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Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Limpus, 625 P.2d 960.

43 citing documents.

  • State v. MacIas 469 P.3d 472 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • State v. MacIas 469 P.3d 472 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    ¶¶ 34–38 (App. 2001) (furnishing material in vending machines); –08 (App. 1995) (rejecting a claim that statute lacked a scienter element)
  • State of Arizona v. Rey David Villegas 281 P.3d 1059 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
  • State of Arizona v. Rey David Villegas 281 P.3d 1059 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
    Citing “[t]he current law on guilty pleas,” our supreme court stated, “A breach of the plea agreement by the state which renders the plea involuntary can be found ‘when the spirit of the inducement, reasonably inferred from the written agreement, is breached.’” Id., see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the 7 prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such pro
  • State v. Siddle 47 P.3d 1150 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
  • State v. Siddle 47 P.3d 1150 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
    In our view, § 13-3102(A)(8) gives “ ‘a person of ordinary intelligence a fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute.’ ”
  • State v. Getz 944 P.2d 503 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Getz 944 P.2d 503 Ariz. 1997
    CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION Criminal offenses must be defined sufficiently to give fair notice to a person of *566 ordinary intelligence “that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute.” , Connally v. General Constr.
  • Reinesto v. Superior Court 894 P.2d 733 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
  • Reinesto v. Superior Court 894 P.2d 733 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
    The underlying principle for the requirement is that no person should be required, at the risk of his liberty, to speculate as to the meaning of a criminal statute.” , (citations omitted).
  • State v. Gates 897 P.2d 1345 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
  • State v. Gates 897 P.2d 1345 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
    Although the term “lewd” is not defined by statute or Arizona case law, it has been held to have an ordinary meaning, one that is “easily, understood by the common man.” , (holding that, although “lewd” is not defined by statute, it sufficiently defines a reasonably ascertainable standard of improper conduct so as not to render A.R.S.
  • State v. Sanchez 852 P.2d 1236 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
  • State v. Womack 847 P.2d 609 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
  • State v. Womack 847 P.2d 609 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
    Thus, “a statute which forbids * * * an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.” , (citation omitted) (quoting Connally v. General Constr.
  • State v. Ellison 819 P.2d 1010 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
  • State v. Ellison 819 P.2d 1010 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
  • State v. Everhart 819 P.2d 990 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1991
  • State v. Everhart 819 P.2d 990 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1991
  • State v. Quick 806 P.2d 907 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1991
  • State v. Quick 806 P.2d 907 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1991
  • State v. Ross 804 P.2d 112 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
  • State v. Ross 804 P.2d 112 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
  • State v. McKinley 755 P.2d 440 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1988
  • State v. McKinley 755 P.2d 440 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1988
  • State v. Cain 733 P.2d 676 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
  • State v. Cain 733 P.2d 676 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
    Although the factual basis may be established by information found in an extended record, , -66 (App.1981), the state concedes that the record contains no additional information which may assist in establishing a factual basis for the acceptance of defendant’s plea.
  • State v. Ybarra 716 P.2d 1055 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1986
  • State v. Ybarra 716 P.2d 1055 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1986
  • Harrelson v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 697 P.2d 1119 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
  • Harrelson v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 697 P.2d 1119 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
  • State v. Shepler 684 P.2d 924 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
  • State v. Shepler 684 P.2d 924 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
  • State v. Chavez 693 P.2d 936 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
  • State v. Chavez 693 P.2d 936 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
  • State v. Williams 656 P.2d 1272 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1982
  • State v. Williams 656 P.2d 1272 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1982
  • State v. Lycett 650 P.2d 487 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1982
  • State v. Lycett 650 P.2d 487 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1982
    The underlying principle for the requirement that statutes be sufficiently definite to give a person notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden “is that no person should be required, at the risk of his liberty, to speculate as to the meaning of a criminal statute.”
  • State v. Walton 650 P.2d 1264 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1982
  • State v. Walton 650 P.2d 1264 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1982
  • State v. Chavez 636 P.2d 1220 Ariz. 1981
  • State v. Chavez 636 P.2d 1220 Ariz. 1981
    A breach of the plea agreement by the state which renders the plea involuntary can be found “when the spirit of the inducement, reasonably inferred from the written agreement, is breached.”