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Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Pyeatt, 659 P.2d 1286.

30 citing documents.

  • David C. Shinn v. Az boec/freeman Ariz. 2022
  • David C. Shinn v. Az boec/freeman Ariz. 2022
    v. Mosher, (The “office [of a nunc pro tunc order] is not to supply omitted action by the court, but to furnish the record of an action really had, where its recording was omitted through inadvertence or mistake.”); (“The object of [a nunc pro tunc] entry is to correct the record to make it speak the truth and not to supply judicial action.”).
  • State v. Estell Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
  • State v. Estell Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
    ¶15 Rule 24.4 may not be used “to cause an order or judgment that was never previously made or rendered to be placed upon the record of the court.”
  • State of Arizona v. Vincent Michael Allen 326 P.3d 339 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
  • State of Arizona v. Vincent Michael Allen 326 P.3d 339 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
    ¶18 The state contends that Allen “waived his right to be present at sentencing by getting up and walking out of his own accord.” the state argues that “Arizona courts have long held a defendant may waive his presence at sentencing, so long as the waiver is knowing.” The state’s reliance on Pyeatt is misplaced.
  • State of Arizona v. Anthony Connue Serrano 323 P.3d 774 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
  • State of Arizona v. Anthony Connue Serrano 323 P.3d 774 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
  • State v. Forte 214 P.3d 1030 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
  • State v. Forte 214 P.3d 1030 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
    t, but creating exception for felony sentencing), 284-85 , 443-44 (1997) (acknowledging rule that defendant must be present at sentencing but observing “sentencing with counsel present and the defendant present by telephone with consent is entirely different” than sentencing in absentia and is permissible procedure), , (notwithstanding former Rule 26.9’s requirement that defendant be present at sentencing, “the right to be present at the pronouncement of sentence may be waived, if the waiver is
  • State of Arizona v. Armando D. Rodriguez-Gonzales Hieber Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
  • State v. Rodriguez-Gonzales 92 P.3d 424 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
  • State of Arizona v. Armando D. Rodriguez-Gonzales Hieber Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
    but rather was sentencing anew”); (“An illegal sentence is no sentence at all.”).
  • State v. Rodriguez-Gonzales 92 P.3d 424 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
    but rather was sentencing anew”); , (“An illegal sentence is no sentence at all.”).
  • State v. Brown 952 P.2d 746 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
  • State v. Brown 952 P.2d 746 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
    Because appellant’s sentence did not comply with § 13-604.01, it was illegal, , and its imposition constituted fundamental error.
  • State v. Sabalos 874 P.2d 977 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1994
  • State v. Sabalos 874 P.2d 977 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1994
  • State v. Diaz 842 P.2d 617 Ariz. 1992
  • State v. Diaz 842 P.2d 617 Ariz. 1992
    The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea because “the record fail[ed] to show that a ‘meeting of the *271 minds’ of the state and defendant occurred.” , ( , ).
  • State v. Diaz 835 P.2d 477 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
  • State v. Diaz 835 P.2d 477 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
  • State v. Rutherford 744 P.2d 13 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
  • State v. Rutherford 744 P.2d 13 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
  • State v. Escalante 714 P.2d 468 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
  • State v. Escalante 714 P.2d 468 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
  • State v. Whitney 726 P.2d 210 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
  • State v. Whitney 726 P.2d 210 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
  • State v. Thomas 688 P.2d 1093 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
  • State v. Thomas 688 P.2d 1093 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984