State v. Workman

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

THOMAS CRAIG WORKMAN, JR., Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0307

FILED 08-25-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. CR-2024-00643
The Honorable Derek C. Carlisle, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Joseph Newberg
Counsel for Appellee

Carr Law Office, PLLC, Kingman
By Sandra Carr
Counsel for Appellant

STATE v. WORKMAN
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge D. Andrew Gaona delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

G A O N A, Judge:

¶1 Thomas Craig Workman, Jr. appeals his convictions for three
counts of sexual conduct with a minor. He argues the superior court
deprived him of a fair trial by (1) seating a statutorily disqualified juror
whose daughter interned with the prosecuting agency and (2) admitting
evidence that he began dating his ex-wife (“Jean”)1 when she was 15 years
old.

¶2 Because Workman hasn’t established error in seating the juror
or reversible error from the admission of the challenged testimony, we
affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the
jury’s verdicts and resolve all reasonable inferences against Workman. State
v. Fierro, 254 Ariz. 35, 38 ¶ 2 (2022).

¶4 When Workman was 27, he started dating 15-year-old Jean,
whom he later married and had a child (“Andrea”) with in July 2006. After
Workman and Jean divorced, Andrea moved with Jean and her now-
husband (“Nate”), first to Chicago and then to Temecula, California.
Andrea, as part of Jean and Workman’s custody arrangement, would visit
Workman in Lake Havasu City, spending about two months with him each
summer and alternating holidays.

¶5 During those visits, Andrea spent time with the niece of
Workman’s long-time family friend (“Alysse”). Workman regularly spent
time with Alysse’s family in Lake Havasu City. One summer, while picking
up Andrea half-way between Temecula and Lake Havasu City for her

1 We use pseudonyms to protect victim and witness identities. Ariz. R. Sup.

Ct. 111(i).

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summer visit, Workman brought Alysse along to surprise Andrea. Jean
testified this occurred in 2021; Alysse testified it was in 2019.

¶6 In summer 2021, Andrea spent the summer with Workman in
Lake Havasu City. While there, Andrea began acting out, and Jean spoke
with both Andrea and Workman about Andrea’s behavior. Andrea knew
she was likely going to be in trouble when she returned home. When she
returned home to Temecula, Jean and Nate grounded Andrea, prohibited
her from seeing friends, and took her phone away. Jean searched Andrea’s
phone and found something—although what she found isn’t in the record.
After confronting Andrea about what she found, Andrea wrote on a piece
of paper that Workman had abused her from ages 7 to 12. Nate disposed of
that paper.

¶7 Jean and Nate then contacted an attorney, who advised them
to contact Lake Havasu police and child protective services. Andrea
reported the abuse, spoke with a Lake Havasu police detective and
participated in a forensic interview. Andrea testified that she first
remembered the abuse when she was 7 or 8 and that it ended when she was
12 or 13.

¶8 In October 2023, Alysse turned 18. Workman and Alysse often
messaged each other. In February 2024, Workman visited Alysse at her
workplace. After that visit, Alysse reported Workman to the Lake Havasu
police for sexually abusing her during the summer she went with Workman
to pick up Andrea. As part of the investigation, a Lake Havasu police
detective had Alysse make a recorded call to Workman and directed her to
discuss what she alleged had occurred that summer.

¶9 Police arrested Workman in April 2024. The State charged
him with three counts of sexual conduct with a minor under 15 (counts 1–
3), one count of molestation of a child (count 4), and one count of attempted
sexual conduct with a minor (count 5), all involving Alysse. As to Andrea,
the State charged Workman with one count of continuous sexual abuse of
a child (count 6). At Workman’s first trial, the superior court entered a
directed verdict on count 5. After five days of trial, the jury couldn’t reach
verdicts on the remaining counts, and the court declared a mistrial.

¶10 The State retried Workman on counts 1–4 and 6, renumbering
count 6 as count 5. At the second trial, the court sat a juror (“Juror”) who
was the father of a Mohave County Attorney Office’s (“MCAO”) (the
prosecuting agency) intern (“Beth”). Jean, Nate, Andrea, Alysse, the
detective who investigated Alysse’s case, and Workman testified. The jury

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also heard the 48-minute recording of Alysse’s call with Workman and saw
the recording of Workman’s custodial interview.

¶11 After opening statements, Workman orally moved in limine
to preclude testimony about Jean’s age when she and Workman met. He
explained that, at the first trial, the State had elicited Jean’s age along with
the history of their relationship and then argued something to the “effect of
there may be three victims and only two charged, referring to Jean being 15
when her and [Workman] would have met.” Workman then objected to
“anything about the age of [Jean], when she met [Workman], as being
irrelevant.” The court sustained the objection as “to the date when they first
met,” but otherwise permitted all other questions from the first trial about
the chronology of Jean and Workman’s relationship because they provided
“background to the relationship.”

