State v. Campo

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

DUSTIN HOLLIS CAMPO, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0241
FILED 08-24-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2010-161954-001
The Honorable Justin Beresky, Judge

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED, RELIEF GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Casey Ball, Kelly Gillilan-Gibson
Counsel for Appellee

Michael P. Denea, PLC, Avondale
By Michael P. Denea
Counsel for Appellant

OPINION

Judge Andrew J. Becke delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

STATE v. CAMPO
Opinion of the Court

B E C K E, Judge:

¶1 Dustin Hollis Campo (“Campo”) appeals the superior court’s
modification of his probation conditions. Treating Campo’s putative appeal
as seeking special action relief, the record presented indicates that some of
those conditions may violate Campo’s rights under the Arizona and United
States Constitutions. We therefore accept jurisdiction, grant relief in part,
and remand for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2011, Campo pled guilty to one count of sexual abuse of a
minor, victim age fourteen, and two counts of attempted molestation of a
child, victim age fourteen, all Class 3 felonies and dangerous crimes against
children. Those crimes did not involve use of the internet. Campo was
sentenced to five years in prison, followed by lifetime probation. Campo
was also required to register as a sex offender. After serving his prison
sentence, Campo’s probation began in April 2015.

¶3 Campo has had difficulty complying with probation. Among
other things, he admitted to violating probation by failing to actively
participate and cooperate in counseling and was reinstated on lifetime
probation. Campo’s probation conditions include computer use
restrictions. One condition requires Campo to get prior written approval
from the Adult Probation Department (“APD”) before accessing the
internet. In recent years, Campo’s social media use has caused substantial
friction between him and APD.

¶4 In 2022, Campo moved to modify his probation conditions to
allow social media use, which he claimed was necessary to exercise his
rights “to freedom of speech, expression, and association.” APD opposed
the request, expressing concerns about APD monitoring his use and noting
that several platforms did not permit convicted sex offenders like Campo
to use them. The State took no position on Campo’s motion. The court
granted the motion by allowing Campo to use social media “to the extent
those platforms permit him to do so” and requiring Campo to cooperate
with APD to monitor his social media use.

¶5 Campo then began video recording interactions with his APD
team in public and at probation offices, video recording his polygraphs and
counseling, and posting those recordings to YouTube. His recordings
included one video of his female probation officer during a home visit
(“Probation Officer Video”). According to a description of the Probation

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Opinion of the Court

Officer Video,1 the camera was focused on the probation officer’s clothed
crotch area throughout the recording. When Campo posted the recording
to YouTube, viewers posted sexualized comments in response.

¶6 In June 2024, Campo signed a behavior agreement that he
would not do any recording inside any judicial branch building, “to include
meeting with probation.” Despite that agreement and several warnings
from probation officers, Campo kept recording and posting his interactions
with APD.

¶7 In January 2025, APD moved to modify Campo’s probation
conditions to prohibit him from video- or tape-recording interactions with
his APD team, or posting those recordings to social media. APD stated that
Campo’s recording and posting of his APD team was a “significant
distraction” and interfered with APD’s ability to “address significant
issues” with Campo and to perform their duties because officers were
hesitant to speak with Campo about private or sensitive matters. APD
argued Campo’s actions violated the court rule ensuring confidentiality of
“diagnostic evaluations, psychiatric and psychological reports, medical
reports, alcohol screening and treatment reports, social studies, probation
supervision histories and any other records maintained as the work product
of pretrial services staff, probation officers and other staff for use by the
court.” Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 123(d)(2)(A). APD alleged that, by posting his
videos on YouTube, Campo subjected one officer to “sexual and lewd
comments.” APD also argued that Campo’s posted videos discuss his
convictions of sexual offenses involving a fourteen-year-old victim, which
“may harm the victim.”

¶8 Campo opposed APD’s motion. He argued that Maricopa
County Superior Court Administrative Order 2019-027 (“AO 2019-027”)—
which prohibits the public from recording in court facilities—violated his
“rights to free speech under the First Amendment and the Arizona
Constitution.” He also argued that the proposed modifications would
violate his equal protection rights, claiming he “is entitled to receive the
same treatment under the law as exercised by the President of the United
States” to “criticize government officials without restriction or fear of
reprisal.” APD did not allege a probation condition violation in its motion,
which Campo maintained must occur before his conditions could be
modified. APD’s arguments for modifying his conditions, Campo argued,

1 Although described in superior court testimony, the video is not part of

the record.

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Opinion of the Court

were unrelated to the objectives of probation (rehabilitation and public
safety) and thus could not support a modification.

¶9 In April 2025, following oral argument, the court granted
APD’s motion in part and modified Campo’s probation conditions. The
court affirmed the validity of AO 2019-027 and ordered the following:

THE COURT FINDS probation offices are Maricopa County
Superior Court facilities which are covered by this
administrative order and as such the probationer is
prohibited from the “use of cameras of any type to
photograph or take a video or audio recording of the inside
areas of a court facility.” [the “Filming in Court Facilities
Condition”]

Moreover, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED precluding the
probationer from filming, recording and/or broadcasting
any portion of any therapy, testing (including polygraphs)
and/or any other probationer in any sort of therapeutic or
counseling setting. [the “Filming in Therapy Condition”]
The Court finds this to be a necessary restriction in order to
maintain the integrity of the therapeutic and monitoring
processes, not just for the probationer but other probationers
in similar situations. The Court also finds other probationers
who are in therapeutic settings have some expectation of
privacy that what is discussed in therapy will not be
broadcast to the general public by the probationer.

