State v. Vansickel

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

DANIELLE VANSICKEL, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0502
FILED 07-17-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. S1300CR202500628
The Honorable Tina R. Ainley, Judge

Mayer Justice Court
No. J1303CM2024000187
The Honorable John Kennedy, Justice of the Peace, Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Danielle Vansickel, Cordes Lakes
Appellant

Yavapai County Attorney’s Office, Prescott
By Zachary R. Jones
Counsel for Appellee
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Veronika Fabian and Judge Anni Hill Foster joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Danielle Vansickel appeals from the superior court’s
judgment affirming her misdemeanor conviction in the Mayer Justice
Court. Because Vansickel has not met her burden of showing that the
statute underlying her conviction is facially unconstitutional, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Vansickel was convicted of one count of providing false
information to law enforcement, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-2907.01. She
appealed to the superior court and raised various issues, including the
constitutionality of § 13-2907.01, sufficiency of the evidence presented at
trial, and deprivation of various constitutional rights. The court affirmed
her conviction and she timely appealed.

JURISDICTION

¶3 Vansickel makes several arguments about the justice court
proceedings that she believes were erroneous or unconstitutional. But this
court only has “jurisdiction specifically given it by statute.” State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 333 (1985). As provided by the legislature in A.R.S.
§ 22-375(A), “[a]n appeal may be taken by the defendant . . . from a final
judgment of the superior court in an action appealed from a justice of the
peace or municipal court, if the action involves the validity of a tax, impost,
assessment, toll, municipal fine or statute.” (Emphasis added.) And subsection
(B) states that “[e]xcept as provided in this section, there shall be no appeal
from the judgment of the superior court given in an action appealed from a
justice of the peace or a municipal court.”

¶4 Applying those statutory provisions, this court has
consistently held that in cases arising from a criminal conviction from a
justice or municipal court that are appealed to this court, our jurisdiction is
limited to reviewing whether the statute under which the defendant was
convicted is facially constitutional. See State v. Yabe, 114 Ariz. 89, 90 (App.
1977) (explaining that “[i]f the statute is facially constitutional our inquiry
is at an end, as we are without jurisdiction to review any alleged

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unconstitutional application of the statute”); see also State v. Hamberlin, 253
Ariz. 470, 474, ¶ 10 (App. 2022); State v. Okken, 238 Ariz. 566, 569, ¶ 8 (App.
2015); City of Tucson v. Grezaffi, 200 Ariz. 130, 133, ¶ 3 (App. 2001); State v.
Anderson, 9 Ariz. App. 42, 43 (1969).

¶5 Vansickel urges us to adopt a different interpretation of this
statute, which would presumably allow her to raise several other
procedural and constitutional issues. She suggests that the phrase
“involves the validity of” only requires her to contest the statute’s validity
on appeal, and so long as that condition is met, she is entitled to “full
appellate review” of the entire judgment (and any issues related to its
validity). Vansickel, however, does not address any of the relevant
decisions from this court on this topic, much less explain why those cases
are clearly erroneous or inapplicable. See Castillo v. Indus. Comm’n, 21 Ariz.
App. 465, 471 (1974).

¶6 Vansickel’s suggested interpretation of A.R.S. § 22-375 would
allow full appellate review by this court simply based on inclusion of an
argument challenging the validity of the underlying statute. Her view of
the statute’s meaning necessarily fails because it conflicts with the
legislature’s decision to strictly limit what this court can consider when
reviewing an appeal from a conviction originating in a justice or municipal
court. Accepting Vansickel’s interpretation would also render the “validity
of a statute” language superfluous. See State v. Furlong, 249 Ariz. 578, 581,
¶ 15 (App. 2020). Tracking the authority cited above, we apply the plain
language of the statute as written, which means the only issue Vansickel
may properly raise in this appeal is the validity of § 13-2907.01. See State v.
Young, 223 Ariz. 447, 452, ¶ 25 (App. 2010) (“When a statute’s language is
plain and unambiguous, we must apply the text as written.”).

¶7 Vansickel also claims A.R.S. § 22-375 is preempted by
provisions of the federal constitution and federal “wiretapping” laws. But
she offers no meaningful legal analysis on why the relationship between
such laws and A.R.S. § 22-375 would implicate preemption. See Hutto v.
Francisco, 210 Ariz. 88, 90, ¶ 7 (App. 2005) (listing the circumstances under
which federal laws preempt state law). Thus, the only issue properly before
us is whether § 13-2907.01 is facially constitutional.1 See Okken, 238 Ariz. at
569, ¶ 8.

1 Vansickel alternatively requests that we exercise special action
jurisdiction and order supplemental briefing over 13 other issues related to
her conviction. We deny her request.

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DISCUSSION

¶8 To prevail on her claim that § 13-2907.01 is facially
unconstitutional, Vansickel must show that “no set of circumstances exists
under which [the statute] would be valid,” State v. Wein, 244 Ariz. 22, 31,
¶ 34 (2018) (quotation and citation omitted). The fact that a statute may
“operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is
insufficient to render it wholly invalid.” Id. We presume that statutes are
constitutional, and the party challenging that statute “has the heavy burden
of overcoming that presumption.” State v. McMahon, 201 Ariz. 548, 550,
¶ 5 (App. 2002). We review questions of a statute’s constitutionality de
novo. Id.

