Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Walton, 650 P.2d 1264.

43 citing documents.

  • State v. Dunbar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
  • State v. Dunbar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
  • State v. Candler Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Candler Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Jude Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Jude Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Moton Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • State v. Moton Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • State v. Monfeli 330 P.3d 376 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • State v. Monfeli 330 P.3d 376 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
    A “statute [that] prescribes different degrees of punishment for the same acts committed under like circumstances by persons in like situations is violative of a person’s right to equal protection of the laws.” , (quoting People v. Calvaresi 188 Colo.
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Duncan 165 P.3d 238 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Duncan 165 P.3d 238 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
    "Negligent homicide is distinguished from reckless manslaughter in that for the latter offense, the defendant is aware of the risk of death and consciously disregards it, whereas, for the former offense, he is unaware of the risk.”
  • State v. Booker 53 P.3d 635 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
  • State v. Booker 53 P.3d 635 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
    § 13-1104(A) (second-degree murder may be committed intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, but must be “without premeditation”); , (“[T]he legislature intended *288 that there be two grades of murder with premeditation as the distinguishing factor between first and second degree murder.”).
  • Martin v. Reinstein 987 P.2d 779 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
  • Martin v. Reinstein 987 P.2d 779 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
  • State v. Ramirez 945 P.2d 376 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
  • State v. Ramirez 945 P.2d 376 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
    After enactment of the 1978 code, , observed that, “In light of the definition of premeditation in the current criminal code, it is apparent that State v. Magby has continuing utility, and thus, it is this period of reflection, regardless of the length of time of the reflection, which distinguishes first degree mur
  • State v. Curry 931 P.2d 1133 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
  • State v. Curry 931 P.2d 1133 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
  • State v. Moerman 895 P.2d 1018 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
  • Korzep v. Superior Court 838 P.2d 1295 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
  • Korzep v. Superior Court 838 P.2d 1295 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
    2213 , 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979) (presumption that is rebutted can be disregarded); , (where defendant pleaded self-defense, state was able to rebut testimony by offering contradictory findings); Burke, The Tension Between In Re Win-ship and the Use of Presumptions in Jury Instructions after Sandstrom, Allen, and Clark, 17 N.M.L.Rev.
  • State Ex Rel. Romley v. Brown 815 P.2d 408 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
  • State Ex Rel. Romley v. Brown 815 P.2d 408 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
  • State v. Beckerman 814 P.2d 1388 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
  • State v. Beckerman 814 P.2d 1388 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
  • State v. Smith 803 P.2d 443 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
  • State v. Smith 803 P.2d 443 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
  • State v. Ross 804 P.2d 112 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
  • State v. Ross 804 P.2d 112 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
  • Aldabbagh v. Arizona Department of Liquor Licenses & Control 783 P.2d 1207 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
  • Aldabbagh v. Arizona Department of Liquor Licenses & Control 783 P.2d 1207 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
  • State v. Woodall 744 P.2d 732 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
  • State v. Woodall 744 P.2d 732 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
  • State v. Stuck 739 P.2d 1333 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
  • State v. Stuck 739 P.2d 1333 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
  • State v. Fatty 724 P.2d 1256 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
  • State v. Fatty 724 P.2d 1256 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
  • State v. Whittle 752 P.2d 489 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
  • State v. Whittle 752 P.2d 489 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
    Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, such person recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death and thereby causes the death of another person.” , it was contended that first-degree murder is indistinguishable from intentional or knowing second-degree murder.
  • State v. Palomarez 657 P.2d 899 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1982
  • State v. Palomarez 657 P.2d 899 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1982
    where the constitutionality of A.R.S.