Defendant may continue to audio record only any
interaction with probation personnel or others in open
public places and his home. Due to safety reasons of the
probation personnel he is specifically prohibited from
video recording and/or disseminating any video recording
in any way. [the “Filming Probation Officers Condition”]

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the probationer to
immediately remove any video recording that is posted
online that was recorded within any probation office,
treatment and/or testing facility as well as the video
recording of the probation[] [officer’s] private area. [the
“Video Depublication Condition”]

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that these orders are a term and
condition of probation. If the Defendant fails to abide by these

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Opinion of the Court

orders the probation department may elect to file a Petition to
Revoke and any such Petition shall be handled by this
division.

¶10 Campo filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

¶11 Campo argues that the modifications of his probation
conditions violate his right to free speech because they prohibit him from
creating and posting videos on the internet. He also argues that APD did
not properly allege a probation condition violation, and that the new
probation conditions violate his procedural due process and equal
protection rights.

¶12 Campo contends we have appellate jurisdiction under A.R.S.
§ 13-4033(A)(3) (“An appeal may be taken by the defendant only from . . .
[a]n order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the
party.”). Although APD does not contest that we have jurisdiction under
§ 13-4033(A)(3), both parties agree that, in the event this section does not
apply, we have the discretion to treat this matter as a special action under
Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 11(e) (“If the reviewing court lacks jurisdiction over a
direct appeal for reasons other than timeliness, the court may—on a party’s
request or on its own initiative—treat the appeal as a special action and
accept special action jurisdiction consistent with Rule 12.”). See A.R.S.
§ 12-120.21(A)(4).

¶13 We elect to treat this matter as a special action and, for several
reasons, accept jurisdiction. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 12(a). First, there is no
“equally plain, speedy, and adequate” remedy by appeal without
jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 13-4033(A)(3). See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 12(a),
(b)(5). Additionally, the superior court’s order raises issues of first
impression, “which are particularly appropriate for special action review,”
regarding a probationer’s free speech rights under the Arizona
Constitution. Dabrowski v. Bartlett, 246 Ariz. 504, 512, ¶ 15 (App. 2019); see
Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 12(b)(3). Finally, the recurring conflict between the
State’s public safety goals and probationers’ claimed free speech rights
makes this an issue of statewide importance. Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 12(b)(4).

¶14 We requested and received supplemental briefing addressing
the following question: “Does Article 2, Section 6 of the Arizona
Constitution provide greater protection than the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution for the speech of probationers in this context?”
We also held oral argument.

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I. APD Did Not Need to Allege a Probation Violation.

¶15 Campo argues that APD must have alleged he violated a
probation condition before seeking modifications to his probation
conditions. Whether the superior court has the authority to modify
probation is a legal question that we review de novo. See State v. Korzuch, 186 Ariz. 190, 192 (1996). We review the superior court’s decision to modify
probation for an abuse of discretion. State v. Dean, 226 Ariz. 47, 50, ¶ 7 (App.
2010).

¶16 “Where additional burdens are imposed on the
probationer . . . the record must contain evidence that the probationer
violated a condition of probation upon which to base the burden.” Burton
v. Superior Court, 27 Ariz. App. 797, 800 (1977), questioned in State v.
Contreras, 180 Ariz. 450, 453 (App. 1994) (“[R]ecent decisions of this court
and a constitutional amendment on the subject of restitution have called the
holding of Burton into question.”); but see A.R.S. § 13-901(C) (“The court, in
its discretion, may . . . modify or add to [probation] conditions . . . .”); Ariz.
R. Crim. P. 27.3(b)(1) (“The court may modify or clarify any condition or
regulation of probation . . . .”). To the extent that Burton’s requirement of an
additional burden remains good law, there is no additional burden here,
meaning APD did not need to allege a probation violation to seek a
modification to Campo’s probation conditions.

¶17 In Contreras, we considered whether the superior court’s
modification of probation terms to include a condition to pay restitution
was an additional burden. 180 Ariz. at 453. Contreras’s plea agreement
included that he was required to pay restitution and set a limit on the
restitution he may owe. Id. at 452. Contreras’s original probation terms did
not include restitution, but the court later added a restitution obligation
after a hearing. Id. at 452–53. We held that because the court was statutorily
required to impose restitution and his probation term remained the same,
no additional burden was imposed. Id. at 453–54.

¶18 Employing the reasoning of Contreras, we first consider the
Filming in Court Facilities Condition. Under AO 2019-027, anyone—
whether on probation or not—who enters a court facility is prohibited from
filming without prior approval of the Presiding Judge. Campo was advised
by his probation team that filming was not allowed in judicial buildings,
and he signed a behavior agreement to that effect. Like in Contreras, Campo
had to follow AO 2019-027 regardless of any probation condition. No
additional burden was imposed, so APD did not need to allege a violation.

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¶19 The same is true of the Filming in Therapy Condition. By rule,
psychiatric and psychological reports and other records maintained as the
work product of probation officers and other staff for use by the court “shall
be withheld from public inspection.” Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 123(d)(2)(A). As part
of Campo’s polygraph testing, he signed an agreement not to record the
testing. Under his signed agreement and Rule 123, recording and
dissemination of the therapy records, including the polygraph testing, are
already restricted. Campo must comply with this requirement, even if it is
not a probation condition. For that reason, there is no additional burden
here.

