State v. Driffin

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

SHY’HEEM DONTE DRIFFIN, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0083
FILED 02-24-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. S8015CR202400428
The Honorable Derek C. Carlisle, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Gracynthia Claw
Counsel for Appellee

Jill L. Evans Attorney at Law, Flagstaff
By Jill L. Evans
Counsel for Appellant
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge David B. Gass and Judge Anni Hill Foster joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Shy’heem Donte Driffin appeals his conviction and sentence
for transportation of drugs for sale. For the reasons below, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 A state trooper with a K-9 partner stopped a car near the
Arizona-Nevada border for following too close. Driffin was in the car’s
passenger seat and his girlfriend was driving. The trooper noted that
Driffin’s girlfriend seemed nervous and asked her to come to his patrol car
so he could issue a traffic warning. When he asked her who rented the car,
she said her uncle, who was not present, rented it. When the trooper
separately asked Driffin, he told the trooper that his family member, who
also was not present, rented the car. In addition to this basic inconsistency,
Driffin and his girlfriend gave conflicting answers about where they were
driving. Driffin told the trooper that they were going to a bowling alley and
to pick someone up from the airport, but he was not sure which airport. His
girlfriend told the trooper that they were visiting Driffin’s family for a few
days, but she was not sure for how long, had no address, and had no return
flight booked, despite having bought a one-way ticket.

¶3 As he finished the warning, the trooper became suspicious
“that there may be more going on beyond the traffic violation.” He had his
K-9 sniff the car and called another trooper for support. The K-9 alerted and
the officers searched the car. In the car’s trunk, officers found Walmart bags
containing 25 pounds of a substance that later tested positive for
methamphetamine. The time between the trooper approaching the car and
finding the substance was 20 minutes.

¶4 The officers then detained Driffin and his girlfriend and
informed them of their rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Officers then transported the car, drove Driffin and his girlfriend to a field
office, and completed a more thorough search of the car, where they found

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more suspected methamphetamine. Ultimately, they found a total of 8
gallon bags of methamphetamine.

¶5 A detective from the Arizona Department of Public Safety
interviewed Driffin, who denied knowing anything about the drugs. In this
interview Driffin explained that he and his girlfriend flew into Las Vegas,
rented a car, drove to the Los Angeles airport to drop off a cousin and were
now “driving to St. George to meet another friend.” He also told the
detective that he went to a Walmart in Las Vegas.

¶6 Before trial, Driffin moved to suppress the drug evidence,
arguing that the trooper had neither reasonable suspicion to initiate the
traffic stop nor reasonable suspicion to extend the stop for a K-9 sniff. The
court held an evidentiary hearing at which the trooper who stopped Driffin
testified. The trooper testified that Driffin and his girlfriend’s stories about
who rented the car and where they were going were inconsistent and
suspicious. See supra ¶ 2. He also said that drug-trafficking organizations
commonly use rental vehicles and the person who rented the vehicle is not
always present. He testified that the location of the stop—near the state
border—and Driffin’s girlfriend’s nervousness added to his suspicions. The
court denied Driffin’s motion to suppress after finding, based on the totality
of the circumstances, that reasonable suspicion supported both the stop and
the additional detention for the K-9 sniff.

¶7 Also before trial, the State moved in limine to request that the
court allow it to “admit relevant drug expert testimony and modus
operandi evidence” at trial. It sought to have the detective who interviewed
Driffin, testify not just about the interview but also as an expert in drug
trafficking to help the jury understand the “modus operandi of a drug-
trafficking organization.” Driffin opposed the motion. After a hearing, the
court granted the motion in limine, noting that “general modus operandi
testimony is admissible,” but “cautioning the State that if it’s tied to the
defendant in any way” it might become inadmissible drug courier profile
evidence.

