State v. Albin

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL DON ALBIN, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0484 PRPC
FILED 09-21-2026

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. CR-2023-00069
The Honorable Richard D. Lambert, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Mohave County Attorney’s Office, Kingman
By Jacob Cote
Counsel for Respondent

Michael Don Albin, Eloy
Petitioner

STATE v. ALBIN
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Veronika Fabian delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Vice Chief Judge David D.
Weinzweig joined.

F A B I A N, Judge:

¶1 Michael Don Albin petitions for review from the superior
court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”)
filed under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1. This is Albin’s first
petition. For the reasons set forth below, we grant review but deny relief.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 On August 25, 2022, police officers were dispatched to The
Human Bean in Bullhead City, Arizona, regarding a suspicious male
sleeping inside a vehicle. Officers contacted the sleeping male, who was
identified as Albin. Albin told the officers he had fled a family’s home after
being bitten by bed bugs and that the truck he was sleeping in belonged to
his friend, William Coffer, who was deceased. Albin claimed Coffer, before
passing away, permitted him to use the truck as long as needed. An officer
ran a records check for the truck and found that it was reported stolen by
the Mohave County Sheriff’s Office. As a result, Albin was detained. Albin
claimed that the truck dashboard contained Coffer’s will, which was proof
that he had not stolen the truck. While the will was located, it was not
notarized, thus rendering it invalid.

¶3 After his arrest, the State charged Albin with forgery,
burglary, theft of means of transportation, and trafficking in stolen
property. Albin was appointed trial counsel in his case. Trial counsel
interviewed several witnesses requested by Albin, but did not call these
witnesses at trial due to credibility issues and other reasons. Albin testified
to the jury that he was given permission to use the truck in exchange for
work. However, the jury found Albin guilty of theft of means of
transportation.

¶4 Albin appealed the guilty verdict and was appointed another
lawyer for his appellate proceedings. Appellate counsel argued that the
superior court erred by improperly instructing the jury during trial, but did

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STATE v. ALBIN
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not raise any issues related to the alleged oral contract between Albin and
Coffer and/or Albin’s permission to use the truck. This Court rejected
Albin’s appeal and affirmed the superior court’s verdict.

¶5 Afterwards, Albin filed a Notice of PCR and was appointed
counsel for his PCR proceedings. PCR counsel informed the superior court
that she found no colorable claim for submission to the superior court in a
supplemental petition. Albin filed a supplemental Petition for PCR in
propria persona and raised various issues related to his alleged oral contract
to use Coffer’s truck, and ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”). The
superior court summarily dismissed Albin’s claims for not complying with
Rule 32 and found no colorable claim of IAC. Albin filed a motion for
rehearing, which the court denied.

¶6 Albin filed a timely petition for review of the superior court’s
summary dismissal with this Court on November 12, 2025. We have
jurisdiction under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.16(a).

DISCUSSION

¶7 We review the superior court’s PCR rulings for an abuse of
discretion, “which occurs if the court makes an error of law or fails to
adequately investigate the facts necessary to support its decision.” State v.
Bigger, 251 Ariz. 402, 407 ¶ 6 (2021). Albin bears the burden “to show the
superior court abused its discretion by denying the petition for post-
conviction relief.” State v. Reed, 252 Ariz. 236, 238 ¶ 6 (2021).

¶8 Albin claims that the superior court abused its discretion in
denying his PCR request by erroneously summarily dismissing his claims
and finding no colorable claim for IAC. Because the superior court did not
abuse its discretion, we deny Albin relief.

I. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Summarily
Dismissing Albin’s First Six Claims.

¶9 Albin argues that the superior court abused its discretion by
denying six claims of his petition as not being cognizable grounds of relief
under Rule 32. We find that the superior court did not abuse its discretion
because Albin failed to comply with Rule 32’s requirements and we find no
colorable claim of actual innocence.

