State v. Haslett

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ERIC AVANTE HASLETT, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0516
FILED 09-16-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2025-108570-001
The Honorable Christina Henderson, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Evan Jacob Ridley
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Mikel Steinfeld
Counsel for Appellant

STATE v. HASLETT
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Veronika Fabian and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1 Eric Avante Haslett (“Haslett”) appeals his conviction for
aggravated assault. He argues the superior court erred by allowing the
State to introduce prior consistent statements beyond what is permitted
under Arizona Rule of Evidence (“Rule”) 801(d)(1)(B)(ii). We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In February 2025, Victoria (a pseudonym to protect victim
privacy), who is homeless, sat behind a restaurant with her dog, watching
a movie on her tablet. The restaurant manager permitted Victoria to sit
there a few hours a day and to tell others they could not be there. Haslett
entered the area with a woman and approached Victoria. Victoria told
Haslett he could not be there, and to go away. Haslett refused, telling
Victoria to shut up. Haslett asked if Victoria would call the police, she said
yes, and he drew a bb gun—which Victoria believed was a real firearm—
from his backpack. Haslett pointed the bb gun at Victoria and threatened
to kill her. When Victoria did not back down, Haslett put the bb gun away
and left the area.

¶3 Victoria called the police. An officer responded and took
Victoria’s statement. The officer then brought her to where other officers
had apprehended Haslett and she positively identified him.

¶4 A grand jury indicted Haslett on one count of aggravated
assault and one count of attempted armed robbery.

¶5 During trial, Haslett’s counsel asked Victoria multiple times
if her testimony was consistent with statements she made to the police,
asked to refresh Victoria’s memory with the body camera video, and asked
if it was fair to say, “it’s possible [she] may not remember” what she said to
Haslett during the incident. Counsel’s questions focused on whether
Victoria’s testimony matched certain statements she made to police.

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¶6 Haslett’s counsel also asked Victoria what the woman with
Haslett was doing. After Victoria answered the question, Haslett asked if
she had conveyed the same information to police. Victoria said yes, but that
she “didn’t go into full detail of every aspect of it.” Haslett then asked if
Victoria’s “story is evolving now” or if she was “adding additional details.”

¶7 The State later elicited testimony from the responding officer
about statements Victoria made to him when he arrived. Haslett’s counsel
objected and the court held a bench conference, during which the State
argued the statements were non-hearsay under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(ii). The
State argued it was eliciting the officer’s testimony about Victoria’s
statements to rehabilitate her credibility after Haslett’s counsel attacked it
during cross-examination. Haslett’s counsel argued that allowing the
officer to “repeat everything [Victoria] told him” would be impermissible
bolstering. The court allowed the testimony.

¶8 The State asked the officer multiple questions about whether
Victoria explained or described certain details at the scene, which the officer
answered affirmatively. The State also asked the officer about what
Victoria conveyed about the incident. The questions did not address
alleged discrepancies Haslett’s counsel raised with Victoria during cross-
examination—the precise phrasing she used when confronting Haslett and
what she told the officer about what Haslett’s female companion was doing.

¶9 The jury found Haslett not guilty of attempted armed robbery
but convicted him of aggravated assault. The court sentenced him to 11.25
years in prison.

¶10 Haslett timely appealed; we have jurisdiction. See A.R.S.
§§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶11 Haslett argues the superior court erred by allowing the State
to more broadly question the officer about Victoria’s prior statements
despite that Haslett only narrowly attacked her credibility. He argues prior
consistent statements must rebut the specific credibility attack to qualify as
non-hearsay under Rule 801. And he argues that admitting prior consistent
statements beyond those that would rebut his credibility attack resulted in
impermissible bolstering.

¶12 We review evidentiary rulings, including those involving
hearsay and related exceptions, for an abuse of discretion. State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 208 ¶ 60 (2004); State v. Giannotta, 248 Ariz. 82, 83 ¶ 8 (App.

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2019). We review de novo the interpretation and application of court rules.
State v. Winegardner, 243 Ariz. 482, 484 ¶ 5 (2018).

¶13 Out-of-court statements offered for their truth are generally
inadmissible as hearsay. Ariz. R. Evid. 801(c), 802. But Rule 801(d) lists
certain statements that are non-hearsay. One such statement is a declarant’s
prior out-of-court statement that is consistent with her in-court testimony
and offered to “rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility.” Ariz. R. Evid.
801(d)(1)(B)(ii). But before such a statement becomes non-hearsay, the
declarant must testify, be subject to cross-examination, and have their
credibility attacked. Ariz. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii). This exemption is
intended “to extend substantive effect to consistent statements that rebut []
attacks on a witness—such as the charges of inconsistency or faulty
memory.” Ariz. R. Evid. 801 cmt. 2015 Amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B).
So “once a party attacks a witness’s credibility, that witness’s prior
consistent statements offered to rehabilitate their testimony become
substantively admissible.” State v. Alston, 261 Ariz. 82, 88 ¶ 12 (App. 2025).

