State v. Begay

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellant,

v.

LARRY BECENTI BEGAY, Appellee,

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellant,

v.

DANIEL LUKE ERICKSON, Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0107
No. 1 CA-CR 25-0108
(Consolidated)
FILED 01-16-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2024-151042-001
No. CR2024-141416-001
The Honorable Justin Beresky, Judge
The Honorable Todd F. Lang, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Johnny Jacquez
Counsel for Appellant
Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Joshua Messick
Counsel for Appellees

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1 The State appeals the superior court’s dismissals of its
criminal cases against Larry Begay and Daniel Erickson for illegally
possessing firearms. The State argues their firearm rights were not
automatically restored when they completed probation for their felonies in
January 2023 and November 2022, respectively. Because the September 24,
2022 amendment to A.R.S. § 13-907 (the “2022 Amendment”) automatically
restored their firearm rights when they completed probation, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. The Parties’ Felony Convictions and Probation Terms

¶2 Begay and Erickson were each convicted of a single felony.
Begay pled guilty in 2021 to Aggravated Driving Under the Influence, a
class 4 non-dangerous felony arising from a 2017 offense. The court
imposed a three-year term of supervised probation. Erickson pled guilty in
2021 to possession of drug paraphernalia, a class 6 undesignated felony
arising from a 2019 offense. The court imposed an eighteen-month term of
probation. Because of these convictions, A.R.S. § 13-904(A) prohibited both
Begay and Erickson from possessing firearms.

B. The Legislature Amended A.R.S. § 13-907 in 2022.

¶3 While both defendants were on probation, the Legislature
enacted House Bill 2119, which amended A.R.S. § 13-907 effective
September 24, 2022. 2022 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 199, § 2 (2nd Reg. Sess.). The
2022 Amendment provided qualifying first-time felony offenders would
automatically have their firearm rights restored “on completion of
probation.” Id. The 2022 Amendment also eliminated the provision of
A.R.S. § 13-910 that required felony offenders to wait two years before their
firearm rights are restored. Id. at § 3.

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C. After the 2022 Amendment Was Effective, Begay and
Erickson Completed Their Probations and Possessed
Firearms, Leading the State to Charge Them With
Misconduct Involving Weapons.

¶4 Begay was discharged from probation in January 2023.
Erickson was discharged from probation in November 2022. Neither
defendant owed any victim restitution, and neither sought a court order
restoring firearm rights. Subsequently, both acquired firearms. In 2024, the
State separately charged both defendants with Misconduct Involving
Weapons, Class 4 felonies, alleging they knowingly possessed firearms
while being prohibited possessors.

D. The Court Grants the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Their
Criminal Cases.

¶5 Begay and Erickson each moved to dismiss their cases under
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 16.4(b), arguing that A.R.S.
§ 13-907, as amended, automatically restored their firearm rights “[o]n
completion of probation,” so they were not prohibited possessors of
firearms. The State argued the 2022 Amendment could not apply because
each defendant’s underlying offense and conviction predated the statute’s
effective date.

¶6 The superior court rejected the State’s position and granted
both motions to dismiss, concluding A.R.S. § 13-907 applies to all
defendants who completed probation after September 24, 2022, regardless
of when their crimes were committed or sentences imposed. The State
timely appealed both matters. This Court consolidated the appeals. We
have jurisdiction. Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. §§ 12-2101(A)(1), 13-4031.

DISCUSSION

¶7 We review a superior court’s “ruling on a motion to dismiss
based on the insufficiency of the indictment for an abuse of discretion.”
State v. Holmes, 250 Ariz. 311, 313 ¶ 5 (App. 2020). But a “court abuses its
discretion when it misapplies the law or predicates its decision on incorrect
legal principles.” Nowell v. Rees, 219 Ariz. 399, 403 ¶ 11 (App. 2008) (quoting
Taylor v. Cruikshank, 214 Ariz. 40, 43 ¶ 10 (App. 2006)). We review questions
of statutory interpretation de novo. Holmes, 250 Ariz. at 313 ¶ 5; State v.
Acuna Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. 197, 211 ¶ 34 (2018).