¶12 In its case-in-chief, the State asked Jean how long she’d
known Workman. Workman objected, and the court overruled it. The State
then asked Jean how old she was when she “began dating [Workman].”
Workman didn’t object. A few moments later, the State asked Jean “you
said you were 15 when you started dating [Workman]. How old was he?”
Again, Workman didn’t object.

¶13 On the second day of trial, Workman sought clarification of
the court’s motion-in-limine ruling after the State again referenced Jean’s
age during cross-examination. Workman asked the court to prohibit the
State from arguing Jean “was a victim” or that her age or the length of their
relationship suggested “ab[errant] sexual behavior, because there was no
proper notice under 404(c).” The State agreed it wouldn’t characterize Jean
as a victim but maintained that it could comment on evidence already
admitted for a proper purpose. The court said it wouldn’t “preclude the
State necessarily from commenting on evidence that was admitted without
an objection,” but that it would “preclude the State from making an
improper argument.”

¶14 After a three-day trial, the court entered a directed verdict on
count 4. The jury found Workman guilty of counts 1–3 but couldn’t reach a
verdict on count 5, resulting in a mistrial as to that count.

¶15 The court sentenced Workman to one year in prison for
counts 1 and 3, to run consecutively, with credit for 42 days’ presentence
incarceration, and 20 years’ probation for count 2—all class 6 felonies.

¶16 Workman appealed and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§
12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, -4033(A)(1).

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DISCUSSION

¶17 Workman claims two errors deprived him of a fair trial: the
superior court’s seating of Juror despite his connection to the prosecuting
agency, and the admission of testimony that Jean was 15 when she began
dating Workman.

I. The Superior Court Didn’t Err in Seating Juror.

¶18 Workman argues Juror was legally “disqualified” under
A.R.S. § 21-211 and Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 18.4(b).
He also faults the superior court for not investigating Beth’s involvement in
the case or asking Juror whether Beth had discussed it with him.

¶19 Workman didn’t object to Juror’s service or ask the court to
strike him. Nor does he challenge on appeal the denial of his motion for a
mistrial. We thus review the court’s failure to sua sponte strike Juror for
fundamental error. State v. Johnson, 247 Ariz. 166, 197 ¶ 112 (2019).
Workman must first establish error. State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 142 ¶
21 (2018). He hasn’t.

¶20 The United States and Arizona Constitutions afford a criminal
defendant the right to a fair and impartial jury. State v. Guevara-Enriquez,
260 Ariz. 434, 437 ¶ 5 (App. 2025). A court must excuse a juror when
reasonable grounds exist to believe the juror cannot render a fair and
impartial verdict. Id.; see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4(b). But knowing someone
involved in the case, without more, doesn’t automatically disqualify a juror.
State v. Acuna Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. 197, 210–11 ¶ 32 (2018); see also State v.
Hill, 174 Ariz. 313, 319 (1993).

¶21 Section 21-211(2) statutorily disqualifies any “[p]erson
interested directly or indirectly in the matter under investigation.” We
review de novo the interpretation of § 21-211 and whether it disqualifies a
juror. State v. Eddington, 226 Ariz. 72, 76 ¶ 7 (App. 2010) (the applicability of
§ 21-211 is a mixed question of law and fact reviewed de novo), aff’d, 228
Ariz. 361 (2011). Whether a particular juror is “interested,” however, is fact
specific. State v. Brown, ___ Ariz. ___, ___ ¶ 13, 592 P.3d 135, 141 (App. 2026).

¶22 Workman hasn’t shown Juror was “interested directly or
indirectly” in this case. He argues Beth had a direct interest because she was
a paid MCAO intern, planned to attend law school, and might later seek
employment or a recommendation from MCAO. But § 21-211(2) asks
whether Juror was interested, not whether Beth was. Workman cites no

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evidence or authority establishing that Beth’s employment or asserted
interests gave Juror an interest.

¶23 Eddington doesn’t fill that gap. There, the juror himself
worked for the law-enforcement agency that investigated the defendant’s
case. Eddington, 228 Ariz. at 362 ¶ 2. Our Supreme Court concluded that the
investigating agency had an interest in the successful prosecution of cases
it investigated and its employees were thus interested under § 21-211. Id. at
363–65 ¶¶ 11, 18. Those concerns aren’t present here. Juror doesn’t work for
MCAO, and nothing in the record shows Beth participated in Workman’s
prosecution. See Fierro, 254 Ariz. at 38 ¶ 2.

