State v. Norris

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

CHAD JUSTIN NORRIS, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0327 PRPC
FILED 03-30-2026

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2012-149725-001
The Honorable Joseph C. Kreamer, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Jordan Anthony Smith
Counsel for Respondent

The Stavris Law Firm PLLC, Scottsdale
By Christopher Stavris
Counsel for Petitioner
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1 Chad Justin Norris (“Norris”) seeks review of the superior
court’s dismissal of his Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”).
Norris argues his trial and appellate counsel were constitutionally
ineffective in various ways and the State engaged in prosecutorial
misconduct. Because the superior court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing Norris’ petition, we grant review but deny relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This Court previously summarized the facts of this case on
direct appeal from Norris’ conviction for killing a colleague. State v. Norris, 2018 WL 1281670 (Ariz. App. Mar. 13, 2018) (mem. decision). In that appeal,
Norris’ counsel filed an Anders brief and Norris submitted a supplemental
brief. Id. at *1 ¶ 1. After reviewing the record for fundamental error and
finding none, we affirmed Norris’ conviction for second-degree murder. Id.
at *2–3 ¶¶ 9, 11–12.

¶3 Later, Norris filed an amended PCR making multiple claims.
The court dismissed Norris’ PCR without holding an evidentiary hearing.
What follows is a brief description of Norris’ claims and the court’s reasons
for rejecting them.

¶4 Norris made multiple claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. First, Norris claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for not
challenging the grand jury proceedings. Norris alleged that the second
page of the transcript from his grand jury proceedings listed eleven grand
jurors, then at the beginning of the proceedings “it was announced that the
entire panel was present, less 5 grand jurors” and one of the “not-present
grand jurors was CT.” Norris argued his trial counsel should have
challenged the grand jury proceedings because “the record lack[ed] clarity”
as to whether nine grand jurors concurred in the indictment. A minute
entry stated “[nine] members of the . . . Grand Jury” were present and the
foreperson presented the indictment to the court. The superior court did

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not disagree with Norris’ description of the transcript, but rejected his
argument because the minute entry, which the court called “the official
court record,” stated that “all nine were present.”

¶5 Norris also claimed trial counsel was ineffective during plea
negotiations. Before trial, the State indicated a willingness to offer a plea
agreement in exchange for the location of the victim’s body. Norris
declined the offer. Norris included an affidavit with his PCR stating that
his counsel was “supposed to propose an alternative” plea offer to the State
but failed to do so. The court rejected Norris’ argument because he did not
provide credible evidence that there was a viable possibility of an
alternative plea agreement.

¶6 Next, Norris asserted he requested, but trial counsel did not
provide, information about the number of bench trial murder cases,
“acquittal rates” between bench and jury trials, and the “advantages and
disadvantages” and “substantive and procedural differences” between
bench and jury trials. He also asserted that he would not have waived his
right to a jury trial if he knew that a judge would be “presented with
inadmissible evidence[.]” Specifically, Norris claimed that a witness
testified to preserving swabs and according to Norris “insinuate[d] . . . that
defense counsel didn’t do their job . . . in retesting[.]” The same judge who
conducted Norris’ bench trial also reviewed Norris’ PCR. The court
reminded Norris that he argued in his direct appeal that his colloquy with
the court about waiving his jury trial rights was insufficient, which this
court rejected. See Norris, 2018 WL 1281670, at *2 ¶¶ 10–11. The court also
told Norris that it “knew to disregard” the comment Norris was concerned
about.

¶7 Norris also claimed his appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to challenge the State’s “judge shopping” because after Norris
requested a bench trial the State asked, “[w]ell, Judge, can you keep this
trial?” The court responded that the trial dates would need to be
determined before the assignment could be made. At the next status
conference, the judge informed the parties he would preside and confirmed
that both the State and Norris agreed to have a bench trial. The court
rejected Norris’ PCR argument because the State’s question was “not judge
shopping.”

¶8 Norris claimed trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating
that a DNA profile found on the victim’s toothbrush belonged to the victim.
He further asserted that counsel only agreed to the stipulation because it
was “just easier to do it this way[.]” When rejecting Norris’ PCR argument,

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the court emphasized the overall strength of the DNA evidence and that
Norris obtained his own expert.

