State v. Walls-Bey

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

JOHNNY RAY WALLS-BEY, Petitioner.

Nos. 1 CA-CR 26-0024 PRPC
1 CA-CR 26-0123 PRPC
(Consolidated)
FILED 08-26-2026

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2022-001155-001
The Honorable Adam D. Driggs, Judge

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Philip D. Garrow
Counsel for Respondent

Johnny Ray Walls-Bey, Phoenix
Petitioner

STATE v. WALLS-BEY
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Petitioner Johnny Ray Walls-Bey seeks review of the superior
court’s order denying his motion to permit delayed filing of a petition for
review and the court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration of that order.
For the following reasons, we treat this petition as a special action, accept
jurisdiction, but deny relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Walls-Bey pleaded guilty to one count of abduction of a child
from a state agency. The superior court sentenced him to 1.5 years in prison
with 266 days of presentence incarceration credit. In a separate matter, the
court also imposed probation to begin upon his release from custody in this
case.

¶3 In June and July 2023, Walls-Bey filed two petitions for post-
conviction relief (“PCR”) under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure
(“Rule”) 33.1, raising claims under Rule 33.1(a), (b), (c), (e), and (h). In
December 2023, the superior court dismissed both petitions, finding he
failed to establish any ground for relief (“dismissal order”). The dismissal
order was mailed to the address Walls-Bey used in his most recent filings,
but was returned to the court as undeliverable in January 2024.1

¶4 In October 2025, Walls‑Bey moved for permission to file a
delayed petition for review under Rule 33.16(a)(4)(B), asserting he was
entitled to relief under Rule 33.1(f) because he did not receive the dismissal
order and could not access it online. The superior court denied the motion,

1 Walls-Bey did not provide any city or zip code for this address. As the
superior court noted, the address he listed appears to correspond to the
United States Postal Service’s main facility in Tempe, Arizona. The record
also shows mail was sent to this address with a different city and zip code,
but it was also returned.

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STATE v. WALLS-BEY
Decision of the Court

finding Walls‑Bey failed to show his untimely filing was not his fault
because he did not keep his address up to date. The court also found
Walls‑Bey did not provide sufficient evidence to show the clerk’s notice
system failed and advised him to contact the clerk’s office for assistance
accessing his records online. Walls‑Bey then moved to reconsider, which
the court denied.

¶5 Walls-Bey filed two separate petitions for review, for the
superior court’s dismissal of his motion to permit the delayed filing of a
petition for review and for the court’s denial of his motion for
reconsideration. We consolidated the petitions because they raise common
issues of fact and law.

JURISDICTION

¶6 Rule 33.16(a)(1) allows a petitioner to seek review of a “trial
court’s final decision on a petition or a motion for rehearing, or the
dismissal of a notice.” See also A.R.S. § 13-4239(C) (“[A]fter the final
decision of the trial court on the petition for post-conviction relief or motion
for rehearing, an aggrieved party may petition the appellate court for
review of the trial court’s actions.”). It is not clear whether the court’s ruling
on a motion to permit delayed filing of a petition for review is reviewable
under Rule 33.16. Instead, we may review such a ruling as a special action.
See Potter v. Vanderpool, 225 Ariz. 495, 498, ¶ 7 (App. 2010) (special action is
appropriate vehicle to challenge interlocutory ruling). Although Walls-Bey
does not invoke our special action jurisdiction, we exercise our discretion
to treat his petition for review as a special action petition. See State v. Perez, 172 Ariz. 290, 292-93 (App. 1992) (appellate court has discretion to consider
a matter as a special action).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Walls-Bey argues the superior court abused its discretion in
denying his motion to permit the delayed filing of a petition for review and
contends he was not at fault for missing the deadline because he did not
receive the dismissal order.2 He further contends the clerk’s online system
did not display the minute entries for his case.

2 Walls-Bey argues he was entitled to relief under Rule 32.1(f), but because

he pleaded guilty, the applicable provision is Rule 33.1(f). And because
Rule 33.1(f) applies only to excusing a defendant’s failure to timely file a

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STATE v. WALLS-BEY
Decision of the Court

¶8 We review the superior court’s PCR rulings for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Bigger, 251 Ariz. 402, 407, ¶ 6 (2021). The court “has
broad discretion over the management of its docket” and we “do not
substitute [our] judgment for that of the trial court in the day-to-day
management of cases.” Findlay v. Lewis, 172 Ariz. 343, 346 (1992). A
defendant must provide the court with current and accurate contact
information, including a valid mailing address. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.
1.6(a)(1)(A) (requiring parties to provide “the filing attorney’s or self-
represented litigant’s name, address, telephone number, and email
address” in documents filed with the court). “The clerk must distribute,
either by U.S. mail, electronic mail, or attorney drop box, copies of every
minute entry to all parties.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.8(a).

¶9 Walls-Bey does not show the superior court abused its
discretion in denying his motion. The record shows he did not provide an
accurate mailing address, as the court received returned mail for the
dismissal order. The record also shows the court previously received seven
additional returned mailings sent to two other addresses Walls-Bey
provided. Walls-Bey argues the court should have tried alternative
methods, such as sending the dismissal order to an address in another
matter or to his email. But he does not show those methods were required
or would have been effective, considering the court’s repeated,
unsuccessful attempts to mail notices to the multiple addresses he
provided.

¶10 Walls‑Bey next argues that the appearance of an attorney’s
name for the State in the dismissal order, without a notice of appearance,
shows a procedural irregularity and requires reversal of the court’s ruling.
He also requests that we order an investigation into the alleged irregularity
and refer it to outside agencies.

¶11 Walls-Bey does not assert any cognizable claim under Rule
33.1. To the extent he raises this argument to suggest that his untimely
filing of a petition for review was not his fault, we disagree. As explained
above, he does not show that the court abused its discretion in dismissing
his motion to permit delayed filing or his motion to reconsider the same,
nor does he show how the presence of the attorney’s name in the dismissal
order undermines the court’s decision.

PCR notice, Walls-Bey does not show that it applies to filing a petition for
review.

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STATE v. WALLS-BEY
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶12 We accept special action jurisdiction but deny relief.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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