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I. The Plain Language of A.R.S. § 13-907 Unambiguously Provides
That Begay’s and Erickson’s Firearm Rights Were Restored.

¶8 Courts must apply the plain language of a statute when
interpreting its meaning. Southern Arizona Home Builders Ass’n v. Town of
Marana, 254 Ariz. 281, 286 ¶ 31 (2023). Only if the text is ambiguous do we
resort to other methods of interpretation. Desert Mountain Energy Corp. v.
City of Flagstaff, 259 Ariz. 346, 339 ¶ 20 (App. 2025).

¶9 After the 2022 Amendment, A.R.S. § 13-907(A) provides:

On completion of probation for an offense committed in this
state or absolute discharge from imprisonment, any person
who has not previously been convicted of a felony offense
shall automatically be restored any civil rights that were lost
or suspended as a result of the conviction if the person pays
all victim restitution imposed. A person who is entitled to the
restoration of any civil rights pursuant to this subsection is
not required to file an application pursuant to section 13-908,
except that if the person does file an application, the court
shall grant the application without receiving a response from
the state or holding a hearing.

A.R.S. § 13-907(A).

¶10 The statute does not tie restoration of a person’s firearm rights
to the date of their offense, conviction, or sentencing. Id. It conditions
restoration instead on completion of probation or absolute discharge,
including payment of all victim restitution imposed. Id.

¶11 Begay and Erickson both completed probation after
September 24, 2022. And both paid all victim restitution owed. The plain
language of the statute dictates that their firearm rights were restored. Id.
Accordingly, neither defendant was a prohibited possessor under A.R.S.
§ 13-3101(A)(7)(b) when the State charged them with Misconduct Involving
Weapons. The superior court correctly dismissed these charges.

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II. A.R.S. § 13-907 Operates Prospectively.

A. Arizona’s Strong Presumption Against Retroactivity
Supports a Prospective Reading of A.R.S. § 13-907.

¶12 The State argues that the plain language of A.R.S. § 13-907
does not make it retroactive, so we must construe the statute to avoid its
retroactive operation here. The State is correct that our law disfavors
retroactivity. See A.R.S. § 1-244 (“No statute is retroactive unless expressly
declared therein.”). But the State’s argument fails because the 2022
Amendment did not make the statute operate retroactively, as applied to
Begay and Erickson.

¶13 In determining whether a statute is being applied
retroactively, courts ask whether “it ‘attaches new legal consequences’ to
events completed before [its enactment]” and must first identify the
relevant “completed event.” Zuther v. State, 199 Ariz. 104, 109 ¶ 15 (2000)
(quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994)). If the statute’s
text clearly identifies that operative event and does not purport to reach
earlier, completed events, courts simply apply the statute according to its
ordinary meaning. See id.

¶14 Here, the relevant “completed event” is the end of both
defendants’ probations (which occurred after the 2022 Amendment), not
their convictions (which occurred before the 2022 Amendment). That
means A.R.S. § 13-907 is not retroactive: it operates prospectively, because
it creates legal consequences only from its effective date forward. Just as
Zuther held that the relevant “completed event” for retroactivity analysis of
a statute altering the source of payment of “gate money” to be paid to
exiting prisoners was an inmate’s release from prison, not the date of his
crime, the completed event here is Defendants’ completion of probation,
which occurred after the amendment took effect. Zuther, 199 Ariz. at 109-
10 ¶¶ 15–17.