¶9 Norris claimed trial counsel also should have moved to
suppress a statement he made to police instead of arguing insufficient
evidence. At trial, the court heard testimony from a detective who
interacted with Norris during the time a technician was obtaining his
fingerprints at the police station. The detective stated he chatted with
Norris to help put him “at ease[.]” The detective explained he did not read
Norris his Miranda rights because he was not there to question Norris. The
detective said he knew Norris “had invoked his rights before, which is why
[the detective] wasn’t going to ask [Norris] any questions.” When the
detective was walking out of the room, Norris asked, “[W]hat would you
do if someone had threatened your wife, your kids and your family?”
Another detective and a technician testified that they also heard Norris ask
that question.

¶10 Before either side presented any testimony, Norris’ counsel
moved to exclude his statement under Miranda. But when later discussing
the issue with the court, Norris’ counsel said, “I haven’t made a Miranda
argument and it’s not my position at this point that this is a coerced
statement or forced statement in any manner. It is my . . . argument there’s
not sufficient evidence to admit[.]” Instead, counsel argued that the
detective did not include the statement in the original report, but in a
supplemental report multiple weeks later, and that the testimony from the
corroborating witnesses did not match. The court rejected counsel’s
argument because there was no basis to challenge the admissibility of the
witness’ testimony based only on credibility. In his PCR, Norris claimed
that failing to argue a Miranda violation demonstrated his counsel’s
“ineptitude and unpreparedness[.]” The court disagreed, concluding that
arguing a Miranda violation was a “losing argument” and counsel was not
deficient for not making such an argument.

¶11 In his PCR, Norris also argued that because trial counsel did
not move to suppress his statement under Miranda, he was “compelled to
testify.” According to Norris, because the court admitted his spontaneous
statement, he had to testify so the court could “reconsider its prior ruling[.]”
The court rejected Norris’ argument, concluding his statement would have
been admitted whether he testified or not.

¶12 Norris also contended his appellate counsel should have
argued that the superior court violated his Confrontation Clause rights.
Before trial, the State requested leave to play a recording of a witness’

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statements to a detective, because the witness now claimed an inability to
“remember anything” due to a stroke. The State indicated the recording
would include the witness’ description of Norris’ demeanor around the
time of the murder, that Norris told the witness about threats from the
victim, and that Norris admitted to doing “something bad.” Norris’
counsel objected, saying if the witness testified to not remembering, she
should be considered unavailable to testify and unavailable for cross-
examination. The court held oral argument and disagreed with Norris’
counsel, saying her argument meant “any time a witness completely walks
away and says I can’t remember, then . . . it can’t be used, and I don’t think
that’s the right result[.]” The court indicated it would admit the recording
under Arizona Rule of Evidence 803(5) if the court was convinced the
witness “really can’t remember.”

¶13 At trial, the witness explained she had a stroke that caused
memory loss and did not remember speaking to a detective. Relying on
State v. Real, 214 Ariz. 232 (App. 2007), the court concluded that because the
witness was present at trial, there was no Confrontation Clause issue
because Norris could cross-examine her, even if she could not remember
her prior statements. Later, Norris’ counsel cross-examined the witness,
but she testified she could not remember the answers to any of counsel’s
questions. A detective testified to recording his interview with the witness.
The court accepted the exhibit “for demonstrative purposes only” and then
listened to the recording. Responding to Norris’ PCR argument, the court
determined Norris’ Confrontation Clause claim was precluded because
Norris already raised it on appeal and it lacked merit.

¶14 Next, Norris argued in his PCR that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to properly object to certain testimony from three
witnesses. First, Tyler Hardy (“Hardy”) testified at trial that Norris told
him years prior that the Mesa proving grounds would be an ideal place to
hide a body because it would be difficult to find bodies “[o]ut in the desert.”
Because the victim’s body was never located, the State theorized that Norris
might have disposed of the victim’s body in the desert. Before Hardy
testified, Norris’ counsel objected to the relevance of his “entire testimony.”
The State initially argued it was 404(b) evidence but later said it did “not
plan on going into any previous bad acts[.]” The court determined the
testimony was admissible but that it was “not particularly moved by a
statement four years ago” alleging that Norris was “out there dumping
bodies[.]” Later, the State also asked Hardy if he “remember[ed] describing
[Norris] as bipolar?” and Hardy testified, “Absolutely.” Norris’ counsel
did not object. In his PCR, Norris argued Hardy’s testimony was
impermissible 404(b) evidence and counsel was deficient for not objecting

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to Hardy’s statements. The court said the testimony “isn’t 404, at all” and
that the “bipolar comment was a throwaway. It moved me zip zero.”