¶20 We need not reach whether an additional burden is imposed
on Campo through the other conditions because, on the record presented,
they cannot stand, as described below.

II. Campo Did Not Abandon His Article 2, Section 6 Argument.

¶21 APD argues that Campo abandoned his Article 2, Section 6
argument by not sufficiently developing it in his opening brief. When a
party fails to bring an argument in their opening brief, it may be waived.
Dawson v. Withycombe, 216 Ariz. 84, 111, ¶ 91 (App. 2007). Whether to apply
waiver is discretionary. City of Tempe v. Fleming, 168 Ariz. 454, 456 (App.
1991).

¶22 APD cites State v. Jean, which states that “[m]erely referring to
the Arizona Constitution without developing an argument is insufficient to
preserve a claim that it offers greater protection than the Fourth
Amendment.” 243 Ariz. 331, 342, ¶ 39 (2018). But Campo did more than
that. Both before the superior court and in his briefs to us, Campo cited State
v. Stummer’s holding that Article 2, Section 6 provides greater protection for
free speech than does the First Amendment. 219 Ariz. 137, 143, ¶ 17 (2008).
Campo also developed an argument, by citing federal and Arizona case
law, that the conditions violated his right to free speech.

¶23 When free speech rights are asserted under both the Arizona
and United States Constitutions, the Arizona Supreme Court has directed
courts to first analyze the issue under Arizona’s Constitution. Nearly 40
years ago, the Arizona Supreme Court noted that “Arizona enacted its
declaration of rights [in the Arizona Constitution] before the United States
Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of incorporation, applying the federal
Bill of Rights [including the First Amendment] to the states,” starting as
relevant here in 1927. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n,
160 Ariz. 350, 356 & n.12 (1989) (citing Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927)).

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This, our supreme court directed, shows the framers of the Arizona
Constitution meant it to be “the main formulation of rights and privileges
conferred on Arizonans.” Id. at 356 (citing John D. Leshy, The Making of the
Arizona Constitution, 20 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 81 (1988)); see also Ctr. for Ariz. Pol’y
Inc. v. Ariz. Sec’y of State, ___ Ariz. ___, ___, ¶ 28, 592 P.3d 75, 88 (2026)
(“When Arizonans at the 1911 election adopted our constitution, including
its declaration of individual rights, they intended [Article 2, Section 6] to
provide the primary protection for free-speech and free-press rights.”).

¶24 Because Campo adequately raised that his rights to free
speech guaranteed by the Arizona and United States Constitutions were
violated, “we first consult our [Arizona] constitution.” Mountain States, 160
Ariz. at 356.

III. Campo’s Equal Protection Rights Were Not Violated.

¶25 Campo argues that his right to equal protection was violated
because others with prior convictions are able to exercise their First
Amendment rights by using social media. Equal protection under the
federal and Arizona constitutions is “essentially the same.” State v. Coleman, 241 Ariz. 190, 192, ¶ 7 (App. 2016) (quoting State v. Lowery, 230 Ariz. 536,
541, ¶ 13 (App. 2012)). Equal protection requires that those in similar
circumstances be treated equally. State v. Navarro, 201 Ariz. 292, 298, ¶ 25
(App. 2001).

¶26 Campo has not shown that his probation conditions were
imposed in a discriminatory manner. See State v. Scott, 17 Ariz. App. 183,
185 (1972) (rejecting argument that equal protection was violated when
discrimination was not shown). Campo contends that others with prior
convictions are able to document their lives on social media and he should
be able to as well. But he does not show how these people are situated
similarly to him. See Navarro, 201 Ariz. at 298, ¶ 25. The individual
circumstances of each probationer may be different based on their offenses
and treatment needs. On this record, Campo has not shown a violation of
his equal protection rights.

IV. Campo’s Procedural Due Process Rights Were Not Violated.

¶27 Campo argues that his right to procedural due process was
violated because the grounds APD asserted in requesting the modification
had “no bearing” on probation objectives. Due process requires notice and
a hearing when probation conditions are modified. Korzuch, 186 Ariz.
at 193. Campo does not argue a lack of notice, a hearing, or an opportunity

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to be heard. As to his argument that there was no reasonable connection
between the conditions and the goals of probation, we address that below.

V. In Some Circumstances, the Arizona Constitution Provides
Greater Free Speech Protection than the First Amendment.

¶28 Article 2, Section 6 of the Arizona Constitution states: “Every
person may freely speak, write, and publish on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of that right.” The language of this provision is
broader than the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which
states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press.” U.S. Const. amend. I. While the First Amendment
“is phrased as a constraint on government,” Article 2, Section 6 “is a
guarantee of the individual right to ‘freely speak, write, and publish,’
subject only to constraint for the abuse of that right.” Brush & Nib Studio, LC
v. City of Phoenix, 247 Ariz. 269, 281, ¶ 45 (2019) (quoting Stummer, 219 Ariz.
at 142, ¶ 14) (clarified by Ctr. for Ariz. Pol’y Inc., ___ Ariz. at ___, ¶ 30, 592
P.3d at 89). Arizona’s appellate courts are seldom asked to interpret this
guarantee in the Arizona Constitution, Stummer, 219 Ariz. at 142, ¶ 16, and
this appears to be the first request to do so in the context of probation
conditions.

