State v. Morrow

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL MORROW, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0455
FILED 08-03-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2000-001456
The Honorable Monica Edelstein, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Evan J. Ridley
Counsel for Appellee

Michael Morrow, Phoenix
Appellant

STATE v. MORROW
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Veronika Fabian delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

F A B I A N, Judge:

¶1 Michael Morrow appeals the denial of his “Motion for
Reconsideration and Completion for Relief; Restoration of Firearm Rights.”
This Court vacates and remands for the superior court to provide written
reasons for its denial of Morrow’s request for firearm rights restoration.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Morrow was convicted of eight, non-dangerous drug-related
offenses in 2003. He was then sentenced to pay a $150,000 fine to the
Arizona Drug Enforcement Fund and serve 9.25 years in prison. The
sentencing court also found that Morrow had previously been convicted of
kidnapping, which is a serious offense under A.R.S. § 13-706(F)(1)(j).
Conviction for a serious offense triggers a ten-year bar to restoration of
firearm rights after discharge under A.R.S. § 13-910(A).

¶3 In May 2012, Morrow was discharged from the Arizona
Department of Corrections after completing his sentence of imprisonment
and related parole. In the fall of 2021, he filed an application requesting: 1)
a restoration of his civil rights; 2) a restoration of his rights to own and
possess a firearm; and 3) a set-aside of his 2003 convictions. The State did
not respond to his application.

¶4 In May 2022, in two separate orders, the superior court
granted his requests to set aside his convictions and restore some of his civil
rights, but not his firearm rights. Neither order explained the reason for the
denial. At the time, the ten-year bar for restoration of firearm rights under
A.R.S. § 13-910(A) had not yet passed. Notably, before the court partially
granted Morrow’s petitions, the clerk reported that Morrow owed nothing
in fines, fees, restitution, or other financial obligations related to his
convictions. This was a mistake because Morrow had not yet paid his
$150,000 fine.

¶5 In 2025, Morrow filed a “Motion for Reconsideration and
Completion for Relief; Restoration of Firearm Rights” referencing the May

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STATE v. MORROW
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2022 court orders. In it, he stated that his motion for reconsideration was
made “pursuant to Rule 24.4 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.”
This time, the State objected based on Morrow’s outstanding balance of
$150,000. The court summarily denied Morrow’s motion for “[n]o good
cause appearing.”

¶6 Morrow timely appealed. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Article VI, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S.
§§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(3).

DISCUSSION

I. This Court Has Jurisdiction over Morrow’s Appeal.

¶7 The State argues this Court lacks jurisdiction over Morrow’s
appeal because the time to appeal expired in 2022 after the superior court
denied his request to restore his firearm rights. Therefore, because his 2025
motion for reconsideration did not extend the deadline to file an appeal, his
appeal is untimely. Morrow argues his appeal is timely because it is
directed at the superior court’s denial of his 2025 motion, not the 2022
orders.

¶8 Although a motion for reconsideration does not extend the
time for appeal, and is not itself appealable, State v. Berry, 133 Ariz. 264, 267
(App. 1982), “the nature of a motion will be determined by its substance
and not by its title.” State ex rel. Corbin v. Tolleson, 152 Ariz. 376, 380-81 (App.
1986). Morrow styled his 2025 filing as a “Motion for Reconsideration”
brought “pursuant to Rule 24.4 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal
Procedure.” But that title and rule are a poor fit for the substance of what
Morrow actually requested: firearm rights restoration pursuant to A.R.S.
§ 13-910.

¶9 Rule 24.4 does not govern motions to reconsider and instead
allows a court to “correct clerical errors, omissions, and oversights in the
record.” Morrow claims the 2022 orders contained a clerical omission
because the superior court intended to restore his firearm rights once the
ten-year bar had passed. But Rule 24.4 does not apply when, as here, the
record is devoid of evidence showing an inaccuracy between what was
intended and what was recorded. See Shinn v. Ariz. Bd. of Exec. Clemency,
254 Ariz. 255, 261 ¶ 20 (2022).

¶10 What Morrow actually requested was a new ruling on his
firearm rights based on changed circumstances. The substance of his
motion confirms this. He devoted an entire section to arguing his statutory

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STATE v. MORROW
Decision of the Court

eligibility under § 13-910. He presented evidence of rehabilitation and a
clean record since his discharge. And his prayer for relief asked the court to
“enter a present-dated order expressly restoring his right to possess and
own firearms under A.R.S. § 13-910.” A request for a present-dated order
under the restoration statute is not a request to correct the record; it is
effectively a new application for firearm rights restoration.

