State v. Inoue

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

YUI INOUE, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0214
FILED 08-19-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2024-006565-001
The Honorable Jeffrey A. Rueter, Judge

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Alice Jones
Counsel for Appellee

Michael J. Dew Attorney at Law, Phoenix
By Michael J. Dew
Counsel for Appellant

STATE v. INOUE
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Anni Hill Foster delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge David B. Gass1 and Judge D. Andrew Gaona joined.

F O S T E R, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Yui Inoue appeals her convictions and sentences
for first-degree murder, child abuse and disorderly conduct. Inoue, through
counsel, filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), certifying that, after a diligent search
of the record, no arguable question of law existed. Counsel asks this Court
to search the record for reversible error. Inoue did not file a supplemental
brief. After reviewing the record, this Court affirms Inoue’s convictions and
sentences as modified.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This Court views the facts in the light most favorable to
sustaining Inoue’s convictions and “resolve[s] all [reasonable] inferences
against [Inoue].” State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998).

¶3 Inoue’s convictions arise from the murder of her two minor
children. After their recent divorce, Inoue had been staying at Husband’s
apartment and was in the process of moving out. Late one night after their
children went to bed, Inoue and Husband began arguing over the divorce
settlement. Inoue demanded $3,000 from Husband, the remaining balance
from their divorce agreement. Husband promised to get the money the next
morning. Inoue became angry, destroying Husband’s monitor, laptop and
keyboard by pounding on it and slashing it with a cleaver. Feeling

1 Judge David B. Gass was a sitting member of this Court when the matter

was assigned to this panel of the Court. He retired effective June 30, 2026.
In accordance with the authority granted by Article VI, Section 3, of the
Arizona Constitution, and under A.R.S. § 12-145, the Chief Justice of the
Arizona Supreme Court has designated Judge David B. Gass as a judge pro
tempore in the Court of Appeals for the purpose of participating in the
resolution of cases assigned to this panel during his term in office and for
the duration of Administrative Order 2026-87.

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STATE v. INOUE
Decision of the Court

threatened, Husband fled from the home telling Inoue that he was leaving
to try to get the money that night. Shortly after leaving the apartment,
Husband called police and reported the incident.

¶4 Officers responded and conducted a welfare check at the
apartment in the early morning hours the next day. They contacted Inoue
and noticed a damaged cleaver in the kitchen sink. They also observed the
children sleeping in a bedroom. In another room, they found multiple items
thrown around, including a severely damaged monitor, laptop and
keyboard. The officer photographed the items, including the cleaver, and
informed Inoue that Husband would not be returning that evening. The
officers left.

¶5 Later that morning, Inoue flagged down a police officer.
Based on his conversation with Inoue, the officer requested a welfare check
at the apartment. Husband met other officers at the apartment and
provided access for the welfare check. Upon entry, the officer on scene
found blood and the children dead. Inoue was immediately arrested as she
stood next to her vehicle. In a search subsequent to arrest, detectives found
packed luggage, a cleaver containing hair and blood and bloodied clothing.
The children’s autopsy determined that multiple sharp force and chop
injuries to the head and neck area, including severed spinal cords, caused
their deaths.

¶6 The State charged Inoue with two counts of first-degree
murder, A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(1), (Counts 1 and 2), class 1 felonies and
dangerous crimes against children; two counts of child abuse, A.R.S. § 13-
3623(A)(1), (Counts 3 and 4), class 2 felonies and dangerous crimes against
children; and one count of disorderly conduct, A.R.S. § 13-2904(A)(6),
(Count 5), a class 6 felony.

¶7 The court held a 7-day jury trial where Inoue received
assistance from an interpreter at all proceedings. At the start of trial and
before each day of trial, Inoue waived her presence and declined to
participate after the court’s colloquy on her rights. At the close of the State’s
case-in-chief, Inoue moved for a judgment of acquittal on all charges. See
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a)(1). She claimed that no substantial evidence
supported a conviction. The court denied her motion and the jury found
Inoue guilty on all counts.

