State v. Johnson

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

DEANDRE TERRELL JOHNSON, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0389
FILED 08-26-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2024-152629-001
The Honorable Aryeh D. Schwartz, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Anne Carmack
Counsel for Appellee

The Law Office of Kyle T. Green P.L.L.C., Mesa
By Kyle Green
Counsel for Appellant

STATE v. JOHNSON
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge D. Andrew Gaona joined.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 Deandre Johnson appeals his convictions for one count of
attempted first-degree murder, one count of unlawful flight from a law
enforcement vehicle, and four counts of disorderly conduct. For the
following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 On November 1, 2024, Johnson went to a Department of Child
Services (“DCS”) building to confront a DCS employee (“the victim”) for
interviewing Johnson’s daughter at school. The victim met with Johnson in
the lobby for an hour. During the meeting, Johnson told the victim several
times that Johnson was going to kill him. The victim provided Johnson
information about the investigation and explained that he could file a
complaint through the ombudsman office. By the end of the meeting, the
victim believed that he and Johnson were “at peace,” and they scheduled a
follow-up meeting.

¶3 On November 5, Johnson and the victim met in the lobby of
the DCS building again. Johnson livestreamed the entire meeting. They
spoke for about an hour, primarily about Johnson seeking services. They
then stood up, shook hands, and when the victim turned to walk away,
Johnson placed the victim in a chokehold from behind. Johnson held him
in a chokehold for more than a minute while multiple people begged
Johnson to stop. Johnson dropped the victim to the floor but then resumed
choking him. Johnson finally released the victim and left the building.
Johnson’s livestream captured the whole encounter.

¶4 Police located Johnson in his vehicle later that day and
pursued him in unmarked police vehicles. The officers turned on their
lights and sirens and made several unsuccessful attempts to forcefully stop
Johnson’s vehicle. Eventually, Johnson pulled over voluntarily, and police
took him into custody. The State charged Johnson with one count of attempt
to commit first-degree murder (Class 2 felony), one count of aggravated

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STATE v. JOHNSON
Decision of the Court

assault (Class 4 felony), one count of unlawful flight from a law
enforcement vehicle (Class 5 felony), and four counts of disorderly conduct
(all Class 1 misdemeanors).

¶5 The case proceeded to a seven-day trial, at which the State
presented testimony from 14 witnesses, including the victim, five
eyewitnesses to the choking incident, and two police officers who pursued
Johnson’s vehicle. The State played the livestream of the assault for the jury.
During cross-examination, defense counsel asked the victim if he was
aware he had lost consciousness multiple times during the attack and if he
required any emergency surgery. The following exchange then occurred:

Defense counsel: I’m just asking questions. Pretty simple.
Ultimately, you didn’t require any emergency surgery with respect
to this particular incident, correct?

The victim: No. A f***ing n***a like that can’t hurt me.

¶6 Ultimately, the jury acquitted Johnson of aggravated assault
but found him guilty of all other counts. The jury found the State had
proven three aggravators as to attempted first-degree murder (Count 1). At
sentencing, the court found Johnson had two prior felony convictions and
imposed a maximum term of 16 years imprisonment for attempted murder
and a presumptive term of 1.5 years for unlawful flight to run
consecutively. The court credited Johnson with 123 days presentence
incarceration credit and sentenced him to time served for the disorderly
conduct convictions.

¶7 Johnson appealed his convictions and sentences. We have
jurisdiction. See Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 9; A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031,
13-4033(A).

DISCUSSION

¶8 Johnson argues the victim’s use of a racial slur to describe him
was improper and likely influenced the jury to decide the case based on
racial stereotypes or hostility rather than the evidence. He argues the court
committed fundamental error because it did not grant a mistrial.

¶9 A mistrial is “the most dramatic remedy for trial error and
should be granted only when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless
the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.” State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557,
570, ¶ 43 (2003). In determining whether a witness’s testimony warrants a
mistrial, the court considers “(1) whether the testimony called to the jurors’

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STATE v. JOHNSON
Decision of the Court

attention matters that they would not be justified in considering in reaching
their verdict and (2) the probability under the circumstances of the case that
the testimony influenced the jurors.” State v. Lamar, 205 Ariz. 431, 439, ¶ 40
(2003). We give great deference to the superior court to make this decision
because it “is in the best position to determine whether the evidence will
actually affect the outcome of the trial.” Id.

¶10 “A defendant generally waives his objection to testimony if
he fails either to ask that it be stricken, with limiting instructions given, or
to request a mistrial.” State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 133, ¶ 61 (2006). Unless
the testimony resulted in fundamental error, “a defendant cannot complain
if the court fails to sua sponte give limiting instructions or to sua sponte
order a mistrial.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶11 Because Johnson did not object to the victim’s statement
during trial, we review for fundamental error. See id. Under fundamental-
error review, the defendant must prove error occurred and “(1) the error
went to the foundation of the case, (2) the error took from the defendant a
right essential to his defense, or (3) the error was so egregious that he could
not possibly have received a fair trial.” State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 142,
¶ 21 (2018) (cleaned up). If a defendant establishes fundamental error under
prongs one or two, he must show prejudice, which requires proof that a
reasonable jury could have reached a different verdict. Id. at 142, 144, ¶¶ 21,
29.

¶12 Here, the victim’s use of the racial slur was one isolated
statement made during a seven-day trial. Johnson does not explain why,
“under the circumstances of th[is] case,” the statement was likely to
improperly influence the jurors. Lamar, 205 Ariz. at 439, ¶ 40. Instead,
Johnson contends generally that “[a] racial slur . . . is an inherently
inflammatory cue that invites decision-making on an improper basis.” In
essence, he asks that we hold that a mistrial is per se required anytime a
witness uses a racial slur during trial, regardless of the surrounding
circumstances. He cites no authority to support that broad proposition.
Such a holding would directly contradict our precedent affording the
superior court great deference to grant or deny a mistrial based on whether
improper testimony “will actually affect the outcome of the trial.” Id.
Johnson has not met his burden to show that error occurred, much less
fundamental error.

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STATE v. JOHNSON
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶13 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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