¶15 Under the statute, if an individual completed probation
before the 2022 Amendment’s effective date, their civil rights would be
automatically restored on the effective date. State v. Danner, ___ Ariz. ___,
2025 WL 2970551, at *4 ¶ 18 (App. 2025). And where, as here, probation
was completed after the amendment took effect, restoration occurs on the
date probation was completed. See State v. Chester, No. 2 CA-CR 2025-0124-
PR, 2025 WL 2587386, at *2 ¶¶ 7-8 (Ariz. App. Sept. 5, 2025) (mem. decision)
(holding the defendant remained a prohibited possessor where he was
arrested with a firearm nineteen days before the 2022 Amendment took

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effect, because his rights could not have been automatically restored until
the amendment’s effective date). In both scenarios, the statute applies
prospectively because it does not alter the legal consequences of any event
occurring before the amendment. See State v. Nixon, 242 Ariz. 242, 243 ¶ 1
(App. 2017). Because Begay and Erickson completed probation after
September 24, 2022, their rights were automatically restored upon
completion of their probation.

B. A.R.S. § 13-907 Is a Procedural Civil Rights Statute, Not a
Substantive Sentencing Statute.

¶16 The State argues the 2022 Amendment can only apply to
offenses committed after its September 24, 2022 effective date absent an
express retroactivity clause, because it effectively re-sentences Begay and
Erickson. Begay and Erickson argue that mischaracterizes A.R.S. § 13-907,
which is a procedural, remedial civil rights statute that governs rights-
restoration after a sentence is complete, not a provision that reopens or
alters the original sentence. Begay and Erickson are correct.

¶17 Arizona law squarely rejects the State’s premise that an
adjustment to one’s civil rights status is a retroactive change in punishment.
In State v. Olvera, the defendant argued that 1994 amendments to A.R.S.
§§ 13-904(A) and 13-3101 — which rendered him a prohibited possessor —
impermissibly added punishment for his earlier felony convictions. 191
Ariz. 75, 76 (App. 1997). We rejected that argument. Id. at 77. To the
contrary, we held the amendments were applied prospectively to punish
only post-amendment possession and did not impose additional
punishment for the defendant’s past crimes. Id. Critically, Olvera explained
that the statute “merely changed his status to a ‘prohibited possessor
felon,’” and that the resulting firearm prohibition served public-safety
purposes, not penal ones. Id. Far from viewing status-based firearm
restrictions as retroactive sentencing changes, Olvera characterizes them as
prospective regulatory consequences. Id.

¶18 We reaffirmed that principle in Nixon, which involved a
defendant whose conviction predated amendments to A.R.S. § 13-
904(A)(5). Nixon, 242 Ariz. at 243 ¶ 1. We held that applying A.R.S. § 13-
904(A)(5) to a pre-amendment conviction “does not change the
consequences of [the defendant’s] past acts[,]” but rather “relates to
conditions that existed in 1994”—namely, the defendant’s ongoing status
as a felon whose rights had not been restored. Id. at 244 ¶ 7. The statute
therefore “prospectively applies to convicted felons who had yet to have
their civil rights restored when it became effective, regardless [of] whether

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the conviction occurred before or after its effective date.” Id. at 244 ¶ 8. This
is precisely the situation here, as both defendants’ civil rights were
prospectively restored when they completed their probation in November
2022 and January 2023.

¶19 Applying Olvera and Nixon, we reject the State’s theory that
A.R.S. § 13-907 applies only to offenses committed after the amendment. If
the Legislature’s choice to suspend firearm rights after a felony conviction
is a prospective, regulatory consequence based on a person’s status, and not
an impermissible retroactive increase in punishment, then the Legislature’s
choice to restore those same rights automatically upon completion of
probation must also be treated as a prospective, status-based consequence.
Furthermore, A.R.S. § 13-907 neither defines criminal conduct nor modifies
sentencing ranges. It simply prescribes the procedure and timing by which
a person’s civil rights status is updated once they have fully served their
felony sentences. Danner, 2025 WL 2970551, at *4 ¶ 17.