¶8 With Inoue present, the court sentenced her to two natural life
terms on the first-degree murder counts (Counts 1 and 2); presumptive
terms of 17 calendar years on the child abuse counts (Counts 3 and 4); and

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STATE v. INOUE
Decision of the Court

a presumptive term of 1 year on the disorderly conduct count (Count 5). See
A.R.S. §§ 13-751(A), -705(F), -702(D). The court ordered all sentences to run
consecutively. At sentencing, the court awarded Inoue 1,405 days of pre-
sentence incarceration credit but its written order awarded her 1,447 days.

¶9 Inoue timely appealed and requested appellate counsel. The
court appointed counsel for the appeal. This Court has jurisdiction under
A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶10 This Court reviews the entire record for reversible error. State
v. Thompson, 229 Ariz. 43, 45, ¶ 3 (App. 2012). This Court has read and
considered counsel’s brief and fully reviewed the record for reversible
error, see Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300. This Court finds none.

I. The record supports exclusion of diminished capacity evidence
at trial.

¶11 During pre-trial proceedings, Inoue initially notified the State
that she would pursue guilty except insane proceedings but instead, later
asserted insanity and diminished capacity defenses. The State moved to
preclude those defenses arguing that outside a guilty except insane (“GEI”)
trial, it would be improper to present an insanity defense or evidence of
Inoue’s behavioral traits. The State noted in its motion that Inoue had not
provided a mental health evaluation to support GEI proceedings. Counsel
did not file a response to the State’s motion to preclude.

¶12 The superior court held oral argument on the State’s motion
and waived Inoue’s presence for the hearing. During the hearing, Inoue’s
counsel acknowledged the lack of response to the State’s motion, stating no
legal argument supported opposing it. The parties discussed the
admissibility of evidence for diminished capacity, but the court delayed the
conversation until Inoue was present. The court then granted the State’s
motion to preclude.

¶13 Diminished capacity evidence is only appropriate at
sentencing for mitigation purposes, not to negate specific intent. State v.
Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 541 (1997); see also State v. Styers, 227 Ariz. 186, 189, ¶ 12
(2011). The court did not err in precluding evidence of diminished capacity
during trial. But even so, a court may order a defendant be examined for
competency if reasonable grounds exist for doing so. See A.R.S. § 13-4503
(“[A]ny party or the court on its own motion may request in writing that
the defendant be examined to determine the defendant’s competency to

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STATE v. INOUE
Decision of the Court

stand trial, to enter a plea or to assist the defendant’s attorney.”); see also
State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 162 (1990) (requirements for reasonable
grounds before a court orders a competency hearing).

¶14 Here, early in the case, the superior court ordered Inoue to
submit to a GEI evaluation. After that evaluation, the appointed physician
found that though Inoue’s “mental health symptoms largely contributed to
[Inoue’s] actions,” it did not “r[i]se to the level of a GEI defense.” The
superior court appropriately allowed Inoue’s counsel to present
information about Inoue’s mental health issues during sentencing. At
sentencing, Inoue addressed the court stating that her children were alive
and with her parents. Following this statement, the court asked Inoue’s
counsel if there was “[a]ny legal cause” to not proceed with sentencing.
Inoue’s counsel replied “No” and the court proceeded with sentencing. This
Court discerns no error.

II. The court did not include the financial assessments in its oral
pronouncement.

¶15 Though the record reveals minor errors occurred during
sentencing, the superior court corrected one, and this Court corrects the
other two.

¶16 First, the superior court initially pronounced a “presumptive
term of 20 years, three calendar years or day for day consecutive” on Count
3 and a presumptive term of 20 years on Count 4 at sentencing. But these
terms conflict with the statutory range. The court noticed this error during
sentencing and corrected it, amending its findings to the statutory
presumptive of 17-year terms. The sentencing order reflects the corrected
sentence for both counts. See State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216 (App. 1992)
(remand is appropriate only when pronouncement and minute entry
cannot be resolved by reference to the record). And because Arizona law
compelled the court to impose consecutive sentences on Counts 3, 4 and 5,
no error occurred. See A.R.S. § 13-705(P) (“The sentence imposed on a
person for any other dangerous crime against children in the first or second
degree shall be consecutive to any other sentence imposed on the person at
any time.”).

