Cited by

P. 15.7(b), which is left to the “sound discretion” of that court

See Hernandez, 250 Ariz. at 33, ¶ 19 (denying a requested Willits instruction because police "had no knowledge that [the defendant] would later assert" an alternate defense); (affirming the denial of a Willits instruction because the State has "no duty to seek out and gain" evidence unless "it is aware" the evidence is material to the defense).

at ¶ 33; (rejecting need for a Willits instruction where “[a]t the time the weapon was seized, the officer had no reason to know what the defendant’s defense would be concerning [the fingerprints defendant claimed were on the weapon]”).

¶18 in arguing “that even if a felony conviction has been set aside or probation has ended, Rule 609 permits use of the felony conviction.” Tyler concluded that a felony conviction set aside under what is now A.R.S.

“Generally speaking, justice dictates that a defendant is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense.” (App. 2 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s current version.

¶16 The State does not have a duty “to seek out and gain possession of potentially exculpatory evidence,” but needs to disclose any exculpatory evidence if it exists.

5 ¶9 Generally, control means to “have power over.” (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged) 496 (1981)); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 378 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “control” as “[t]o exercise power or influence over”).

¶9 Cox appealed, arguing that the jury’s verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence and that the trial court erred by refusing to give a -17, -19 (App. 1986).

¶ 6 “[W]hether a criminal defendant is entitled to discovery of certain evidence[, including medical records,] is a matter within the trial court’s discretion.”

On appeal, Cox challenges his convictions on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, the trial court erred when it refused Cox’s -17, -19 (App. 1986), and the trial court’s instruction on constructive possession resulted in fundamental error.

P.2d 214 (App. 1986), for his contention that “it would be appropriate ” to clarify that “passing control does no t constitute possession.” In Tyler, the defendant’s theory had been that his mere “momentary innocent handling” of a prohibited weapon was insufficient to establish criminal possession.

(impeachment allowed even though defendant placed on probation for the prior offenses); , (impeachment by a prior conviction of open-ended second-degree burglary was proper); -08

(defendant’s theory at trial was that his mere “momentary innocent handling” of prohibited weapon failed to show “necessary degree of dominion or control” to be criminal possession).

the defendant knowingly possessed a sawed-off shotgun, but claimed it had been planted on his premises and that he took possession only to ensure its safe disposal.

Rule 15.7 provides that, for violations of the discovery rules, “the court may impose any sanction which it finds just under the circumstances.” Reviewing the trial court’s decision on sanctions for discovery violations for an abuse of discretion, , , we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion by not precluding the state’s three witnesses from testifying.

509 , while the Arizona statute requires a knowing mental state

(early termination of probation not by itself equivalent procedure to certificate of rehabilitation, citing Blankinskip, 137 Ariz. at 220 , 669 P.2d at 997 ).