State v. Perez

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ARTURO SANCHEZ PEREZ, JR., Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0235
FILED 07-30-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2017-002742-001
The Honorable Timothy Ryan, Judge (Retired)

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Joseph Newberg
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Aaron J. Moskowitz
Counsel for Appellant

STATE v. PEREZ
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Anni Hill Foster delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge David B. Gass1 joined and Judge D. Andrew Gaona
concurred.

F O S T E R, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Arturo Perez appeals the superior court’s sentence
of natural life for first-degree murder. Under Arizona law, if a defendant is
convicted of first-degree murder while committing another crime and is
over the age of 18, the court must impose a sentence of natural life. A.R.S.
§ 13-752(A). A defendant sentenced to natural life is ineligible for
commutation, parole, work furlough, work release or release from
confinement on any basis. A.R.S. § 13-751(A)(1). Following an appeal
challenging his improper concurrent sentences, this Court remanded for the
superior court to correct that issue. See State v. Perez, 1 CA-CR 22-0111, 2024
WL 1071875 (Ariz. App. Mar. 12, 2024) (mem. decision).

¶2 In those proceedings, the superior court affirmed Perez’s
sentence of natural life. Perez argues this was error because the court at his
original sentencing pronounced the sentence as “life” and the superior
court’s jurisdiction on remand did not allow it to resentence him. But in that
appeal, Perez acknowledged and this Court adopted, the original sentence
as one for natural life. For this reason and because the superior court’s
jurisdiction on remand was limited to the concurrent sentence issue, this
Court affirms.

1 Judge David B. Gass was a sitting member of this Court when the matter

was assigned to this panel of the Court. He retired effective June 30, 2026.
In accordance with the authority granted by Article VI, Section 3, of the
Arizona Constitution, and under A.R.S. § 12-145, the Chief Justice of the
Arizona Supreme Court has designated Judge David B. Gass as a judge pro
tempore in the Court of Appeals for the purpose of participating in the
resolution of cases assigned to this panel during his term in office and for
the duration of Administrative Order 2026-87.

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STATE v. PEREZ
Decision of the Court

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 This Court previously detailed the facts of this case in its
memorandum decision, Perez, 1 CA-CR 22-0111. This decision supplements
those facts to address Perez’s argument in this appeal.

¶4 A person commits first-degree murder by intentionally or
knowingly causing the death of another person with premeditation or
while committing another crime, including burglary. A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(1)
(pre-meditation), (2) (another crime). If a defendant was at least 18 years of
age at the time of the offense, the law mandates a sentence of natural life in
prison, A.R.S. § 13-752(A), and the person is not eligible for commutation,
parole, work furlough, work release or release from confinement on any
basis. A.R.S. § 13-751(A)(1).

¶5 In contrast, if a defendant is convicted of first-degree murder
while committing another crime, the court may impose either a sentence of
life or natural life. A.R.S. § 13-752(A). A sentence of life imprisonment
allows for the release of a defendant after 25 years of confinement if the
victim was over 15 years old. A.R.S. § 13-751(A)(2).

¶6 The superior court held a 16-day trial, after which the jury
found Perez guilty of two counts of first-degree murder, a class 1 felony.
(Count 1, A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(1) (pre-meditation) and Count 2, A.R.S. § 13-
1105(A)(2) (another crime)). The jury also convicted him of one count of
first-degree burglary, a class 2 felony (Count 3). See A.R.S. §§ 13-1105(D)
(first-degree murder), -1508(B) (burglary). Following the jury’s verdict, the
State recommended a sentence of “natural life in prison mandated by law
for count 1 and for count 2.” Its sentencing memorandum noted that the
murder convictions required a natural life sentence under A.R.S. § 13-
752(A). Perez’s sentencing memorandum acknowledged that he “is not
eligible for life imprisonment and must be sentenced to natural life.”

¶7 During sentencing, Perez addressed the court, asserting his
innocence in spite of the jury’s verdict and acknowledged the mandatory
natural life sentence, stating: “I never had to sit there and not take
responsibility whether I’m looking at natural life in prison or not.” The
court then sentenced Perez to “life sentences in [C]ount 1 and [C]ount 2
consecutive to each other” with Counts 2 and 3 (burglary), to be concurrent.