¶11 This conclusion is consistent with State v. Ballard, 1 CA-CR
24-0287, at *2 ¶ 11 (Ariz. App. Mar. 20, 2025) (mem. decision), where this
Court held a defendant’s motion to reconsider was “essentially a new
application” when the motion attempted to resolve the reasons for a prior
denial of firearm rights restoration and the trial court treated the motion as
a new application. The same basic reasoning applies here. Morrow was
clearly seeking relief the court could not have granted in 2022 because the
statutory preconditions had not yet been met. Treated as a new application
under § 13-910, the superior court’s denial of the motion is appealable and
this Court has jurisdiction. See State v. Gahary, 252 Ariz. 21, 22 ¶ 5 (App.
2021) (Arizona courts treat an action for restoration of rights as a criminal
proceeding implicitly appealable under A.R.S. § 13-4033(A)(3)).

II. The Superior Court Should Have Stated Its Reasons for Denying
Morrow’s Request for Firearm Rights Restoration.

¶12 Morrow argues that the superior court was required to state
its reasons for denying his application for firearm rights restoration under
A.R.S. § 13-910. This Court agrees.

¶13 A superior court’s decision to restore firearm rights is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Nixon, 242 Ariz. 242, 244 ¶ 10
(App. 2017). “An error of law committed in reaching a discretionary
conclusion may constitute an abuse of discretion.” State v. Hall, 234 Ariz.
374, 375 ¶ 3 (App. 2014) (citation modified).

¶14 A.R.S. § 13-906 governs the process for restoring civil rights.
Subsection E provides: “If the court denies an application for the restoration
of a person’s civil rights, the court shall state its reasons for the denial in
writing.” Arizona’s rule governing the disposition of applications for civil
rights restoration similarly provides: “If the court denies an application, its
order must state the reasons for the denial in writing, including any
statutory requirements the applicant has not met.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 30.6(e).
And, as the State acknowledges in its answer, firearm rights are civil rights
under A.R.S. § 13-904(A)(5), thus triggering the requirements of § 13-906(E)

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and Rule 30.6(e) when a court denies an application to restore firearm
rights.

¶15 Because the superior court did not state its reasons for
denying Morrow’s request for firearm rights restoration, this Court vacates
the order and remands this matter to the superior court to make express
findings explaining why Morrow’s request for firearm rights restoration
was denied. This Court makes no judgment on the merits of Morrow’s
firearm rights application. The superior court may well have legally
sufficient reasons for denying Morrow’s application, but those reasons
need to be spelled out in the order. See A.R.S. § 13-906(E); Ariz. R. Crim. P.
30.6(e). Further, as noted by the State, Morrow’s outstanding fine cannot
support a denial of firearm rights restoration because the fine is a penalty
that “was set aside when his convictions were set aside” in 2022. See State v.
Payne, 223 Ariz. 555, 565–66 ¶¶ 31-39 (App. 2009); State v. Marquez-Sosa, 161
Ariz. 500, 503 (App. 1989).

III. The State Did Not Waive Objections to Morrow’s 2025 Application
by Not Responding to the 2022 Applications.

¶16 Morrow claims the State waived factual objections to his 2025
motion when it did not respond to his 2022 applications. Because this Court
has determined that the 2025 motion was in effect a new application for
firearm rights restoration, the State’s failure to object to the 2022 request
does not waive its rights with respect to the 2025 request.

IV. Morrow’s Citation Errors.

¶17 As noted by the State, many of Morrow’s legal citations
contain substantial defects, including inaccurate case names, misstated
holdings, and false statements of law. Thus, this Court finds Morrow’s
briefs violate Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 31.10(a)(7)’s requirement
that appellate arguments include citations to legal authority.

¶18 Compliance with this Court’s rules is not optional. The
integrity of the appellate process depends on accurate and honest advocacy.
In the future, failure to provide accurate legal authority may result in
striking of the filing or the imposition of other sanctions. See Ariz. R. Crim.
P. 31.10(l).

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STATE v. MORROW
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CONCLUSION

¶19 For the foregoing reasons, this Court vacates and remands for
the superior court to provide express reasons for its denial of Morrow’s
request for firearm rights restoration.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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