¶29 “[B]y its terms, the Arizona Constitution provides broader
protections for free speech than the First Amendment.” Brush & Nib, 247
Ariz. at 281, ¶ 45. But our supreme court has recently held that “our
Constitution stands on its own terms and may be equally, more, or less
protective than the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of analogous
federal provisions.” Ctr. for Ariz. Pol’y Inc., ___ Ariz. at ___, ¶ 30, 592 P.3d
at 89. Article 2, Section 6 “and the First Amendment generally, but not
invariably, offer the same protection for speech and the press.” Id. at ___,
¶ 24, 592 P.3d at 87. When, as here, a party raises challenges under both
Article 2, Section 6 and the First Amendment, our courts apply “the same
principles under both challenges, when warranted.” Id. at ___, ¶ 25, 592
P.3d at 88. But when “our state provision justifies a departure,” we use an
“Arizona-specific standard of review, anchored on the meaning of” Article
2, Section 6. Id. at ___, ¶¶ 25, 26, 592 P.3d at 88.

¶30 Challenges under Article 2, Section 6 “are evaluated through
an Arizona-specific framework rooted in the Clause’s text, context, and
public meaning at statehood.” Id. at ___, ¶ 59, 592 P.3d at 96. The test has
two steps.

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¶31 In the first step, we “determine whether the expression at
issue is protected.” Id. Arizona courts generally follow “federal
interpretations of the United States Constitution” in determining whether
speech is unprotected. Stummer, 219 Ariz. at 142, ¶ 16. If the speech is
unprotected, the inquiry ends. Ctr. for Ariz. Pol’y Inc., ___ Ariz. at ___, ¶ 32,
592 P.3d at 90.

¶32 In the second step, we “evaluate whether the challenged law
prevents people from ‘freely’ engaging in that expression.” Id. at ___, ¶ 59,
592 P.3d at 96. Article 2, Section 6 “generally forbids prior restraints and
compelled speech laws, but it accommodates reasonable regulations
enacted pursuant to the state’s regulatory authority or constitutional
directives.” Id.

¶33 Our supreme court has also adopted Arizona-specific tests for
evaluating time, place, and manner restrictions under Article 2, Section 6.
See id. Content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions are evaluated
under the Mountain States test. See id. at ___, ¶ 50, 592 P.3d at 94. Content-
based time, place, and manner restrictions are governed by the Stummer
test. See id. at ___, ¶ 51, 592 P.3d at 94.

¶34 Under the First Amendment, time, place, and manner
restrictions are permissible when the restrictions (1) are content neutral;
(2) “are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest”; and
(3) “leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).

¶35 Arizona’s Mountain States test incorporates the first two
elements of the First Amendment test, but replaces the third element—
”ample alternative channels”—with a different question: whether the
restriction “regulate[s] with narrow specificity so as to affect as little as
possible the ability of the sender and receiver to communicate.” Mountain
States, 160 Ariz. at 358; see Ctr. for Ariz. Pol’y Inc., ___ Ariz. at ___, ¶ 50, 592
P.3d at 94. Narrow specificity does not require the “least restrictive means.”
See Stummer, 219 Ariz. at 143–44, ¶¶ 21–22.

¶36 Arizona’s Stummer test applies to content-based time, place,
and manner restrictions. Ctr. for Ariz. Pol’y Inc., ___ Ariz. at ___, ¶ 51, 592
P.3d at 94. “First, once the challenger shows interference with expression,
the state must demonstrate that the regulation targets secondary effects of
the speech rather than suppressing protected expression.” Id. (citing
Stummer, 219 Ariz. at 144, ¶ 25). “Second, if the state satisfies that showing,

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courts then assess whether the regulation (1) protects a substantial
governmental interest; (2) significantly furthers that interest; and (3) does
not unduly burden protected expression.” Id. (citing Stummer, 219 Ariz. at
144–45, ¶ 27).

¶37 The cases interpreting Article 2, Section 6 establish another
important principle under the Arizona Constitution: something more than
governmental inconvenience is necessary to support a restriction on speech.
Id. at ___, ¶ 47, 592 P.3d at 94 (“Although courts may sometimes
accommodate competing constitutional interests, such as the right to a fair
trial, they may not dilute speech protections merely for reasons of
administrative ease, policy preference, or other regulatory convenience.”);
Stummer, 219 Ariz. at 145, ¶ 28 (“[G]overnmental convenience[] will not
justify suppression of speech.”); Mountain States, 160 Ariz. at 358
(“[G]overnmental convenience and certainty cannot prevail over
constitutionally guaranteed rights.”); see also New Times, Inc. v. Ariz. Bd. of
Regents, 110 Ariz. 367, 372 (1974) (“It is well settled that minor matters of
public inconvenience or annoyance cannot be transformed into substantive
evils of sufficient weight to warrant the curtailment of liberty of expression
by legislative preferences or beliefs.”).

¶38 We next apply these standards to Campo’s arguments.

VI. Campo’s Creation of Video Recordings and His Posting of Those
Recordings on the Internet Are Speech Subject to Protection.

