State v. Davis

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

TAYLOR MOWER DAVIS, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 26-0006 PRPC
FILED 09-02-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR1999-007317
The Honorable Patricia A. Starr, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

APPEARANCES

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Philip D. Garrow
Counsel for Respondent

Taylor Mower Davis, Phoenix
Petitioner

STATE v. DAVIS
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams, Judge Anni Hill Foster, and Vice Chief
Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the Court’s decision.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Taylor Mower Davis challenges the superior court’s order
denying his motion to disallow interest and to correct a criminal restitution
order (“CRO”) nunc pro tunc. For the following reasons, we grant review,
but deny relief.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In 1999, Davis pled guilty to aggravated assault and leaving
the scene of a serious injury accident. The superior court sentenced him to
a prison term followed by probation. In 2000, Davis agreed to pay
$81,021.53 in restitution, and the court ordered him to pay thirty percent of
his monthly earnings while incarcerated and no less than $100 per month
while on probation toward restitution, fines, and fees. Upon discharge from
probation in August 2012, the court entered a CRO for $73,971.53 in
remaining restitution and $1,970 for the probation service fee. Following
entry of the CRO, ten percent interest began accruing pursuant to A.R.S.
§ 13-805(E).

¶3 In November 2025, Davis filed a motion seeking to disallow
all interest, which then totaled $73,803.80, asserting A.R.S. § 13-805 did not
include any interest provision at the time he committed the offenses in 1999
and therefore could not be applied retroactively. The superior court denied
the motion, reasoning that restitution is remedial rather than punitive, the
interest provision was in effect when the CRO was entered, and the court
has no authority to modify a lawfully imposed CRO.

¶4 Davis then filed this petition for review. Because he
challenges the CRO that was “entered pursuant to a plea agreement that
contemplated payment of restitution and capped the amount,” we treat it
as a petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”). Hoffman v. Chandler, 231
Ariz. 362, 366, ¶ 19 (2013); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.3(b) (“If a court
receives any type of application or request for relief--however titled--that
challenges . . . a sentence following entry of a plea or admission of a

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STATE v. DAVIS
Decision of the Court

probation violation, it must treat the application as a petition for post-
conviction relief.”).

DISCUSSION

¶5 We will not disturb the superior court’s ruling on a PCR
petition absent an abuse of discretion or error of law. State v. Gutierrez, 229
Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19 (2012). We review de novo issues involving the
interpretation of statutes. Id.

¶6 On review, Davis reasserts his retroactivity argument. He also
contends the superior court erred by relying on the CRO’s entry date rather
than the date of his offense when determining the applicability of the
interest provision.

¶7 The ex post facto clauses of the Arizona and United States
Constitutions bar the enactment of any law “which imposes a punishment
for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or
imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.” State v. Correll, 148
Ariz. 468, 481 (1986) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981)). But
the prohibition against ex post facto laws does not “limit the legislative
control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not affect matters of
substance.” State v. Weinbrenner, 164 Ariz. 592, 593 (App. 1990) (quoting
Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 (1925)). Thus, procedural or regulatory laws
may be applied retroactively, whereas punitive laws may not. State v.
Henry, 224 Ariz. 164, 167, ¶ 8 (App. 2010).

¶8 The Arizona Victims’ Bill of Rights requires a defendant to
pay “prompt restitution” to the victims of the defendant’s crimes. Ariz.
Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(8). A CRO is procedural in nature and “serves the
broader goal of restitution, which is to make victims whole for the economic
losses they suffer from crimes.” State v. Cota, 234 Ariz. 180, 184, ¶ 10 (App.
2014). Mandatory accrual of interest under A.R.S. § 13‑805(E) does not alter
restitution’s remedial character because it was added to the statute as an
enforcement mechanism for CROs. See id. at ¶ 11; see also A.R.S. § 13‑805(E)
(“Enforcement of a criminal restitution order . . . includes the collection of
interest that accrues at a rate of ten percent a year.”).

¶9 Here, A.R.S. § 13‑805 did not have any interest provision. See
1999 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 106, § 2. Instead, the statute permitted a victim to
record and enforce a CRO as any civil judgment and, once recorded, ten
percent annual interest would apply under A.R.S. § 44-1201 (1999). See 1999
Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 106, § 2; 1999 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 131, § 2. In 2005, the
legislature amended A.R.S. § 13-805 to expressly authorize interest on CROs

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STATE v. DAVIS
Decision of the Court

by incorporating A.R.S. § 44-1201. See 2005 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 260, § 6. In
2011, the legislature amended the statute again, removing the
cross-reference to A.R.S. § 44-1201 and replacing it with explicit language
imposing the ten percent rate. See 2011 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 99, § 4. Because
the interest requirement is procedural and attaches to a CRO as part of its
enforcement mechanism, it does not violate ex post facto prohibitions.

¶10 Further, the superior court did not err by relying on the CRO’s
entry date to determine the applicable version of the statute. In 1999, A.R.S.
§ 13‑805 required the superior court to enter a CRO only upon Davis’s
completion of probation or sentence. See 1999 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 106, § 2.
Davis was discharged from probation in June 2012, and the court entered
the CRO in August 2012. The court ordered Davis to pay the unpaid balance
of the CRO with interest. Because the CRO could only be entered upon
Davis’s completion of his sentence or probation, the governing statute is the
one in effect when the CRO was entered, and the superior court correctly
applied the interest provision. Thus, no statute was improperly applied
retroactively.

CONCLUSION

¶11 We grant review but deny relief.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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