State v. Garcia

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

EDGAR GARCIA, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0276 PRPC
FILED 02-06-2026

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2012-159502-001
The Honorable Jeffrey A. Rueter, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Philip D. Garrow
Counsel for Respondent

Edgar Garcia, Buckeye
Petitioner
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey joined.

K I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 A jury found Petitioner Edgar Garcia guilty of eleven crimes,
including sexual conduct with a minor, kidnapping, sexual abuse, and child
molestation. See State v. Garcia, 1 CA-CR 18-0628, 2019 WL 4200741 at *1, ¶ 1
(Ariz. App. Sept. 5, 2019). On April 1, 2015, Petitioner was sentenced to
concurrent and consecutive sentences totaling 150 years of imprisonment.
Id. at ¶ 2.

¶2 Over three years later, Petitioner petitioned for post-
conviction relief (“PCR”), asserting that his court-appointed attorney
neglected to file an appeal on his behalf. The superior court appointed new
counsel and granted Petitioner leave to file a delayed appeal. See Ariz. R.
Crim. P. 31.2(a)(3), 32.1(f).

¶3 On direct appeal, this Court modified one of Petitioner’s
sentences to correct an error in the calculation of presentence incarceration
credit, but otherwise affirmed his convictions and sentences. See Garcia,
2019 WL 4200741 at *5, ¶ 23. The mandate in that case issued on October 17,
2019.

¶4 In January 2025, Petitioner filed another PCR petition,
challenging the superior court’s evidentiary rulings and its failure to excuse
certain prospective jurors for cause. He also raised claims of ineffective
assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Petitioner explained his years-long
delay in filing his second PCR petition by asserting that although his
appellate attorney “sent him all his record” from the direct appeal,
including “the Decision and the Mandate,” in December 2019, appellate
counsel “did not even bother to send [him] a letter with it explaining or
guiding him at least basically what he needs to do to at least initiate his Rule
32 Appeal [sic].” Moreover, he asserted, the “Inmate” who “help[ed]” him
file his first PCR petition “was not available anymore” by the end of his
direct appeal. According to Petitioner, he “was on his own,” and so “the
untimeliness” of the second PCR petition “is not [his] fault[.]”

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¶5 The superior court dismissed Petitioner’s second PCR
petition on the basis, inter alia, that the claims were untimely, finding that
Petitioner “fail[ed] to adequately account for” the delay in filing his second
PCR petition.

¶6 Petitioner seeks review of the superior court’s order denying
his second PCR petition. This Court will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on
a petition for post-conviction relief absent a clear abuse of discretion. State
v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19 (2012) (citation omitted).

¶7 A PCR petition raising challenges to alleged trial errors or to
the performance of trial counsel must be raised within 90 days of the
imposition of sentence or 30 days after the issuance of the mandate on direct
appeal, whichever is later. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(b)(3)(A). A claim of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must be raised within 30 days of
the issuance of the mandate on direct appeal. Id.; see also State v. Rosales, 205
Ariz. 86, 89, ¶ 8 (App. 2003). Enforcing these deadlines serves to promote
important interests in finality while ensuring that relief, when warranted,
is granted in a timely manner. See State v. Shrum, 220 Ariz. 115, 118, ¶ 12
(2009) (“By requiring that all post-conviction claims be raised promptly,”
the PCR rules “not only serve[] important principles of finality, but also
allow[] any relief to be issued at a time when the interests of justice . . . can
best be served.” (citation omitted)). A petitioner’s failure to comply with
the deadlines set forth in Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.4(b)(3)(A)
will be excused, however, “if the [petitioner] adequately explains why the
failure to timely file [the] notice was not the [petitioner’s] fault.” Ariz. R.
Crim. P. 32.4(b)(3)(D).

¶8 Here, Petitioner attributes his years-long delay in filing his
second PCR petition to his lack of familiarity with the legal process. Such
an assertion, even if true, does not establish a PCR petitioner’s lack of fault
for the untimely filing of a PCR petition. See State v. Cornell, 179 Ariz. 314,
331 (1994) (”[A] defendant acting in propria persona is subject to the same
rules as an attorney.”); see also State v. McFarland No. 1 CA-CR 24-0585
PRPC, 2025 WL 1189807 at *1, ¶¶ 3-4 (Ariz. App. Apr. 24, 2025) (mem.
decision) (affirming dismissal of untimely PCR petition and holding that
PCR petitioner’s contention that he was “not legally trained” did not
establish that “the untimeliness [was] not [his] fault”); State v. Littleton, 1
CA-CR 13-0925 PRPC, 2015 WL 3537136 at *1, ¶ 4 (Ariz. App. June 2, 2015)
(mem. decision) (“Lack of knowledge of the law is not sufficient to present
a colorable claim that the failure to file a timely petition for post-conviction
relief was not the petitioner’s fault.”). Petitioner has not established that the
superior court abused its discretion in finding that Petitioner failed to

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establish that he is not at fault for the untimeliness of his second PCR
petition.

¶9 We grant review and deny relief.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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