¶24 Extending Eddington based solely on Juror’s relationship with
Beth would require speculation that § 21-211 doesn’t support. See Guevara-
Enriquez, 260 Ariz. 434, 438 ¶¶ 9–10 (App. 2025), review denied (Mar. 3, 2026)
(declining to extend Eddington based on speculative risks unsupported by
the evidence). Even assuming Beth herself had an interest, Workman
identifies no evidence that her interest gave Juror one of his own.

¶25 Workman instead faults the prosecutor and the court for the
absence of evidence about Beth’s duties, her involvement in this case, and
whether she discussed it with Juror. But Workman bears the burden on
fundamental-error review to establish error from the record. 245 Ariz. at
142 ¶ 21. The lack of evidence connecting Beth to this case doesn’t establish
that Juror was statutorily disqualified. See Guevara-Enriquez, 260 Ariz. at 438
¶¶ 9–10; State v. Diaz, 223 Ariz. 358, 361 ¶ 12 (2010).

¶26 Aside from § 21-211, Workman hasn’t established Rule 18.4(b)
required Juror’s excusal. Under that rule, the court “must excuse a
prospective juror . . . from service in the case if there is a reasonable ground
to believe that the juror . . . cannot render a fair and impartial verdict.” Ariz.
R. Crim. P. 18.4(b). We defer to the superior court’s factual determination
of whether a prospective juror can serve impartially if the record supports
that determination. State v. Colorado, 256 Ariz. 97, 99–100 ¶¶ 10–16 (App.
2023).

¶27 By retaining Juror, “the court implicitly determined [he]
could serve as a fair and impartial juror.” See Guevara-Enriquez, 260 Ariz. at
439 ¶ 11. And the record supports that determination. The court asked Juror
whether Beth’s employment with MCAO would prevent him from being
fair and impartial, and Juror unequivocally said it would not. He also said
Beth’s employment wouldn’t prevent him from finding Workman not
guilty if the State failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

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Nothing in Juror’s responses gave the court reasonable grounds to believe
he could not render a fair and impartial verdict.

¶28 Workman hasn’t shown Juror was statutorily disqualified
under § 21-211(2) or that Rule 18.4(b) required his excusal. Brown, ___ Ariz.
at ___ ¶ 18 (“appellant must affirmatively establish error in the record”).
Because Workman hasn’t established error, we need not address whether
any error was fundamental or prejudicial.

II. Workman Hasn’t Established Reversible Error Based on
Testimony About Jean’s Age When They Started Dating.

¶29 Workman challenges Jean’s testimony that she was 15 when
she began dating him. He contends the testimony was inadmissible
propensity evidence and the prosecutor improperly elicited and used it,
depriving him of a fair trial. Workman asserts he “objected to the admission
of this evidence” and thus seeks harmless-error review. The State responds
that Workman didn’t contemporaneously object when the prosecutor
elicited the challenged testimony and that Workman must establish
fundamental, prejudicial error.

¶30 Workman didn’t file a reply brief and thus didn’t address the
State’s preservation argument. The record reflects no contemporaneous
objection to the challenged testimony. Workman instead appears to rely on
his motion in limine. Although a party need not renew an objection after
the court “rules definitively on the record,” Ariz. R. Evid. 103(b), Workman
doesn’t explain how the court’s pretrial ruling on when he and Jean first
met “definitively” resolved the different question of how old Jean was
when they began dating. It didn’t.

¶31 At the motion-in-limine hearing, Workman sought to prevent
a repeat of what occurred at the first trial. There, the State asked Jean when
she and Workman met, married, divorced, and had Andrea, and elicited
testimony that Jean was 15 when she met Workman. In the first trial’s
closing argument, the State used the testimony about Jean being 15 when
they met, to portray Jean as Workman’s “third victim” and suggest a
pattern of pursuing underage girls. Workman thus sought to preclude the
State from eliciting that testimony and “object[ed] to anything about the age
of [Jean], when she met [Workman], as being irrelevant.”

¶32 The court sustained the objection in part as “to the date when
they first met,” finding that fact irrelevant, but otherwise overruled it. The
court explained that questions about when Jean and Workman married,
divorced, and had Andrea provided relevant “background to the

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relationship.” The court distinguished when Jean and Workman first met
from when their romantic relationship began, which could have a different
relevance depending on the State’s purpose. Indeed, the court noted that of
“the many dates [the State] did ask [at the first trial], [it] didn’t ask how old
they were when they first started engaging in a romantic or sexual
relationship.” Because the State hadn’t elicited when Jean and Workman’s
relationship began at the first trial, that question wasn’t before the court,
and the court thus didn’t rule on its admissibility.

