State v. Soriano

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

ALEXANDER CASTILLO SORIANO, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 26-0089 PRPC
FILED 09-01-2026

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR 2024-142486-001
The Honorable Stasy Avelar, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Philip Daniel Garrow
Counsel for Respondent

Alexander Castillo Soriano, Florence
Petitioner Pro se

STATE v. SORIANO
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams, Judge Anni Hill Foster, and Vice Chief
Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Alexander Castillo Soriano seeks review of the superior
court’s dismissal of his post-conviction relief (“PCR”) petition filed under
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 33.1. This Court grants review
but denies relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 A grand jury indicted Soriano for two counts of sexual
assault. Soriano pled guilty to two amended charges of attempted sexual
assault. Soriano and the State stipulated to a prison sentence between five
and seven years for one charge and lifetime probation for the other charge
once he completed the prison sentence. The court followed the stipulation
in the plea agreement and on May 27, 2025, sentenced Soriano to five years’
incarceration with a lifetime probation tail. The court notified Soriano of his
rights after conviction, including that he had to file a PCR notice within 90
days of the entry of sentence or he “may lose the opportunity to have the
court correct any errors.”

¶3 Soriano filed a delayed PCR petition on December 4, 2025. In
the petition, Soriano claimed the superior court imposed an illegal sentence.
He asserted that lifetime probation was not an authorized disposition for a
class 3 felony. The court rejected Soriano’s argument, finding that A.R.S.
§ 13-902(E) authorizes lifetime probation for offenses under chapter 14 of
title 13 and dismissed the petition.

¶4 Soriano petitioned this Court for review. This Court has
jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 13-4239(C) and Rule 33.16.

DISCUSSION

¶5 This Court will not disturb a superior court’s ruling on a PCR
petition absent an abuse of discretion or error of law. State v. Gutierrez, 229
Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19 (2012); State v. Macias, 249 Ariz. 335, 340, ¶ 16 (App.
2020). “It is the petitioner’s burden to show the superior court abused its

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STATE v. SORIANO
Decision of the Court

discretion by denying the petition for post-conviction relief.” State v. Reed, 252 Ariz. 236, 238, ¶ 6 (2021). Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. State
v. Pandeli, 242 Ariz. 175, 180, ¶ 4 (2017).

¶6 Soriano argues an inherent conflict exists between A.R.S. § 13-
902(A) and (E), and therefore he should have been sentenced under
subsection (A) and not (E). Soriano’s argument is frivolous.

¶7 When two statutes appear to conflict, this Court attempts to
harmonize their language to give effect to each. See State v. Wagstaff, 164
Ariz. 485, 491 (1990). Section 13-902 governs the probationary periods that
courts may impose following criminal convictions. A.R.S. § 13-902.
Subsection (A) sets forth the standard maximum probation periods by
felony classification, with class three felonies carrying no more than five
years. A.R.S. § 13-902(A). This subsection provides the default framework
for most felony convictions in Arizona.

¶8 Subsection (E) operates as an exception to the general rule
established in subsection (A). A.R.S. § 13-902(E). It provides that

after conviction of a felony offense or an attempt to commit
any offense that is included in chapter 14 or 35.1 of this title
or § 13-2308.01, 13-2308.03, 13-2923, 13-3212 or 13-3623, if
probation is available, probation may continue for a term of
not less than the term that is specified in subsection A of this
section up to and including life.

A.R.S. § 13-902(E)(emphasis added). This language explicitly references
subsection (A) as establishing the minimum probation period, while
authorizing courts to extend probation up to life for the specifically
enumerated offenses.

¶9 Arizona courts have consistently interpreted these
subsections as complementary rather than conflicting. In State v. Peek, our
supreme court analyzed subsection (E) in the context of lifetime probation
for dangerous crimes against children, recognizing that the provision
authorizes extended probation terms for specific offenses beyond the
general maximums in subsection (A). 219 Ariz. 182, 184, ¶ 10 (2008) (“Thus,
lifetime probation was clearly available for an attempted child molestation
occurring before 1994 or after the effective date of the 1997 amendment.”).

¶10 The court in Demarce v. Willrich confirmed that trial courts
have discretion to impose lifetime probation for designated felony offenses
under subsection (E), establishing that this provision functions as an

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enhancement mechanism rather than a contradiction of subsection (A). 203
Ariz. 502, 506, ¶ 15 (App. 2002) (“Thus, the trial court has both the discretion
to impose lifetime probation and accept a plea agreement that includes a
term of lifetime probation.”).

¶11 Soriano’s plea agreement stipulated to a lifetime probation
tail as provided by A.R.S. § 13-902(E). The term was not illegal, and the
superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying Soriano’s claim to the
contrary.

CONCLUSION

¶12 This Court grants review but denies relief.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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