State v. Ortiz

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JUAN JAVIER ORTIZ, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0245
FILED 07-21-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. CR-2024-00133
The Honorable Derek C. Carlisle, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Christine Davis
Counsel for Appellee

Jill L. Evans, Flagstaff
Counsel for Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Andrew J. Becke and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.
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Decision of the Court

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Juan Javier Ortiz appeals his convictions and
sentences for the murder of S.B.1 and related offenses. Because Ortiz has
shown no error, his convictions and sentences are affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 One night in January 2024, shortly after 8:00 p.m., Arizona
Department of Public Safety (DPS) Detective Shed conducted a traffic stop
in Kingman. He pulled over a black Ford Expedition with a male driver,
later identified as Ortiz. Detective Shed recognized Ortiz’ vehicle as one
that fled from him earlier in January 2024. Ortiz parked inside a self-serve
car wash bay. Detective Shed parked his unmarked blue Dodge Charger in
front of Ortiz’ vehicle. DPS Detective Upton arrived, also in an unmarked
police car, and parked behind Ortiz’ vehicle. A third DPS officer, Detective
Cortez, then arrived in his unmarked car and parked in the parking lot.

¶3 Ortiz got out of his vehicle but, when Detective Shed called
out, Ortiz got back inside his vehicle. Detective Shed told Ortiz to stop. But
Ortiz reversed his vehicle, hit Detective Upton’s car, drove forward into
Detective Shed’s blue Charger, and drove away.

¶4 Several DPS officers chased Ortiz, at times activating their
emergency lights and sirens. As Ortiz was driving west on Bank Street, he
ran a stop sign and hit a car, killing the driver, S.B. Ortiz suffered minor
injuries, refused medical care and was taken into custody. Ortiz was
indicted on one count of first-degree felony murder, two counts of
aggravated assault, one count of unlawful flight from a pursuing law
enforcement vehicle and one count of criminal damage.

¶5 The State filed a motion seeking an advance admissibility
determination under Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(b) about Ortiz’ prior
evasions from law enforcement. The State sought to admit evidence that,
on two separate occasions before the charged offenses, Ortiz fled from law
enforcement. The State asserted the flight events occurred in 2010, then
again in January 2024, three weeks before the charged offenses. Ortiz
countered with a motion in limine, arguing the “other act evidence” was
“improper.”

1 Initials are used to protect the victim’s privacy. State v. Maldonado, 206

Ariz. 339, 341 ¶ 2 n.1 (App. 2003).

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¶6 After oral argument, the court found evidence of the January
2024 flight was relevant to show Ortiz knew that he was evading a law
enforcement vehicle, and that its probative value was not substantially
outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. The court, however, rejected
evidence of the 2010 flight because it was too remote.

¶7 At oral argument, the State indicated that it intended to offer
evidence that, at the time of the charged offenses, “there was a valid felony
parole warrant” for Ortiz’ arrest. Counsel for Ortiz responded that he
would address it separately with the State. Deferring any ruling on the
issue, the court encouraged the parties to see if they could reach an
agreement on the warrant evidence, commenting that the evidence
probably was relevant to the unlawful flight charge and, if presented
tersely, would “probably not [be] terribly prejudicial.”

¶8 During a five-day trial that began in February 2025, the State
called various witnesses, including the officers involved. Without objection,
Detective Shed testified that he knew Ortiz had an outstanding “valid
felony warrant” at the time of the flight incident earlier in January 2024.
Also without objection, Detective Shed testified that, when he saw the black
Ford Expedition Ortiz was driving on the day of the offenses, he requested
assistance to stop the vehicle “because I had known the individual had a
felony warrant and it was known that he had fled from me in the past.”

¶9 Although the blue Dodge Charger is an unmarked car,
Detective Shed testified without objection that it “stands out,” adding that
“[o]nce I make a traffic stop in it, everybody usually knows it,” and
agreeing that he believed “even though it’s not marked, . . . it’s well known
in the area.” Detective Shed also testified, over a relevance objection, that
he had “people walking up to our [unmarked] patrol cars, taking pictures
of them. I have debriefed individuals that say those pictures get passed
around within the community saying kind of like who – or to watch out for
the unmarked cars any time we get a new patrol vehicle.”