¶9 Section 13-2907.01(A) prohibits the following conduct:

It is unlawful for a person to knowingly make to a law
enforcement agency of either this state or a political
subdivision of this state a false, fraudulent or unfounded
report or statement or to knowingly misrepresent a fact for
the purpose of interfering with the orderly operation of a law
enforcement agency or misleading a peace officer.

This court considered the facial constitutionality of this statute in State v.
Terrell, 168 Ariz. 112 (App. 1991). The defendant in that case argued, much
like Vansickel, that § 13-2907.01(A) is unconstitutionally vague, overbroad,
and penalizes protected speech under the First Amendment. Terrell, 168
Ariz. at 113. The court held that the statute only applied to “those persons
providing the kind of information set forth in the statute with the requisite
knowledge or purpose,” and that knowingly false statements to officers do
not have constitutional protection. Terrell, 168 Ariz. at 113–14. The court
also concluded that individuals “must be deterred from providing law
enforcement officers and agencies with any information known to be false,
fraudulent or misleading and from intentionally impeding such officers or
agencies from carrying out their function.” Id. at 114.

¶10 Vansickel argues Terrell is inapplicable because subsequent
caselaw from the Supreme Court of the United States has overruled its
reasoning. She cites United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, a plurality opinion
in which the Supreme Court found the Stolen Valor Act (a statute that made
falsely representing oneself as a recipient of the Congressional Medal of
Honor a misdemeanor offense) unconstitutional. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 715,
730. The concurring justices in that case rejected the notion that all false
factual statements receive “no protection at all” under the First

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Amendment. Id. at 732–33 (Breyer, J., concurring). 2 As the concurring
opinion explained, the Stolen Valor Act lacked any limiting features to
ensure the false statements are connected to some specific harm; instead,
the Act criminalized false statements “in family, social, or other private
contexts, where lies will often cause little harm.” Id. at 736. To avoid
unconstitutional overbreadth, the statute had to be more finely tailored to
prohibit false statements that “caused specific harm or at least was
material,” or statements “likely to be harmful or [in] contexts where such
lies are most likely to cause harm.” Id. at 738.

¶11 Section 13-2907.01, unlike the act at issue in Alvarez, does not
penalize every false statement made to police officers based only on the
falsity of the statement. Rather, the statute criminalizes knowingly making
a false statement “for the purpose of interfering with the orderly operation
of a law enforcement agency or misleading a police officer.” And as Terrell
acknowledged, the State “has a legitimate interest in facilitating the law
enforcement process by discouraging individuals not from communicating
with law enforcement officers generally, but from knowingly providing
information that will confound the functioning of the justice system.”
Terrell, 168 Ariz. at 114. The added requirement that false statements to
officers must be made with a purpose of interfering with law enforcement
operations or misleading an officer adequately tailors the statute to
“contexts where such lies are most likely to cause harm.” Alvarez, 567 U.S.
at 738. Because § 13-2907.01 is sufficiently tailored to avoid penalizing
constitutionally protected speech, the statute is not facially
unconstitutional. See also State v. Albarelli, 159 A.3d 627, 640, ¶ 36 (Vt. 2016)
(concluding a similar Vermont statute did not offend the logic of Alvarez
because “the prohibition of false speech [wa]s directly linked to a
defendant’s intent to deflect a government investigation, thus preventing
government waste”).

¶12 Vansickel also references Article 2, Section 6 of the Arizona
Constitution, which provides that “[e]very person may freely speak, write,
and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.”

2 In Alvarez, four justices joined a plurality opinion, and two other
justices concurred. “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding
of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those [justices] who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citation modified). Thus, Justice Breyer’s
concurring opinion (applying intermediate scrutiny to the statute at issue)
provides the governing standard of Alvarez. 567 U.S. at 732.

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Although this provision of our constitution may afford broader protection
than the First Amendment, see Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 361,
¶ 36 n.5 (2012), Vansickel has not explained how or why this provision
would invalidate § 13-2907.01. “Merely referring to the Arizona
Constitution without developing an argument is insufficient to preserve a
claim that it offers greater protection than the [United States Constitution.]”
State v. Jean, 243 Ariz. 331, 342, ¶ 39 (2018). Even so, her reading ignores the
second clause of the provision, which provides consequences when such a
right is abused, such as providing false information that causes harm.

¶13 Lastly, Vansickel asks us to consider the constitutionality of
another statute, A.R.S. § 41-1750(U)(2), which requires an individual to
provide fingerprints if summoned to court. But she seems to challenge
subsection (U)(8), which allows a court to remand a defendant into custody
for fingerprinting. From Vansickel’s brief, it appears she believes these
statutory provisions allow for an unconstitutional arrest without a finding
of probable cause or a preliminary hearing. The constitutionality of these
provisions, however, falls outside the narrow limits of our jurisdiction
under A.R.S. § 22-375. And even if we believed our jurisdiction extended
to this argument, the constitutionality of § 41-1750 would not affect her
conviction.

CONCLUSION

¶14 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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