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Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Steiger, 781 P.2d 616.

65 citing documents.

  • In Re Tyrus T. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
  • In Re Tyrus T. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
    (“[A] penal statute is vague if it fails to give persons of average intelligence reasonable notice of what behavior is prohibited or is drafted in such a manner that it permits arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”) (citation omitted).
  • State v. Hartwell Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
  • State v. Hartwell Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
    ¶18 A litigant may challenge a statute’s constitutionality for overbreadth under the First Amendment even if his conduct or expression is not constitutionally protected and clearly falls within the statute’s “plainly legitimate sweep.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 731–32 (2000); –44 (App. 1989).
  • Brush & Nib v. Phoenix 418 P.3d 426 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • Brush & Nib v. Phoenix 418 P.3d 426 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    ¶41 A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it “fails to give a person of average intelligence reasonable notice of what behavior is prohibited or permits arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kessler, 199 Ariz. at 87, ¶ 15 (-42 (App. 1989)).
  • State v. Wiggins Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • State v. Wiggins Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
    “Although due process requires notice which provides a fair and definite warning, it neither requires absolute precision nor impossible standards.” -42, -20 (App. 1989) (citations omitted).
  • State of Arizona v. Dean William Zinsmeyer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
  • State of Arizona v. Dean William Zinsmeyer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
    But, when committing an offense, a defendant would still lack notice that his or her probation status—or any other of an essentially unlimited set of facts or circumstances—could serve to increase 16 the length of any sentence ultimately imposed beyond the presumptive term.4 (“[A] penal statute is vague if it fails to give persons of average intelligence reasonable notice of what behavior is prohibited or is drafted in such a manner that it permits arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”).
  • State v. Brown 85 P.3d 109 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
  • State of Arizona v. Lawrence Brown, Jr. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
  • State v. Brown 85 P.3d 109 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
    Musser, , , (vagueness).
  • State of Arizona v. Lawrence Brown, Jr. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
  • State v. Kaiser 65 P.3d 463 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
  • State v. Kaiser 65 P.3d 463 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
    “There must be a realistic danger that the statute will significantly jeopardize recognized first amendment protections of individuals not before the court.” McLamb, 188 Ariz. at 10 , 932 P.2d at 275 ( , (citation omitted)(emphasis original)).
  • Bertleson v. Sacks Tierney, P.A. 60 P.3d 703 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
  • Bertleson v. Sacks Tierney, P.A. 60 P.3d 703 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
    Moreover, we must consider “whether a limiting construction could be placed on the statute to cure [any] constitutional infirmity.”
  • LaFaro v. Cahill 56 P.3d 56 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
  • LaFaro v. Cahill 56 P.3d 56 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
    Takacs, 169 Ariz. at 395 , 819 P.2d at 981 ( , ).
  • In Re Moises L. 18 P.3d 1231 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
  • In Re Moises L. 18 P.3d 1231 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
  • State v. Anderson 16 P.3d 214 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
  • State v. Anderson 16 P.3d 214 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
  • State v. Kessler 13 P.3d 1200 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
  • State v. Kessler 13 P.3d 1200 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
  • State v. Alawy 9 P.3d 1102 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
  • State v. Alawy 9 P.3d 1102 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
    See McLamb, 188 Ariz. at 5 , 932 P.2d at 270
  • State v. Cotton 5 P.3d 918 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
  • State v. Cotton 5 P.3d 918 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
  • State v. Musser 977 P.2d 131 Ariz. 1999
  • State v. Musser 977 P.2d 131 Ariz. 1999
    (defendant was able to show that fear A.R.S.
  • State v. Lefevre 972 P.2d 1021 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
  • State v. Lefevre 972 P.2d 1021 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
  • State v. Musser 954 P.2d 1053 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
  • State v. Musser 954 P.2d 1053 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
    Courts generally decline to confer standing on litigants who challenge a statute only “on the grounds that it may conceivably be unconstitutional when applied to others.” -44 , -22 (App.1989); see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 , 93 S.Ct.
  • AA MECHANICAL v. Superior Court 948 P.2d 492 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
  • State v. Trachtman 947 P.2d 905 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
  • State v. Trachtman 947 P.2d 905 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
    A penal statute or ordinance is unconstitutionally vague “if it fails to give persons of average intelligence reasonable notice of what behavior is prohibited or is drafted in such a manner that it permits arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”
  • Soto v. Superior Court 949 P.2d 539 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
  • Soto v. Superior Court 949 P.2d 539 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
  • State v. McLamb 932 P.2d 266 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
  • State v. McLamb 932 P.2d 266 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
  • Bird v. State 908 P.2d 12 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
  • Bird v. State 908 P.2d 12 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
    When the literal scope of a criminal statute is capable of reaching constitutionally-protected expression, then “the vagueness doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity.” , citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 , 94 S.Ct.
  • State v. Weinstein 898 P.2d 513 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
  • State v. Weinstein 898 P.2d 513 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
    (holding subsection (A)(8) of A.R.S.
  • Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County 887 P.2d 599 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
  • Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County 887 P.2d 599 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
  • State v. Averyt 876 P.2d 1158 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994