¶33 At trial, the prosecutor asked Jean how old she was when she
“began dating” Workman. She answered 15. Workman didn’t object, seek
clarification of the motion in limine, move to strike, or request any other
relief. See State v. Gonzales, 105 Ariz. 434, 437 (1970) (“[I]t is the universal
rule that if improper statements are made by counsel during the trial it is
the duty of opposing counsel to register an objection thereto so that the
court may make a correction by proper instruction and, if the offense be
sufficiently hurtful, declare a mistrial.”) (citation omitted). We thus review
for fundamental error. Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 142 ¶ 21.

¶34 Under fundamental-error review, Workman must establish
that the error (1) goes “to the foundation of the case,” (2) deprived him of a
“right essential to his defense,” or (3) was so egregious that he couldn’t
“possibly have received a fair trial.” Id. at 140 ¶ 13 (quoting State v.
Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567 ¶¶ 19–20 (2005)). If he establishes error under
the first two prongs, he must separately establish prejudice. Id. at 142 ¶ 21.

¶35 We need not decide whether the superior court erred in
admitting Jean’s age because, even assuming it did, Workman hasn’t
established fundamental error. Workman characterizes the testimony and
the prosecutor’s conduct as depriving him of a fair trial, but he doesn’t
explain how the testimony went to the foundation of his case, deprived him
of a right essential to his defense, or made a fair trial impossible. See id. at
140–42 ¶¶ 13, 18–21. And the record doesn’t make that showing for him.
See State v. Gendron, 168 Ariz. 153, 155 (1991) (we “should not reverse a case
on the ground of fundamental error unless [our] analysis of the entire
record permits [us] to set forth reasons clearly demonstrating that the case
falls within our definition of fundamental error.”).

¶36 The record doesn’t show the State used the testimony for the
improper propensity purpose Workman identifies. The court recognized
that Jean’s age could create an improper inference if used to suggest
Workman had a propensity for sexual relationships with underage girls.
But the State didn’t argue Jean was another victim, that she was a part of a

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“clear pattern of behavior,” or rely on Jean’s age as proof that Workman
committed the charged offenses. Instead, the prosecutor used the history of
Jean and Workman’s relationship as background to the family and
chronology of the case. Fierro, 254 Ariz. at 38 ¶ 2. And the State elicited
Jean’s age just twice during the three-day trial and referenced it only briefly
in closing without further comment. See State v. Hulsey, 243 Ariz. 367, 392 ¶
114 (2018) (brief and inconsequential errors don’t constitute fundamental
error).

¶37 The court also guarded against the improper use Workman
feared. When clarifying its motion-in-limine ruling, the court stated it
would preclude the State from arguing that Jean’s age when she and
Workman began dating showed he was “attracted to younger females.”
Nothing in the record shows the State made that argument. We don’t
suggest the challenged testimony was free from legitimate concern. But on
this record, Workman hasn’t shown the assumed evidentiary error was
fundamental.

¶38 Nor has Workman established prejudice—a “fact-intensive
inquiry.” Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 142 ¶ 21. To do so, he must show that, absent
the assumed error, “a reasonable jury could have plausibly and intelligently
returned a different verdict.” Id. at 144 ¶ 31. Speculation isn’t enough. State
v. Dickinson, 233 Ariz. 527, 531 ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (defendant “must
affirmatively prove prejudice and may not rely upon speculation to carry
his burden”) (cleaned up).

¶39 Workman asserts that the testimony “absolutely contributed
to the verdict” and allowed the State to “inappropriately support a weak
case with inadmissible propensity evidence.” But he doesn’t explain how.
His argument is conclusory and speculates the jury drew the very
propensity inference the State never asked it to draw. See id.

¶40 Beyond that, the jury already had evidence from which it
could infer the length and chronology of Jean and Workman’s relationship.
Jean had already testified that she was 39 and she had known him for 24
years. Even without the challenged evidence, the jury could infer that their
relationship began when Jean was young. The challenged testimony was
thus largely cumulative. See State v. Williams, 133 Ariz. 220, 226
(1982) (erroneous admission of cumulative evidence is harmless error).

¶41 Workman also points to the first trial, which ended in a hung
jury, to argue that the challenged testimony allowed the State to
“inappropriately support a weak case with inadmissible propensity

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evidence.” But that comparison cuts the other way. At the first trial, the
State went further, expressly using Jean’s age to argue that Workman “has
a clear pattern of behavior.” Yet that jury still hung. Workman doesn’t
explain how the different outcomes show prejudice from the more limited
testimony here, particularly when the State didn’t make the same
propensity argument in this trial.

¶42 More fundamentally, prejudice turns on whether the
assumed error could’ve affected the verdict in this trial. See Escalante, 245
Ariz. at 144 ¶ 31. Workman identifies nothing establishing that the
challenged testimony—rather than any number of differences between the
two trials—accounts for the different outcomes.

¶43 Workman hasn’t established that the assumed evidentiary
error amounted to fundamental, prejudicial error.

CONCLUSION

¶44 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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