State v. Riehle

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL LEE RIEHLE, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0553 PRPC
FILED 08-07-2027

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. CR2024-00094
The Honorable Douglas Camacho, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Mohave County Attorney’s Office, Kingman
By Jacob Cote
Counsel for Respondent

John Trebon, P.C., Flagstaff
By John Trebon
Counsel for Petitioner

STATE v. RIEHLE
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley, Judge D. Steven Williams, and Judge
Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the Court’s decision.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Michael Lee Riehle seeks review of the superior court’s
dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) filed under
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 32.1. We grant review but
deny relief.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 The facts and trial procedure are outlined in this court’s prior
opinion.

On a Friday morning in October 2023, Riehle
threatened two victims with a rifle in separate incidents
outside his home. The first incident occurred when a woman
was parked outside Riehle’s home, waiting for a friend. Riehle
yelled at her and fired three shots in her direction. She fled
unharmed and immediately called the police. Soon after,
Riehle pointed his rifle at a second victim as he drove past
Riehle’s property. This victim also called the police.

Police arrested Riehle at the scene. Officers described
him as “freaking out” and unintelligible. He said he fired at
an intruder in self-defense, but a protective sweep of the
home revealed no one inside. A later search of Riehle’s home
uncovered weapons and drug evidence. Officers recovered a
rifle, a pistol, spent shell casings, ammunition and a zip lock
bag containing a white crystal substance resembling
methamphetamine. Next to the bag was a pen cap and burned
aluminum foil covered in melted methamphetamine.

A three-day jury trial was held. The jury heard
testimony from the police officer who collected the drug
evidence and the crime scene analyst who tested it. Both
identified the white crystal substance as methamphetamine
based on their training and experience. The analyst also

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STATE v. RIEHLE
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administered a Marquis test, which tested positive as
amphetamine. The jury found Riehle guilty of two counts of
disorderly conduct with a weapon, possession of dangerous
drugs and possession of drug paraphernalia. See A.R.S.
§§ 13-2904(A)(6), -3407 and -3415. The jury also found both
victims suffered physical, emotional or financial harm. See
A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(9).

State v. Riehle, 261 Ariz. 567, 570, ¶¶ 4–6 (App. 2026). The superior court
sentenced Riehle to concurrent and consecutive sentences totaling three
years’ incarceration as non-dangerous offenses.

¶3 Both sides appealed. We affirmed Riehle’s convictions but
vacated and remanded the sentences, holding the superior court erred by
concluding that the disorderly conduct with a weapon convictions were
non-dangerous offenses without a jury finding. Id. at 700, ¶¶ 36–37. Riehle’s
petition for review is pending before our supreme court. See State v. Riehle,
No. CR-26-0048-PR (filed Feb. 20, 2026).

¶4 Meanwhile, Riehle petitioned for PCR with the superior
court, asserting trial counsel committed ineffective assistance of counsel
(“IAC”) by failing to: (1) hire an expert to challenge the State’s bullet
analysis from inside Riehle’s residence, (2) consult with Riehle before the
trial, (3) inspect Riehle’s residence, where the shooting occurred, (4) object
to hearsay and other-act evidence, and (5) interview prosecution witnesses
before the trial. After reviewing the PCR petition, response, and reply, the
court determined that a hearing was warranted.

¶5 The parties presented evidence at a recorded PCR hearing.
After the hearing, the superior court found that Riehle had failed to prove
his claims and dismissed his PCR petition in a detailed order. Riehle then
petitioned this court for review. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S.
§ 13-4239(C) and Rule 32.16.

DISCUSSION

¶6 In his petition for review, Riehle reasserts two of his IAC
claims, contending trial counsel was ineffective by failing to: (1) investigate
or inspect the crime scene, or consult with an expert to analyze it, and (2)
object to hearsay and other-act evidence.

¶7 We review the superior court’s denial of PCR for an abuse of
discretion, State v. Macias, 249 Ariz. 335, 339, ¶ 8 (App. 2020), but review the
interpretation of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure de novo, State v.