¶8 At trial, the State sought to prove that Driffin “knew that he
was transporting illegal drugs.” The State called the detective who testified
first about his investigation and interview of Driffin. Then, the State paused
his testimony and informed the court and defense counsel that he would be
“transitioning now from fact to expert testimony.” In open court, the State
signposted that it was “going to turn now away from the facts of this case
and turn to a different topic” before asking the detective if he was “familiar
with the practices and habits of drug trafficking organizations.” The

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detective then testified that drug-trafficking organizations generally do not
use unwitting couriers, that couriers are typically paid in cash, and that
trafficking organizations can be violent.

¶9 In its closing argument, the State argued that some evidence
suggested Driffin “is not only driving, but he’s getting paid to do so. As we
heard from [the detective], it’s common for drug trafficking organizations
to pay couriers to transport their illegal drugs.” Also in closing, the State
connected a text Driffin received warning him “[d]on’t get beat up” to the
detective’s testimony that trafficking organizations can be violent. The State
concluded that, in the detective’s expert opinion, “these organizations don’t
use unknown couriers,” implying that Driffin was aware of the
methamphetamine.

¶10 Before deliberations, the court instructed the jury that
opening statements and closing arguments are not evidence, and that jurors
were to “[d]etermine the facts only from the evidence produced” consisting
of testimony and exhibits. The court also instructed the jury that “[t]he
testimony of a law enforcement officer is not entitled to any greater or lesser
importance or believability” and that it may accept or reject expert opinion
testimony.

¶11 The jury convicted Driffin of transportation of dangerous
drugs for sale, a class 2 felony. The court sentenced him to ten years’
incarceration with credit for 61 days of presentence credit. Driffin appeals
and we have jurisdiction. Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1),
13-4033(A).

DICUSSION

¶12 Driffin argues that the superior court erred by (1) denying the
motion to suppress and (2) admitting improper drug courier profile
evidence.

I. Motion to Suppress

¶13 Driffin first argues that “[t]he superior court erred by denying
the motion to suppress based on an illegal detention which lasted beyond
the purpose of the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion.” We review
the court’s factual findings on a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion,
but consider the “ultimate legal determination de novo.” State v. Evans, 237
Ariz. 231, 233 ¶ 6 (2015).

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¶14 To determine whether sufficient reasonable suspicion for an
officer to stop a person exists, courts consider “the totality of the
circumstances—the whole picture.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417
(1981). “From that whole picture the officers must derive a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal
activity.” Evans, 237 Ariz. at 234 ¶ 8 (cleaned up). We give consideration “to
the specific reasonable inferences [that an officer] is entitled to draw from
the facts in light of his experience.” Id.

¶15 Although Driffin does not challenge the validity of the
trooper’s initial stop for following too close on appeal, see supra ¶ 6, he
contends that the trooper improperly extended the stop to conduct the K-9
sniff of the car. Absent reasonable suspicion, officers may not extend a
traffic stop to conduct a K-9 sniff. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348,
353–57 (2015). But the trooper testified at the suppression hearing regarding
the factors that gave rise to his reasonable suspicions about additional
criminal activity. He explained that Driffin and his girlfriend’s conflicting
stories about who rented the car and where they were going were
suspicious. He testified, relying on his experience working on hundreds of
drug trafficking investigations, that “part of the tradecraft of smuggling is .
. . you’ll have a cover story, an idea of what you’re gonna say if you’re
stopped or contacted by law enforcement, but when the details aren’t—it’s
hard to make all of the details match when all of it is really a lie.” He
elaborated that drug-trafficking organizations commonly use rental
vehicles and the individual who rented the vehicle is not always present.
These facts together support the court’s conclusion that the trooper had
sufficient reasonable suspicion to conduct a K-9 sniff. See Evans, 237 Ariz.
at 235 ¶¶ 12–13 (an officer must only “exercise common sense to determine
whether the facts justify an objectively reasonable suspicion”). The court
did not err.

