State v. Cooper

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

ALVIN DEMOND COOPER, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0540 PRPC
FILED 07-06-2026

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2023-152577-001, CR2024-112636-001
The Honorable David J. Palmer, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Douglas Gerlach
Counsel for Respondent

Law Office of Stephen M. Johnson, Inc., Phoenix
By Stephen M. Johnson
Counsel for Petitioner

STATE v. COOPER
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court,
in which Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Veronika Fabian
joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Vice Chief Judge:

¶1 Petitioner Alvin Demond Cooper seeks review of the superior
court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief
(“PCR”) filed under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. We have
considered the petition for review and grant review and deny relief.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Cooper pled guilty to promoting prison contraband, a class
two felony, and shoplifting, a class one misdemeanor, in CR2023-152577-
001, and to first-degree criminal trespass, a class six felony, in CR2024-
112636-001. See A.R.S. §§ 13-2505(G), -1805(H) and -1504(A)(1), (B). The
plea agreements provided a sentencing range of five to ten years in prison
for the promoting prison contraband charge, a terminal disposition for the
shoplifting charge and supervised probation for the trespass charge.

¶3 At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel requested a five-
year prison term, citing Cooper’s substance-abuse issues and his
participation in classes during incarceration as mitigating factors. Cooper
personally addressed the court and also requested a five-year prison term,
referencing his mental health problems and desire for treatment. The court
acknowledged Cooper’s sincerity and intent to change but concluded his
criminal history outweighed the mitigating factors and imposed a slightly
aggravated six-year prison term.

¶4 Cooper filed a PCR petition raising two claims: (1) the
sentencing court violated A.R.S. § 13-701(C) by imposing an aggravated
sentence without properly weighing mitigating factors against aggravating
circumstances, and (2) trial counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate
and present Cooper’s mental health records as mitigating evidence. The
superior court summarily dismissed Cooper’s petition, finding the
sentencing court acted within its discretion when it found Cooper’s

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STATE v. COOPER
Decision of the Court

substantial criminal history outweighed the mitigating factors, and Cooper
failed to show prejudice to prove ineffective assistance.

¶5 Cooper petitioned for review. We grant review under Article
6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S. § 13-4239(C) and Rule 33.16.

DISCUSSION

¶6 We review the superior court’s PCR rulings for an abuse of
discretion, “which occurs if the court makes an error of law or fails to
adequately investigate the facts necessary to support its decision.” State v.
Bigger, 251 Ariz. 402, 407, ¶ 6 (2021).

¶7 On review, Cooper repeats the arguments raised in his PCR
petition. Neither is persuasive. First, Cooper does not show the sentencing
court abused its discretion in weighing mitigating and aggravating factors.
See State v. Cazares, 205 Ariz. 425, 427, ¶¶ 6–7 (App. 2003) (describing the
court’s sentencing discretion as “broad” and requiring that abuse of
discretion be “clearly” apparent when the sentence imposed is within the
statutory range); A.R.S. § 13-701(C) (permitting the court to deviate from
the presumptive sentence if it finds sufficient aggravation or mitigation).
The court acknowledged that Cooper wanted to change but concluded that
his extensive criminal history outweighed the mitigating circumstances.
A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(11) (prior convictions may constitute an aggravating
circumstance). The court then imposed a slightly aggravated six-year
prison term, which fell within the range permitted by the plea agreement.

¶8 Second, Cooper does not establish prejudice in his ineffective
assistance claim. To prevail on such a claim, Cooper must show counsel’s
performance fell below objectively reasonable standards and he was
prejudiced by the deficient performance. Bigger, 251 Ariz. at 407, ¶ 8 (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984)). To demonstrate
prejudice, he must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” State v. Anderson, 257 Ariz. 226, 234, ¶ 33 (2024) (citation
omitted). “Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is fatal to an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, 567,
¶ 21 (2006).

¶9 Even assuming counsel performed deficiently by not
obtaining and presenting mental-health records, Cooper fails to show a
reasonable probability that he would have received a better result if the
records had been offered. The sentencing court was aware of Cooper’s
mental health issues and his desire for treatment yet determined that his

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STATE v. COOPER
Decision of the Court

criminal history outweighed those considerations. Cooper has not shown
that more documents would have changed the court’s decision.

CONCLUSION

¶10 Because Cooper does not show the superior court abused its
discretion, we grant review and deny relief.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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