State v. James

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

JOHN ASHLEY JAMES, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0192
FILED 03-03-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. S8015CR202100621
The Honorable Douglas R. Camacho, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Mohave County Attorney’s Office, Kingman
By Matthew J. Smith, Ryan H. Esplin, Jason Mitchell
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Harris & Winger, P.C., Flagstaff
By Chad Joshua Winger
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
 STATE v. JAMES
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Andrew J. Becke and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 John Ashley James appeals from an order involuntarily
committing him to a secure state mental health facility. That order was
entered after (1) the superior court found him to be not competent and not
restorable, but responsible for a serious offense, and (2) a jury found him to
be dangerous beyond a reasonable doubt (Title 13 Commitment). See Ariz.
Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) §§ 13-4517 and 13-4521 (2026).1 The court rejects James’
challenge to the constitutionality and applicability of the Title 13
Commitment scheme, as well as his challenge to the admission of an
expert’s opinion that he is dangerous. Although the superior court erred by
admitting multiple gruesome images of the murder victim’s body at the
dangerousness trial, that error does not require reversal. Thus, the Title 13
Commitment order is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 James was indicted for first-degree murder for stabbing his
stepfather to death in their shared home. The superior court found James
incompetent to stand trial and ordered him to submit to competency
restoration treatment at the Arizona State Hospital and, later, the Yavapai
County Restoration to Competency Program. Although he received the
maximum 21 months of treatment, James was never restored to
competency. See A.R.S. § 13-4515(A); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.5(b)(2)(C).
The court found him not competent and not restorable when the treatment
period ended in December 2023.

¶3 When making the not competent and not restorable finding,
the court granted the State’s request to start procedures for a Title 13
Commitment. The court set the first hearing for January 2, 2024, the day
after the Title 13 Commitment procedures became effective. See 2022 Ariz.
Sess. Laws, ch. 352, § 7 (2nd Reg. Sess.) (S.B. 1310); 2023 Ariz. Sess. Laws,

1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.

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ch. 130, § 4 (1st Reg. Sess.) (H.B. 2689). The court appointed a guardian ad
litem and scheduled further proceedings. James unsuccessfully moved for
dismissal on jurisdictional and constitutional grounds.

¶4 At an evidentiary hearing under A.R.S. § 13-4521(A), the
court found the State carried its burden to show, by evident proof or great
presumption, that James committed a serious offense. The court set a jury
trial under A.R.S. § 13-4521(E) to address the issue of James’ dangerousness.
The court appointed Drs. Mark Harvancik and Laurence Schiff, the same
professionals who evaluated James for competency, to evaluate him for
dangerousness. After the evaluations, Dr. Schiff concluded that James is not
dangerous so long as he is medicated, while Dr. Harvancik concluded that
James is dangerous even when medicated.

¶5 James filed a pretrial motion in limine to preclude
Dr. Harvancik’s testimony, arguing the doctor was not statutorily qualified
and that his opinions were inadmissible under Arizona Rule of Evidence
702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). As trial
began, the court ruled that both doctors were statutorily qualified and that
the parties could raise Rule 702 challenges during the doctors’ testimony.

¶6 At trial, Dr. Harvancik testified about his education and
experience before explaining that he relied on treatment records to assess
dangerousness because James was actively hallucinating at both his
competency and dangerousness evaluations. Dr. Harvancik testified that
records showed James was diagnosed with schizophrenia and antisocial
personality disorder, and that he continued to experience psychotic
symptoms—specifically, hallucinations and paranoia—even when on high-
dose antipsychotic medications.