¶39 APD argues that the “being responsible for the abuse of that
right” clause in Article 2, Section 6 permits the restrictions on Campo
because he has “abused” his free speech rights. We reject this argument.
Since statehood, that clause has applied only to unprotected speech. See
Stummer, 219 Ariz. at 142, ¶ 16 (“For example, in being ‘responsible for the
abuse’ of the right to speak, write, and publish on ‘all subjects,’ one may be
held liable for defamation, notwithstanding the right to ‘freely speak.’”);
Yetman v. English, 168 Ariz. 71, 73, 82 (1991) (holding in a defamation action
that Article 2, Section 6 “undeniably imposes responsibility on those
exercising their rights to free speech for any abuse thereof”); Truax v. Bisbee
Loc., No. 380, Cooks’ & Waiters’ Union, 19 Ariz. 379, 394 (1918) (holding that
Article 2, Section 6 does not bar an action for defamation); see also Ctr. for
Ariz. Pol’y Inc., ___ Ariz. at ___, ¶ 56, 592 P.3d at 95–96 (describing “abuses”
of the free speech right as “defamation, fraud, or other harmful acts”). APD
made no argument to the superior court that Campo’s filming, or his later
posting of the videos on the internet, constituted unprotected speech. See
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010) (noting unprotected

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speech is limited to obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech
integral to criminal conduct); Stummer, 219 Ariz. at 142, ¶ 16 (holding that
the analysis of unprotected speech is the same under the First Amendment
and Article 2, Section 6).

¶40 Video recording is a form of protected speech under the First
Amendment. Project Veritas v. Schmidt, 125 F.4th 929, 942 (9th Cir. 2025) (“It
is well established that audio recordings and audiovisual recordings are
generally entitled to First Amendment protection.”). The First Amendment
“applies to creating, distributing, [and] consuming speech.” Brown v. Ent.
Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 n.1 (2011).

¶41 The ability to publish material on the internet is likewise
speech subject to protection under the First Amendment. “A fundamental
principle of the First Amendment is that all persons have access to places
where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen
once more.” Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 104 (2017). Social
media websites “can provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms
available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard.” Id. at 107. For
that reason, “to foreclose access to social media altogether is to prevent the
user from engaging in the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights.”
Id. at 108.

¶42 The same is true under the Arizona Constitution. Because
Arizona courts generally follow “federal interpretations of the United
States Constitution” in evaluating unprotected speech under the Arizona
Constitution, Stummer, 219 Ariz. at 142, ¶ 16, the First Amendment
protection of video recording and posting material on the internet suggests
those activities are also protected under Article 2, Section 6.

¶43 Furthermore, because Article 2, Section 6 “guaranteed the
continued exercise of free-speech rights Arizonans already enjoyed before
statehood,” we can look to the rights Arizonans exercised at statehood to
illuminate the scope of Article 2, Section 6. Ctr. for Ariz. Pol’y Inc., ___ Ariz.
at ___, ¶ 28, 592 P.3d at 89; see also id. at ___, ¶¶ 37–41, 592 P.3d at 91–92
(using statehood-era statutes and ordinances to describe the contemporary
understanding of Article 2, Section 6’s scope).

¶44 The right of newspapers to freely publish factual accounts of
governmental activities was well established before the adoption of the
Arizona Constitution. Indeed, the Arizona Penal Code of 1887 specifically
protected newspaper reporters from libel prosecution “for a fair and true
report of any judicial, legislative or other public official proceeding[.]” Ariz.

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Penal Code, Title VIII, ch. 10, § 410 (1887); see also Ariz. Penal Code,
Title VIII, ch. 10, § 226 (1901) (same). Following statehood, the First Arizona
Legislature reaffirmed this principle by passing an identical statute. Ariz.
Penal Code, Title VIII, ch. 10, § 227 (1913).

¶45 Although Campo is not a newspaper reporter, his video
recordings of his interactions with APD and his publication of those
recordings on the internet are akin to the protected activities of a statehood-
era newspaper reporter in reporting on the proceedings of judicial
employees. Cf. Chatrie v. United States, 609 U.S. ___, ___, 146 S. Ct. 2193, 2222
(2026) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[T]he First Amendment protects speech
over the internet today no less than it did speech delivered in the town
square in 1791.”). Given the Arizona Constitution’s robust protection of
“free-speech and free-press rights,” Ctr. for Ariz. Pol’y Inc., ___ Ariz. at ___,
¶ 28, 592 P.3d at 88, Campo’s recording and posting of videos commenting
on his treatment as a probationer are speech subject to protection under
Article 2, Section 6.

VII. Probationers Have Constitutionally Protected Free Speech Rights.

¶46 The fact that Campo’s recording and posting of videos are
speech subject to protection does not end our inquiry. Probationers are
subject to reduced free speech rights. Wilson v. Higgins, 251 Ariz. 282, 287,
¶ 24 (2021) (“[P]robationers possess ‘reduced liberty interests.’” (quoting
Korzuch, 186 Ariz. at 193)). Probationers possess “conditional liberty
properly dependent on the observance of special (probation) restrictions.”
State v. Alfaro, 127 Ariz. 578, 579 (1980) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 480 (1972)). Much like convicted felons can have their rights to vote or
possess guns suspended, those on probation can have their free speech
rights curtailed.

¶47 As we noted nearly 50 years ago, probation “[c]onditions that
unquestionably restrict otherwise inviolable constitutional rights may
properly be subject to special scrutiny to determine whether the limitation
does in fact serve the dual objectives of rehabilitation and public safety.”
State v. Davis, 119 Ariz. 140, 141–42 (App. 1978) (quoting United States v.
Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975)). In determining whether
a condition is valid, “[t]he question is whether there is a reasonable nexus
between the conditions imposed and the goals to be achieved by the
probation.” Id. at 142. “Thus, where a condition impinges on but does not
violate the defendant’s fundamental rights, the condition may still be
constitutional.” State v. Nickerson, 164 Ariz. 121, 123 (App. 1990); see also
State v. Kessler, 199 Ariz. 83, 88, ¶ 21 (App. 2000) (“Courts have consistently

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upheld imposition of conditions of probation that restrict a defendant’s
freedom of speech and association when those conditions bear a reasonable
relationship to the goals of probation.” (quoting United States v. Turner, 44
F.3d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1995))).

