State v. Sajovic

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

NICHOLAS ANTHONY SAJOVIC, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0226 PRPC
FILED 02-24-2026

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2020-140159-001
The Honorable Stasy D. Avelar, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Robert E. Prather
Counsel for Respondent

Nicholas Anthony Sajovic, San Luis
Petitioner
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1 Nicholas Sajovic (“Sajovic”) asks us to review the superior
court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”).
We grant review but deny relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 After a night of drinking, Sajovic drove the wrong way on the
freeway and collided head-on with a motorcycle, killing its driver. Sajovic
does not dispute these facts. Officers at the scene noticed Sajovic’s
“careless” demeanor, his slurred speech, and that his breath smelled of
alcohol. Sajovic failed field sobriety testing and one hour after the collision,
a breath test showed his blood alcohol concentration was 0.183%. A later
blood test at booking showed Sajovic’s blood alcohol concentration was
0.158%. Sajovic admitted driving the vehicle and consuming alcohol before
the crash. Before the collision, police had received multiple calls about
Sajovic’s vehicle driving the wrong direction on the freeway.

¶3 The State initially charged Sajovic with second degree
murder, endangerment, and aggravated DUI, but he later pleaded guilty to
manslaughter and endangerment. Sajovic’s initial counsel began
representing him shortly after his arrest and through the plea-bargaining
process. Different counsel represented him for sentencing.

¶4 On September 17, 2021, at an initial settlement conference, the
court summarized the length of incarceration Sajovic may face if he opted
to proceed with trial—ten to twenty-five years—and the range offered in
the State’s plea—twelve to sixteen years. Sajovic responded that he had no
questions. No further discussion about the plea occurred on the record and
the court scheduled another settlement conference for the following month.

¶5 On October 28, 2021, at a second settlement conference, the
State outlined its reasons for the offered plea and the court clarified some
of the plea’s contents. There was no on-the-record discussion about
whether Sajovic would enter into the plea agreement, but the court

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indicated that copies of it were distributed and that after a break, the court
would “move forward with the change of plea.” After the parties and the
court reconvened, the court asked Sajovic a series of questions—to which
he responded affirmatively—to confirm he read the entire agreement,
understood it, and was willingly entering into it. Sajovic then pleaded
guilty to the two counts contained in the plea agreement. The plea
agreement showed a printed date of September 17 but had been altered by
hand to show the signing date of October 28.

¶6 Over five months later, on April 8, 2022, the court sentenced
Sajovic to an aggravated term of thirteen years’ incarceration followed by
three years of probation. The court explained the mitigating and
aggravating factors it considered in imposing Sajovic’s sentence.

¶7 Sajovic timely filed his Notice Requesting PCR. Appointed
counsel filed a notice of review, indicating that she had not identified any
colorable claims for relief. Sajovic filed a pro se PCR under Arizona Rule of
Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 33.1(a), arguing that his counsel’s deficient
communication prevented him from making an intelligent decision as to
the plea, that counsel failed to adequately investigate his case, and that
counsel “forced” him to sign the plea. He requested reconsideration of the
plea or a change in sentence, or in the alternative, withdrawal from the plea.

¶8 The superior court summarily denied Sajovic’s PCR under
Rules 33.2(a)(1) and 33.11(a) because he had entered a guilty plea and had
not articulated sufficient facts showing counsel provided deficient
performance.

¶9 Sajovic petitioned for review. We grant review under A.R.S.
§ 13-4239(C) and Rule 33.16(a)(1), (4).

DISCUSSION

¶10 We review the denial of PCR for an abuse of discretion. State
v. Reed, 252 Ariz. 236, 238 ¶ 6 (App. 2021). We review legal conclusions de
novo. Naranjo v. Sukenic, 254 Ariz. 467, 472 ¶ 17 (2023). Summary dismissal
of a PCR is required when the petition presents no “material issue of fact or
law that would entitle the defendant to relief[.]” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.11(a).

¶11 Sajovic argues that counsel failed to keep him apprised of
discovery such that he had insufficient information about his case to
knowingly or intelligently enter into the plea agreement. He also contends
that counsel’s investigation into his case was deficient, outlining the various
things he would have done differently or that he asked his counsel to

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investigate to no avail. Sajovic reiterates that counsel pressured him to sign
the plea agreement and he did not have sufficient time to read the
agreement or discuss it with counsel.

¶12 To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
defendant “must show both that counsel’s performance fell below
objectively reasonable standards and that this deficiency prejudiced [him].”
State v. Bennet, 213 Ariz. 562, 567 ¶ 21 (2006); Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A PCR filed after entry of a guilty plea is limited to
ineffective assistance of counsel claims pertaining to the validity of the plea.
State v. Banda, 232 Ariz. 582, 585 ¶ 12 (App. 2013).

