State v. York

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellant,

v.

JEFFREY JOSEPH YORK, Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0098
FILED 08-10-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. S1300CR202301112
The Honorable Michael P. McGill, Judge

SENTENCES VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Joshua C. Smith
Counsel for Appellant

Zickerman Law Office PLLC, Flagstaff
By Adam Zickerman
Counsel for Appellee

STATE v. YORK
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Veronika Fabian delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

F A B I A N, Judge:

¶1 At the time Jeffrey York was sentenced, sentencing
enhancements for dangerous crimes against children were not available
where the victim was not actually a minor under State v. Marner (Marner I),
258 Ariz. 512 (App. 2024), rev’d, 261 Ariz. 275 (2026). But in State v. Marner
(Marner II), 261 Ariz. 275, 285 ¶ 47 (2026), the Arizona Supreme Court
reversed Marner I. Thus, the State argues that York received an illegally
lenient sentence.

¶2 Because York’s case is on appeal, it is not final, and Marner II
applies. Accordingly, we vacate York’s sentences and remand for
resentencing.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 In 2023, Yavapai County law enforcement conducted an
undercover operation in Prescott where officers used social media apps to
chat with, identify, and apprehend possible child sex offenders. During the
operation, a detective set up an undercover profile on an app and was
contacted by York. The detective told York that he had two children, ages 7
and 11. The detective sent photos of the “children” to York, but there in fact
were no children. The two planned to meet at a park where York would
meet the “children.” York and the detective also talked over the phone,
where York spoke with someone posing as the detective’s daughter. York
indicated to the “daughter” that he would perform oral sex on her.

¶4 York was apprehended by police at the park where he had
arranged to meet the detective. In York’s truck was candy, a condom, and
the phone used to communicate with the detective.

¶5 York was indicted in October 2023. At a March 2024
settlement conference, he requested more time to review the State’s plea
offer, but the offer was withdrawn and the case went to trial.

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STATE v. YORK
Decision of the Court

¶6 Prior to trial, but after the plea offer was withdrawn, on
October 30, 2024, this Court issued its opinion in Marner I. That case held
that the sentencing enhancements for dangerous crimes against children
under A.R.S. § 13-705 (“DCAC enhancements”) do not apply to a conviction
of luring a minor for sexual exploitation if the victim is not actually a minor
under the age of 15, or a “fictitious minor.” Marner I, 258 Ariz. at 518-19
¶¶ 20-23.

¶7 At trial, York testified in his defense. Although he denied
having any sexual interest in children, he admitted that he intended to meet
the detective’s “undercover persona and engage in sex with him and his
children.”

¶8 Before trial, the State stated that it understood that, under
Marner I, DCAC enhancements did not apply, but requested the jury still
make DCAC findings. The superior court included the DCAC interrogatory
on the final verdict form with no objection. The jury found York guilty of
luring a minor for sexual exploitation and two counts of attempt to commit
sexual misconduct with a minor. The jury found all three offenses were
dangerous crimes against children.

¶9 At sentencing, consistent with Marner I, the superior court did
not apply DCAC enhancements. The court sentenced York to a four-year
sentence for luring a minor and three-year sentences for attempted sexual
misconduct with a minor, all to be served consecutively. The court found
no aggravating factors. As mitigating factors, the court considered York’s
“family support, the community support, his efforts at treatment, his
medical issues, possible mental health issues” and York’s prior law
enforcement career, but gave those factors “very little weight” based on the
facts of the case.

¶10 The State timely appealed and we have jurisdiction under
Article VI, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S.
§§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 13-4031 and 4032(5).

DISCUSSION

¶11 Whether the superior court applied the correct sentencing
statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Hollenback, 212
Ariz. 12, 16 ¶ 12 (App. 2005). The State argues that because this Court’s
holding in Marner I was overturned, York should have received an
enhanced sentence under § 13-705. See State v. Marner (Marner II), 261 Ariz.
275, 285 ¶ 47 (2026). York argues that the Supreme Court’s holding in
Marner II should not apply retroactively.

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STATE v. YORK
Decision of the Court

I. Marner II Applies to York.

¶12 A decision that overrules precedent and announces a new
standard for criminal cases “generally must be applied retroactively” to
cases that are not yet final. State v. Slemmer, 170 Ariz. 174, 180 (1991). If a
case is pending on direct review, it is not final, and new rules for criminal
proceedings, even those constituting a “clear break” from the past, must be
applied to it. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 326-28 (1987).

¶13 York argues that retroactive application of Marner II would
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. In
support, he maintains that the retroactive application of Marner II would
have a detrimental effect on the administration of justice because it would
deprive him of the ability to make an informed decision about how to
proceed with his case, including considering plea offers, violating his due
process rights. However, the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to a change in the
law that criminalizes conduct that was not criminal when committed. See
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353–54 (1964). And here, neither
Marner I nor Marner II criminalized otherwise non-criminal conduct.

¶14 Furthermore, at the time of the State’s final plea offer in March
of 2024 was withdrawn, Marner I had not been decided. Thus, York’s
potential sentence at the time the offer remained open included possible
DCAC enhancements, and York was aware of “the full range of potential
punishment” he faced upon conviction. State v. Benak, 199 Ariz. 333, 336–37
(App. 2001). Accordingly, applying Marner II, we vacate York’s sentences.

II. York’s Sentences on Remand.

¶15 York argues that if the case is remanded for resentencing, we
should instruct the superior court to impose a mitigated sentence as the
court initially found mitigating factors and a lack of aggravating factors. On
remand, the superior court should, complying with § 13-705 and in
consideration of its original findings on mitigating and aggravating factors,
impose a just sentence as it deems fit.

¶16 York also argues that his four-year sentence for luring a minor
was illegal as it was above the presumptive 3.5-year sentence under A.R.S.
§ 13-702(D) and the jury found no aggravating factors. This issue is moot,
however, because we have vacated that sentence.

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STATE v. YORK
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶17 We vacate York’s sentences and remand to the superior court
for resentencing.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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