¶48 Campo and APD agree that Davis sets forth the applicable
standard. Accordingly, we apply Davis in addressing Campo’s arguments
2

under Article 2, Section 6 of the Arizona Constitution.

VIII. On the Record Presented, Some of Campo’s Probation Conditions
Cannot Withstand Constitutional Scrutiny.

¶49 In addressing Campo’s argument that his modified probation
conditions violate Article 2, Section 6 and the First Amendment, we review
the conditions de novo. State v. McGill, 213 Ariz. 147, 159, ¶ 53 (2006).

A. “[P]robationer is prohibited from the ‘use of cameras of any type to
photograph or take a video or audio recording of the inside areas of
a court facility’” – the Filming in Court Facilities Condition.

¶50 AO 2019-027 prohibits filming in court facilities without the
prior approval of the Presiding Judge. APD contends that Campo does not
have standing to contest the constitutionality of AO 2019-027 because he
only complains of a generalized harm. To have standing, Campo must
“allege a distinct and palpable injury.” Sears v. Hull, 192 Ariz. 65, 69, ¶ 16
(1998). Alleging a generalized harm that is shared by “all or a large class of
citizens generally is not sufficient to confer standing.” Id.

¶51 Here, Campo is exposed to probation violation consequences
if he violates AO 2019-027, while the general public only faces having to
delete the recording, removal from the building, or other sanctions by the
court. See AO 2019-027. Thus, Campo has alleged a distinct and palpable
injury, Hull, 192 Ariz. at 69, ¶ 16, meaning he has standing to challenge the
constitutionality of AO 2019-027.

¶52 Campo argues that because Arizona is a one-party consent
state, he may film any conversation he wishes if he (as one party to the
conversation) consents to the recording. See A.R.S. § 13-3005 (criminalizing
the interception of oral or electronic communications without the consent
of either party to the communication). But the fact that it is not illegal to

2 In light of this agreement by the parties, we assume, but expressly do not

decide, that the Davis standard is consistent with Article 2, Section 6 of the
Arizona Constitution.

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record if one party consents to the recording does not mean that no
restrictions on recording are permissible. Campo has failed to show that the
prohibition of filming in court facilities is inconsistent with A.R.S. § 13-3005.

¶53 Campo also argues that a probation office is not a court
building and thus not subject to AO 2019-027. We review the superior
court’s interpretation of the administrative order de novo. See State v. Soria, 217 Ariz. 101, 102, ¶ 5 (App. 2007). We first look to the plain language of the
administrative order to interpret it, and we give words their plain
meanings. See id. at 102–03, ¶ 6; Hornbeck v. Lusk, 217 Ariz. 581, 583, ¶ 6
(App. 2008). AO 2019-027 prohibits filming in a “court facility.” Probation
offices are court property, and probation officers are employed by the court.
Probation offices therefore plainly fall within the common understanding
of “court facilities.” The court did not err in finding that probation offices
are covered by AO 2019-027.

¶54 Under the First Amendment, free speech activity on
government property is subject to “forum analysis.”3 Korwin v. Cotton, 234
Ariz. 549, 554, ¶ 9 (App. 2014). “Under this analysis, the extent to which the
government can control access to a particular forum depends upon the
nature of the forum.” Id. Speech in “traditional public fora,” like parks and
streets, receives the highest level of protection from government
interference. Id. at 555, ¶ 14. In contrast, regulation of speech in “nonpublic
fora”—property owned and controlled by the government that “is not by
tradition or designation a forum for public communication”—is
permissible so long as the restrictions are viewpoint neutral and reasonable.
Id. at 555, ¶ 15 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460
U.S. 37, 46 (1983)).

¶55 “Judicial and municipal complexes are not public fora.”
United States v. Gileno, 350 F. Supp. 3d 910, 917 (C.D. Cal. 2018). Because
courthouses are not public fora, restrictions on filming are permissible if
they are: (1) viewpoint neutral and (2) reasonable in light of the purpose
served by the forum. Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1074–75 (9th Cir.

3 Because Campo has not argued that the analysis should be any different

under the Arizona Constitution, we assume without deciding that forum
analysis is consistent with Article 2, Section 6. See Ino Ino, Inc. v. City of
Bellevue, 937 P.2d 154, 163 (Wash. 1997) (finding that Washington’s identical
free speech provision affords no “greater protection under the state
constitution for speech in nonpublic fora” than the federal constitution),
cited with approval in Ctr. for Ariz. Pol’y Inc., ___ Ariz. at ___, ¶ 24, 592 P.3d
at 87–88.

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2001). Thus, the lobby of a courthouse “may forbid all political rallies, but
it may not forbid one party’s rallies while allowing another’s.” Sefick v.
Gardner, 164 F.3d 370, 372 (7th Cir. 1998).

¶56 Both Campo and APD agree that this condition is viewpoint
neutral. And Campo—just like every other member of the public—is
prohibited from recording in any court facility regardless of his viewpoint.

¶57 The Filming in Court Facilities Condition is also reasonable.
As AO 2019-027 sets forth, restricting recording on court property furthers
the significant governmental interests in the security of court facilities,
limiting disruptions to court operations, and providing a safe work
environment to court staff and users of the court. Because the restriction
here is viewpoint neutral and reasonable, it is permissible under both the
Arizona Constitution and the First Amendment.

