Opinion text
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,
v.
JOHNNY RAY WALLS-BEY, Petitioner.
No. 1 CA-CR 25-0556 PRPC
FILED 07-15-2026
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2020-001909-001
The Honorable Rodney Mitchell, Judge Pro Tempore
REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
COUNSEL
Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Philip Casey Grove
Counsel for Respondent
Johnny Ray Walls-Bey, Phoenix
Petitioner
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.
STATE v. WALLS-BEY
Decision of the Court
B A I L E Y, Judge:
¶1 Petitioner Johnny Ray Walls-Bey seeks review of the superior
court’s order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) filed
under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 33. We have
considered the petition for review and, for the following reasons, grant
review and deny relief.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 In July 2022, Walls-Bey pled guilty to threatening or
intimidating and misconduct involving weapons. The superior court
imposed concurrent terms of supervised probation: one year for
threatening and intimidating and two years for misconduct involving
weapons. The court ordered the probation to begin after Walls-Bey was
released from prison in a separate matter.
¶3 In May 2023, the Adult Probation Department (“the
Department”) petitioned to revoke Walls-Bey’s probation based on his
failure to report to the Department after his discharge from prison. Walls-
Bey admitted the violation, and the superior court reinstated probation on
both counts. In addition to the original probation conditions for threatening
and intimidating, the court imposed an alcohol‑prohibition requirement
and authorized substance‑abuse treatment if directed by the Department.
The court then provided Walls-Bey with written copies of the probation
terms, which he signed.
¶4 Walls-Bey moved to modify the terms of his probation in
December 2024, asserting the probation conditions related to alcohol use
and substance-abuse treatment had not been included in the original
probation terms and were unnecessary and excessive. The State’s response
agreed that the additional conditions were not included in the original
probation terms but deferred to the court’s discretion on whether to modify
probation. The court did not rule on the motion, resulting in its denial by
operation of law. See State v. Serrano, 234 Ariz. 491, 494, ¶ 8 (App. 2014).
¶5 Walls-Bey petitioned for PCR. He contended the superior
court violated his due process rights when it imposed the modified
probation conditions without notice and an opportunity to be heard and
that the new conditions constituted an illegal sentence. The court
summarily dismissed the petition, finding it had authority to modify Walls-
Bey’s probation, and the newly imposed conditions were reasonably
related to his rehabilitation and to public safety.
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STATE v. WALLS-BEY
Decision of the Court
¶6 Walls-Bey petitioned for review of the superior court’s ruling.
We grant review under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution,
Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 13-4239(C), and Rule 33.16.
DISCUSSION
¶7 We review the superior court’s PCR rulings for an abuse of
discretion, “which occurs if the court makes an error of law or fails to
adequately investigate the facts necessary to support its decision.” State v.
Bigger, 251 Ariz. 402, 407, ¶ 6 (2021).
¶8 In his petition for review, Walls-Bey reasserts his argument
that he is entitled to relief under Rule 33.1(a) and (c) because the superior
court violated his due process rights by adding new conditions to his
probation without notice or a factual finding.
¶9 “Upon finding that [a] probationer violated a condition or
regulation of probation, the court may revoke, modify, or continue
probation.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 27.8(c)(2); see also A.R.S. § 13-901(C). When a
court imposes probation, it has authority to impose conditions “as the law
requires and the court deems appropriate.” A.R.S. § 13-901(A). “Of
necessity, the trial court must be given substantial latitude in such matters
in light of the uncertainty as to how rehabilitation is actually
accomplished.” State v. Donovan, 116 Ariz. 209, 212 (App. 1977). “The
question is whether there is a reasonable nexus between the conditions
imposed and the goals to be achieved by the probation” and we will not
“strike down conditions of release, even if they implicate fundamental
rights, if such conditions are reasonably related to the ends of rehabilitation
and protection of the public from recidivism.” State v. Kessler, 199 Ariz. 83,
88, ¶ 21 (App. 2000) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
¶10 At the disposition hearing, the court advised Walls-Bey of the
new conditions. Walls-Bey acknowledged them on the record and signed
the written terms of probation. Thus, he received both notice and an
opportunity to be heard. Further, the superior court did not abuse its
discretion in ordering these additional conditions because they are
reasonably related to his rehabilitation and public safety. The court
reasonably found that substance abuse and alcohol use could increase the
risk of future dangerous behavior as Walls-Bey’s offenses involved victims
and weapon misconduct. Therefore, Walls-Bey has shown no error in the
superior court’s dismissal of his PCR petition.
¶11 While his petition for review was pending, Walls-Bey also
filed a motion arguing the State’s decision not to file a substantive response
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STATE v. WALLS-BEY
Decision of the Court
constitutes confession of error. We may treat the State’s failure to file a
response as a confession of error. State ex rel. McDougall v. Superior Court
(Blendu), 174 Ariz. 450, 452 (App. 1993). But we decline to do so here
because the superior court correctly applied the law and the record
supports the court’s decision. See Nydam v. Crawford, 181 Ariz. 101, 101
(App. 1994) (“[W]e are reluctant to reverse based on an implied confession
of error when . . . the trial court has correctly applied the law.”).
CONCLUSION
¶12 We grant review and deny relief.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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