State v. Gallegos

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

KIMBERLY CRISTEL GALLEGOS, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0224
FILED 07-01-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
CR2024-106589-001
The Honorable Suzanne Marie Nicholls, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Alice Jones
Counsel for Appellee

Zhivago Law, Phoenix
By Kerrie M. Droban Zhivago
Counsel for Appellant

STATE v. GALLEGOS
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Anni Hill Foster delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge David B. Gass and Chief Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

F O S T E R, Judge:

¶1 Kimberly Cristel Gallegos appeals her conviction for criminal
damage, a class five felony, and resulting sentence. Gallegos’ counsel filed
a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State
v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), certifying that after a diligent search of the
record, no arguable questions of law exist. Counsel asks this Court to search
the record for reversible error. Gallegos had the opportunity to file a
supplemental brief but did not do so. After reviewing the record, this Court
affirms.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This Court views the facts “in the light most favorable to
sustaining the [conviction] and resolve[s] all reasonable inferences against
[Gallegos].” State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998).

¶3 In December 2023, Gallegos stabbed the passenger side
windshield and passenger side window of a blue Honda, repeatedly
causing damage to it. Gallegos then drove another car onto the sidewalk,
across a front yard and into the rear bumper of the blue Honda before
driving off. Home security cameras caught these acts on video. The police
reviewed the camera footage, took photos of the damage to the car and
interviewed the victims, who identified Gallegos as the perpetrator.

¶4 The State charged Gallegos on one count of criminal damage,
a class five felony, for damage to property between $2,000 and $10,000.
A.R.S. § 13-1602(A). Counsel represented Gallegos at all critical proceedings
and Gallegos exercised her right to a jury trial. At trial, the first victim
testified that she watched Gallegos repeatedly damage the blue Honda.
Another victim also testified about the security camera footage and the
damage he saw Gallegos cause. He further testified that he and the other
owner of the Honda never gave Gallegos permission to damage it. A third
witness, a car damage estimator, testified to the cost of repairs for the

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STATE v. GALLEGOS
Decision of the Court

damage to the windshield and rear of the car. Finally, a police detective
testified that the estimated damage from Gallegos’ actions was $4,894.62.

¶5 The jury found Gallegos guilty of criminal damage in an
amount of more than $2,000 but less than $10,000. The jury also found the
damage to the property supported an aggravating circumstance. The court
conducted the sentencing hearing in compliance with Gallegos’
constitutional rights and Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 26.
It sentenced Gallegos to a three-year term of supervised probation, with
conditions that she complete anger management counseling and serve
thirty days in jail. The court also ordered restitution.

¶6 Gallegos timely appealed. This Court has jurisdiction under
A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶7 This Court has read and considered counsel’s brief and has
reviewed the record for arguable issues of fundamental error, see Leon, 104
Ariz. at 300. It finds none.

¶8 The record shows the court afforded Gallegos all her
constitutional and statutory rights and that it conducted the proceedings in
compliance with the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Counsel
represented Gallegos at all critical stages of the proceedings. And the
sentence imposed was within the statutory guidelines.

¶9 This Court notes that Gallegos’ trial counsel failed to appear
at two separate proceedings leading up to trial, once due to conflicting court
proceedings in another case and the second due to a vacation. Both times,
the court declined to address any substantive legal matters affecting
Gallegos’ rights and continued the proceedings to another date when her
trial counsel would be available. This inconvenience does not raise an
arguable issue of reversible error. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,
309–10 (1991) (total deprivation of the right to counsel constitutes structural
error and is not harmless suggesting something less is harmless). The
court’s prohibition on discussing substantive matters protected Gallegos’
right to counsel and prevented error. The court reset the final trial
management conference, ensuring Gallegos’ right to counsel. And since
Gallegos was present in both instances, she received actual notice of the
new final trial management conference and trial date. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 9.1.

¶10 This Court also notes that during sentencing, the court
referred to Gallegos’ lack of remorse. A court may not consider lack of

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STATE v. GALLEGOS
Decision of the Court

remorse or failure to admit guilt when imposing an aggravated sentence.
State v. Trujillo, 227 Ariz. 314, 318, ¶ 15 (App. 2011). Here, the court’s
reference to remorse occurred after the court determined that the jury had
found one aggravator and that no other aggravators were proven. After
making those findings the court said,

[s]o, outside of that the [c]ourt finds the
defendant’s lack of remorse, her lack of
compliance with pretrial services. The [c]ourt
notes the pretrial services report indicates that
the defendant failed to report to pretrial services
since September 26, 2024, and all efforts to
contact her have failed.

With that, the court observed that Gallegos did not “appear to this
[c]ourt . . . that [she did not] take any of this to be serious in nature” making
the court “concerned for [Gallegos] and [her] success on probation.” The
context of the court’s comments show they did not concern Gallegos’ lack
of remorse or failure to admit guilt to criminal damage. Rather, the court
was articulating its concern about Gallegos’ ability to succeed on probation
given her lack of effort in complying with other court orders. Thus, the
court’s comment does not raise an arguable issue of reversible error.

¶11 Upon the filing of this decision, defense counsel shall inform
Gallegos of the status of the appeal and of her future options. Counsel has
no further obligations unless, upon review, counsel finds an issue
appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for
review. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85 (1984). Gallegos shall have
thirty days from the date of this decision to proceed, if she desires, with pro
per motion for reconsideration or petition for review.

CONCLUSION

¶12 This Court affirms.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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