B. “[P]recluding the probationer from filming, recording and/or
broadcasting any portion of any therapy, testing (including
polygraphs) and/or any other probationer in any sort of therapeutic
or counseling setting” – the Filming in Therapy Condition.

¶58 APD argues that Campo abandoned any argument on the
Filming in Therapy Condition by not adequately addressing it in the
opening brief. See Dawson, 216 Ariz. at 111, ¶ 91 (failing to bring argument
in opening brief constitutes waiver). However, Campo broadly argues in
his opening brief that the conditions restricting his use of social media
violate his free speech rights. This condition prohibits Campo from
broadcasting any portion of his therapy and thus impacts whether he may
post his recordings on social media. Therefore, we do not treat this
argument as waived.

¶59 The Filming in Therapy Condition is not subject to forum
analysis because the condition prohibits Campo from filming therapy and
testing regardless of where those activities take place. The parties agree,
however, that this is a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction.
Because the Arizona test for these restrictions differs from the federal test,
we analyze the restriction under both tests. See Ctr. for Ariz. Pol’y Inc., ___
Ariz. at ___, ¶¶ 25–26, 30–31, 592 P.3d at 88–90.

1. Article 2, Section 6 analysis

¶60 Under the Mountain States test, a time, place, and manner
restriction is permissible when it: (1) is content neutral; (2) is narrowly
tailored to advance a significant government interest; and (3) “regulate[s]

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with narrow specificity so as to affect as little as possible the ability of the
sender and receiver to communicate.” 160 Ariz. at 357–58. The parties agree
the restriction is content neutral, so the first step is satisfied.

¶61 APD showed that it has a significant government interest in
protecting the propriety of the polygraph testing so that other probationers
may not view the recording and know which questions are asked prior to
their polygraph test. APD also showed a significant interest in protecting
the privacy of other therapy participants, so that their personal information
is not shared with others and so they feel empowered to speak openly and
honestly in therapy. The condition is narrowly tailored to meet those
significant interests because “the state would have achieved its asserted
interest ‘less effectively absent the regulation.’” Blankenship v. Louisville-
Jefferson Cnty., Ky. Metro Gov’t, 162 F.4th 644, 658 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting
Reform Am. v. City of Detroit, 37 F.4th 1138, 1151 (6th Cir. 2022)).

¶62 The condition is also narrowly specific. Campo remains free
to communicate with his intended audience about his therapy and testing,
he simply cannot record those activities. There is no practical way to protect
the privacy of probation materials and the privacy of other probationers
other than restricting Campo from recording and broadcasting that
information. The Filming in Therapy Condition is therefore narrowly
specific, passes the Mountain States intermediate scrutiny test, and does not
violate the Arizona Constitution. Ctr. for Ariz. Pol’y Inc., ___ Ariz. at ___, ¶
49, 592 P.3d at 94 (“A law that survives scrutiny as a valid time, place, and
manner regulation does not interfere with Arizonans’ right to ‘freely’ speak,
write, and publish under the Speak Freely Clause and must be upheld.”).

2. First Amendment analysis

¶63 As noted supra ¶ 35, the first two steps of the federal analysis
of time, place, and manner restrictions are the same as the Mountain States
test. The Filming in Therapy Condition clears those two hurdles.

¶64 The Condition also meets the federal test’s third requirement.
Campo has ample alternative channels for communication. Campo remains
free to speak and record himself, outside of therapy, testing, and counseling
settings, about his own experience in therapy, and post that on social media.
See Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029, 1041 (7th Cir. 2002) (“An
adequate alternative does not have to be the speaker’s first choice.”).

3. The Condition is valid under both the State and
Federal Constitutions.

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¶65 Because the Filming in Therapy Condition is a valid, content-
neutral time, place, and manner restriction under both the state and federal
tests, it is permissible under both the Arizona Constitution and the First
Amendment.

C. “Defendant may continue to audio record only any interaction with
probation personnel or others in open public places and his home.
Due to safety reasons of the probation personnel he is specifically
prohibited from video recording and/or disseminating any video
recording in any way” – the Filming Probation Officers Condition.

¶66 As discussed above, the Filming in Court Facilities Condition
and the Filming in Therapy Condition are grounded in generally applicable
rules and would pass constitutional muster even if they were applied to the
public in general. The same cannot be said for the Filming Probation
Officers Condition.

¶67 Article 2, Section 6 “tolerates no censorship or restraint—
major or minor—on the right to speak, write, or publish on any subject
except through the state’s proper exercise of its regulatory authority and in
accordance with the Constitution’s directives.” Ctr. for Ariz. Pol’y Inc., ___
Ariz. at ___, ¶ 47, 592 P.3d at 93. This Condition prospectively prohibits
Campo from video recording and posting those videos on the internet.
Article 2, Section 6 “generally forbids prior restraints.” Id. at ___, ¶ 59, 592
P.3d at 96.

¶68 The filming of government officials in public is also protected
by the First Amendment. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2011)
(collecting cases). Public employees going about the public’s business in
public should generally expect to do so under the public’s eye. Law
enforcement officers routinely record their interactions with the public on
body-worn cameras and those recordings are public records “presumed
open to the public for inspection.” Smith v. Town of Marana, 254 Ariz. 393,
397, ¶ 11 (App. 2022) (quoting KPNX-TV v. Superior Court, 183 Ariz. 589,
592 (App. 1995)). “This approach serves ‘to open government activity to
public scrutiny.’” Id. (quoting Lake v. City of Phoenix, 222 Ariz. 547, 549, ¶ 7
(2009)).