¶7 James objected under Rule 702, challenging Dr. Harvancik’s
knowledge, his reliance on collateral sources and his failure to cite a
scientific methodology. The court ruled that Dr. Harvancik had proper
knowledge and he properly relied on records, but required the State to
provide further foundation about his methodology. In providing that
further foundation, Dr. Harvancik testified that when a patient’s behavior
precludes a mental health professional from administering a psychological
test for dangerousness, it is standard practice to assess dangerousness
based on the patient’s records. He concluded that James’ records showed
that he was dangerous even when consistently medicated, and that he
needed to be committed to a secure state mental health facility. James raised
no further Rule 702 objections. Dr. Schiff then testified to his opinion,
without objection by the State, describing a successful interaction with

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James and concluding that records and his psychotic symptoms did not
show a propensity for violence.

¶8 James moved in limine to prevent the State from using
photographs and video of the murder victim’s body. He argued that the
images were not relevant to show future dangerousness, and, alternatively,
that the images’ gruesomeness made them unfairly prejudicial. The State
responded that the video only briefly showed the victim, only a few
photographs were being offered and the selected photographs reflected
James’ dangerousness because they show the multiple, intentional stab
wounds he inflicted on the victim, including severe facial wounds. The
court denied James’ motion to preclude, other than precluding one
photograph the court found cumulative.

¶9 The jury received one video of the crime scene, five
photographs of the victim’s body at the crime scene, and eight photographs
of the autopsy of the victim, all in color. The one-minute video, from a
police officer’s body camera, shows the officer entering a house and finding
the victim. The video briefly shows the victim’s supine body with blood on
his chest, his face and the floor around him. The crime scene photographs
show: (1) a distant view of the victim’s body; (2) a close-up view of the
victim’s body, showing blood on his chest and face along with pooled and
spattered blood around him; (3) a similar close-up view from a different
angle; (4) a similar close-up view from the side, showing the victim’s
complete head and additional pooled blood and (5) a close-up view of
hands pulling up the victim’s shirt to show a cut on his torso. The autopsy
photographs show: (1) hands pulling apart a cut on the victim’s finger; (2) a
close-up view of the victim’s face showing cuts at the top of his nose and
the side of his face; (3) a close-up view of hands pulling the victim’s nose
away from his face at the cut; (4) another close-up view of the victim’s face
showing the cuts; (5) a close-up view of a tool entering the cut on the side
of the victim’s face and exiting through the interior of his upper lip; (6) a
close-up view of the same tool in the same position, with hands pulling back
the victim’s upper lip to show the exit point; (7) a close-up view of a cut on
the victim’s ear and (8) a close-up view of a tool stuck in a cut near the
victim’s armpit.

¶10 For the crime scene photographs, a police officer testified to
finding the victim’s body when he responded to James’ mother’s 911 call.
Regarding the autopsy photographs, the medical examiner described what
they showed, stated that the finger wound could be defensive, and
concluded that the victim died from multiple sharp force injuries that
caused him to aspirate blood.

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¶11 James’ mother testified that James has a long history of mental
illness, including diagnoses of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and
paranoia. She stated that, although doctors had told her he should always
be medicated, he had been without medication for the three months before
the murder, which affected his behavior. She reported that he would pace,
go outside and yell in a panic and talk to dead people. Although at the trial
she denied seeing him kill the victim, she stated otherwise in her interview
with the police.

¶12 In video clips admitted at trial, James’ mother told police that
on the day of the murder, she had locked James out of the house to stop his
repeated entering and exiting. When he banged on the door and asked for
shoes, she opened the door to give him a pair, and he forced his way in,
knocking her to the ground. He then encountered the victim. His mother
saw him making stabbing motions and heard him asking “Mason,” a name
he had been mentioning for some time, to leave him alone. She then saw
him put a knife in the kitchen sink and leave the house. Police found two
clean knives in the kitchen, and they apprehended James outside the house
later that day.

¶13 After considering the evidence, the jury found, consistent
with A.R.S. § 13-4521(E), that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that James is dangerous and should be committed to a secure state mental
health facility. The court, consistent with A.R.S. § 13-4521(F)-(H), then
dismissed the criminal charge without prejudice and ordered James
committed to a secure state mental health facility, licensed under A.R.S.
§ 36-425.06, for education, care, supervision and treatment to render him
either competent or non-dangerous. The Title 13 Commitment order would
last for James’ natural life or until he became competent or non-dangerous.
See A.R.S. § 13-4521(G)(2).

