was more elaborate than what they initially told the
police, and the interviewing detective asked several leading questions
during interviews with the victims.

¶10 This Court reviews sufficiency of the evidence de novo. State v.
Pena, 235 Ariz. 277, 279 ¶ 5 (2014). In doing so, this Court reviews the
evidence presented at trial to determine if “substantial evidence exists to
support the jury verdict.” Id. “Substantial evidence is more than a ‘mere
scintilla’ and is that which reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to
support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Hughes, 189
Ariz. 62, 73 (1997). This Court “does not reweigh the evidence to decide if
it would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact.” State v. Barger, 167
Ariz. 563, 568 (App. 1990).

¶11 A defendant commits continuous sexual abuse of a child if the
defendant engages in three or more acts of either sexual assault, sexual
conduct with a minor, or molestation of a child, over a period of three
months or more with a child under the age of fourteen. See A.R.S. §§
13-1405, 1406, 1410, 1417. Sexual conduct is “intentionally or knowingly
engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact.” A.R.S. § 13-1405(A).
Sexual assault is sexual conduct with a person without their consent. See
A.R.S. §§ 13-1405(A), 1406(A). Molestation of a child is “intentionally or
knowingly engaging in or causing a person to engage in sexual contact,
except sexual contact with the female breast, with a child who is under
fifteen years of age.” A.R.S. § 13-1410(A). Oral sexual contact means “oral
contact with the penis, vulva, or anus.” A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(1). Sexual
contact means “any direct or indirect touching, fondling or manipulating of
any part of the genitals, anus or female breast by any part of the body.”
A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(3)(a).

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¶12 At trial, R.M. testified that: (1) when Elizondo and R.M. lived
together, Elizondo digitally penetrated R.M.’s genitals “a couple times a
month” for a year; (2) Elizondo engaged in sexual intercourse with R.M. “a
lot;” (3) Elizondo had engaged in sexual conduct with R.M. and K.C. at the
same time; (4) Elizondo either touched R.M.’s genitals or engaged in
intercourse with R.M. around three times a month for a year after they
moved to another house; and (5) Elizondo would engage in oral intercourse
with R.M. and have R.M. engage in oral intercourse with Elizondo “a lot”
over this period of time. R.M. did not consent to this sexual conduct.

¶13 K.C. testified Elizondo touched K.C.’s genitals and engaged
in sexual intercourse with K.C. over four times. K.C. also corroborated
R.M.’s testimony that Elizondo had engaged in sexual intercourse with and
touched the genitals of R.M. and K.C. at the same time.

¶14 Arizona law is clear and consistent that uncorroborated
testimony, especially in child sexual abuse cases, is sufficient to affirm a
conviction. See State v. Jerousek, 121 Ariz. 420, 427 (1979) (“In child
molestation cases, the defendant can be convicted on the uncorroborated
testimony of the victim.”); State v. Munoz, 114 Ariz. 466, 469 (App. 1976)
(“[A] conviction may be based on the uncorroborated testimony of the
victim unless the story is physically impossible or so incredible that no
reasonable person could believe it.”); State v. Copeland, 253 Ariz. 104, 116 ¶
31 (App. 2022) (physical evidence and corroborating eyewitness testimony
are “not required for the state to meet its burden of proof”).

¶15 At trial, Elizondo was able to cross-examine the detective who
interviewed the victims about the leading nature of the detective’s
questions. The jury heard this testimony and as the triers of fact had the
opportunity to judge the credibility of the testimony and weigh the
testimony accordingly. See State v. Clemons, 110 Ariz. 555, 556–57 (1974)
(“No rule is better established than that the credibility of the witnesses and
the weight and value to be given to their testimony are questions
exclusively for the jury.”). Here, the jury clearly found both R.M.’s and
K.C.’s testimony credible. And as for Elizondo’s remaining arguments
regarding conflicting evidence, he is asking this Court to reweigh the
evidence, which this Court will not do. See Barger, 167 Ariz. at 568.

¶16 Reasonable jurors had sufficient evidence to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Elizondo committed continuous sexual abuse of a
child against both victims. See Pena, 235 Ariz. 277, 279 ¶ 5.

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CONCLUSION

¶17 For the foregoing reasons, Elizondo’s convictions and
sentences are affirmed.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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