II. Modus Operandi Evidence

¶16 Driffin also argues that “[t]he superior court erred by
admitting improper drug courier profile evidence.” He contends that the
detective’s expert testimony about drug-trafficking organizations and
couriers constituted inadmissible drug courier profile evidence rather than
modus operandi evidence. We review the admission of evidence for abuse
of discretion, State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 585 ¶ 11 (2017), and—because
Driffin objected to the State’s motion in limine regarding the detective’s
testimony—we review any error for harmless error, see State v. Garcia-
Quintana, 234 Ariz. 267, 269 ¶ 5 (App. 2014) (“[W]here a motion in limine is
made and ruled upon, the objection raised in that motion is preserved for

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appeal.”) (citation omitted). “Error . . . is harmless if we can say, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict.”
State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 588 (1993).

¶17 “A drug courier profile is a loose assortment of general, often
contradictory, characteristics and behaviors used by police officers to
explain their reasons for stopping and questioning persons about possible
illegal drug activity.” State v. Lee, 191 Ariz. 542, 544 ¶ 10 (1998). “While
expert testimony concerning the structure and methods used by drug
trafficking organizations is admissible, the expert may not provide an
opinion comparing the modus operandi of such an organization with the
conduct of a defendant in a particular case.” Garcia-Quintana, 234 Ariz. at
271 ¶ 14. In other words, “[t]he [S]tate may not offer ‘profile’ evidence as
substantive proof of the defendant’s guilt.” Haskie, 242 Ariz. at 586 ¶ 15. But
“there may be situations in which drug courier profile evidence has
significance beyond the mere suggestion that because an accused’s conduct
is similar to that of other proven violators, he too must be guilty.” Lee, 191
Ariz. at 546 ¶ 19. Evidence may be admitted “to assist a jury in
understanding the modus operandi of a drug-trafficking organization,”
State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 142 ¶ 22 (2018), or “to explain how a person’s
actions may indicate their active participation in a crime,” Garcia-Quintana,
234 Ariz. at 271 ¶ 13. That modus operandi evidence “may indicate [the
defendant’s] active participation in a crime” does not transform it into
inadmissible profile evidence. Id. at 271 ¶¶ 13, 15; see Escalante, 245 Ariz. at
143 ¶ 25.

¶18 Here, the detective testified as an expert generally about
drug-trafficking organizations and couriers. Supra ¶ 8. His explanation that
trafficking organizations do not tend to use unknown couriers, can be
violent, and often pay their couriers in cash was modus operandi evidence
explaining general practices. See State v. Gonzalez, 229 Ariz. 550, 553–54 ¶ 13
(App. 2012) (“Expert testimony that drug traffickers do not entrust large
quantities of drugs to unknowing transporters is not drug courier profile
evidence, but rather, is modus operandi evidence.”). And he did not compare
the evidence “with the conduct of [Driffin] in [this] particular case.” Garcia-
Quintana, 234 Ariz. at 271 ¶ 14. In fact, the State took a break between the
detective’s testimony about Driffin specifically and the modus operandi
testimony. The State clearly noted this separation to the jury by
commenting that the testimony would “turn now away from the facts of
this case.” The court did not err in allowing the detective’s modus operandi
testimony.

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¶19 Driffin further argues that the way the State connected the
detective’s testimony to Driffin’s case in its closing argument was error. But
“there [i]s nothing improper about” the State “describ[ing] how the actions
of [Driffin] fit into the modus operandi of a drug trafficking organization.”
Id. at 273 ¶ 29. The State may “argue[] reasonable inferences to the jury
based on the expert testimony of the officers.” Id. The State could
reasonably argue about the detective’s testimony that trafficking
organizations do not tend to use unknown couriers supported the
knowledge element of the crime. See A.R.S. § 13-3407 (A)(7) (“A person shall
not knowingly . . . [t]ransport for sale . . . a dangerous drug.”). Further,
statements by attorneys are not evidence, the jury was instructed as such,
and we presume jurors follow their instructions. State v. Vargas, 251 Ariz.
157, 165 ¶ 17 (App. 2021). Thus, any potential error would be harmless. See
Bible, 175 Ariz. at 588.

CONCLUSION

¶20 For the reasons stated, we affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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