¶10 After the State rested in its case in chief, Ortiz unsuccessfully
moved for a judgment of acquittal. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20 (2026).2 Ortiz did
not testify or present any evidence, and after deliberating, the jury found
him guilty as charged. The jury then found as aggravating circumstances,
for the aggravated assault convictions, that the victims were peace officers

2 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.

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and that those offenses were dangerous offenses. The jury also found that
Ortiz committed the offenses while on community supervision.

¶11 The court later sentenced Ortiz to life in prison without the
possibility of release for the first-degree murder conviction and a
concurrent five year prison term for the unlawful flight conviction, with 475
days presentence incarceration credit; a consecutive 15.75 year prison term
for one aggravated assault conviction, with a concurrent five year prison
term for the criminal damage conviction; and another consecutive 15.75
year prison term for the other aggravated assault conviction.

¶12 This court has jurisdiction over Ortiz’ timely appeal pursuant
to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised
Statutes (A.R.S) sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and 13-4033(A).

DISCUSSION

¶13 When a timely objection is made, this court reviews a superior
court’s “decision to admit evidence of other acts for an abuse of discretion,”
State v. Hausner, 230 Ariz. 60, 78 ¶ 68 (2012) (citation omitted), recognizing
an admissibility “ruling will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that
discretion,” State v. Kiper, 181 Ariz. 62, 65 (App. 1994) (citation omitted).
Failure to timely object results in review for fundamental error. See State v.
Strong, 258 Ariz. 184, 210 ¶ 111 (2024). Ortiz “bears the burden to establish
that ‘(1) error exists, (2) the error is fundamental, and (3) the error caused
him prejudice.’” State v. Bearup, 221 Ariz. 163, 168 ¶ 21 (2009) (citation
omitted); accord State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 142 ¶ 21 (2018).

I. Ortiz Has Not Shown the Court Erred in Admitting Evidence.

A. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by
Admitting Flight Evidence.3

¶14 Ortiz argues the State improperly used the flight evidence
from earlier in January 2024 to show he had a “propensity to flee from
police,” an improper purpose. See Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b). Ortiz also argues
the evidence should have been excluded because “its probative value was

3 The State argues, with some force, that Ortiz did not preserve the
objections addressed here in superior court, which would limit the review
on appeal for fundamental error. See Ariz. R. Evid. 103(e). Because Ortiz has
shown no error, under either fundamental error or abuse of discretion, this
court need not resolve the State’s argument.

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substantially outweighed” by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Ariz. R.
Evid. 403. Ortiz alleges the evidence violated his right to a fair trial.

¶15 Although other act evidence “is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion,” Ariz. R. Evid. 404(a), it may “be admissible for other purposes,
such as . . . intent [or] knowledge,” Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). To be
admissible, “a proper purpose must be shown under Rule 404(b), it must
be relevant under Rule 402 [and] the probative value of the evidence must
not be substantially outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect under
Rule 403.” State v. Acuna Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. 197, 207 ¶ 12 (2018) (citations
omitted).4

¶16 The flight evidence was relevant, given that the State was
required to prove that Ortiz willfully fled or attempted to elude a pursing
official law enforcement vehicle. A.R.S. § 28-622.01. Among other things,
both for the prior flight and the unlawful flight charge here, Ortiz fled from
the same unmarked blue Dodge Charger. That fact was relevant to whether
Ortiz “knew that the vehicle was an official law enforcement vehicle,” one
path to proving the unlawful flight charge. A.R.S. § 28-622.01(2)(b); accord
Ariz. R. Evid. 401 (evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency” to make a
fact of consequence more or less probable). Moreover, Ortiz has not shown
that the flight evidence had an “undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis, such as emotion, sympathy, or horror,” State v. Mott, 187
Ariz. 536, 545 (1997) (citation omitted), or that it otherwise was inadmissible
under Rule 403. Accordingly, he has shown no error in the admission of the
flight evidence or that its admission violated his right to a fair trial.

B. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Admitting Testimony
that Others in the Community Recognized Detective Shed’s
Unmarked Blue Dodge Charger as a Police Vehicle.

¶17 At trial, Detective Shed testified that his unmarked blue
Dodge Charger was well known in the area as a police vehicle. Over Ortiz’
relevance objection, Detective Shed testified that his blue Dodge Charger:

[C]ould be just parked anywhere, and I’ve had
people slow down, look at us, kind of trying to
figure out what was going on. I’ve had so much

4 When requested, the court also must give a proper limiting instruction for

other act evidence that is admissible at trial. See id. (citing Ariz. R. Evid.
105). Ortiz did not request such a limiting instruction.

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as people walking up to our patrol cars, taking
pictures of them. I have debriefed individuals
that say those pictures get passed around within
the community saying kind of like who – or to
watch out for the unmarked cars any time we
get a new patrol vehicle.

Ortiz alleges this testimony was irrelevant and, even if minimally relevant,
“was unfairly prejudicial.” See Ariz. R. Evid. 401, 403. Ortiz claims “[t]here
was no evidence that any of those unknown people had told Ortiz about it,
or had any relation to Ortiz, or that Ortiz had seen a picture of it identified
as a police car.”

¶18 Here, the testimony was relevant to whether Detective Shed’s
unmarked vehicle was recognizable as a police vehicle, a fact relevant to the
unlawful flight charge. See A.R.S. § 28-622.01(2)(b); see also Ariz. R. Evid.
401. And Ortiz has not shown that this passing reference to unnamed
“people” identifying the blue Dodge Charger as a police vehicle created an
“undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,” Mott, 187 Ariz.
at 545 (citation omitted), or violated Rule 403. Accordingly, Ortiz has shown
no error in the admission of this evidence.

C. The Superior Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Error by
Allowing the State to Admit Evidence that Ortiz Had a
Felony Warrant.

¶19 During the State’s case in chief, without objection, Detective
Shed testified about the warrant. He confirmed that Ortiz had a warrant
outstanding at the time he fled from police officers in January 2024. When
asked about the events on the date of the charged offenses, Detective Shed
described his plan to have another officer box in Ortiz’ car because he “had
known the individual had a felony warrant and it was known that he had
fled from me in the past.” During redirect, when asked if he knew of the
warrant when trying to capture Ortiz on the charged offenses, Detective
Shed responded, “[t]hat is correct. I did have that.” The State mentioned the
warrant during closing argument, asserting Ortiz “sees vehicles coming
into the car wash and he starts to leave. He starts to leave because he knows
that he has a warrant or should know he has a warrant and he knows that
he recognizes the vehicles.”

¶20 Ortiz argues evidence of the warrant was inadmissible
character evidence that was unfairly prejudicial, indicating he “was a
serious criminal and therefore guilty” of the charged offenses regardless of

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the trial evidence. Ortiz argues that, as in State v. Green, 110 Ariz. 293 (1974),
“the evidence was highly prejudicial to the defendant’s right to a fair trial
and probably influenced the jury.” Green, however, is distinguishable.

¶21 Green involved a conviction for the sale of narcotic drugs
where the court denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial when a witness
for the State testified the defendant “was known to us as a dealer in
narcotics.” 110 Ariz. at 293-94. The Arizona Supreme Court found that
testimony was not “competent to prove the crime charged,” concluding
that “[i]n a trial for the sale of narcotics in which the defense is entrapment,
we feel that the remark made by the police officer was most certainly
prejudicial.” Id. at 294-95 (citation omitted).