¶14 This court has jurisdiction over James’ timely notice of appeal
from the Title 13 Commitment order under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21 and
-2101(A)(10)(a).

DISCUSSION

¶15 James apparently is not currently in custody under the Title
13 Commitment order. In a special action filed with this court in 2024, it
emerged that the State never transferred James from jail to a “secure state
mental health facility” as required by the Title 13 Commitment order
because no such facility exists. As a result, in a September 2024 order, this
court ordered that James be released from jail pending his commitment to

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a secure state mental health facility. The next day, it appears, the State
instituted commitment proceedings under Title 36 that led to James’
placement at the Arizona State Hospital. The court in that matter ordered
that if he is released in the Title 36 proceedings, his public-fiduciary
guardian may direct his placement until commitment to a secure state
mental health facility becomes possible.

¶16 Regardless of where James is physically being held, the Title
13 Commitment order remains in place and compels his placement in a
secure state mental health facility when possible. Thus, resolution of this
appeal from the Title 13 Commitment order affects James and it is
appropriate for this court to decide it. Further, this court may consider even
moot issues that are of great public importance or are capable of repetition
yet evading review. Cardoso v. Soldo, 230 Ariz. 614, 616-17 ¶¶ 5-7 (App.
2012).

I. James’ Challenges to the Title 13 Commitment Scheme’s
Constitutionality and Application Fail.

¶17 James first challenges the constitutionality and application of
the Title 13 Commitment scheme. This court reviews the validity of statutes
de novo, construing them as constitutional if possible. In re Leon G., 204
Ariz. 15, 19 ¶ 9 (2002) (citing cases).

¶18 The Title 13 Commitment scheme provides that, when a
defendant who is found not competent and not restorable is charged with
a serious offense (including first degree murder, A.R.S. § 13-706(F)(1)(a)),
any party may request a trial to determine whether the defendant is
dangerous and should be involuntarily committed. See A.R.S. § 13-
4517(A)(4). For commitment, the court must first find that the proof is
evident or the presumption great that the defendant committed a serious
offense. See A.R.S. § 13-4521(A). If the court makes that finding, mental
health experts must examine the defendant. See A.R.S. § 13-4521(D). Then,
at a trial to the court (or a jury, on request), the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is dangerous and should be
involuntarily committed. See A.R.S. § 13-4521(E). If the fact finder
determines that the State has carried its burden of proof, the court must
dismiss the criminal charges without prejudice and order the defendant
committed to a secure state mental health facility for education, care,
supervision and treatment to render the defendant either competent or non-
dangerous. See A.R.S. § 13-4521(F). The resulting commitment, subject to
Title 36 procedures, may last no longer than the presumptive sentence the
defendant could have received for the highest charged offense (and will

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count as presentence incarceration), and must end if the defendant becomes
either competent or non-dangerous. See A.R.S. § 13-4521(G)(1), (2), (H), (K).
Upon expiration of the commitment order, the State or the director of the
secure state mental health facility may petition for further treatment under
Title 36 or for the appointment of a guardian under Title 14. See A.R.S. § 13-
4521(I).

¶19 James contends that the Title 13 Commitment scheme is
unconstitutional, both facially and as applied, because it forces an
incompetent defendant to undergo a criminal trial without due process of
law and the assistance of counsel, in violation of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, as applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. James has not shown that the Title 13
Commitment scheme is unconstitutional, either facially or as applied.

