Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Takacs, 819 P.2d 978.
- State v. Musser 954 P.2d 1053 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
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State v. Musser
954 P.2d 1053
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
NARROWING CONSTRUCTION “Before declaring a statute unconstitutional, a court should consider whether a limiting construction would cure its constitutional infirmity.” , ( , ).
- State v. McDonald 952 P.2d 1188 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
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State v. McDonald
952 P.2d 1188
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
¶ 5 When engaging in statutory interpretation, we give words and phrases “their ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context of the statute or from that of the act of which the statute is a part that a different meaning is intended.” , (citation omitted).
- State v. Trachtman 947 P.2d 905 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
- State v. Trachtman 947 P.2d 905 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
- State v. Tiscareno 950 P.2d 1163 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
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State v. Tiscareno
950 P.2d 1163
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
that a different meaning is intended.” , (citation omitted).
- State v. Singer 945 P.2d 359 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
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State v. Singer
945 P.2d 359
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
A legislative enactment must “provide explicit standards for those who will apply it.”
- State v. Davila 938 P.2d 93 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
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State v. Davila
938 P.2d 93
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
Division One of this court found that a statute is not to be considered unconstitutionally vague because a term is undefined and susceptible to more than one meaning.
- State v. Schwartz 935 P.2d 891 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
- State v. Schwartz 935 P.2d 891 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
- State v. McLamb 932 P.2d 266 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
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State v. McLamb
932 P.2d 266
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
“A legislative enactment is unconstitutionally vague if it does not give persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to learn what it prohibits and does not provide explicit standards for those who will apply it.”
- Lewis v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 925 P.2d 751 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
- Lewis v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 925 P.2d 751 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
- Homebuilders Ass'n of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale 925 P.2d 1359 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
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Homebuilders Ass'n of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale
925 P.2d 1359
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
(reviewing court may look to legislative history as some indication of legislative intent; may also look to policy behind statute and wiH read statutes relating to same subject in harmony).
- State v. Baldwin 908 P.2d 483 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
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State v. Baldwin
908 P.2d 483
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Before declaring a statute unconstitutional, a court should consider whether a limiting construction would cure its constitutional infirmity.” , (citation omitted).
- State v. Walker 914 P.2d 1320 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
- State v. Walker 914 P.2d 1320 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
- State v. Cid 892 P.2d 216 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
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State v. Cid
892 P.2d 216
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
A complementary rule of statutory construction holds that, whenever possible, statutes which are in pari materia are read together and harmonized, see -71 , -26 (1985); , to avoid rendering any clause, sentence or word “superfluous, void, contradictory or insignificant.” , 827 * ( , ).
- State v. Moerman 895 P.2d 1018 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
- State v. Buhman 887 P.2d 582 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
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State v. Buhman
887 P.2d 582
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Ill A statute is unconstitutionally vague “if it does not give persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to learn what it prohibits and does not provide explicit standards for those who will apply it.”
- State v. Helffrich 846 P.2d 151 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
- State v. Helffrich 846 P.2d 151 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
- State v. Rowan 848 P.2d 864 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1992
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State v. Rowan
848 P.2d 864
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1992
Additionally, long-established principles of statutory construction require that words be given “their ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context of the statute or from that of the act of which the statute is part that a different meaning is intended.”
- State v. Womack 847 P.2d 609 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
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State v. Womack
847 P.2d 609
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
In substance, we “look to the policy behind the statute and to the evil that it was designed to remedy.”
- State v. Tober 826 P.2d 1199 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
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State v. Tober
826 P.2d 1199
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 , 102 S.Ct.