State v. Mendoza

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

JOSE ESTEBAN MENDOZA, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 26-0107 PRPC
FILED 11-10-2026

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2022-111702-001
The Honorable Jeffrey A. Rueter, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Benjamin A. Armstrong
Counsel for Respondent

Rosenstein Law Group, PLLC, Scottsdale
By Vicki A. R. Lopez
Counsel for Petitioner

STATE v. MENDOZA
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge D. Andrew Gaona joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Jose Esteban Mendoza petitions for review of the superior
court’s dismissal of his first petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) filed
under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 33.1. We grant review
but deny relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2022, Mendoza was driving home from a trip to Mexico
with four other people. During that trip, a disagreement occurred, resulting
in Mendoza strangling one person (“KD”) and punching another (“BG”),
before the driver (“ZD”) stopped the car. Mendoza then got out of the car
with BG and the two fought beside the road before finally reentering the
car and resuming their return trip.

¶3 After the group arrived at Mendoza’s residence, ZD heard a
single gunshot and an exclamation from BG. ZD then saw Mendoza, a
prohibited possessor, pointing a gun at BG, who was lying on the floor.
Mendoza aimed the gun at ZD, ordered him to leave the residence and not
report what happened. Mendoza fled but was eventually captured and
charged. After lingering for ten days—intubated as a quadriplegic in a
hospital’s care—BG eventually died from his wounds.

¶4 Mendoza entered a plea agreement with the State, by which
he pled guilty to Count I, second-degree murder, a Class 1 dangerous
felony; Count II, aggravated assault, a Class 3 dangerous felony; Count III,
aggravated assault, a Class 4 felony and domestic violence offense; and
Count IV, misconduct involving weapons, a Class 4 felony. The parties
stipulated that for Count I, Mendoza would be sentenced to no less than 16
calendar years and no more than 25 calendar years.

¶5 After a full mitigation and aggravation hearing, the superior
court sentenced Mendoza to a maximum term of 25 calendar years’
imprisonment for Count I, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 13-710(A), a
presumptive term of 7.5 years’ imprisonment for Count II, see A.R.S. § 13-
704(A), a maximum term of three years’ imprisonment for Count III, see

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STATE v. MENDOZA
Decision of the Court

A.R.S. § 13-702(D), and a presumptive term of 2.5 years’ imprisonment for
Count IV, see A.R.S. § 13-702(D), all to be served concurrently.

¶6 Mendoza timely sought post-conviction relief in the superior
court. Challenging only his sentence for the second-degree murder
conviction, he argued he should be resentenced on Count I because the
superior court misapplied aggravating factors, which resulted in a
maximum sentence. See Rule 33.1(c). Mendoza also alleged the court did
not find the statutory aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt. Mendoza
further argued he should be resentenced on Count I because the court
inadequately considered the mitigating factors, resulting in an improper
sentence. See id. After the parties fully briefed the issues, the superior court
dismissed the petition, finding Mendoza failed to raise a colorable claim.

¶7 Mendoza timely petitioned for review. Rule 33.16. We grant
review. See A.R.S. § 13-4239.

DISCUSSION

¶8 We review the superior court’s ruling on a petition for post-
conviction relief for an abuse of discretion. State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573,
576–77 ¶ 19 (2012). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the PCR court makes
an error of law or fails to adequately investigate the facts necessary to
support its decision.” State v. Pandeli, 242 Ariz. 175, 180 ¶ 4 (2017) (citing
cases).

¶9 In his petition for review, Mendoza argues that, regarding
Count I, the superior court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to
a maximum term of 25 calendar years for second-degree murder because it
applied improper aggravating factors pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-701(C). The
court found two aggravating circumstances: (1) the victim suffered physical
and emotional harm; and (2) the victim’s family suffered emotional and
financial harm. See A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(9). The remaining aggravating
circumstances the court found fell under the “catch-all” provision of A.R.S.
§ 13-701(D)(27).

¶10 Because the court found at least one enumerated statutory
aggravating circumstance, it could—and did—impose the maximum
sentence. See A.R.S. §§ 13-701(C), -710(A). Further, the sentence complies
with Mendoza’s plea agreement. Mendoza stipulated in the plea agreement
that the sentencing range encompassed the maximum sentence of 25
calendar years, and he stated during the change of plea hearing that he
understood the plea agreement and the possible sentences he could serve.

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STATE v. MENDOZA
Decision of the Court

¶11 Mendoza also argues the court failed to find at least one
aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt under A.R.S. § 13-701(C). He is
correct that the superior court did not expressly state on the record that it
found the aggravating circumstances “beyond a reasonable doubt.” But the
failure to do so does not necessarily entitle Mendoza to post-conviction
relief because courts are presumed to know and properly apply the law
when making decisions. See State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 608, 616 (1997).

¶12 Here, the victim’s family had informed the court the victim
“suffer[ed] unimaginable pain in his final days” and “knew he was going
to die.” The court found that the victim “suffered excruciating pain,
physically. The emotional toll had to be devastating because I’m sure he
was aware of his circumstances. That factor alone would support an
aggravated sentence.” The record shows beyond a reasonable doubt that
the victim suffered physical and emotional harm. Moreover, the record also
fully supports finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim’s family
suffered emotional and financial harm. And once the court found either of
these statutorily enumerated aggravating circumstances, it was free to
impose the maximum sentence for second-degree murder in accordance
with A.R.S. §§ 13-701(C) and 13-710(A).

¶13 Mendoza further argues the court inadequately considered
the mitigating circumstances he presented. But the “court ha[d] the
discretion to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors.” State v. Harvey, 193
Ariz. 472, 477 ¶ 24 (App. 1998). And it expressly considered Mendoza’s
sentencing recommendation and attachments and his argument at
sentencing, in which he presented mitigating circumstances, and it found
the mitigating factors presented were sufficient to call for his sentences to
run concurrently. The determination of what mitigations were established
for sentencing purposes, as well as the weight to assign those mitigating
circumstances, was properly left to the court’s discretion. See id.

CONCLUSION

¶14 We grant review but deny relief.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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