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Mendoza, 248 Ariz. 6, 14–15, ¶ 12 (App. 2019). We do not engage in
fundamental error review in PCR proceedings. State v. Smith, 184 Ariz. 456,
459 (1996) (“Because no court rule provides for fundamental error review
of a petition for review to the appellate courts [in a PCR proceeding], such
review is no longer required.”); State v. Reed, 252 Ariz. 236, 239, ¶ 12 (App.
2021) (“Because a PCR petition for review to this court is discretionary, we
do not review for fundamental error.”). When the superior court commits
an error of law or fails to investigate the facts supporting its decision
adequately, it constitutes an abuse of discretion. State v. Pandeli, 242 Ariz.
175, 180, ¶ 4 (2017). Riehle bears the burden of proving the superior court
erred. Reed, 252 Ariz. at 238, ¶ 6.

I. We presume the superior court correctly ruled on the PCR claims
because Riehle failed to include the PCR hearing transcripts in the
record on appeal.

¶8 Riehle makes claims concerning the evidence presented at
the PCR hearing held on September 17, 2025, and asserts the superior court
orally denied some claims at a status conference held on August 13, 2025.
Although both hearings were recorded, the transcripts are not part of this
court’s record.

¶9 “It is the defendant’s duty, as the party seeking relief, to
prepare the record in such a manner as to allow the appellate court to pass
upon the questions raised on appeal.” State v. Mendoza, 181 Ariz. 472, 474
(App. 1995). Thus, it was incumbent on Riehle to ensure that the record
contains all necessary transcripts. See id. “When matters are not included in
the record on appeal, the missing portion of the record is presumed to
support the decision of the [superior] court.” Id.

¶10 For PCR review, the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure
provide the mechanism to ensure the reviewing court can pass upon the
questions raised. Rule 32.16(b) reads that “[n]o later than 3 days after a
petition or cross-petition for review is filed, the petitioner or cross-
petitioner must file with the superior court a ‘notice of filing.’” (Emphasis
added.) The mandatory notice should include the items the clerk must
transmit to the appellate court under Rule 32.16(j). If a defendant wishes to
include PCR transcripts in the review record, he or she must request
production under Rule 32.13(e) (“On a party’s request, the court must order
the preparation of a certified transcript of the evidentiary hearing.”) and
designate the transcripts in the mandatory notice of filing.

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¶11 Here, there is no “notice of filing” in the superior court record.
On December 24, 2025, this court ordered the Mohave County Court Clerk
to transmit the record for review. The clerk, under Rule 32.16(j), filed the
record on February 9, 2026. Nothing in the clerk’s record shows that the
transcripts from the two hearings have been filed with the Mohave County
Clerk or transferred to this court based on a notice of filing by Riehle. Thus,
we presume that the missing transcripts support the superior court’s denial
of the PCR claims.

II. Riehle failed to show a reasonable probability of a different result
even if trial counsel’s performance fell below professional
standards.

¶12 Whether Riehle received “ineffective assistance [of counsel] is
a mixed question of fact and law,” which we review de novo. State v. Denz, 232 Ariz. 441, 443–44, ¶ 6 (App. 2013) (holding that both the prejudice and
performance prongs of an IAC claim are mixed questions of law and fact).
So while we defer to the PCR court’s factual findings, we review the
ultimate legal conclusion de novo. Id.

¶13 To prevail on an IAC claim, a defendant must prove deficient
performance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984). For the deficient performance component, a defendant must
demonstrate that counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness.” Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 272 (2014) (citation
modified). We measure the standard of reasonableness by the “practice[s]
and expectations of the legal community.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,
366 (2010). In so doing, we presume that “counsel’s conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance” that “might be
considered sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quotation
omitted). To overcome this presumption, a defendant must “show
counsel’s decisions were not tactical in nature, but were instead the result
of ineptitude, inexperience or lack of preparation.” Denz, 232 Ariz. at 444,
¶ 7 (quotation omitted). Courts must make every effort to “eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight” and “evaluate the conduct from counsel’s
perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

¶14 If a defendant proves deficient performance, the inquiry shifts
to prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; State v. Miller, 251 Ariz. 99, 102, ¶ 9
(2021). To establish IAC prejudice, a defendant must show a “reasonable
probability” that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. Miller, 251 Ariz. at 104, ¶ 17. In other words, a

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defendant must show that counsel’s errors deprived him of a fair trial with
a reliable result. Id.

¶15 IAC is a constitutional violation. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
685–86. Once a defendant has shown deficient performance and prejudice,
id., the burden shifts to the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the violation was harmless, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.13. But the “[f]ailure to
satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is fatal to an [IAC] claim.” State v.
Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, 567, ¶ 21 (2006). Accordingly, “this Court is not
required to address both prongs ‘if the defendant makes an insufficient
showing on one.’” Pandeli, 242 Ariz. at 181, ¶ 6 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 697).