¶13 If a defendant claims ineffective assistance for failing to
investigate evidence or file pretrial motions, the defendant must establish
that counsel’s advice to plead guilty without having first pursued those
actions “rendered that advice outside the ‘range of competence demanded
of attorneys in criminal cases.’” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 268 (1973)
(quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). And “[t]o
establish prejudice in the context of a plea agreement, a defendant must
show a reasonable probability that except for his lawyer’s error he would
not have waived his right to trial and entered a plea.” State v. Ysea, 191 Ariz.
372, 377 ¶ 17 (1998), superseded on other grounds by statute, A.R.S. § 13-703.

¶14 In dismissing Sajovic’s PCR, the superior court found that
counsel’s performance was not deficient. It found that counsel investigated
Sajovic’s claims and made the strategic decision to pursue mitigation
evidence instead.

¶15 The court correctly concluded that counsel made a strategic
decision to focus on mitigation for sentencing. Nothing in the record
suggests more investigation into evidence of guilt or communication about
discovery with Sajovic would have led to a reduced plea range or sentence.
Sajovic does not identify any evidence his counsel could have discovered
during additional investigation that likely would have changed counsel’s
advice and, thereby, the outcome. Given the overwhelming evidence that
Sajovic was driving the wrong way on the freeway while severely
intoxicated when he collided with the victim, counsel was not deficient for
focusing on mitigation, and Sajovic has not established a reasonable
probability that further investigation would have changed the outcome of
his case. See State v. Pandeli, 242 Ariz. 175, 181 ¶ 6 (2017) (defendant must
show more than that the error “’had some conceivable effect on the outcome
of the proceeding’”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693)). The superior

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court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Sajovic’s ineffective assistance
claim based on counsel’s strategic decision to focus on mitigation evidence.

¶16 Sajovic also claims he was unaware going into the second
settlement conference that there would be a change of plea and that counsel
“forced” him to sign the plea agreement and refused to answer questions
about it.

¶17 The Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure contain detailed
procedures for superior courts to follow when advising criminal
defendants of the consequences of a guilty plea and in determining whether
a plea is entered voluntarily and intelligently. See Ariz. R. Crim P. 17.2–
17.3. To ensure plea agreements remain final, statements made during a
plea hearing “carry a strong presumption of verity, and constitute a
formidable barrier in a subsequent challenge to the validity of the plea.”
State v. Leyva, 241 Ariz. 521, 525 ¶ 12 (App. 2017) (cleaned up).

¶18 So a defendant seeking post-conviction relief based on a claim
that a plea agreement was not entered voluntarily and intelligently because
of ineffective assistance of counsel carries a heavy burden. The defendant
must show “a reasonable probability that except for his lawyer’s error he
would not have waived his right to trial.” State v. Bowers, 192 Ariz. 419, 424
¶ 21 (App. 1998). And the claim “must be accompanied by an allegation of
specific facts which would allow a court to meaningfully assess why that
deficiency was material to the plea decision.” Id. at 425 ¶ 25.

¶19 The record reflects that the plea was initially offered—both in
print and with the court explaining the ranges—at the September 17
settlement conference. Over a month later—on October 28—Sajovic
accepted the State’s offer, which had remained unchanged since September
17, and changed his plea to guilty. The court complied with Rules 17.2 and
17.3 in accepting Sajovic’s guilty plea. Sajovic affirmed he read the plea
agreement, understood it, and had an opportunity to discuss it with
counsel. Sajovic confirmed he understood the binding nature of the plea
agreement and what rights he was giving up by entering it. Over five
months later, the court sentenced Sajovic pursuant to the plea agreement.
And Sajovic never sought to withdraw his guilty plea. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.
17.5 (“The court may allow a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty or no
contest if it is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.”).

¶20 Sajovic’s statements during his change of plea “carry a strong
presumption of verity.” Leyva, 241 Ariz. at 525 ¶ 12. Sajovic has not
overcome that presumption. He did not allege specific facts supporting that

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his counsel made an error material to his plea decision. Bowers, 192 Ariz. at
425 ¶ 25. He instead alleged only unsupported statements that counsel
forced him to sign the plea agreement and refused to answer his questions.
Those allegations are inconsistent with the timeline leading to his change of
plea and sentence and with what he represented to the court. The superior
court did not err in concluding that Sajovic failed to show “a reasonable
probability that except for his lawyer’s error he would not have waived his
right to trial.” See id. at 424-25 ¶¶ 21, 25 (“[A] Rule 32 hearing is not
required on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel when the petition
offers only mere generalizations and unsubstantiated claims.”).

CONCLUSION

¶21 We grant review but deny relief.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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