¶22 Here, by contrast, Ortiz did not object at trial. Moreover, as
the State notes, the fact that Ortiz had an outstanding warrant was relevant
to whether he fled, and his motive to flee, for the unlawful flight charge. See
A.R.S. § 28-622.01(2)(b); see also Ariz. R. Evid. 401. And as with evidence of
his flight earlier in January 2024, he has not shown that the superior court
was required, sua sponte, to preclude that evidence as unfairly prejudicial
under Rule 403. On this record, Ortiz has not shown error, let alone
fundamental error resulting in prejudice, from the admission of evidence
regarding his outstanding warrant. See Bearup, 221 Ariz. at 168 ¶ 21.

II. There Was Sufficient Evidence that Ortiz Intentionally Placed
Detectives in Reasonable Apprehension of Imminent Physical
Injury.

¶23 Counts two and three alleged Ortiz committed aggravated
assault with a dangerous instrument by intentionally placing the detectives
in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury. See A.R.S. § 13-
1203(A)(2). “Either direct or circumstantial evidence may prove the victim’s
apprehension. There is no requirement that the victim testify to actual
fright.” State v. Wood, 180 Ariz. 53, 66 (1994) (citation omitted).

¶24 Ortiz argues there was insufficient evidence he intentionally
placed the detectives “in imminent fear as he was attempting to flee, as he
did not ‘ram’ the cars but pushed them out the way in order to flee, and did
not point his car in the direction of Detective Shed who was outside his
vehicle.” In making that argument, however, Ortiz concedes that “the
officers testified that they were in fear.” He adds, however, that “there was
no evidence or reasonable inference that they were in reasonable fear of
‘imminent physical injury’ or that Ortiz intentionally place[d] them in such
fear.” In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence argument, this court considers

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the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the conviction. See
State v. Pena, 235 Ariz. 277, 279 ¶ 5 (2014) (citing cases).

¶25 Here, the jurors could reasonably find Detectives Shed and
Upton were in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury.
Detective Upton testified he was in fear when Ortiz started to run his
vehicle into the detectives’ vehicles, stating, “I was worried that either I or
Detective Shed would get hurt.” Detective Upton testified that, “if we were
to ram a vehicle, that’s treated as lethal force; and so when somebody rams
us, we have to treat it in the same fashion.”

¶26 This testimony properly allowed the jury to conclude that the
detectives were in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury.
See, e.g., State v. Sands, 145 Ariz. 269, 275 (App. 1985) (victims’ testimony
that defendant’s firing gun caused them “fear that another shot might injure
them” was evidence of reasonable apprehension of imminent physical
injury). In essence, Ortiz asks that the evidence considered by the jury be
reweighed on appeal, something this court will not do. See State v.
Rodriguez, 205 Ariz. 392, 397 ¶ 18 (App. 2003). On this record, sufficient
evidence supported the fact that Ortiz intentionally placed the detectives in
reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury.

III. The Superior Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Error by
Failing to Instruct the Jury on the Lesser-Included Offense of
Disorderly Conduct for the Aggravated Assault Charges.

¶27 When addressing jury instructions for the aggravated assault
charges, Ortiz affirmatively told the superior court he was not requesting a
lesser-included offense instruction on simple assault or assault without the
use of a dangerous instrument or against a peace officer. At no time did
Ortiz request a disorderly conduct lesser-included offense jury instruction.
Now, on appeal, he argues the superior court committed fundamental error
by failing to sua sponte give a disorderly conduct lesser- included offense
jury instruction.

¶28 A court has no obligation to give a lesser-included offense
instruction that the defendant has expressly rejected. See State v. Krone, 182
Ariz. 319, 323 (1995); State v. Fish, 222 Ariz. 109, 132 ¶¶ 79–80 (App. 2009).
Moreover, in a case like this, the superior court had no obligation to sua
sponte instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense. See State v. Gipson, 229
Ariz. 484, 487 ¶ 15 (2012) (“‘In general the trial judge should withhold
charging on lesser included offense[s] unless one of the parties requests
it.’”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, Ortiz has not shown that the superior

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court committed fundamental error by failing to sua sponte instruct the
jury, for the aggravated assault charges, on the lesser-included offenses of
disorderly conduct.

CONCLUSION

¶29 Ortiz’ convictions and resulting sentences are affirmed.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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