State v. Haddad

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

HASANAIN Z. HADDAD, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0301
FILED 07-06-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2022-124571-001
The Honorable Joseph Shayne Kiefer, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Joshua C. Smith
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Abigail Smith
Counsel for Appellant

STATE v. HADDAD
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Hasanain Haddad appeals his convictions and sentences for
eight counts of sexual conduct with a minor and one count of child
molestation. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the
verdict. State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 509, ¶ 93 (2013).

¶3 Haddad is M.H.’s father. In March 2022, then-nine-year-old
M.H. disclosed to his sister and his mother that Haddad had “done stuff to
me.” Two months later, his mother contacted the police, and soon after
M.H was forensically interviewed regarding his disclosure. In the recorded
interview, M.H. alleged that Haddad repeatedly sexually abused him.
M.H. later recanted his accusations during a second interview.

¶4 Haddad was charged with eight counts of sexual conduct
with a minor, one count of molestation of a child, and one count of
furnishing obscene items to a minor. During a jury trial, M.H. repeated his
recantation and testified that “imaginary friends” had told him to fabricate
the accusations. The State played the recording of M.H.’s first forensic
interview for the jury. The State also presented a cold expert who testified
about factors that affect children disclosing sexual abuse, delaying
disclosure, and recanting. And a detective read previously-admitted
transcripts of recorded conversations between Haddad and his wife, M.H.’s
mother, into the record.

¶5 The jury acquitted Haddad on the furnishing count and found
him guilty as charged on the other nine counts. He was sentenced to 17
years in prison for the molestation count, 20 years for one of the sexual
conduct counts, and life in prison for the other seven sexual conduct counts,
to be served consecutively.

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STATE v. HADDAD
Decision of the Court

¶6 Haddad timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article
6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes
sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Haddad argues that the prosecutor misstated the law during
his closing argument rebuttal, and that the misstatements violated his right
to a fair trial. Haddad failed to object to the alleged prosecutorial error at
trial, so we review for fundamental error. See State v. Murray, 250 Ariz. 543,
549, ¶ 16 (2021). To prevail under fundamental error review, Haddad must
demonstrate that error occurred, the error was fundamental, and, if the
fundamental error was not “so egregious that he could not possibly have
received a fair trial,” that the error resulted in prejudice. State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 142, ¶ 21 (2018).

¶8 To succeed on a claim of prosecutorial error, a defendant must
demonstrate “that the prosecutor’s [error] so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.”
Murray, 250 Ariz. at 548, ¶ 13 (quoting State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, 335,
¶ 46 (2007)). A defendant does so by showing that “(1) [error] exists and (2)
‘a reasonable likelihood exists that the [error] could have affected the jury’s
verdict, thereby denying [the] defendant a fair trial.’” Id. (internal citations
omitted). In reviewing a prosecutor’s statements, we “look[ ] at the context
in which the statements were made as well as ‘the entire record and to the
totality of the circumstances.’” State v. Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421, 466, ¶ 196
(2016) (citation omitted).

¶9 Haddad points to several statements made during the State’s
rebuttal closing argument that he contends amounted to prosecutorial
error. We address each of them, keeping in mind that prosecutors are given
“wide latitude” in presenting closing argument to the jury so long as they
do not misstate the law. Murray, 250 Ariz. at 549, ¶ 18 (citation omitted).

¶10 First, the prosecutor asserted that Haddad’s argument about
how M.H. could have learned the language to describe the alleged sexual
conduct was merely an invitation “to speculate.” The prosecutor noted that
“[d]efense wants you to speculate as to how [M.H.] got that information.
Speculate that his mother implanted those things in his head.” On the same
topic, he added, “[a]gain, [d]efense wants you to speculate that somehow
[M.H.] had these ideas implanted in his head.” As to Haddad’s argument
that M.H. could have been influenced by other sources, the prosecutor
countered that defense counsel “asked you to speculate about gaming, the

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STATE v. HADDAD
Decision of the Court

Internet, things like that, but none of that came out of [M.H.’s] testimony.
It’s more speculation . . . Don’t speculate. Rely on the evidence that you
actually saw in this courtroom.” (Cleaned up.) Later, the prosecutor told
the jury, “[e]verything [d]efense counsel has told you, she wants you to
speculate. You are not allowed to speculate.” The prosecutor then
reminded the jury that their “responsibility as a juror is not to find a reason
to find the Defendant not guilty. Your responsibility is to weigh the
evidence and determine whether or not the State has met its burden of
proof.”

¶11 The prosecutor also argued, in reference to Haddad’s corporal
punishment of M.H., that “[d]efense counsel wants you to speculate that
this was the reason why” M.H. accused Haddad of abusing him. Finally,
the prosecutor told the jury, “[a]gain, in closing, you are not allowed to
speculate. You must make a decision based upon the evidence that was
presented to you on the witness stand and on the screen.”