¶15 Second, Michael Havrelock (“Havrelock”), Norris’ friend and
prior business partner, testified that he visited Norris in jail. He described
Norris’ body language as follows:

The best way I can describe it is - - you know, I have dogs. So
if you go in your house and you know something’s chewed
up and, you know, you can tell which one did it. The head’s
down; they pop their eyes up at you. That’s what I got the
whole time I was there. So I just needed to see him to know
the truth and I saw what I needed to see.

¶16 In his PCR, Norris argued trial counsel should have objected
because Havrelock gave an “opinion on what he believed was the truth as
to the ultimate issue in the case, . . . that [Norris] murdered the Victim.” The
court found that the testimony was not offered “for the truth of the matter
asserted” but rather to show Haverlock’s “observation” which the court
gave “no weight[.]” Here is how the court put it: “So what if he went in
and thought that Mr. Norris looked like he was guilty? To me, that didn’t
impact my verdict at all.”

¶17 Third, Norris argued Detective Bermudez also opined on
Norris’ guilt by responding “Norris” when the State asked him, “[B]ased
upon the investigation, . . . who was believed to be the cause of [Victim’s]
death and why?” The PCR court rejected this argument as well because it
viewed the testimony as a “summar[y] [of] the evidence, which is typical
for a case agent.”

¶18 Norris then argued his counsel did not conduct a “reasonable
pretrial investigation” into ballistics evidence, which allowed the State to
submit “false evidence” that Norris’ gun was the murder weapon. At trial,
a criminologist for the State testified about examining five 9mm bullets
obtained from the wall of the business where the State believed the murder
occurred. The criminologist admitted to being “unable to identify or
eliminate [the bullets] as being fired from a particular firearm[.]” The
criminologist testified that all fourteen cartridge casings obtained from
Norris’ trailer during the investigation were fired from the same firearm.
The State also provided testimony about obtaining a safe Norris used,
which contained a loaded 9mm firearm, and that the caliber and brand of
the bullets in that firearm matched the cartridge casings collected from
Norris’ trailer.

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¶19 For his PCR, Norris hired a ballistics expert who concluded
that, based on comparisons to test-fired cartridges, each cartridge casing
from evidence was fired from the same type of gun Norris possessed. But
the ballistics expert was “unable to conclude” that the bullets in evidence
were fired from Norris’ actual gun, or even all from the same gun. In
response to Norris’ argument, the court found that the new expert’s opinion
was “substantively the same” as the State’s expert because neither could
conclude the bullets were fired from Norris’ gun. So the PCR court
concluded that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient.

¶20 Finally, Norris claimed the State committed prosecutorial
misconduct by “intentionally” misstating evidence during closing
arguments. Specifically, Norris asserted that the State improperly stated
that five bullets “were consistent with having been fired” from a specific
gun, and that the State “drew the conclusion” that it “was the murder
weapon.” The court concluded this claim was precluded because Norris
could have made it on direct appeal

¶21 Norris petitioned for review. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.16(a)(4).
We grant review under A.R.S. § 13-4239(C).

DISCUSSION

¶22 We review the superior court’s denial of a PCR for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Reed, 252 Ariz. 236, 238 ¶ 6 (App. 2021). “An abuse of
discretion occurs if the PCR court makes an error of law or fails to
adequately investigate the facts necessary to support its decision.” State v.
Pandeli, 242 Ariz. 175, 180 ¶ 4 (2017). Summary dismissal of a PCR is
required when the petition presents no “material issue of fact or law that
would entitle the defendant to relief[.]” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.11(a).

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶23 Norris argues the court erred in dismissing his ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. To prevail on such a claim, a petitioner must
“demonstrate that counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that he was prejudiced thereby.” State v. Bigger, 251
Ariz. 402, 407 ¶ 8 (2021) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–
88 (1984)). “Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is fatal to an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, 567
¶ 21 (2006). Under the first prong, “we must presume ‘counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance’ that
‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” State v. Denz, 232 Ariz. 441, 444
¶ 7 (App. 2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

