State v. Coble

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellant,

v.

PHILIP COBLE, Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CR 26-0054
FILED 10-09-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Navajo County
No. S0900CR20020128
The Honorable Joseph Samuel Clark, Judge

APPEAL DISMISSED

COUNSEL

Navajo County Attorney’s Office, Holbrook
By Myles A. Braccio
Counsel for Appellant

Jackson White PC, Mesa
By Jeremy Scott Geigle, Travis W. Jenson
Counsel for Appellee

STATE v. COBLE
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Veronika Fabian and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1 The State appeals an order denying Philip Coble’s (“Coble”)
motion to set aside his conviction. Because we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss
the appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2003, Coble pleaded guilty to manslaughter, a class 2
felony, for stabbing and killing his victim. The plea agreement listed the
crime as a “non-dangerous, non-repetitive offense under the criminal
code.” The court accepted Coble’s plea and sentenced him to 12.5 years in
prison. In 2007, for reasons irrelevant here, the court resentenced Coble to
9 years.

¶3 After serving his sentence, in 2023, Coble moved to set aside
his conviction. See A.R.S. § 13-905. Coble argued the court should do so
because he “completed his prison sentence,” “paid all fees and fines,” and
“remained a law abiding and upstanding citizen.” The State responded
that Coble was ineligible for the relief requested because he had been
convicted for using a deadly weapon, which made his conviction a
dangerous offense. Coble responded that he was eligible because he
“plead[ed] guilty to a non-dangerous offense.” Following a hearing, the
court denied Coble’s motion.

¶4 About nine months later, Coble again sought to set aside his
conviction, making the same arguments he made in his first petition. The
State argued Coble could not again request relief when he did not appeal
the court’s order denying his 2023 motion, making it the law of the case.
The State also again argued that Coble was ineligible to have his conviction
set aside because he committed a dangerous offense. The court agreed with
the State that Coble committed a dangerous offense, so his conviction was
ineligible to be set aside. The court also said it was “not sure about the
[S]tate’s argument regarding the law of the case,” but it acknowledged that
“a year is pretty quick” to again move to set aside a conviction.

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STATE v. COBLE
Decision of the Court

¶5 On appeal, Coble argued the court did not properly apply the
law of the case doctrine. State v. Coble, 2025 WL 2621594, at *2 ¶ 8 (Ariz.
App. Sept. 11, 2025) (mem. decision). But this court did not consider that
issue because the superior court did not rely on law of the case when
denying Coble relief and the State did not preserve the issue on appeal. Id.
¶¶ 9–10. This court instead concluded Coble’s conviction was eligible to be
set aside because during sentencing the superior court designated his
offense as non-dangerous. Id. ¶¶ 12–13. This court remanded to the
superior court for it to determine whether Coble was entitled to relief on
the merits. Id. at *3 ¶¶ 17–19. The State did not seek review from the
Arizona Supreme Court.

¶6 Back in the superior court, the State filed a supplemental
response requesting that the court decide whether Coble was eligible to set
aside his conviction because he used a deadly weapon, whether his
conviction should be set aside on the merits, and whether Arizona law
permitted Coble to file multiple motions to set aside his conviction. After
holding a hearing, the superior court concluded that this court’s decision
precluded it from finding Coble ineligible for relief. The court also decided
that Coble’s second motion was “not a violation of victims’ rights,” but after
weighing the statutory factors, the court denied relief. The State timely
appealed.

JURISDICTION

¶7 The State appeals the superior court’s order denying Coble’s
motion to set aside his conviction. Despite prevailing in the superior court,
the State asks us to address whether Coble was ineligible to have his
conviction set aside and whether a defendant can file multiple applications
to set aside a conviction.

¶8 Although neither party challenges our jurisdiction, we have
an independent duty to ensure we have jurisdiction. Sorensen v. Farmers
Ins. Co., 191 Ariz. 464, 465 (App. 1997). “[A]ppeals by the state in criminal
matters have not been favored and are allowed only when that right is
clearly provided by constitution or statute.” State ex rel. McDougall v. Gerber, 159 Ariz. 241, 242 (1988). If there is no “constitutional provision or statute
conferring the state’s right to appeal, an appellate court has no subject
matter jurisdiction to consider that appeal.” State v. Dawson, 164 Ariz. 278,
280 (1990).

¶9 Both parties list A.R.S. § 13-4032(4) as conferring jurisdiction.
That subsection grants us jurisdiction when the State appeals from “[a]n

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STATE v. COBLE
Decision of the Court

order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the state or a
victim, except that the state shall only take an appeal on an order affecting
the substantial rights of a victim at the victim’s request.” A.R.S. § 13-
4032(4). We disagree that we have jurisdiction over the State’s appeal under
§ 13-4032(4).

¶10 True, “[t]he State has a substantial right in ensuring that the
legal consequences of a felony conviction are lawfully preserved[.]” State
v. Santillanes, 256 Ariz. 534, 542 ¶ 33 (2024). But the State does not have a
substantial right in ensuring that the superior court uses particular
reasoning when ruling in its favor. Here, the court lawfully preserved the
consequences of Coble’s felony conviction when it refused to set aside his
conviction. The State does not have a substantial right in obtaining an
advisory opinion from us on issues subsumed within the superior court’s
ruling in the State’s favor. See Bennett v. Brownlow, 211 Ariz. 193, 196 ¶ 16
(2005) (exercising “judicial restraint” includes “refrain[ing] from issuing
advisory opinions”). While the State may have desired additional
reasoning from the court, that does not mean the court’s order affected the
State’s substantial rights for purposes of jurisdiction.

¶11 Because the State is not aggrieved, we also reject the State’s
assertion that we have jurisdiction under Arizona Constitution article 6,
section 9, A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A), and 13-4031. All three say that we may
exercise jurisdiction as provided by law. But no statute gives us jurisdiction
to hear this appeal.

¶12 The State alternatively asks us to accept special action
jurisdiction to address whether allowing repetitive filings to set aside a
conviction under the circumstances presented here violates victims’ rights.
The concern raised is valid, but we decline to provide an advisory opinion
based on a factual predicate that may or may not arise in the future.
Accordingly, we decline the State’s request to accept special action
jurisdiction, without prejudice to the State or the victim(s) reasserting the
issue if the defendant again seeks to have his conviction set aside under
§ 13-905.

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STATE v. COBLE
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶13 We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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