A. Assuming, without deciding, that trial counsel’s
performance fell short of an objective standard of
reasonableness, Riehle fails to show how the lack of an
investigation or inspection of his home, nor consultation
with an expert, prejudiced him.

¶16 In our de novo review of the record, we determine, as did the
superior court, that Riehle failed to show IAC prejudice. Riehle maintains
that trial counsel failed to hire a crime scene expert to analyze the inside of
his home to impeach the State’s expert on whether there were bullet holes
in the home and which direction the gunshots came from. But the gunshots
and casings had little bearing on the crimes—disorderly conduct with a
weapon—for which Riehle was convicted.

¶17 The first victim, Rosa (a pseudonym), testified that she went
to pick up a friend who lived near Riehle. When the friend got in the truck,
Rosa drove it into the street. Riehle was yelling at the women and
eventually yelled, “[Expletive] you. Get out of here,” and shot three times
at the truck. Rosa drove away and stopped at a park where she called
9-1-1. Rosa testified that Riehle was on his porch when he fired his gun.

¶18 The second victim, Marvin (a pseudonym), testified that he
heard three shots near his home. Soon after, Marvin and his son drove past
Riehle’s home and Riehle fired his gun at them from his porch as they drove
by. They proceeded to the same park as Rosa, and also called 9-1-1.

¶19 Both victims maintained that Riehle was outside of his home
when he fired toward them. Consistent with that testimony, crime scene
investigators found four shell casings on the porch, or just off the porch.
Notably, the two victims were not friends, though they both retreated to the

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same park near Riehle’s home before calling 9-1-1. The superior court
noted:

[T]he allegations made by the victims as shown by their
testimony concerned the Defendant’s conduct that occurred
outside the residence. While the State did present evidence
regarding bullet holes within the residence, this evidence was
only ancillary to the actual charges in the case.

(Emphasis in original.) Given the victims’ accounts, the lack of evidence
impeaching the State’s crime scene investigation inside Riehle’s home does
not rise to the level of IAC prejudice. Therefore, the superior court did not
err by rejecting Riehle’s claim.

B. Assuming, without deciding, that trial counsel’s
performance fell short of an objective standard of
reasonableness, counsel’s failure to object to the admission
of alleged hearsay evidence did not prejudice Riehle.

¶20 A Mohave County Sheriff’s Office detective testified that the
office received a call reporting that a male subject at Riehle’s residence was
firing a gun at “basically anything that moved outside of the residence.”
Another detective confirmed that the sheriff’s office received a call that
someone “was shooting outside of his residence at anything that moves.”
Trial counsel did not object to the testimony.

¶21 At trial, the State presented evidence that Riehle admitted to
shooting his gun 19 times on the day in question but maintained he did so
while inside his home. Both victims testified that they called 9-1-1 to report
the shootings. And the detectives’ explained why they went to the scene
armed and forcefully took Riehle into custody. Viewed in context, this
testimonial evidence appears to be non-hearsay. Ariz. R. Evid. 801(c), (d)
(defining out-of-court statements as hearsay when offered for “the truth of
the matter asserted”); see State v. Rivera, 139 Ariz. 409, 413–14 (1984)
(explaining that extrajudicial statements presented to explain a hearer’s
conduct may be admissible when offered to show the “effect on one whose
conduct is in issue,” and if they are not being offered to prove the matter
asserted in the statement.) But even if it constitutes hearsay, its admission
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Lundstrom, 161 Ariz.
141, 150 n.11 (1989) (concluding error is harmless if the court can say
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to or affect the
verdict). The trial evidence supported the detectives’ testimony that they

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received calls reporting that Riehle was shooting indiscriminately.
Therefore, the superior court did not err by denying Riehle’s claim.

C. Assuming, without deciding, that trial counsel’s
performance fell short of an objective standard of
reasonableness, Riehle failed to prove prejudice for the
admission of alleged prior act evidence.

¶22 Riehle alleges that the State offered evidence in violation of
Arizona Rule of Evidence (“Evidence Rule”) 404(b) without objection,
which constituted IAC. We address the potential prejudice for each claim.