¶20 This court confirmed this understanding in Danner, holding
that A.R.S. § 13-907 is a procedural statute governing the method of
restoring civil rights, not a substantive change to criminal punishment. Id.
Danner applied the same principle we recognized in Nixon — that the
operative question is whether the triggering event (completion of probation
or absolute discharge) occurs after the statute’s effective date, not when the
underlying conviction occurred. Id.

¶21 Thus, the State’s argument that applying A.R.S. § 13-907
amounts to a retroactive modification of punishment is inconsistent with
our precedent. Firearm-rights disability and restoration statutes operate
prospectively based on a defendant’s post-sentence status, not retroactively
based on the date of the offense. A.R.S. § 13-907 fits squarely within that
settled framework and the superior court correctly applied the statute to
defendants whose civil rights status changed once they completed their
probation.

III. The State’s Argument That the Court’s Application of A.R.S. § 13-
907 Leads to Absurd and Irrational Results Fails.

¶22 The State also argues that the superior court’s interpretation
of A.R.S. § 13-907 “leads to absurd and irrational” results. The State
contends that under the superior court’s logic, sentencing law would no
longer be “fixed” at the date of offense and that noncompliant probationers
or more serious offenders would receive “automatic immediate

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restoration” of firearm rights while compliant probationers and less serious
offenders would not.

¶23 Begay and Erickson respond that the State’s interpretation
rests on a misreading of the statute and does not justify departing from
A.R.S. § 13-907’s plain language. They emphasize that automatic
restoration applies only to individuals who (1) have a single prior felony
conviction, (2) were not convicted of a dangerous or serious offense, (3)
have paid all victim restitution, and (4) have completed probation or been
absolutely discharged from imprisonment. A.R.S. § 13-907(A), (C). Because
dangerous and serious offenders are categorically excluded, defendants
argue there is no “windfall” for “more serious” offenders whose sentences
extend past the 2022 Amendment’s effective date, as the State contends.

¶24 The State’s policy concerns do not justify departing from the
statute’s plain text. See State v. Wilson, 200 Ariz. 390, 396 ¶ 14 (App. 2001)
(“[W]e do not begin our statutory analysis by examining the general
‘purpose’ of a statute and then determining whether public policy concerns
support application of the statute in particular factual circumstances. We
must begin by examining the actual language of the statute. If that
language is unambiguous, we must apply the statute as written.” (quoting
People v. Childs, 243 Mich. App. 360, 367 (2000))). A.R.S. § 13-907 does not
alter the punishment imposed for the underlying crime; it governs only
post-sentence restoration of civil rights. As Zuther and Nixon confirm, a
statute is not retroactive merely because it relates to antecedent convictions.
Zuther, 199 Ariz. at 109 ¶ 17; Nixon, 242 Ariz. at 244 ¶ 7. The penalties for
Begay’s and Erickson’s prior offenses were fixed when those offenses
occurred. Automatic restoration of their civil rights under A.R.S. § 13-907
did not change their punishment at sentencing retroactively.

¶25 We also reject the State’s argument that we should not apply
the statute’s plain text because it rewards “noncompliant” probationers
who end up completing probation later than “compliant” probationers.
Our job is to apply the statute, and whether probationers subject to the
statute had difficulties finishing probation or not, all probationers subject
to the statute receive restoration by operation of law. Probationers still
serving probation or imprisonment on September 24, 2022, who fully
complete their sentence and pay all outstanding restitution after September
24, 2022, have their firearm rights restored as of their completion date.
A.R.S. § 13-907 uniformly applies to all qualifying first-time offenders.

¶26 Nor does the State show absurdity. A.R.S. § 13-907 applies
uniformly to a narrow class of first-time, non-dangerous, non-serious

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offenders who have paid restitution and completed their probation or been
absolutely discharged from imprisonment. A.R.S. § 13-907(A), (C). By its
terms, both “compliant” and “noncompliant” probationers receive
restoration by operation of law. Any policy concerns this implicates are for
the Legislature, not us.

CONCLUSION

¶27 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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