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A. Grand Jury

¶24 Norris argues the court erred by relying on a minute entry
instead of the grand jury transcript to reject his claim that his trial counsel
should have challenged whether the required number of grand jurors were
present. “[A]t least [nine] grand jurors” must agree to an indictment
“regardless of the number of grand jurors hearing a matter.” Ariz. R. Crim.
P. 12.6(a). “A discrepancy between a transcript and a minute entry may be
resolved by reference to the transcript.” State v. Ruiz, 239 Ariz. 379, 384 ¶ 16
n.4 (App. 2016) (citing State v. Ovante, 231 Ariz. 180, 188 ¶ 38 (2013)). But
when a transcript is “ambiguous rather than in conflict with the minute
entry . . . the minute entry clarifies[.]” Id. We have a “duty to interpret all
parts of the record together, giving effect, if possible, to all and a deficiency
in one place may be supplied by what appears in another.” State v.
Rockerfeller, 9 Ariz.App. 265, 267 (1969). The “origin or nature of the
particular record” is something to consider “in deciding which part of the
record is entitled to the greater credence[.]” Id.

¶25 Crucially, Norris has not provided us with a full copy of the
grand jury transcript, and one is not otherwise in the record. See State v.
Esaw, 258 Ariz. 614, 621 ¶ 26 (App. 2024) (“We must presume, without a
transcript, that the trial court’s [actions were] satisfactory.”) But the record
does include an attachment to a filing Norris made in the superior court,
with what appears to be the first two pages of a grand jury transcript. Those
pages are dated September 28, 2012, the same date Norris referenced for the
grand jury proceedings in his PCR. They reference a grand juror with the
initials “CT.” But unlike what Norris described in his PCR, the second page
lists “Appearances” and “Grand Jurors Present.” The list of “Grand Jurors
Present” includes nine names, including an individual with the initials
“CT.” So what little we have from the grand jury transcript does not
support Norris’ claim.

¶26 But even accepting Norris’ description of the transcript, there
is at most an ambiguity in the record. Norris has not established that less
than nine jurors concurred in the indictment. See Franzi v. Super. Ct., 139
Ariz. 556, 565 (1984) (without sufficient facts “we presume . . . the actions
of the grand jury were lawful”). Even Norris argues only that “the record
lack[ed] clarity[.]” But the court’s minute entry about the supervening
indictment provides clarity. That minute entry says that nine “members of
the . . . Grand Jury” were present, and the foreperson presented the court
with the indictment. The court did not err in relying on the minute entry to
reject Norris’ claim that trial counsel should have challenged the
indictment.

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B. Plea Offer

¶27 Norris next argues the court erred by rejecting his claim that
trial counsel should have proposed an alternative plea offer to the State.
“Although a defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel in
deciding whether . . . to accept a plea offer, defendants do not have a
constitutional right to a plea bargain.” State v. Anderson, 257 Ariz. 226, 232
¶ 23 (2024) (cleaned up). “But once the State engages in plea bargaining,
the defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to be adequately informed of
the consequences before deciding whether to accept or reject the offer.”
State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, 413 ¶ 14 (App. 2000). A defendant alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing only if he makes “more than a conclusory assertion that
counsel failed to adequately communicate the plea offer or the
consequences of conviction.” Id. at ¶ 17. To make such a showing, the
defendant must first establish a “concrete plea offer[.]” State v. Jackson, 209
Ariz. 13, 16–17, ¶¶ 7–11 (App. 2004); see also State v. Vallejo, 215 Ariz. 193,
195 ¶ 7 (App. 2007) (refusing, like Jackson, to extend Donald to “include a
defense counsel’s failure to investigate the speculative possibilities of a
potential plea offer”).

¶28 Norris acknowledges the State indicated it was willing to
offer him a plea agreement but only in exchange for Norris helping locate
the victim’s body. Norris declined the offer and maintained his innocence.
To support his PCR, Norris submitted an affidavit stating that his counsel
was “supposed to provide an alternative” plea offer to the State but did not.
But neither his affidavit nor his PCR provide sufficient detail to show that
the State might have accepted a plea that did not require Norris to reveal
where the victim’s body was, something Norris was unwilling to do.
Because Norris did not provide evidence demonstrating even the
possibility of a viable offer that both he and the State would have agreed to,
he failed to establish that trial counsel’s performance was deficient.

C. Bench Trial

¶29 Norris next argues the court erred in rejecting his claim that
trial counsel was ineffective for not properly educating him about bench
trials. A defendant “may waive the right to a trial by jury” but “the court
must address the defendant personally, inform the defendant of the
defendant’s right to a jury trial, and determine that the defendant’s waiver
is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.1(b)(1)–(2).
“The pivotal consideration in determining the validity of a jury trial waiver
is the requirement that the defendant understand that the facts of the case

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will be determined by a judge and not a jury.” State v. Muhammad, 253 Ariz.
371, 377 ¶ 23 (2022) (citation omitted).