¶8 Perez appealed his convictions and sentences, challenging
evidentiary rulings and that the superior court improperly considered his
lack of remorse in imposing consecutive sentences for the first-degree

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STATE v. PEREZ
Decision of the Court

murder counts.2 Perez, 1 CA-CR 22-0111, at *3, ¶ 20. This Court affirmed
Perez’s convictions and first-degree burglary sentence but agreed with
Perez that the court improperly considered his lack of remorse in ordering
consecutive sentences on the murder convictions. Id. at *6, ¶¶ 37–38. Citing
A.R.S. § 13-752(A), this Court stated that “[t]he [superior] court said the law
required a sentence of natural life imprisonment for each first-degree
murder count, but that it had to decide whether to impose concurrent or
consecutive sentences.” Id. at *3, ¶ 17. It then remanded the first-degree
murder counts for resentencing. Id. at *6, ¶ 38.

¶9 After this Court’s mandate, the superior court held
resentencing proceedings. Before resentencing, Perez asked in his
sentencing memorandum that the court impose two life sentences with the
possibility of release after 25 years but argued they should be served
concurrently. The State’s memorandum requested that the sentences for the
two murder counts to run consecutively and again asserted that § 13-752(A)
required a sentence of natural life.

¶10 Perez attended the resentencing. There, the court ordered him
to serve concurrent sentences of “two life terms” for the first-degree murder
counts. The court also confirmed that the burglary sentence would be
concurrent with the second murder sentence. Following the court’s
pronouncement, the State clarified the court’s pronouncement asking: “The
court [ ] called it ‘life’ today and I just want to be clear for the record that it
means ‘natural life.’” After discussion with counsel and Perez, the court
then said, “My option is life, and that, as I understand it for now, means
natural life. I don’t have a natural life category.”

¶11 Perez then inquired about the basis of the court’s jurisdiction
to impose natural life, and the court ultimately stated “I am not going to say
life or natural life. I will let that be a decision going forward. But you are
correct in the statute that applies based on the jury verdict.” Perez objected
to the court’s oral pronouncement regarding his sentence on jurisdictional
grounds and timely appealed.

¶12 This Court has jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1),
13-4031 and -4033(A).

2 This Court takes judicial notice of this Court’s record in Perez’s prior

appeal. See State v. Rhome, 235 Ariz. 459, 461, ¶ 8 (App. 2014) (a court may
take notice “of its own records”).

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STATE v. PEREZ
Decision of the Court

DISCUSSION

¶13 Perez argues the superior court exceeded its jurisdiction on
remand when it imposed a sentence of natural life instead of life
imprisonment for the first-degree murder counts. This Court reviews a
superior court’s jurisdiction and a court’s adherence to an appellate
mandate de novo. State v. Donahoe, 220 Ariz. 126, 127, ¶ 1 n.1 (App. 2009)
(jurisdiction); Bogard v. Cannon & Wendt Elec. Co., Inc., 221 Ariz. 325, 334,
¶ 30 (App. 2009) (mandate).

¶14 On remand, an appellate court’s mandate limits a superior
court’s jurisdiction, especially for resentencing. Bogard, 221 Ariz. at 334,
¶ 30; see State v. Serrano, 234 Ariz. 491, 494, ¶ 9 (App. 2014) (a court in a
resentencing proceeding may not act beyond its limits if the sentence is not
fully vacated). Modifying a sentence on a limited remand exceeds a court’s
jurisdiction if the judgment and sentence is “‘complete and valid’ upon oral
pronouncement.” Serrano, 234 Ariz. at 494, ¶ 9; see State v. Healer, 246 Ariz.
441, 448, ¶ 19 (App. 2019). Thus, the issue here is the scope of the mandate
and whether the court modified its original sentence, exceeding its
jurisdiction on remand. See State v. Guthrie, 110 Ariz. 257, 258 (1974)
(superior courts do not have jurisdiction to modify an original judgment
without a mandate from an appellate court).