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STATE v. ALBIN
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¶10 Under Rule 32.1, Ariz. R. Crim. P., there are eight enumerated
grounds for post-conviction relief.1 Courts “have no jurisdiction to rule on
the merits of a petition for post-conviction review where no ground
cognizable under rule 32 is asserted.” State v. Manning, 143 Ariz. 139, 141
(1984). A petition for post-conviction relief must cite “to relevant portions
of the record and to relevant legal authorities.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.7(b).
Failure to comply with this rule constitutes waiver and warrants summary
rejection of a petitioner’s claims. See State v. Carriger, 143 Ariz. 142, 146
(1984) (stating that petitioners bear the burden to assert grounds within the
scope of Rule 32 and that relief will be denied if the rule is not strictly
complied with).

¶11 Other than IAC, Albin raised six claims in his Petition for
PCR. Specifically, Albin claimed that: (1) he had a “parol lease” agreement
with Coffer to use the truck; (2) his right to contract was “unconstitutionally
disturbed” by the State; (3) the doctrine of quantum meruit should have
prevented the State from voiding his oral contract with Coffer; (4) the “trial
court judge abused his discretion by denying [Albin] replacement counsel”;
(5) his defense counsel “tricked” him “into involuntarily waiving his right”
to a preliminary hearing; and (6) the State did not sufficiently disprove
Albin’s argument that he had lawful permission to use Coffer’s truck. Albin
argued his claims were colorable and he was therefore entitled to an
evidentiary hearing.

¶12 The superior court found that Albin’s claims made “no sense
legally” and that he did not “assert any basis for relief cognizable under
Rule 32.” We find that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Albin’s request for PCR regarding these six claims. Albin’s petition
does not cite relevant authority and “does not develop the argument in any

1 The eight enumerated grounds include: (1) the defendant’s conviction was

obtained, or the sentence was imposed, in violation of the United States or
Arizona constitutions; (2) the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction
over the defendant’s case; (3) the sentence was not authorized by law; (4)
the defendant continues to be in custody after his sentence expires; (5)
newly discovered material facts probably exist and probably would have
changed the judgment or sentence; (6) the failure to timely file a notice of
appeal was not the defendant’s fault; (7) there has been a significant change
in the law applicable to the defendant’s case that would probably overturn
the judgment; and (8) the defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing
evidence that the facts underlying the claim sufficiently establish that no
reasonable fact-finder would find the defendant guilty of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)-(h).

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STATE v. ALBIN
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meaningful way,” for why his first six claims are a cognizable ground for
relief under Rule 32. State v. Stefanovich, 232 Ariz. 154, 158 ¶ 16 (App. 2013).
Instead, Albin makes conclusory statements that the superior court was
ignorant of the law, biased against him, and that he was innocent of theft
because of an alleged oral contract. Rule 32 petitions “must consist of more
than conclusory assertions” to warrant an evidentiary hearing. 2 State v.
Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, 414 ¶ 21 (App. 2000). Thus, the superior court did not
err in dismissing Albin’s first six claims.

¶13 Albin primarily argues that he was “actually innocent of all
charges” of theft because he had a lawful oral contract to possess Coffer’s
truck. While the superior court did not address whether a colorable claim
of actual innocence existed, the court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing this claim.

¶14 A defendant is entitled to relief for actual innocence if he
“demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the facts underlying
the claim would be sufficient to establish that no reasonable fact-finder
would find the defendant guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(h). The evidence supporting an actual innocence claim
must do more than merely contradict evidence presented at trial. See State
v. Denz, 232 Ariz. 441, 447–48 ¶ 22 (App. 2013).

¶15 Here, Albin claimed he was actually innocent of the crime of
theft because he had a valid oral contract with Coffer to lawfully possess
the truck. Overall, Albin’s argument merely restated or attempted to
contradict some of the evidence presented at trial. He does not demonstrate,
by clear and convincing evidence, that he is actually innocent. Thus, the
superior court did not err in dismissing his claims. See id; State v. Roseberry, 237 Ariz. 507, 508 ¶ 7 (2015) (“We will affirm a trial court’s decision [on a
petition for post-conviction relief] if it is legally correct for any reason.”).

2 We recognize that Albin submitted two affidavits from himself to support

his argument that he was innocent of theft because he had an alleged oral
contract to use Coffer’s truck. However, “conclusory” affidavits “lacking in
detail” without “any reliable factual foundation” cannot form the basis for
a colorable claim. State v. Krum, 183 Ariz. 288, 294 (1995). The affidavits here
do not provide sufficient details or factual foundation to warrant an
evidentiary hearing on whether Albin was innocent of theft due to an
alleged oral contract.