¶20 Although the Title 13 Commitment scheme arises from
criminal charges and is found in Arizona’s Criminal Code, it defines no
crime and imposes no punishment. See Carson v. Gentry, ___ Ariz. ___, ___,
¶¶ 78, 80-83, 86, 574 P.3d 205, 221-23 (2025). It is, instead, a civil mechanism
designed to promote mental health treatment and protect the public. See id.
The Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel for “criminal prosecutions”
therefore does not apply. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also In re MH-2008-
000867, 225 Ariz. 178, 179-80 ¶¶ 2, 7 (2010) (the Sixth Amendment’s
confrontation clause does not apply in involuntary commitment
proceedings under Title 36).

¶21 The Title 13 Commitment scheme provides—consistent with
the constitutional guarantee of due process—that the defendant has the
right to legal representation. See A.R.S. § 13-4517(A)(4); accord In re Leon G.,
204 Ariz. at 20 ¶ 15 (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 500 (1980)). Here,
James was represented by counsel for the entire proceedings. And given the
nature of the proceedings, the court is unpersuaded by James’ arguments
that the representation was not meaningful because his incapacity forced
his attorney to “go[] it alone,” without his input. His incapacity is what
warranted the representation. James has not shown any violation of due
process with respect to his representation.

¶22 Nor has James shown that the Title 13 Commitment scheme
otherwise violates due process. A civil commitment scheme tracks the
constitutional guarantee of due process if it is sufficiently narrow and
imposes proper procedures and evidentiary standards. See In re Leon G., 204
Ariz. at 19 ¶ 8. The Arizona Supreme Court recently held that the Title 13
Commitment scheme “is commensurate with the civil commitment

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schemes” for sex offenders upheld in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)
and Martin v. Reinstein, 195 Ariz. 293 (App. 1999). See Carson, ___ Ariz. at
___ ¶¶ 86, 80-81, 574 P.3d at 222-23. The Title 13 Commitment scheme
ensures that counsel must be appointed to represent the defendant; that the
defendant may be committed only if he or she is proved at an evidentiary
hearing to have committed a serious offense; that the defendant is allowed
to retain a mental health expert to examine him or her and present the
expert’s evaluation at trial; that the defendant may not be committed unless
proved to be dangerous beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the defendant
may not be committed indefinitely. See A.R.S. §§ 13-4517(A)(4), -4521; In re
Leon G., 204 Ariz. at 20 ¶ 15. Here, James was afforded counsel, all hearings
were properly conducted and all findings were made consistent with the
statutory burdens of proof and other requirements.

¶23 James argues in passing that the Title 13 Commitment scheme
violates the right to equal protection because “[h]e does not stand on an
equal footing with any other criminal defendant.” That argument fails.
Martin explained that the constitutionality of the civil commitment scheme
for sexual offenders was determined under rational basis review, and that
the scheme’s application to “persons who have been convicted of, charged
with but found incompetent to stand trial for, or acquitted by reason of
insanity of, one or more violent sexual acts” was a rational classification
designed to protect the public. 195 Ariz. at 309-13 ¶¶ 49-63. So too here, the
interests of public protection provide a rational basis for applying the Title
13 Commitment procedures to criminal defendants charged with serious
offenses who are found to be not competent, not restorable and dangerous.

¶24 Finally, in oral argument before this court, James’ counsel
conceded that Carson v. Gentry, decided by the Arizona Supreme Court after
briefing in this matter, rejected his ex post facto arguments. See ___ Ariz. at
___ ¶¶ 74-86, 574 P.3d at 221-23. For these reasons, James’ challenges to the
constitutionality and applicability of the Title 13 Commitment statutes fail.

II. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting
Dr. Harvancik’s Opinion on James’ Dangerousness.