¶15 This Court’s remand limited the superior court to determine
whether the sentences for the first-degree murder convictions should be
served consecutively, which the court considered. See Perez, 1 CA-CR 22-
0111, at *6, ¶¶ 37–38. The mandate did not provide for a change in the
sentence between life and natural life, so this Court’s analysis turns to
whether the superior court modified the original sentence.

¶16 The record shows the superior court imposed a natural life
sentence at the original sentencing. Before the original sentencing, the State
noted that law dictated a “natural life” sentence and Perez acknowledged
the same. At sentencing, Perez’s counsel stated that “the defense position
for sentencing w[as] laid out in the sentencing memorandum,” which cited
natural life for the murder convictions, and “I’d ask that the [c]ourt follow
the request made in the sentencing memorandum.” In sentencing Perez, the
court reasoned that

[u]nder the law, there is nothing, other than life in prison, on
the first two counts. There is no legal sentencing that I can
impose, other than life.

...

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STATE v. PEREZ
Decision of the Court

[I]f you’re convicted of this charge, there’s no such thing as
life with possibility of parole in 25 years. That—that doesn’t
exist.

See A.R.S. § 13-751(A)(1); Chaparro v. Shinn, 248 Ariz. 138, 141, ¶ 11 (2020)
(“An order sentencing the defendant to natural life is not subject to
commutation or parole, work furlough or work release.”) (cleaned up). The
court then noted that “the only thing left for the court to consider is whether
[] counts 1 and 2 should be concurrent or consecutive,” because the jury
convicted Perez of premeditated and felony murder, implicating §§ 13-
751(A)(1) and -752(A). Though the court’s sentencing order reflected a
“term of life” for each of the first-degree murder convictions and identified
the offense under § 13-1105(A)(2), the record reflects that the jury convicted
Perez of “first-degree murder” that was “[b]oth premeditated murder and
felony murder.” And the oral pronouncement of a life sentence,
accompanied by language that there was no possibility of parole, supports
the conclusion that the court imposed natural life sentences at the original
sentencing. State v. Hanson, 138 Ariz. 296, 304–05 (App. 1983) (where a
conflict exists between the oral pronouncement and the record, the oral
pronouncement controls). Thus, the record shows the court followed the
mandate of § 13-751(A)(1) and -752(A) to impose natural life sentences and
Perez acknowledged such in his appellate pleadings.

¶17 Perez conceded this point in his earlier appeal challenging the
superior court’s order. Perez’s opening brief stated “the trial court decided
to impose the two natural-life-imprisonment sentences consecutively,
instead of concurrently.” His brief also stated “the trial court made a legal
error when the court based its consecutive-or-concurrent sentencing
decision for the two natural-life imprisonment terms.” This Court adopted
Perez’s statements on his natural life sentences as part of its decision in
Perez’s appeal. See Perez, 1 CA-CR 22-0111, at *3, ¶¶ 17–18.

¶18 At resentencing, the State asked “for the only sentence which
is appropriate, which is natural life in prison mandated by law for count 1
and for count 2,” but the mandated sentence was no longer at issue. See
Perez, 1 CA-CR 22-0111, at *6, ¶¶ 37–38 (the court’s imposition of
consecutive sentences improperly relied on Perez’s lack of remorse due to
a claim of innocence and not vacating the original sentence). Perez then
disputed that the superior court originally sentenced him to natural life and
claimed he was sentenced to only life terms, which would allow him to be
eligible for release. See A.R.S. § 13-751(A)(1). Perez admitted that the law
required natural life sentences, but argued that the State failed to challenge
the oral pronouncement of life sentences at the original sentencing and

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STATE v. PEREZ
Decision of the Court

therefore the life sentences were final, even though they were contrary to
§§ 13-751(A)(1) and -752(A).

¶19 Similar to the original sentencing, the superior court at
resentencing orally pronounced that both first-degree murder counts were
to be concurrent life terms, addressing the issue for which this Court
remanded. This imprecise language caused the State to clarify the court’s
use of the term “life” and its pronouncement. The court clarified “[n]atural
life under the statute.” See State v. Gomez, 211 Ariz. 494, 501, ¶ 35 n.7 (2005)
(“As we have previously emphasized, trial judges should clearly identify
the specific statute under which they are sentencing a criminal defendant
in order to facilitate appellate review.”); State v. Hancock, 27 Ariz. App. 164,
167 (1976) (“When sentence is imposed the court should state with care the
precise terms of the sentence which is imposed.”) (cleaned up); State v.
Owen, 2 Ariz. App. 580, 582 (1966) (“[A] sentence must be certain, definite
and consistent in all its terms, and not ambiguous, and not be open to any
serious misapprehensions by those who must execute it.”) (cleaned up).