¶17 Second, the court’s sentencing order imposed six assessments
on Inoue,

$20.00 probation assessment
$13.00 criminal penalty assessment
$50.00 family offense assessment

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STATE v. INOUE
Decision of the Court

$50.00 address confidentiality assessment
$2.00 victim rights enforcement assessment
$9.00 victim rights/compensation fund.

But the court’s oral pronouncement did not include these assessments. See
State v. Ovante, 231 Ariz. 180, 188, ¶ 38 (2013) (oral pronouncement of a
sentence in open court controls over the sentencing order); Ariz. R. Crim. P.
26.16(a) (“The judgment of conviction and sentencing on the judgment are
complete and valid at the time the court orally pronounces them in open
court.”). Before sentencing Inoue, the court noted it reviewed the State’s
and Inoue’s sentencing memorandum. But neither addressed the
assessments. Moreover, neither the State nor the superior court discussed
the assessments at sentencing. And the court did not address the issue when
scheduling the restitution hearing.

¶18 The lack of discussion of the assessments in the sentencing
memorandum and during sentencing results in the court’s inability to
impose the fees through the sentencing order. See State v. Powers, 154 Ariz.
291, 295 (1987). This Court therefore modifies the sentencing order, striking
the $20 mandatory probation assessment. See A.R.S. §§ 12-269(C), -114.01, -
116.06; State v. Gutierrez, 130 Ariz. 148, 150 (1981) (modifying a sentencing
order to correct technical errors). And without any underlying fine, the
court erred in imposing the remaining administrative fees. See State v.
Dustin, 247 Ariz. 389, 392, ¶ 12 (App. 2019) (the criminal penalty assessment
and victim rights’ enforcement assessment require a predicate fine or
penalty); A.R.S. § 12-116.08 (the victims’ rights compensation fund also
requires a predicate fine or penalty). This Court therefore further modifies
the sentencing order, striking the $13 criminal penalty assessment, the $50
address confidentiality, the $50 family offense assessment, the $9 victims’
rights/compensation fund and the $2 victim rights enforcement assessment
fee. See Ovante, 231 Ariz. at 188, ¶ 38; Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.16(a).

¶19 Third and lastly, the court failed to award Inoue the proper
amount of pre-sentence incarceration credit. Inoue was incarcerated on
May 15, 2021 and sentenced on May 2, 2025. When calculating
presentencing credit, the court excludes the sentencing date. State v.
Hamilton, 153 Ariz. 244, 245–46 (App. 1987). At sentencing, the court
awarded Inoue 1,405 days of credit. But in its sentencing order, the court
awarded 1,447 days of credit. The court should have awarded Inoue 1,448
days of credit. This Court may correct pre-sentence incarceration credit but
still affirm Inoue’s convictions and sentences. See A.R.S. § 13-4037; State v.
Stevens, 173 Ariz. 494, 496 (App. 1992). Because the superior court’s

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STATE v. INOUE
Decision of the Court

calculation is incorrect and a detriment to Inoue, this Court directs the
sentencing order be corrected.

¶20 Other than these issues, the record reflects that the superior
court afforded Inoue all her constitutional and statutory rights and that it
conducted the proceedings in compliance with the Rules. Counsel
represented Inoue at all critical stages, and the court provided interpreter
services during proceedings. Although Inoue did not attend trial, she
expressly waived her right to be present after an advisement of her rights.
See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 9.1. The evidence presented at trial supports the jury’s
verdicts. The court properly composed and instructed the jury, and the
record contains no evidence of jury misconduct.

CONCLUSION

¶21 This Court affirms Inoue’s convictions and sentences as
modified by this decision. Unless defense counsel finds an issue
appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for
review, counsel’s obligations regarding Inoue’s appeal will end once
informing her of the outcome of this appeal and her future options. See State
v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85 (1984). Inoue shall have 30 days from the
date of this decision to proceed, if she desires, with a pro per motion for
reconsideration or petition for review. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.3(a), 31.20(c),
31.21(b)(2)(A).

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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