¶25 James argues that the superior court abused its discretion by
admitting Dr. Harvancik’s opinion on James’ dangerousness into evidence
under Rule 702.2 Rule 702 unquestionably applies to these types of

2 Because James does not reprise on appeal his argument in superior court

that Dr. Harvancik failed to qualify as a “mental health expert” under

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proceedings. See A.R.S. § 13-4521(C) (stating Arizona Rules of Evidence
apply at the dangerousness trial in a Title 13 Commitment case); Ariz. State
Hosp./Ariz. Cmty. Prot. & Treatment Ctr. v. Klein, 231 Ariz. 467, 472-73 ¶¶ 21,
24 (App. 2013) (where the legislature broadly provided for application of
the Arizona Evidence Rules at discharge proceedings for persons
committed as sexually violent, Rule 702 applied). The decision to admit
expert testimony under Rule 702 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 594 ¶ 13 (2014) (citing cases).

¶26 Rule 702 is a gatekeeping rule under which the court must
assess whether the proposed expert testimony is relevant, reliable and will
assist the trier of fact. See State ex rel. Montgomery v. Miller, 234 Ariz. 289, 298
¶¶ 19-21 (App. 2014). Under the rule, a witness qualified as an expert by
“knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” may testify in the
form of an opinion if it is shown more likely than not that:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or
data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods; and

(d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable
application of the principles and methods to the
facts of the case.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

¶27 James’ arguments turn on Rule 702(c)’s “reliable principles
and methods” requirement. This requirement means that the expert “must
be able to explain how his [or her] methods, reasoning and opinions are
based on ‘an accepted body of learning or experience.’” Miller, 234 Ariz. at
298 ¶ 23 (citation omitted). To evaluate the evidence on this point, the court
may look to the factors discussed in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95:

A.R.S. § 13-4521(D), that argument is waived. See Carrillo v. State, 169 Ariz.
126, 132 (App. 1991) (citing cases).

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(1) whether the expert’s theory or technique can
be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or
technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication; (3) whether the technique or theory
is generally accepted within the relevant
scientific community; (4) the known or potential
rate of error of the technique or theory when
applied; and (5) the existence and maintenance
of standards controlling application of the
technique.

Miller, 234 Ariz. at 299 ¶ 24. But these factors are non-exclusive. Id. And
critically, “[n]o single Daubert factor is dispositive of the reliability of an
expert’s testimony, and not all of the Daubert factors will apply to ‘all
experts or in every case.’” Id. at 299 ¶ 25 (citation omitted).

¶28 James argues that Dr. Harvancik provided no testimony
about his methodology’s testing, peer review, general acceptance, error rate
or standards. He also emphasizes that, although Dr. Harvancik identified
several psychological tests for dangerousness, he did not evaluate James
using those tests. James has shown no abuse of discretion.

¶29 Dr. Harvancik testified that he had to rely on James’ extensive
treatment records to assess his dangerousness because James’ psychosis
rendered him largely unable to cooperate at interviews. When James
objected to the doctor’s approach, the court permitted the State to lay
further foundation. Dr. Harvancik then testified (with no further objection)
that it is standard practice for mental health professionals to rely on records
to determine an uncooperative patient’s dangerousness based on his or her
behavior patterns.3 The evidence was sufficient to satisfy Rule 702(c)’s
requirement of reliable principles and methods, as well as Rule 702(d)’s
requirement for reliable application in the case. See Miller, 234 Ariz. at 299

3 James notes Dr. Harvancik testified to being “real puzzled about the
nature of the [Title 13 Commitment] statutes.” The doctor’s conception of
the statutory scheme, however, had no impact on his ability to assess the
factual issue of James’ dangerousness. He testified he understood that task
and performed it, explaining that he approached it “similar to how [he]
would approach a competency evaluation with a particular emphasis on
assessing for dangerousness.”

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¶24 (general acceptance in the relevant scientific community is among the
non-exclusive factors relevant to the assessment of a method’s reliability).