¶30 The PCR court did not err for at least four reasons. First,
Norris did not show that the data he allegedly requested about bench trials
was readily available, and even if it was available, that not obtaining and
providing that data was deficient performance.

¶31 Second, Norris ignores that the court advised him that “most
cases go to a jury” and “by agreeing to a bench trial, you move back from a
jury of eight persons to me, a single person, that would make that
determination.” The court further explained:

Now, when I am conducting the bench trial, I take both roles,
and so that means we will be having a discussion about what
the law is, . . . what’s admissible in evidence, the things that
can come in, and then that evidence will be presented in court,
and I will make a decision as to what happened, just one
person. So you’re giving up that right to have the jury make
the determination.

¶32 Third, while the court may hear inadmissible evidence during
a bench trial, that does not mean the judge’s factfinding role transforms
inadmissible evidence into admissible evidence or that the court will
consider inadmissible evidence when rendering the verdict. To the
contrary, we presume a judge knows the law and applies it. State v.
Williams, 220 Ariz. 331, 334 ¶ 9 (App. 2008). But applying that presumption
is unnecessary here because the court said that it knew at trial to disregard
the “insinuat[ing]” comment Norris raised as an example of inadmissible
evidence the court heard.

¶33 Finally, on direct appeal, Norris argued that his jury-trial
waiver was not voluntary, knowing, or intelligent, and this court rejected
that the court improperly secured Norris’ waiver of a jury trial. Norris, 2018
WL 1281670, at *2 ¶¶ 10–11.

D. Judge Shopping

¶34 Norris argues the court erred because the State engaged in
“judge shopping” and appellate counsel should have raised the issue on
appeal. Norris asserts the State engaged in judge shopping by asking,
“Well, Judge, can you keep this trial?” The superior court acknowledged
that the State conditioned its agreement to a bench trial on a particular

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judge “keeping” the case. But Norris does not identify how this constitutes
“judge shopping.”

¶35 In any event, because Norris did not object to the State’s
question at the time, his appellate counsel would have had to demonstrate
that Norris was prejudiced and that the superior court committed
fundamental error. See State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 140 ¶ 12 (2018).
Norris has not identified any record evidence supporting that the result of
his trial would have changed if a different judge was randomly assigned.
Plus, on direct appeal, this court independently reviewed the record for
fundamental error and found none. See Norris, 2018 WL 1281670, at *2 ¶ 11.

E. Stipulation

¶36 Norris argues the court erred in dismissing his claim that trial
counsel was ineffective for stipulating that a toothbrush contained the
victim’s DNA profile. Norris says trial counsel instead took the “easier”
course of action. “When evaluating the reasonableness of counsel’s
strategic decisions, the foundational inquiry is the rationale for the
decision.” Bigger, 251 Ariz. at 408 ¶ 11. Counsel does not render deficient
performance by choosing to take a less combative approach in some
situations. See State v. Allen, 223 Ariz. 125, 127 ¶ 11 (2009) (“Parties
routinely stipulate to easily proven facts, and courts encourage such
stipulations[.]”). Norris retained a DNA expert who had access to the DNA
evidence and could have testified if the DNA profile from the toothbrush
did not match the victim’s DNA. And a detective testified about obtaining
the victim’s toothbrush from the victim’s residence. Tellingly, Norris does
not dispute the DNA test results; in fact, he concedes the DNA on the
toothbrush matched the DNA at the crime scene. Because Norris cannot
now dispute the DNA results, we cannot see how counsel was deficient by
stipulating that the victim’s toothbrush contained the victim’s DNA.

F. Spontaneous Statement

¶37 Norris next challenges the superior court’s dismissal of his
claim that trial counsel was ineffective in the way she challenged a
statement he made to police during booking.