¶20 As the entire appellate record reflects, the court sentenced
Perez to two natural life terms. This Court’s limited remand was to correct
the error identified in Perez’s appeal that his sentences were to be served
consecutively. See Serrano, 234 Ariz. at 494, ¶ 9 (a court’s power to modify a
sentence post-trial is limited to the Criminal Rules and within the exercise
of its jurisdiction on remand). The court made the correction without
changing Perez’s original mandatory sentences as acknowledged by Perez
in his appeal. It therefore did not exceed its jurisdiction on remand.

CONCLUSION

¶21 This Court affirms.

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STATE v. PEREZ
Gaona, J., Concurring

G A O N A, Judge, concurring:

¶22 I concur in the Court’s decision to affirm Perez’s sentence, but
I cannot join the majority’s categorical assertion, see supra ¶ 16, that “[t]he
record shows the superior court imposed a natural life sentence at the
original sentencing.” The record is more nuanced, making the question of
the superior court’s jurisdiction on remand closer than it may seem. And
absent Perez’s concessions to this Court in his first appeal—concessions this
Court adopted—I might even agree that the superior court lacked
jurisdiction to sentence him to natural life.

¶23 In the realm of final judgments that appellate courts review,
the sentence in a criminal case may be the only type in which the court’s
spoken words may matter more than what’s ultimately reduced to writing.
Compare State v. Whitney, 159 Ariz. 476, 487 (1989) (in criminal cases, “[o]ral
pronouncement in open court controls over the minute entry”), with
Farnsworth v. Hubbard, 78 Ariz. 160, 172 (1954) (in civil cases, “[t]he
judgment as signed and filed by the court . . . resolve[s] any prior
inconsistency” with the “oral rendition from the bench”). And as the
majority ably recounts, see supra ¶ 19, a long line of precedent requires
sentencing courts to be clear and precise when pronouncing a sentence. The
liberty interests at stake require no less.

¶24 The majority focuses on the superior court’s statement at one
point during the sentencing hearing that “there’s no such thing as life with
possibility of parole in 25 years.” The problem, however, is that the court
didn’t impose its sentence until sometime later, and when doing so never
said the sentence was for “natural life,” “life without the possibility of
parole,” or even “life” under the statutes that compel a natural life sentence.
At most, the superior court referenced a “life” sentence without further
detail. This lack of clarity carried over to the minute entry from the
sentencing hearing, which reflected only that the court imposed a “term of
life” on the first-degree murder convictions, and to the order of
confinement, which reflected “Life.” Compare the superior court’s
imprecise language in Perez’s original sentencing hearing with what it
ultimately said—only after the State requested clarification—at Perez’s
resentencing after remand: that Perez’s sentence was for “[n]atural life
under the statute.”

¶25 But whatever question there may have been about Perez’s
sentence, his briefing in his first appeal conceded the point despite this
question not being at issue in that appeal. See supra ¶ 17 (“the trial court
decided to impose the two natural-life-imprisonment sentences

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STATE v. PEREZ
Gaona, J., Concurring

consecutively, instead of concurrently”). We accepted that concession in
our decision. Perez, 1 CA-CR 22-0111, at *3, ¶ 18 (“The court sentenced Perez
to 5 years’ imprisonment for the first-degree burglary count, concurrent
with the natural life sentence in count 2.”) (emphasis added). That leaves us
with nothing to do on direct appeal other than affirm.

¶26 I thus concur in the Court’s judgment. But this appeal proves
that this Court’s words from half a century ago bear repeating: “[w]hen
sentence is imposed the court should state with care the precise terms of the
sentence which is imposed.” Hancock, 27 Ariz. App. at 167 (cleaned up).

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JT

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