¶30 James has not shown that the superior court abused its
discretion by finding Dr. Harvancik’s testimony admissible under Rule 702.
As much as James argues the testimony was deficient, he had ample
opportunity to challenge it through cross-examination and to present his
own conflicting evidence, and the court properly instructed the jurors on
the burden of proof and their ability to determine the weight and credibility
of expert testimony. See Miller, 234 Ariz. at 298 ¶ 20 (citation omitted)
(“‘[C]ross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate
means of attacking shaky but admissible [expert] evidence.’”).

III. The Superior Court Abused Its Discretion by Admitting Multiple
Images of the Murder Victim’s Body, but that Error Does Not
Require Reversal.

¶31 James’ final argument is that the superior court abused its
discretion by allowing the jury to consider what he describes as gruesome
video and photographs of the murder victim’s body. Admission of such
evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz.
281, 290 (1983) (citing cases).

¶32 Under the Arizona Rules of Evidence, the issues are (1)
whether the video and photographs were relevant and (2) whether their
probative value was substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair
prejudice, needlessly presenting cumulative evidence or other mischief. See
Ariz. R. Evid. 401 - 403. James argues a third inquiry—whether the video
and photographs have “the tendency to incite passion or inflame the jury”
– is required. Tracing to Chapple, 135 Ariz. at 288, Arizona courts have
applied this “incite or inflame” inquiry in criminal, but not civil, cases. See,
e.g., State v. Allen, 253 Ariz. 306, 344 ¶ 126 (2022); State v. Bocharski, 200 Ariz.
50, 55 ¶ 21 (2001); State v. Doerr, 193 Ariz. 56, 64 ¶ 29 (1998); State v. Bailey, 160 Ariz. 277, 280 (1989). The State, however, has not argued the “incite or
inflame” inquiry is inapplicable here. Given this briefing, and leaving for
another day a more definitive resolution of whether Chapple applies in civil
cases, the court addresses all three inquiries. The court concludes that the
images’ admission was error in any event.

¶33 To start, the superior court properly could conclude images
of the victim’s body and wounds were minimally relevant. See Ariz. R. Evid.
401. The State had the burden to prove to the jury beyond a reasonable

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doubt, A.R.S. § 13-4521(E), that James was “dangerous and should be
involuntarily committed.” A.R.S. § 13-4521(B).4 The State argued that the
images of the victim’s body were relevant to the question of James’
dangerousness because they showed the violence of his crime. The record
supports a conclusion that the images were relevant. Although James
argued he was not the killer, the manner in which the victim was attacked,
as shown by the images, was relevant to the question of the killer’s
dangerousness. The relevance was, however, minimal, as evidence of any
manner of murder typically will tend to show that the perpetrator is
dangerous.

¶34 But the superior court abused its discretion in weighing the
images’ minimal relevance against their tendency to cause unfair prejudice,
whether in the form of jury incitement, jury inflammation or otherwise. To
be sure, the court has substantial discretion to weigh evidence’s probative
value against the potential for prejudice because neither factor is easily
quantified. See Hudgins v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 221 Ariz. 472, 481 ¶ 13 (App.
2009) (citing cases). But where gruesome photographs’ “only possible use
. . . would have been to inflame the minds of the jury or to impair their
objectivity,” they should not be admitted because they create an undue risk
of prejudice—particularly when they are cumulative of other evidence.
Chapple, 135 Ariz. at 290. Stated differently, when “graphic and disturbing”
images show nothing “that could not be made abundantly and equally
clear” through other evidence, the images are “at best cumulative and at
worst offered in an attempt to incense the jurors.” State v. Jones, 203 Ariz. 1,
10 ¶ 30 (2002). In several criminal cases, the Arizona Supreme Court has
found an abuse of discretion in admitting gruesome photographs of a dead
victim’s body. See State v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 140-42 (1997) (superior court
abused its discretion by admitting “unduly disturbing” photographs of the
murder victim’s severely decomposed body, that provided “little or no
additional aid” to the medical examiner’s clear testimony); Chapple, 135
Ariz. at 287-90 (superior court abused its discretion in admitting
photographs of the murder victim’s burned body, including a close-up of
his skull with the bone cut away to show a bullet in the brain matter, when
the manner of the victim’s death was undisputed); Bocharski, 200 Ariz. at
55-56 ¶¶ 20, 24-27 (superior court properly admitted some photographs of
the murder victim’s body, but abused its discretion by admitting
photographs of the victim’s empty skull with a rod through it, which had
“little tendency to establish any disputed issue in the case” and “were