1. Miranda

¶38 Norris first argues counsel should have moved to preclude
his statement as coerced under Miranda, instead of arguing there was
insufficient evidence that he made the statement. A petitioner can
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel by showing that counsel’s

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decision was “not tactical in nature but . . . the result of ‘ineptitude,
inexperience or lack of preparation.’” Denz, 232 Ariz. at 444 ¶ 7 (quoting
State v. Goswick, 142 Ariz. 582, 586 (1984)). But a petitioner must show more
than just a “disagreement[]” because if counsel has “some reasoned basis,”
the petitioner’s claim fails, “even if the tactics counsel adopts are
unsuccessful.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶39 Here, trial counsel initially moved to suppress Norris’
statement under Miranda and on grounds that the State’s evidence that
Norris made the statement was too unreliable. The superior court held an
evidentiary hearing to decide admissibility. After testimony from the
State’s witnesses, trial counsel narrowed her argument to focus only on
reliability.

¶40 Counsel’s choice to narrow the argument after hearing the
pertinent testimony was a strategic decision that cannot support deficient
performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (“[S]trategic choices made after
thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are
virtually unchallengeable[.]”). The State’s detective testified that Norris
spontaneously asked him, “What would you do if someone had threatened
your wife, your kids and your family.” The detective testified that, in
response to Norris, he said, “[T]hat’s not something we can talk about right
now. If you want to set up a free talk like we discussed, I would be more
than happy to talk about that with you, but I said I’m not going to talk with
you now because you already said you don’t want to.”

¶41 Considering that testimony, trial counsel had a reasoned basis
for focusing on whether Norris ever made the statement, rather than on
whether the police coerced it. Once the court found the State’s evidence
about the statement was sufficiently reliable to be admitted, the chances
Norris would succeed on a Miranda claim were exceedingly slim. See State
v. Carter, 145 Ariz. 101, 106 (1985) ([A]dmission of an accused’s
spontaneous, voluntary statement that is not made in response to police
interrogation does not violate the defendant’s Miranda rights.”). Counsel
was not deficient for forgoing a futile argument.

2. Norris’ Testimony

¶42 Norris also argues that because counsel did not move to
suppress his statement, he was “forced to relinquish his right to remain
silent and had to testify[.]” But Norris was not compelled to testify, he
chose to testify to try to refute the State’s evidence. In his PCR, Norris
conceded he knew that by testifying “he would be subjecting himself to the

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full litany of the State’s examination[.]” And the court correctly concluded
that Norris’ statement would have been admissible regardless of when
counsel moved to exclude it. Norris chose to testify, and he does not
demonstrate that counsel’s argument forced him to do so.

G. Confrontation Clause

¶43 Norris claimed his appellate counsel should have raised a
Confrontation Clause argument because he could not effectively cross-
examine a witness. The Confrontation Clause “‘prohibits the introduction
of testimonial statements by a nontestifying witness’ unless the defendant
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the now-unavailable witness.”
State v. Fordson, 258 Ariz. 167, 171 ¶ 14 (App. 2024) (quoting Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 243 (2015)). Rule 803(5) allows a recorded recollection to be
admitted about an issue “the witness once knew about but now cannot
recall well enough to testify fully and accurately[.]” Ariz. R. Evid. 803(5).

¶44 In Real, this court concluded there was no Confrontation
Clause violation when an officer “had no memory of investigating,” so he
read from his police report, but the defendant was permitted to cross-
examine him. 214 Ariz. at 233–34 ¶¶ 3–4, 7. Here, the witness at issue
testified at trial and explained she had a stroke resulting in memory loss.
The court then allowed the State to play a recording of the witness’ police
interview after a detective testified about interviewing and recording the
witnesses’ prior statements. Norris cross-examined the witness and the
detective.

¶45 “The Confrontation Clause does not guarantee that the
resulting cross-examination will be effective.“ Id. at 235 ¶ 10. Because
Norris was permitted to cross-examine the witness, there was no
Confrontation Clause violation. Moreover, on direct appeal, this court
independently reviewed the record and determined the superior court did
not make any reversible error, and thus Norris’ claim is precluded. See
Norris, 2018 WL 1281670, at *2 ¶ 11.

H. Witness Testimony

¶46 Norris claimed trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting
to testimony from Hardy, Havrelock, and Detective Bermudez.

1. Hardy

¶47 Norris argues trial counsel should have objected when Hardy
testified about Norris’ previous comment about disposing of a body at the

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Mesa proving grounds because it was improper other acts evidence.
Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits evidence of other acts or crimes
if offered “to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith.” Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). But Rule 404(b)(2) allows
other acts evidence to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Ariz. R. Evid.
404(b)(2).

