State v. Jensen

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL JENSEN, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0386 PRPC
FILED 03-02-2026

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2004-020949-001
The Honorable Margaret LaBianca, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Philip D. Garrow
Counsel for Respondent

Michael Jensen, Florence
Petitioner

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma, Judge Andrew J. Becke and Judge
Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court.
 STATE v. JENSEN
Decision of the Court

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Petitioner Michael Jensen seeks review of the superior court’s
order dismissing his notice and petition for post-conviction relief under
Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. This is petitioner’s
seventh post-conviction relief proceeding.

¶2 Absent an abuse of discretion or error of law, this court will
not disturb a superior court’s ruling on a request for post-conviction relief.
State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577 ¶ 19 (2012). It is petitioner’s burden to
show that the superior court abused its discretion by denying relief. See
State v. Poblete, 227 Ariz. 537, 538 ¶ 1 (App. 2011).

¶3 This court has reviewed the record in this matter, the superior
court’s order dismissing the petition and the petition for review. This court
finds that Jensen has not shown the superior court abused its discretion.

¶4 First, Jensen’s claim asserting newly discovered evidence
under Rule 32.1(e) – relating to an alleged alibi – has been raised in five
previous PCR proceedings based on substantially the same evidence he
now alleges is newly discovered. Accordingly, these alibi-based claims are
precluded. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2) & (b). Second, Jensen’s arguments
that the court erred by finding his claims were untimely and had been
waived fail because the court addressed his claims on the merits. Third, the
court correctly rejected Jensen’s argument that dangerousness is a
necessary element of DCAC offenses. Fourth, the few Arizona Supreme
Court cases recognizing fact-specific exceptions to mandatory DCAC
sentencing do not render the entire DCAC scheme void, as Jensen argues.
See State v. Davis, 206 Ariz. 377 (2003); State v. Bartlett, 164 Ariz. 229 (1990),
vacated, 501 U.S. 1246 (1991), on remand, 171 Ariz. 302 (1992).

¶5 Accordingly, this court grants review but denies relief.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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