Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Linden, 664 P.2d 673.

25 citing documents.

  • State v. Termini Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
  • State v. Termini Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
    (recognizing that when “inconsistencies” in witness testimony are “apparent[,]” the “credibility” of the testimony is “a question for the jury”).
  • State v. Lohmeier Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
  • State v. Lohmeier Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
    (precluding the defendant from challenging the denial of a directed- verdict motion on an acquitted charge).
  • State v. Lopez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
  • State v. Lopez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
  • State v. Dutra 426 P.3d 308 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • State v. Dutra 426 P.3d 308 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    See, -76 (1982) (victims bound with chains and dog leashes); ¶ 5 (App. 2009) (defendant compelled victim to drive to bank and return with cash by threatening harm to victim's spouse); (victims bound with ropes); (victims' arms bound behind their backs).
  • State v. Sandoval Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • State v. Sandoval Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • State of Arizona v. Nelson E. Nottingham 289 P.3d 949 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
  • State of Arizona v. Nelson E. Nottingham 289 P.3d 949 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
    In Arizona, a defendant generally is entitled to a jury instruction “on any theory reasonably supported by the evidence.” -38, -82 (App. 1983) (even if court denies motion to suppress statements on voluntariness grounds, defendant entitled to voluntariness instruction “if the evidence has raised a question for the jury”).5 In making this assessment, a court must view the evidence in the light most 4
  • State v. Osorio 931 P.2d 1089 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
  • State v. Scott 865 P.2d 792 Ariz. 1993
  • State v. Scott 865 P.2d 792 Ariz. 1993
    (length of time is but one factor to be considered).
  • State v. Lopez 822 P.2d 465 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
  • State v. Lopez 822 P.2d 465 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
    Other Arizona cases, however, appear to have embraced the “threshold” approach in analyzing requests for counsel, and have found that various statements mentioning an attorney fail to qualify even as “equivocal.” , we considered whether a suspect’s inquiry of police as to “who a good attorney would be” was suffi *116 cient to invoke his right to counsel.
  • State v. Prince 772 P.2d 1121 Ariz. 1989
  • State v. Prince 772 P.2d 1121 Ariz. 1989
    (citing United States v. Bettenhausen, 499 F.2d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir.1974) (“The record shows that the defendant clearly understood his right to counsel and did not make a specific request for assistance of counsel.”)).
  • State v. Staatz 768 P.2d 143 Ariz. 1988
  • State v. Staatz 768 P.2d 143 Ariz. 1988
    41 , 459 N.E.2d 1137 (1984) (defendant’s statement, “maybe I need a lawyer,” did not constitute sufficient invocation of counsel for interrogation to cease); Cannady v. State, 427 So.2d 723 (Fla.1983); , (questions regarding the desirability of counsel were not an invocation of right to counsel).
  • State v. Alder 704 P.2d 255 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
  • State v. Alder 704 P.2d 255 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
  • State v. LeMaster 669 P.2d 592 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
  • State v. LeMaster 669 P.2d 592 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983