4 The court’s previous determination under A.R.S. § 13-4521(A) that James

committed the offense by evident proof or great presumption was not
determinative of the inquiry under A.R.S. § 13-4521(E).

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introduced primarily to inflame the jury”); State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 208-
09 ¶¶ 62-63 (2004) (superior court properly admitted graphic autopsy
photographs as evidence on the disputed time and manner of the victims’
deaths, but abused its discretion by admitting crime-scene photographs
and video of the victims’ burned bodies, which were “highly
inflammatory” yet “of minimal probative value”).

¶35 Here, although the medical examiner used the autopsy
photographs in his brief testimony, nothing about his testimony required
the photographs—his descriptions of the undisputed wounds could stand
alone. The autopsy photographs were also repetitive. They showed the
same close-up torso wound as one of the crime-scene photos, this time with
a tool inserted (explained by the medical examiner as a tool to determine
wound-path direction—a question not at issue). Further, they showed the
same facial wounds multiple times. Although the depth of the wounds was
relevant to the force of the killer’s attack, the multiple views and
manipulations to show the same—especially the image of the pulled-back
nose and the two images of the facial cut run through with a tool—were
cumulative and inflammatory.

¶36 The crime scene photographs were also repetitive, showing
different views of the body and the surrounding blood pools. The State
provided no explanation why the multiple views were needed, and the
record does not show why a single image could not have sufficed to
establish the scene’s violence.

¶37 Given the minimal probative value of all the images, their
significant tendency to unfairly prejudice the jury and their cumulative
nature, the superior court erred by admitting nearly all of them for the
jury’s consideration. The court’s preclusion of a single image was
insufficient.

¶38 This conclusion of error, however, does not end the inquiry.
The dangerousness trial was governed by the Arizona Rules of Civil
Procedure. See A.R.S. § 13-4521(C). Under these rules, harmless error in
admitting evidence does not require reversal. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 61 (“Unless
justice requires otherwise, an error in admitting . . . evidence . . . is not
grounds for” reversal). “‘[E]rror is harmless unless it is inconsistent with
substantial justice or affects the substantial rights of the parties.’” Paz v. City
of Tucson, 256 Ariz. 391, 401 ¶ 37 (App. 2023) (citation omitted). “‘The
improper admission of evidence is not reversible error if the jury would
have reached the same verdict without the evidence.’” Id. (citation omitted).

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 STATE v. JAMES
Decision of the Court

“Reversible [error] ‘will not be presumed but must affirmatively appear
from the record.’” Id. (citation omitted).

¶39 The record does not show that the improper admission of the
cumulative gruesome images constituted reversible error. The State’s
evidence shows that the jury would have reached the same decision even
without the images. Separate from the images, the State presented
substantial evidence that James has a long history of serious mental health
issues, that he committed a violent murder while psychotic and that he
remained psychotic despite extensive treatment and medication. On this
record, the erroneous admission of the images does not require appellate
relief. See Paz, 256 Ariz. at 401 ¶ 37; cf. Davolt, 207 Ariz. at 209 ¶ 64 (under
the criminal standard for harmless error, articulated as whether it can be
said beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the jury’s
verdict, the improper admission of graphic photographs did not require
reversal given the other evidence of guilt); Bocharski, 200 Ariz. at 56-
57¶¶ 28-34 (same); Spreitz, 190 Ariz. at 142 (same).

CONCLUSION

¶40 The Title 13 Commitment order is affirmed.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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