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STATE v. ALBIN
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II. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Finding No Colorable Claim of
IAC.

¶16 Additionally, Albin claims the superior court erred by finding
no colorable claim for IAC. Albin argues that his “filings when compared
to counsel’s filings establish I.A.C. of all” his attorneys, and that none of his
counsels’ work “meets even a [de minimis] standard of competence.” In his
PCR petition, Albin argued that trial counsel, appellate counsel, and PCR
counsel provided IAC. The superior court did not err in dismissing these
claims without an evidentiary hearing.

¶17 “To state a colorable claim of [IAC], a defendant must show
both that counsel’s performance fell below objectively reasonable standards
and that this deficiency prejudiced the defendant.” State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz.
562, 567 ¶ 21 (2006) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
However, there is a “strong presumption” that “counsel’s conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” State v. Miller, 251 Ariz. 99, 102–03 ¶ 10 (2021) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). To show
prejudice, the defendant “must show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “Failure to satisfy
either prong of the Strickland test is fatal to an [IAC] claim.” Bennett, 213
Ariz. at 567 ¶ 21.

¶18 Albin argued that trial counsel provided IAC because trial
counsel did not call a specific witness to testify about Albin’s alleged
contract with Coffer to use the truck. However, trial counsel stated in an
affidavit that he interviewed the witness who stated that “he currently lived
in Michigan, has prostate cancer and cannot travel, that he knew Mr. Albin
for approximately 7 to 8 years, that he has never met William Coffer and
does not remember meeting him.” These statements contradict Albin’s
claim that the witness observed Coffer give Albin ownership to the truck.
The decision to call a witness typically falls within counsel’s discretion for
trial strategy. See State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 335 (1996). Given the witness’s
inability to travel and his statements contradicting Albin’s claim, trial
counsel’s decision to not call him as a witness “seems well within the
bounds of competent decision-making.” Id. at 335–36. Thus, the superior
court did not abuse its discretion when finding no colorable claim of IAC
regarding trial counsel.

¶19 Albin also argued that appellate counsel provided IAC
because he did not argue on appeal that Albin had a valid oral contract with
Coffer to use the truck. Appellate counsel stated in a sworn affidavit that

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STATE v. ALBIN
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he “raised the issues with the Court of Appeals that [he] believed had the
best chance for reversal.” Here, the jury had already made the related
factual determination, to which we give great deference, that Albin did not
have permission to use the truck. See City of Phoenix v. Mangum, 185 Ariz.
31, 34 (App. 1996). Thus, appellate counsel was within his professional
discretion to decline to raise the oral contract argument on appeal. See State
v. Febles, 210 Ariz. 589, 596 ¶ 20 (App. 2005) (finding that winnowing out
weaker arguments on appeal to focus on other arguments more likely to
prevail “is an acceptable exercise of professional judgment”); see also State
v. Macias, 249 Ariz. 335, 341 ¶ 21 (App. 2020) (“Appellate counsel did not
render ineffective assistance by selecting more viable issues to press on
appeal.”). Thus, the superior court did not abuse its discretion when finding
no colorable claim of IAC regarding appellate counsel.

¶20 Finally, Albin argued that PCR counsel provided IAC because
she did not find a colorable claim of IAC regarding trial counsel or appellate
counsel. While Rule 32.5, Ariz. R. Crim. P., allows the superior court to
appoint PCR counsel for indigent defendants, there is no constitutional
guarantee of effectiveness. See Krum, 183 Ariz. at 292 n.5 (1995) (“The
United States Supreme Court has made clear that, at least when a defendant
is entitled to a direct appeal with the assistance of counsel, there is no
constitutional right to counsel or effective assistance in post-conviction
proceedings.”); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (“There is no
constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings . . . .
Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally [IAC] in such
proceedings.”). Thus, the superior court did not abuse its discretion when
finding no colorable claim of IAC from PCR counsel.

CONCLUSION

¶21 We grant review but deny relief.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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