¶14 Alston is our first and most recent opinion to consider the
“scope or significance of a credibility attack required to trigger the rule’s
protection for such statements[.]” 261 Ariz. at 88 ¶ 13. Because the Rule
mirrors its federal counterpart, compare Ariz. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii) with
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii), we looked to federal caselaw for guidance.
Alston, 261 Ariz. at 88 ¶ 13; see also Winegardner, 243 Ariz. at 485 ¶ 8. Under
that caselaw, even brief credibility attacks open the door to prior consistent
statements. Alston, 261 Ariz. at 88 ¶ 13; see also United States v. Flores, 945
F.3d 687, 705 (2d Cir. 2019); United States v. Cox, 871 F.3d 479, 487 (6th Cir.
2017).

¶15 In Alston, a criminal defendant challenged admission of prior
consistent statements of several witnesses. 261 Ariz. at 87 ¶ 8. The
defendant argued his attack on the witness’s credibility was minor and did
not justify allowing the prior consistent statements. Id. at ¶ 11. But we held
the superior court did not abuse its discretion because it “could have
reasonably determined that Alston had attacked [the witness’s] credibility.”
Id. at 88 ¶ 14. Put differently, if the record supports that the trial court
“could have reasonably determined” that a credibility attack occurred, it
may then permit out-of-court statements offered to rehabilitate the witness.
Id.

¶16 Rule 801(d) converts an out-of-court statement that would
ordinarily be hearsay into non-hearsay. But that rule does not make every
prior consistent statement admissible. Such statements are still subject to

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STATE v. HASLETT
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other rules of evidence governing admissibility. Thus, if a prior consistent
statement is irrelevant to the issues being litigated or it is unduly
prejudicial, confusing, misleading, or cumulative, the statement remains
subject to exclusion. See Ariz. R. Evid. 402, 403.

¶17 As in Alston, the superior court here “could have reasonably
determined that [Haslett] ha[d] attacked [Victoria’s] credibility.” See 261
Ariz. at 88 ¶ 14. Haslett admits he did so, though he claims it was very brief
and specifically targeted at what Victoria said about the woman present
with Haslett. But the superior court could also have reasonably interpreted
Haslett’s questions about Victoria’s memory, including whether her “story
is evolving now,” as credibility attacks. See Ariz. R. Evid. 801 cmt. 2015
Amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) (exemption intended to allow consistent
prior statements to rebut attacks “such as the charges of inconsistency or
faulty memory”). So the court did not abuse its discretion by concluding
that Haslett sufficiently attacked Victoria’s credibility to allow some prior
consistent statements. See Alston, 261 Ariz. at 88 ¶ 14.

¶18 Haslett argues the court erred because it allowed the State to
introduce prior consistent statements that went beyond the scope of his
credibility attack. But Haslett’s view about the scope of permitted
rehabilitation is too narrow. See id. ¶ 12 (“Contrary to [the defendant’s]
position, nothing in Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(ii) limits or qualifies the use of prior
consistent statements based on how a party attacks witness credibility, or
how important attacking that witness’s credibility is to the party’s case.”).
Once defense counsel suggested that Victoria had a faulty memory and an
evolving story, it was within the court’s discretion to allow the State to rebut
that suggestion by eliciting testimony from the officer about what Victoria
told him at the scene. The officer’s testimony about Victoria’s prior
consistent statements addressed defense counsel’s charges of inconsistency
or faulty memory. So the court did not abuse its discretion by concluding
that the officer’s testimony was non-hearsay under Rule 801 and admissible
under Rules 402 and 403. And this is true even if some of the prior
consistent statements did not “relate specifically to matters on which
[Victoria] was impeached.” See United States v. Graham, 123 F.4th 1197, 1252
(11th Cir. 2024).

¶19 Haslett lastly argues the State used the officer’s testimony
about Victoria’s prior statements to impermissibly bolster her credibility.
Impermissible bolstering occurs when the State attempts to enhance a
witness’s credibility by using material outside the record to support a
witness’s testimony or by reinforcing the witness’s credibility before it is
attacked. State v. Dunlap, 187 Ariz. 441, 462 (App. 1996); see also State v.

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Vargas, 127 Ariz. 59, 61–62 (1980); United States v. Cardena, 842 F.3d 959, 990
(7th Cir. 2016).

¶20 The State sought to introduce Victoria’s prior consistent
statements only after Haslett attacked her credibility. And the officer’s
testimony merely confirmed the consistent statements she made at the
scene. The State neither used material outside the record nor sought to
reinforce Victoria’s credibility before Haslett attacked it. Haslett’s
bolstering argument fails.

CONCLUSION

¶21 The court did not err by allowing the State to introduce
Victoria’s prior consistent statements to rehabilitate her credibility. We
affirm Haslett’s conviction.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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