1. Marvin’s statement about how he knew Riehle.

¶23 At trial, Marvin had trouble identifying Riehle as the shooter.
Trial counsel followed up with Marvin on cross-examination and asked
whether Marvin knew Riehle. Marvin responded:

Houses near us. Some young kids, young men hang around
there to make noise, disturbance, and I feel that he’s the one
of them that has hung out around with them.

On redirect examination, the State followed up on trial counsel’s questions.

[State]. Had you ever seen [Riehle] around before the day of
the incident?

[Marvin]. I think so. He hangs around with those guys.

Q. Where do those guys usually hang around?

A. It’s two houses on the side of my neighbors, and they’re
always making noise in the middle of the night, and they’re
outside with lamps.

Q. Okay. Can you -- do you remember ever seeing these guys?

A. Yes.

Q. What do they generally look like?

A. They’re not good guys.

Q. What did they look like, though?

A. Like if they were kids from the streets.

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Q. Okay. Do you remember –

A. Like homeless.

Trial counsel did not object.

¶24 Generally, evidence of a person’s character or a trait of
character is not admissible to prove that he or she acted in conformity on a
particular occasion. Ariz. R. Evid. 404(a). And under Evidence Rule 404(b),
specific acts may not prove character. Here, the evidence presented was not
that Riehle was “homeless” or a dangerous person, but that Marvin may
have seen him hanging around such individuals in his neighborhood. The
evidence was perhaps admissible to show Marvin’s bias against Riehle,
based on his belief that Riehle was hanging out with these young men.
Regardless, it was not character evidence proving that Riehle acted in
conformity on that day. Furthermore, even if we assume the evidence
violated Evidence Rule 404(b), its admission was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

2. Rosa’s testimony that she had to secure a protective
order.

¶25 At trial, Rosa testified that she knew Riehle as a neighbor. On
direct examination, she volunteered that she previously obtained a
“harassment order” against Riehle, but explained “everything was good for
a few years, and then things kind of went crazy on this one day.” On cross-
examination, trial counsel asked Rosa why she got the protective order.

He used to ride his quad on really windy days when wind
was blowing our direction towards our house, and he would
do donuts and laugh and try to irritate us, and we finally got
tired of it, so we got video of it, and we ended up getting a
harassment order against him.

Rosa confirmed that the order expired a “couple of years prior” and she had
had no further trouble with Riehle until this incident.

¶26 The superior court, in addressing this testimony, noted:

[Trial counsel] testified that prior to the trial, [she] had
spoken to the attorney from her office who had handled the
preliminary hearing. That attorney informed [trial counsel]
that the State’s witnesses, including [Rosa], were not
especially credible witnesses. At the evidentiary hearing,

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[trial counsel] testified that she did not object because, in her
opinion, the fact that [Rosa] obtained a harassment order
tended to show that she was prejudiced against [Riehle].
[Trial counsel] also testified that [Rosa] did not come across
very well while testifying. [Trial counsel] testified that [Rosa]
appeared angry and agitated against [Riehle]. [Trial counsel]
further testified that [Rosa] was not very consistent. [Trial
counsel] testified that this tended to show that [Rosa] “had it
out for” [Riehle]. [Trial counsel] also said that she felt that
allowing this testimony might weaken [Rosa’s] credibility.

During closing arguments, [trial counsel] argued that
the injunction against [Riehle] was “still clearly important to
[Rosa], and it might be coloring what she’s saying later.”
[Trial counsel] argued that [Rosa] was still holding something
against [Riehle]. She argued that [Rosa] was clearly upset
with [Riehle]. [Trial counsel] argued that the jury should
consider the prior injunction in evaluating the testimony of
[Rosa]. [Trial counsel] also suggested that [Rosa’s] discussion
of the injunction might also be evidence that [Rosa] was
confusing the events that occurred on October 20, 2023, with
those of a prior incident.

This Court listened to [Rosa’s] testimony during the
trial. The Court noted that [Rosa] was non-responsive at times
and rambled off on tangents. While testifying, [Rosa’s] voice
was confrontational, and she acted somewhat aggressively
towards [Riehle].

The court found the evidence admissible under Evidence Rules 401 and 403
to show Rosa’s prejudice against Riehle.

¶27 Even if we assume that trial counsel should have objected to
Rosa’s testimony under Evidence Rule 404(b) and the evidence should have
been excluded, its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Trial counsel used the evidence to her advantage to attack Rosa’s
credibility, and the overwhelming evidence of Riehle’s guilt rendered any
error harmless.

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CONCLUSION

¶28 We grant review but deny relief.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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