¶48 Hardy did not testify about “other acts.” See State v. Connor, 215 Ariz. 553, 563 ¶ 32 (App. 2007) (“Rule 404(b) only precludes evidence
. . . to show the character of a defendant to prove disposition to acts of a
particular type.”). Hardy merely testified about a previous conversation
with Norris. As the superior court concluded, the testimony “isn’t 404, at
all.”

¶49 Norris also argues trial counsel should have objected when
the State asked Hardy if he “remember[ed] describing [Norris] as bipolar”
and Hardy responded, “Absolutely.” Norris says the State’s inquiry was
“irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.” The superior court disagreed,
explaining that the “bipolar comment was a throwaway. It moved me zip
zero.”

¶50 Norris overlooks that trial counsel objected to the entirety of
Hardy’s testimony as irrelevant. Moreover, Hardy used the term “bipolar”
in the colloquial sense; he was not making a medical diagnosis. And trial
counsel also introduced evidence that Norris often jumped from one project
to another and had been diagnosed with attention deficit disorder. Counsel
used Norris’ tendency to shift from one thing to another during closing to
justify why Norris suddenly shifted the focus of renovations on the office
to the break room where the State theorized the murder occurred. So
counsel’s decision not to object to Hardy’s testimony was likely strategic; it
was not deficient.

2. Havrelock

¶51 Next, Norris argues trial counsel should have objected to
Havrelock’s testimony about Norris’ demeanor when Havrelock visited
him in jail. Norris contends Havrelock’s testimony was inappropriate for a
lay witness because it went to an ultimate fact (his guilt). A lay witness may
testify to his opinion if it is limited to comments “rationally based on the
witness’s perception,” “helpful to clearly understand the witness’
testimony,” and “not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge[.]” Ariz. R. Evid. 701. Havrelock explained Norris’ demeanor

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after seeing him in jail, which is different from opining on Norris’ guilt or
innocence. Even assuming Havrelock’s testimony was improper, it did not
prejudice Norris because the court expressly stated it gave the testimony
“no weight[,]” and noted the testimony “didn’t impact [the court’s] verdict
at all.”

3. Detective Bermudez

¶52 Like Havrelock’s testimony, Norris argues trial counsel
should have objected to Detective Bermudez’s testimony because he
“opined to the ultimate issue.” Detective Bermudez responded, “Norris,”
when asked, “[B]ased upon the investigation, . . . who was believed to be
the cause of [Victim’s] death and why?”

¶53 Viewing his testimony in context, Detective Bermudez
explained the evidence police obtained in the case, how police ruled out
other individuals based on that evidence, and why the State ultimately
charged Norris with murdering the victim. There is nothing objectionable
about him doing so. Furthermore, trial counsel cross-examined Detective
Bermudez and Norris takes no issue with her performance there. Again,
trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object to admissible testimony.

I. Ballistics Evidence

¶54 Norris contends his counsel failed to “conduct a reasonable
investigation” into ballistics evidence. Specifically, Norris asserts his expert
would have provided testimony contradicting the State’s attempt to show
his gun was the murder weapon. “[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. But counsel need
not pursue an investigation if it “would not yield useful information or is
otherwise unnecessary in light of counsel’s chosen trial strategy.” Denz, 232
Ariz. at 445 ¶ 11.

¶55 The court found that the expert Norris retained for his PCR
did not adequately contradict testimony from the State’s expert at trial
because neither was able to confirm Norris’ gun matched the ballistics
results on the fired bullets. We agree with the superior court.

¶56 Even if Norris’ ballistics expert had testified at trial, it would
not have furthered Norris’ defense. See id. To the contrary, Norris’ expert
testimony may have bolstered the credibility of the State’s expert witness
because both made similar conclusions. Thus, Norris has not demonstrated
that trial counsel’s performance was deficient.

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Decision of the Court

II. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶57 Finally, Norris argues the State committed prosecutorial
misconduct by “arguing and misstating evidence” that five bullets “were
consistent with having been fired” from a specific gun. The PCR court
concluded Norris cannot now raise this issue. We agree. A petitioner is
precluded from post-conviction relief for an issue “finally adjudicated on
the merits in an appeal[.]” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). Following his
sentencing, Norris filed a direct appeal and a supplemental brief. We
“searched the entire record for reversible error” but “[found] none.” Norris,
2018 WL 1281670, at *2 ¶ 11. Thus, this argument is precluded.

CONCLUSION

¶58 Because the court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Norris’ PCR, we grant review but deny relief.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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