¶12 Haddad contends that the prosecutor’s arguments were
tantamount to telling the jury that it could not question the State’s evidence
and thus deprived him of his right to a fair trial. We disagree. A prosecutor
may offer a “fair rebuttal to an area opened by the defense,” State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 510 (1983), and argue the State’s case has not been
contradicted, State v. Byrd, 109 Ariz. 10, 11 (1972). Haddad’s contention that
M.H. could have learned about sexual acts from other sources, such as his
mother, a friend, or adults online, opened the door to the prosecutor’s
rebuttal arguments. Once raised, the prosecutor could fairly rebut
Haddad’s argument by reminding the jury that it heard no evidence that
M.H. learned anything from an outside source, and that the jury had to rely
on evidence presented at trial in reaching its verdict. See United States v.
Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 1405, 1409 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Criticism of defense theories
and tactics is a proper subject of closing argument.”). In context, the State’s
warnings to avoid speculation were merely a reminder to the jury that it
could not base its decision on evidence that was not in the record. The
prosecutor’s comments were not error.

¶13 Beyond that, the prosecutor reiterated the court’s instructions
that the State bears the burden of proof and the jury may not speculate
about evidence not presented at trial. See State v. Jerdee, 154 Ariz. 414, 419
(App. 1987). We presume the jurors followed the court’s instructions, State
v. Tucker, 215 Ariz. 298, 319, ¶ 89 (2007), and improper argument can be
cured by proper jury instructions, Jerdee, 154 Ariz. at 418. Thus, even if the
prosecutor’s comments were error, no prejudice resulted because the error

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STATE v. HADDAD
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was cured by both the court’s instruction and the prosecutor’s reiteration of
the correct burden of proof.

¶14 Haddad relies on State v. Murray to argue that the
prosecutor’s comments amounted to fundamental error, but this
comparison is unpersuasive. In Murray, the prosecutor misstated the law
by telling the jury that the reasonable doubt standard was satisfied if it
thought the defendants “might be guilty.” Murray, 250 Ariz. at 549, ¶ 19.
This error was fundamental because it lowered the prosecution’s burden to
prove the elements of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt and
therefore went to the foundation of the case. Id. at 550, ¶¶ 22-23. Here, in
contrast, the prosecutor instructed the jury that their job was to “determine
whether or not the State has met its burden of proof” and reminded them
that if “you find that there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you must
give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.” The prosecutor
did not misstate the law but instead affirmatively provided the correct
standard of proof to the jury. Murray is inapposite.

¶15 Second, the prosecutor urged the jury to discount M.H.’s
recantation because in his first forensic interview M.H. gave ”very vivid
descriptive explanations of disclosures” in “describing the things that the
Defendant did to him.” The prosecutor then commented “[h]ow would a
nine-year-old know these things if they didn’t actually happen to him?”
Haddad argues that “[by] telling the jury they were not permitted to
question the authenticity of the evidence presented, the State misstated the
law.” But the prosecutor’s comments were proper because they recounted
evidence for the jury and then asked the jury to draw a reasonable inference
from that evidence. See State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 602 (1993) (“[D]uring
closing arguments counsel may summarize the evidence [and] . . . urge the
jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence . . . .”).

¶16 Third, Haddad challenges the prosecutor’s response to his
argument that the jury should consider the discrepancies between the
recording transcripts initially requested by the State and those admitted at
trial. The prosecutor cited this argument as “[m]ore speculation, the
recordings were tampered with. They were spiced [sic]. Did we hear any
evidence of that? No.” Haddad raises this issue in his opening brief but
provides no specific argument as to why the statement was improper or
how it prejudiced him. We therefore deem his challenge to the statement
waived. See State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 175 (1989) (“In Arizona, opening
briefs must present significant arguments, supported by authority, setting
forth an appellant’s position on the issues raised. Failure to argue a claim
usually constitutes abandonment and waiver of that claim.”).

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STATE v. HADDAD
Decision of the Court

¶17 Because we conclude that the prosecutor’s challenged
statements did not deny Haddad a fair trial, he has not met his burden of
showing that these statements, viewed in the context of the trial, were
prosecutorial error. See Murray, 250 Ariz. at 548, ¶ 13; Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at
466, ¶ 196. But even assuming the comments were error, given the curative
jury instructions, the State’s statements reiterating the correct burden of
proof, and the State’s repeated reference to the jury instructions, Haddad
has failed to demonstrate that the error could have affected the verdict and
denied him the right to a fair trial. See Murray, 250 Ariz. at 548, ¶ 13.

CONCLUSION

¶18 Because Haddad has not established prosecutorial error, we
affirm his convictions and sentences.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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