¶69 A general prohibition on recording APD personnel in public
fora would likely not survive a challenge by a non-probationer under either
the Arizona Constitution or the First Amendment. But Campo is on
probation. Because of that fact, his rights are subject to restriction in ways
that would not be permissible as applied to others. For the court to impose

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those restrictions, however, there must be “a reasonable nexus between the
conditions imposed and the goals to be achieved by the probation.” Davis,
119 Ariz. at 142.

¶70 APD attempts to justify the condition by asserting that the
Probation Officer Video was a surreptitious recording that violated A.R.S.
§ 13-3019(A)(2), which criminalizes non-consensual video recordings that
“directly or indirectly capture[] or allow[] the viewing of the person’s
genitalia, buttock or female breast, whether clothed or unclothed, that is not
otherwise visible to the public.” But APD made no such argument to the
superior court.4 And even if this court was to consider the argument for the
first time here, the superior court made no findings about the video and did
not articulate any link between the Probation Officer Video and the Filming
Probation Officers Condition.

¶71 The only justification offered to the superior court by APD in
support of the Recording Probation Officers Condition was “officer safety.”
APD’s argument focused on the fact that people other than Campo had
posted “sexual and lewd comments” in response to the Probation Officer
Video. But those who produce online content are generally not responsible
for the comments of others in reaction to that content. See Shiamili v. Real
Est. Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1018–19 (N.Y. 2011) (discussing § 230
of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230). Although APD
argues that Campo “liked” some of the sexual and lewd comments, it failed
to articulate how these “likes” adopted the speech of the commenters,
imperiled officer safety, or justified a blanket prohibition on video
recording APD personnel.

¶72 Moreover, the condition permits Campo to “audio record
only any interaction with probation personnel or others in open public
places and his home,” a condition that arguably prohibits Campo from
video recording people other than APD personnel in public places or in
Campo’s home. APD conceded at oral argument that this “or others” aspect
of the condition is not justified.

¶73 Although probation officer safety is unquestionably an
important interest related to the goals of probation, APD has not shown
how prohibiting Campo from video recording (while allowing him to audio
record) his interactions with probation personnel in public and in his own

4 Because § 13-3019(A)(2) was not before the superior court, we express no

opinion on whether that statute is consistent with Article 2, Section 6 of the
Arizona Constitution or the First Amendment.

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home furthers any such safety interest. As such, based on the record
presented, the imposition of the Filming Probation Officers Condition
violates both Article 2, Section 6 of the Arizona Constitution and the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. That condition is vacated.5

D. “[D]irecting the probationer to immediately remove any video
recording that is posted online that was recorded within any
probation office, treatment and/or testing facility as well as the video
recording of the probation[] [officer’s] private area” – the Video
Depublication Condition.

¶74 Campo may be restricted from recording in court facilities
and in therapy, treatment, or testing. Accordingly, requiring Campo to
remove videos recording such interactions is not a violation of his Article 2,
Section 6 or First Amendment rights.

¶75 However, because the Filming Probation Officers in Public
Condition cannot be sustained on this record, the Video Depublication
Condition may also run afoul of Article 2, Section 6 and the First
Amendment. Because the record does not contain a copy of the Probation
Officer Video, we are unable to make an independent evaluation of whether
that video is protected speech. From the record, all we can discern is that
the camera was focused on the probation officer’s clothed crotch area and
the video was recorded in Campo’s home. The superior court made no
factual findings about the video and conducted no legal analysis regarding
whether the video was protected or unprotected speech.

¶76 Filming government officials in public fora is protected
speech. Supra ¶¶ 67–68. The fact that the government finds the particular
speech offensive or disagreeable does not strip it of that protection. See
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011).

¶77 Because Article 2, Section 6 states that “[e]very person may
freely speak, write, and publish on all subjects,” we begin with the
presumption that the video is protected speech. (Emphasis added). Given
Campo’s probation status, the court can restrict that speech, but only to
“serve the dual objectives of rehabilitation and public safety” and when
there is “a reasonable nexus between the conditions imposed and the goals
to be achieved by the probation.” Davis, 119 Ariz. at 141–42. To overcome

5 On remand, the court retains jurisdiction to modify Campo’s probation

conditions consistent with this opinion, without the need for a petition
alleging a violation of probation conditions.

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the presumption that Campo’s creation and publishing of video recordings
is protected speech, the superior court must make specific findings on how
this video meets the Davis test or is otherwise unprotected. Because the
record contains no such findings, we vacate the Video Depublication
Condition, at least with respect to the Probation Officer Video.

¶78 On remand, the superior court is free to reconsider its order
with the necessary factual findings or receive other evidence regarding the
Probation Officer Video.

CONCLUSION

¶79 In the exercise of our discretion, we accept special action
jurisdiction and grant relief in part. We affirm the superior court’s order
imposing the Filming in Court Facilities Condition and the Filming in
Therapy Condition. We affirm the portion of the Video Depublication
Condition pertaining to videos taken in court facilities and in therapy,
treatment, or testing. We vacate the portion of the Video Depublication
Condition pertaining to the Probation Officer Video and the superior
court’s order imposing the Filming Probation Officers Condition.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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